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Shabbos Daf 36

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Handling the Shofar And Interchanging Terms

The *braisa* had stated: the sexton of the community had a hidden place on the top of his roof, where he placed his *shofar*, because neither a *shofar* nor a trumpet may be handled on the *Shabbos*.

The *Gemora* asks: But it was taught in a *braisa*: A *shofar* may be handled, but not a trumpet?

Rav Yosef said: There is no difficulty: The one refers to a private individual (*and is not regarded as muktzeh*); the other to that of the community.

Abaye said to him: And in the case of an individual's, what is it fit for?

The *Gemora* answers: It is possible to give a child a drink with it.

The *Gemora* asks: Then in the case of a community *shofar* as well, it is fit for giving a drink to a poor child? And furthermore, as to what was taught in the following *braisa*: Just as a *shofar* may be moved, so may a trumpet be moved; with whom does that agree (*for one cannot scoop up water in a trumpet*)?

Rather, there is no difficulty, for one *braisa* agrees with Rabbi Yehudah, one with Rabbi Shimon, and one with Rabbi Nechemiah. [(1) *R' Yehudah* holds that a *shofar* may be moved, since it can be put to a permitted use, but not a trumpet. This can be used only in a way that is forbidden on the *Shabbos* – by blowing with it, and is therefore *muktzeh*, the handling of which *R' Yehudah* prohibits on the *Shabbos*. (2) *R' Shimon* holds that *muktzeh* may be handled, therefore both may be moved. (3) *R' Nechemiah* holds that a

utensil may be handled only for its normal use, and therefore both are forbidden.]

And (*continues Abaye*), what indeed is meant by '*shofar*' (*in R' Nechemiah's braisa; for if the shofar, which can be used for a child, cannot be carried, certainly the trumpets are forbidden; why state shofar and then trumpets*)? It means 'a trumpet' (*as the meanings here are transposed*). This is in accordance with Rav Chisda, for Rav Chisda said: The following three things reversed their designations after the destruction of the Temple [*These changes were not germane to the destruction of the Beis HaMikdash. Rather, the change came because of ignorant people who confused the names of different religious articles and terms.*]: [1] What was once called a *chatzotzarta* is now referred to as a *shofar*, and what was called *shofar* is now referred to as *chatzortzta* (*trumpet changed to shofar, and shofar to trumpet*).

The *Gemora* notes the practical ramification of this interchanging of terms: It is with regard to a *shofar* of *Rosh Hashanah*. [*We can only use what people call a trumpet, not a shofar, as the blasts on Rosh Hashanah must be from a ram's horn, which is now called a trumpet.*]

Rav Chisda continues: What was once called *aravah* is now called *tzaftzafah*, and what was called *tzaftzafah* is now called *aravah*. [*An aravah is a willow branch that has a red stem and long smooth leaves, and the aravah grows near the river; tzaftzafah has a white stem and its leaves are round and jagged, and grows on mountains.*]

The *Gemora* notes the practical ramification of this interchanging of terms: It is with regard to a *lulav* (*for the lulav requires an aravah as one of the four species, and a tzaftzafah is not valid for use*).



Rav Chisda continues: What was once called *pesorah* is now called *pesortah* and what was called *pesortah* is now called *pesorah*. [*Pesorah means a large table and pesortah is a smaller table.*]

The *Gemora* notes the practical ramification of this interchanging of terms: It is with regard to commerce. [*If one stipulates to sell a pesorah, he must sell a larger table, as a pesorah is the larger table.*]

Abaye said: We also said: The terms *huvlila* and *bae casei* are interchangeable. *Huvlila* is part of a kosher animal's stomach. People originally called the omasum (*the third stomach*) by the name *huvlila*, and the reticulum was called the *bae casei*. Later the names became interchanged.

The *Gemora* notes that the ramification of this change is regarding a needle that is found in the thick wall of an animal's reticulum. When one side of the reticulum's wall is pierced, the animal is kosher, but if the wall is pierced on both sides, the animal is a *tereifah*¹.

Rav Ashi said: We also said: The terms *Bavel* and *Bursif* are interchangeable. [*The area known as Bavel became known as Bursif, and the area known as Bursif became known as Bavel.*]

The *Gemora* notes that the ramification of this change is with regard to a *get*, a bill of divorce. [*If one sends a get from outside of Eretz Yisroel to his wife in Eretz Yisroel, the messenger who delivers the get must declare that the get was written and signed in his presence. When one brings a get from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel, however, the messenger is not required to make such a declaration. Nowadays, Bavel is called Bursif and Bursif is called Bavel, so in modern day Bavel, one would be required to make such a declaration, as the people of Bursif are not familiar with the necessity of having the get written lishmah, for the names of the man and woman involved in the divorce.*] (35b – 36b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, BAMEH MADLIKIN

Mishna

One can place a cooked food on a *kirah* (*a rectangular stove that is open on the top; it can accommodate two pots*) that was heated with straw and stubble. [*Straw and stubble do not conduct heat*

¹ *an animal with a physical defect that will cause its death; it is forbidden to be eaten even if it was slaughtered properly*

well, so one may leave a pot of cooked food before Shabbos on a kirah that is heated with straw and stubble. We are not concerned that one is going to stoke the coals to make the food cook faster.]

One cannot place cooked food on a *kirah* that was heated with marc (*sesame or olive pulp*) or wood, unless the coals are removed or ash sprinkled on them. [*The remaining coals of sesame pulp are hot enough to allow the continued cooking of the food. Therefore, one may not place a pot of cooked food before Shabbos on a kirah that is heated with sesame pulp unless the coals are removed or covered with ash. Rashi states that this is because we are concerned that he will stoke the coals on Shabbos to enable it to cook faster.*]

[*When the coals are removed or covered*] Beis Shammai maintain that one may only place hot water on the *kirah* but not cooked food. Beis Hillel, however, permits placing hot water and cooked food on a *kirah* (*whose coals are removed or covered*). [*Beis Shammai is concerned that, by cooked food, which improves by stewing on the kirah – even after it is fully cooked, even after the coals are removed or covered, one may come to stoke the remaining coals and this constitutes a prohibition of Shabbos. Alternatively, Beis Shammai is concerned that placing the food on a kirah appears like one is cooking on Shabbos. This, however, does not apply by hot water, for there is no reason at all for anyone to stoke the coals after it is fully cooked. Beis Hillel, however, is of the opinion that once the coals are removed or covered, we are not concerned that one may stoke the remaining coals or that it appears like one is cooking on Shabbos.*]

Beis Shammai permits one to remove something from a *kirah* on Shabbos, but he forbids placing the pot back on it, and Beis Hillel permits it. [*Even with regard to leaving something on the fire before Shabbos, Beis Shammai maintains that one may leave hot water on the fire before Shabbos but because it appears like cooking on Shabbos, one may not return the pot to the fire on Shabbos. Beis Hillel, however, is of the opinion that once the coals are removed or covered, one may leave hot water and hot food on the fire and if he removed the food or water on Shabbos, he may place them aback on the fire.*] (36b)

“Leaving” or “Returning”?

The *Gemora* inquires: When the *Mishna* states, ‘One cannot place’ (*cooked food on a kirah that was heated with marc or wood, unless the coals are removed or ash sprinkled on them*), does that mean that one must not return it (*chazarah*), yet it is permitted to keep



it there (*she'hiyah*) - even if it (*the stove*) is neither swept nor covered with ashes; and which *Tanna* would the *Mishna* be following? Chananyah! For it was taught in a *braisa*: Chananyah said: Whatever is (*cooked*) as the food of 'ben Derusai' (*a bandit, who would eat his food when it was only one-third cooked*) may be kept on the stove, even if it is neither swept nor covered with ashes? Or perhaps, the *Mishna* (*when it states 'one cannot place,' it*) is referring to keeping it there, and that is permitted only if it is swept or covered with ashes, but not otherwise; and how much more so (*that it is forbidden*) with respect of returning it.

The *Gemora* attempts to prove this from the words of the *Mishna*, for two clauses are taught in our *Mishna*: [*When the coals are removed or covered*] Beis Shammai maintain that one may only place hot water on the *kirah* but not cooked food. Beis Hillel, however, permits placing hot water and cooked food on a *kirah* (*whose coals are removed or covered*). Beis Shammai permits one to remove something from a *kirah* on *Shabbos*, but he forbids placing the pot back on it, and Beis Hillel permits it. Now, if you say that the *Mishna* (*when it states 'one cannot place,' it*) is referring to keeping it there, it is well, for this is what the *Tanna* is teaching: If a *kirah* was heated with straw and stubble, one may leave a cooked food on it (*before the commencement of Shabbos*); with marc or wood, one may not leave a cooked food on it unless it is shoveled or ash was sprinkled on it. And what (*kinds of food*) may be left there? Beis Shammai maintain that one may only leave hot water there, but not cooked food, whereas, Beis Hillel, however, permits leaving hot water and cooked food there. And just as they differ in respect to leaving it there (*from before Shabbos*), so do they differ in respect to returning it, where Beis Shammai permits one to remove something from a *kirah* on *Shabbos*, but he forbids returning it, and Beis Hillel permits it (*even returning*). But if you say that the *Mishna* (*when it states 'one cannot place,' it*) is referring to returning it, then this is what the *Tanna* is teaching: If a *kirah* was heated with straw and stubble, one may return a cooked pot (*that had been removed*) to it; with marc or wood, one may not return a cooked pot to it, unless it is shoveled or ash was sprinkled on it. And what (*kinds of food*) may he return? Beis Shammai maintain that one may only return hot water there, but not cooked food, whereas, Beis Hillel, however, permits returning hot water and cooked food there. Now, the last clause states: Beis Shammai permits one to remove something from a *kirah* on *Shabbos*, but he forbids returning it, and Beis Hillel permits it (*even returning*). Then what is the necessity of this addition (seeing that it has already been stated in the previous clause)? [*This would prove that the first interpretation is the correct one; the Mishna means 'leaving it there,' and it reflects the opinion of Chananyah!*] (36b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Muktzeh That Has Usage On Shabbos

The Shaar HaMelech quotes a dispute amongst the Rishonim regarding a vessel that for some people the vessel is permitted to carry on *Shabbos*, and for others it is forbidden to carry on *Shabbos*. The question is, what is the law concerning those who use the vessel despite the fact that they do not have a need for the vessel on *Shabbos*. Have they transgressed a prohibition or not?

The Steipler in Kehilas Yaakov proves from our *Gemora* that states that a *shofar* that belongs to the public is only considered fitting to draw water for a poor child who the public is obligated to support. It is evident from this *Gemora* that the only reason one can carry this *shofar* is because he is also obligated to support the poor child. If the person was not obligated to support the child, even though the *shofar* can be used by a select group of people, others are forbidden to carry the *shofar*.

The Yaavetz is troubled as to why the *Gemora* needs to state that the *shofar* can be used to draw water for a poor child. The *shofar* should be permitted to carry because the *shofar* is a vessel that had potential for usage on *Shabbos*.

The Yaavetz infers from the *Gemora* that an object that has potential usage but in reality cannot be used is rendered as *muktzeh*. It would follow, then, that a vessel that is being safeguarded by someone, although it is fit for use, the watchman cannot carry the vessel on *Shabbos*, because it is forbidden for the watchman to use the vessel for his own use.