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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Requirements of a Scholar

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: A Torah scholar must learn three things: writing (*how to sign his name when he sits in judgment*), *shechitah*, and circumcision.

Rav Chananya bar Shelemya said in the name of Rav: He must also learn the art of forming the knot of the *tefillin* (*into the shape of a ‘daled’ – on the back of his head; this forms the name of Hashem - Shakai*), the blessings recited at a wedding, and the tying of the *tzitzis* (*all of its knots and windings*).

Rav Yehudah did not mention these three, for they are fairly common (*and they would obviously know how to do them*). (9a)

Five Laws of Shechitah

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: It is forbidden to eat of the slaughtering of any butcher who does not know the rules of *shechitah*. And the following are the rules of *shechitah*: pausing (*during the slaughtering*), pressing the knife downward, or burrowing (*the knife*) between the pipes, cutting past the prescribed area, and tearing.

The *Gemora* asks: Why is it necessary to teach us this? All of these *halachos* are taught in a *Mishna*!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is only necessary for a case when one (*who does not know those halachos*) slaughtered two or three times in our presence, and he slaughtered correctly (*and he then slaughtered once without our supervision*); you might have said (*without Shmuel’s ruling*) that since on those occasions he slaughtered correctly, so now too, he slaughtered correctly. It is therefore necessary to teach us that since he does not know the rules, it may sometimes happen that he will pause or press, and will not know (*that it is now invalidated*). [*Therefore, his unsupervised slaughtering is invalid.*] (9a)

Examining the Simanim

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel: The butcher must examine the *simanim* (*the two pipes; trachea and esophagus*) after slaughtering (*to see if the majority of each one of them was cut*).

Rav Yosef said: We have learned the same in a *Mishna*: Rabbi Shimon said: If one paused (*during the slaughtering*) long enough to examine . . . (*it is invalid*). Now, is that not referring to the time it takes to examine the *simanim*?

Abaye replied: No! [*It does not support Shmuel.*] For Rabbi Yochanan explained the *Mishna* to mean that it was long enough for a scholar to examine the knife. [*This includes the amount of time it takes to bring the knife to the scholar.*]



The *Gemora* asks: If this is the meaning, then your words would be subject to a constant assessment (*the rule would vary according to circumstances, for it would depend on the distance between the scholar and the slaughterer*)!?

Rather, Rabbi Yochanan means - the time it takes for a butcher, who is himself a scholar, to examine the knife.

The *Gemora* asks: What is the *halachah* if one did not examine the *simanim* (*after slaughtering*)?

Rabbi Eliezer ben Antignos said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Yannai: The animal is regarded as a *tereifah* (*an animal with a physical defect that will cause its death; it is forbidden to be eaten even if it was slaughtered properly*) and cannot be eaten. In a *braisa* it was taught: The animal is regarded as a *neveilah* (*it was not slaughtered*) and contaminates one who carries it.

The *Gemora* suggests that they differ regarding the principle laid down by Rav Huna, who said: An animal that is alive is assumed to be prohibited until one is certain that it was slaughtered properly, and once it was slaughtered properly, it is assumed to be in a state of permissiveness until one knows that it became a *tereifah*. The *Gemora* explains: The *Tanna Kamma* (*first opinion*) reasons as follows: The animal (*when the simanim were not examined*) remains forbidden, and now it is dead (*and therefore regarded as neveilah and therefore transmits tumah*). Rabbi Eliezer, however, maintains that the presumption is applicable only in respect of the prohibition (*to be eaten*), but there is no presumption in respect of *tumah* (*for when it was alive, although it could not have been eaten, there is no tumah*). (9a)

The *Gemora* above cited Rav Huna: An animal that is alive is assumed to be prohibited until one is certain that it was slaughtered properly, and once it was slaughtered properly, it is assumed to be in a state of permissiveness until one knows that it became a *tereifah*.

The *Gemora* asks: Should he not have simply said: 'Once it was slaughtered properly, it is permitted'?

The *Gemora* answers: He is teaching us that even if some problem happened to the animal (*which might possibly impair its validity; a defect is now observed, but we do not know if it occurred before the shechitah or afterwards*), it is nevertheless permitted. This is like the case which Rabbi Abba asked Rav Huna: If a wolf came and carried away the small intestines (*of a slaughtered animal*), what is the law? [*Are we concerned that the animal might have been a tereifah?*]

The *Gemora* clarifies the inquiry: It could not be referring to a case where the intestines were carried away, for then, they are not here (*and there is no reason to suspect that it is a tereifah*). Rather, the case is where the wolf punctured the intestines (*after it was slaughtered*).

The *Gemora* clarifies further: It cannot simply mean that the wolf was seen puncturing it, for then, it is evident that the wolf did it! Rather the case is where the wolf carried away the intestines and brought them back punctured. Now, what is the law? Should we be concerned that the wolf inserted its teeth in the exact area that had a pre-existing hole or not?

Rav Huna replied: We are not concerned that the wolf inserted its teeth in the exact area that had a pre-existing hole.

Questions of Doubt



Rabbi Abba asked him from the following *braisa*: If one saw a bird pecking at a fig, or a mouse puncturing melons, we are concerned that they might have punctured it in the exact area that had a pre-existing hole (*made by a snake in which it deposited poison; the fruit may not be eaten on account of this danger*)!?

He replied: How can you compare a prohibition with what is forbidden on account of possible danger to life! In a case of danger, we are certainly more apprehensive.

Rava asked Rav Huna: What difference is there between the two? Whenever there arises a doubt where a life is in danger, it is decided stringently; the same is true by a doubt in connection with a prohibition – it is also decided stringently!?

Abaye said to him: Is there then no difference between doubts concerning danger to life and doubts concerning prohibitions? But let us consider the following: Whenever there is a doubt regarding an object if it became *tamei* or not, and this doubt arose in a public domain, it is deemed *tahor*; but whenever there is a doubt regarding water that was left uncovered (*which might be poisoned from a snake*), it is deemed to be forbidden!?

Rava answered: In the case of *tumah*, the rule is derived through an Oral Tradition from *sotah* (*a suspected adulteress*) that just as it (*the seclusion of a sotah and the person she was warned about*) only takes place in the private domain, so too doubtful *tumah* is only ruled stringently in a private domain, so too every doubt in connection with *tumah* is ruled stringently only if it occurred in a private domain. [*It is therefore only because of the Oral Tradition that a doubt of tumah in a public domain constitutes an exception to the general rule that wherever a doubt arises in a case of a prohibition, as well as a danger to life, the law is decided stringently.*]

Rav Shimi asks on Rava from the following *braisa*: If a weasel has a dead *sheretz* (*the Torah enumerates eight creeping creatures whose carcasses transmit tumah through contact*) in its mouth, and it walks over loaves of *terumah*, and it is doubtful whether it touched the *terumah* or not, they are deemed *tahor*. Yet in the case of water left uncovered, if there is a doubt concerning it, it is forbidden!? [*Evidently, a possible danger is decided stringently, but not a possible prohibition; this contradicts Rava's opinion!*]

Rava answers: Here also, the rule is derived through an Oral Tradition from *sotah*, that just as it (*where we rule stringently*) only relates to a person (*the woman*) that has an understanding to be questioned about it, so too every doubt in connection with *tumah* (*that is decided stringently*), must relate to something that has an understanding to be questioned about it (*and that is why the loaves are ruled to be tahor*).

Rav Ashi said: Let us learn a proof (*that a doubt concerning danger is treated in a stricter manner than one concerning a prohibition*) from the following *braisa*: If a man left a jug uncovered (*containing purification water – this is spring water where the ashes of the red heifer were not yet mixed in it*) and came and found it covered, it is ruled to be *tamei*, for I can say that a *tamei* person entered and covered it. If he left it covered and came and found it uncovered, and a weasel, or, even a snake, according to Rabban Gamliel has the ability to drink from it, or if dew fell on it during the night, the water is invalid. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi explained the reason for this: It is common for rodents to uncover jugs, but it is not common for them to cover one. [*Therefore, if it is found uncovered, we follow the majority, and it was not touched by a tamei person; it is therefore disqualified, but not tamei. If, however, it was found covered, we assume that it was touched by a tamei*

person.] Whereas, in the case of water left uncovered, if there is any doubt about it, it is forbidden (even though the concern that a poisonous snake was there is a mere minority). This, therefore, proves that questions concerning danger to life are treated more stringently than questions regarding prohibitions. This indeed proves it. (9a – 10a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Should a bird's feathers be removed before shechitah?

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

In 5748 (1988) an interesting discussion developed among the *poskim* as to if a bird's feathers should be removed before *shechitah*. This article explores the suspicions and doubts concerning this issue.

The five rules of *shechitah*: Moshe Rabbeinu received five rules of *shechitah* from Mount Sinai – it is forbidden to eat from the slaughtering of any *shochet* who doesn't know them. They are *shehiyah*, *derasah*, *chaladah*, *hagramah* and *ikur*. ***Shehiyah*:** pausing during *shechitah*. ***Derasah*:** the *shochet* presses the knife on the animal's neck. ***Chaladah*:** slaughtering in a way that the knife or the animal's *simanim* – the windpipe and the esophagus – are not visible during *shechitah*. ***Hagramah*:** not slaughtering the *simanim* in their proper place. ***'Ikur*:** the *simanim* were uprooted from their place before the end of *shechitah*. All of the five rules disqualify the *shechitah*.

The *Gemora* (30b) explains that it is obvious that slaughtering in a way that the knife is not seen at the

moment of *shechitah*, such as if it is hidden by the *simanim*, is disqualified, as this is *chaladah*. However, the *Gemora* is in doubt (see *ibid*, that they disputed the matter) if *chaladah* not caused by the *simanim* disqualifies – for instance, if a sheep's wool covers the knife. The *Gemora* does not resolve the doubt and the halachah is ruled strictly (*Shulchan 'Aruch*, Y.D. 24:8), that such an animal must not be eaten.

The reasons for removing the feathers: According to the *Mordechai* (see *Tevuos Shor* and *Pri Megadim*), *chaladah* could be caused not only by a fleecy-necked sheep but also by sparse wool. Therefore he ruled (604): "The custom is to remove the feathers of fowl so as not to cause *chaladah*." Acharonim added that removing the feathers of the throat not only prevents *chaladah* but also prevents *shehiyah* as we should be concerned lest, during *shechitah*, a feather will be caught under the knife. The *shechitah* would thus not be done continuously since a small time of the *shechitah* was devoted to cutting the feather (*Simlah Chadashah*, 23, S.K. 6). The author of *Shoel Umeishiv* adds (Respona, III, 147) that removing the feathers also prevents the suspicion that the feathers will flaw the knife.

A suspicion of perforating the esophagus by removing the feathers: If everything is so simple, what is the debate? Let the *shochetim* remove the feathers and be forever rid of these serious doubts. Many years after the *Mordechai*, however, the Remo wrote (*Shulchan 'Aruch*, Y.D. 23:6): "One should take care **not** to remove the feathers if he can slaughter without such"! This ruling stems from the suspicion that removing the feathers from a chicken's neck would cause a hole in the esophagus, rendering it *treifah*. Indeed, a chicken with blood where feathers were removed is not slaughtered due to this suspicion (see *ibid* in the *Shach*, S.K. 20, that it is a decree

because of a case where the skin is torn from the neck and see *ibid* that some are lenient in a case of great loss).

A change in the prevalent age of fowl when slaughtered:

Until our era the common practice was to remove the feathers at the place of *shechitah* with great care. In our generation an essential change has occurred in slaughtering fowl as almost all of them are very young and their feathers are not long, such that the suspicion of *chaladah* becomes smaller and, on the other hand, their soft skin may easily bleed when their feathers are removed. That was the main point of the issue placed before the *poskim* – should one remove the feathers as previously practiced, though some chickens may bleed, or, because of these suspicions, should one not remove the feathers but merely turn them to the sides (see Responsa *Sheivet HaLevi*, VII, 111-112, and *Kovetz Teshuvos* by HaGaon Rav Y.S. Elyashiv, 70).

DAILY MASHAL

Hashem chose domestic animals, which are usually harassed by others, as sacrifices. Likewise, He declared fit among the birds those species which are helpless and attacked by birds of prey. Turtledoves may be offered if they are at least one year old. Regarding doves, the halachah changes. Only a young dove is eligible for sacrifice. Rabbeinu Bachya explains the reason for this. Hashem designated grown turtledoves fit for sacrifice due to their unique trait. When the female's mate dies, she remains loyal to it and never associates with another bird. The fidelity of this bird to its mate teaches us a powerful lesson. Indeed, we are compared to the turtledove in that we remain faithful to Hashem, never turning away from the true G-d for another. Grown doves, on the other hand, are not kosher, since they are overprotective of their mates, and -- out of jealousy-- stir up needless strife.

Chazal, explains *Rabbi A. Leib Scheinbaum* In his *Peninim on the Torah*, want us to take note of these birds and derive a necessary lesson regarding our own character development. Fidelity to a relationship is a requisite for maintaining it. This idea applies to marriage, to friendship, to a rebbe/talmid, teacher/student, relationship, as well as to all areas where a commitment of two parties is intrinsic to the relationship. There is yet another area where fidelity is not only necessary, it is crucial. I refer to the mitzvah of *chesed*, performing kindness to others. Quite often, when we do the right thing and reach out to those in need, we forget that they begin to rely on us. We might be the first or only person that has shown an interest in them, that has really cared about them. They have yearned for this moment, and now we must follow through. *Chesed* is a wonderful activity, but, we must remember, it is a commitment and, in many situations, it is a compelling one.

People begin to rely on this commitment, on the fidelity of their benefactor, to the point that it is almost inconceivable to them that their benefactor will not follow through. Whether it is an Erev Shabbos phone call, a Shabbos visit, delivering a supper, or just a constant social gesture of good-will, we must follow through. The following story demonstrates the consequences of this type of dependence.