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Mav the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

HIGHLIGHTS

1. **Mishna:** A man may not go out with weapons of war. If he does, he must bring a *korban chatas*. Rebbe Eliezer says weapons are a form of adornment. A *biris* is not susceptible to *tum'ah*, and one may go out wearing it on *Shabbos*. *Kevalim* are susceptible to *tum'ah*, and one may not go out with them on *Shabbos*.

2. An *aleh* is a mace. Rebbe Eliezer considers weapons to be a form of adornment. Although they will be useless after *Mashiach* comes, Rabbi Eliezer considers them a form of adornment now, since there is a use for them. The Chachamim consider the fact that they will be destroyed after *Mashiach* comes as proof that they are only worn out of necessity. Rabbi Chiya bar Abba holds that all the prophecies given of the end of days refer only to the times of *Mashiach*, but not of the world to come. Shmuel holds that the times of *Mashiach* will be little different than things are now. Another version of Rabbi Eliezer's answer to the Chachamim is that he holds like Shmuel, and that weapons *will* be carried after the times of *Mashiach*. One should first try to learn the information of the Talmud before trying to understand it all.

3. When two students sharply question each other for the sake of knowing the truth, Hashem makes them successful and brings them greatness, long life, wealth, and honor. This is only true, however, when they learn for the right reasons, without becoming haughty. One who is

prevented from doing a mitzvah is rewarded as if he did it. If two students have no one to teach them Torah, and they draw each other to figure out the law on their own, Hashem loves them, but this is only true if there is no one to teach them and they already know the essential form of the laws under discussion. It is better to lend than to give charity, and the best way is to invest in a pauper. A sharp Torah scholar is better than a friendly ignoramus. One should not have a dangerous dog in his home, since it frightens away paupers seeking charity, and removes one's fear of Heaven.

4. Rav Yehudah said that a *biris* is similar to an armlet, but worn on the thigh. Ravin says that a *koveles* is like a *biris*, but goes on both legs. Rav Yirmiyah and Rav Huna said that both are worn on both legs, but that a *koveles* has a chain stretched between the two rings. Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said that an object that makes noise is considered a vessel and thus susceptible to *tum'ah*. A weave or adornment of any size is susceptible to *tum'ah*, no matter how small, as is a tiny object comprised of two even smaller sections, one of weave and the other an adornment.


COMMENTARY

1. **Mishna:** A man may not go out on *Shabbos* with a sword, bow, shield, *aleh*,¹ or spear. If he does, he must bring a *korban chatas*. Rabbi Eliezer says these weapons are a form of adornment,² but the Chachamim say that

1 The *Gemora* defines this as a mace, a staff with a hard ball at one end for swinging at people.

2 It is interesting to note that he does not say that one may go out into the public domain wearing a weapon on *Shabbos*, but merely calls them adornments. This might mean that it is entirely permitted, or

he might simply hold that one who does wear them in the public domain is not required to bring a *korban chattas*. It might still not be permitted, however, since there is a concern that one might remove the weapon from its holder and carry it. It would seem that Rebbe Eliezer permits carrying weapons entirely, however, since not all the weapons



weapons are disgraceful, as it is written: *They shall beat their swords into plowshares, and their spears into pruning shares; nations shall lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war anymore.*

A *biris*³ is not susceptible to *tum'ah*, and one may go out wearing it on *Shabbos*. *Kevalim*⁴ are susceptible to *tum'ah*, and one may not go out with them on *Shabbos*. (63a)

2. An *aleh* is a mace. When Rabbi Eliezer said that weapons are considered a form of adornment, and thus permissible to take into the public domain on *Shabbos*, the Chachamim challenged him with a verse that says that in the end of days, weapons will be beaten into the shapes of tools. They asked: If they are considered an adornment, why will they be eliminated?

One version of Rabbi Eliezer's response is that they will no longer be necessary, as it is written: *Nation shall not lift up a sword against nation*. The Gemara asks: But let it be worn as an adornment? Abaye explained that it is compared to a lamp in broad daylight.⁵

The *Gemora* notes that this opinion (*that weapons will become obsolete in the Messianic era*) is in disagreement with Shmuel, who says that the Messianic era will be the same natural order (*it will not be that different than things are today*), but with the Jews not subjugated by the nations (*and the Beis Hamikdosh will be rebuilt – Tosafos*). This is based upon the verse: *For the poor shall not cease from the land*. It is, however, a support to the opinion of Rabbi Chiya bar Abba who said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The prophets only referred to the

Messianic era, but the World to Come has never been perceived, as it is written: *No eye has seen, besides Yours, O God, what He will do for one that awaits Him.*

Another version has Rabbi Eliezer respond that weapons will not be eliminated (*in the Messianic era*), and the prophecies cited by the Chachamim will not take place during the times of *Mashiach*, but rather in the later time when we enter the World to Come, which is not part of this world. The *Gemora* notes that this reflects the opinion of Shmuel (*who says that the Messianic era will be the same natural order*), and it disagrees with Rabbi Chiya bar Abba.

Abaye said to Rav Dimi, or it was to Rav Avya, and according to others, it was Rav Yosef who said to Rav Dimi, or it was to Rav Avya, and according to others, it was Abaye who said to Rav Yosef: What is Rabbi Eliezer's reason that weapons are regarded as adornment to him? It is because it is written: *Gird your sword upon your thigh, O mighty one, your glory and your splendor.*

Rav Kahana points out that the verse refers to Torah learning, not actual weapons of war, but Mar, the son of Rav Huna answers with the dictum that the simple meaning of a verse always has some relevance. Rav Kahana then remarked that one should make sure to learn the information of the Talmud, even if one doesn't always understand it fully, since he did not know this rule, but nevertheless had learned the entire Talmud by the time he was eighteen. Had he insisted on learning the reasons for everything before moving on, he would not have been able to finish, since he didn't know this rule.⁶ (63a)

mentioned in the mishnah are worn in a holder. A spear, for instance, is usually carried. Thus, Rebbe Eliezer seems to hold that actually carrying these weapons is a form of adornment.

3 This term is defined in the *Gemora* as a type of leg-bracelet used to hold up some sort of clothing that covered the loins.

4 The meaning of this term is the subject of debate in the *Gemora*. The first opinion says it is similar to a *biris*, but worn on both legs.

⁵ Weapons are considered an adornment while they are useful, like a lantern in the night. During the day, the lantern is never used, but it is still considered an adornment for a table at night. Accordingly, weapons

cannot be worn as an adornment in the times when they are not useful at all.

6 This interpretation follows Rashi. Another interpretation: Rav Kahana was saying that one should not attempt to use logic (*lisbor*) to determine law until one is familiar with all the rules of the Talmud (*ligros*). Thus, Rav Kahana meant that although he knew all the Talmud when he was 18, he might have erred in a ruling since he did not know this dictum. Thus, one must first make sure one knows all the operational laws of the Talmud before considering oneself capable of interpreting it properly.

3. The *Gemora* now cites a number of various statements about the value of Torah students engaged in their studies for the right reasons. [A mnemonic: *ZaRoS* (“*Zayin*” is for *R’ EloZar*; “*Reish*” is for *Rish Lakish*; “*Os*” is for “*And their students.*”)] Rabbi Yirmiyah said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: When two scholars sharpen each other in halachah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, gives them success, for it is said, and in your majesty [va-hadarecha] be successful: read not va-hadarecha but va-chadadecha [your sharpening]. Moreover, they ascend to greatness, as it is said, ‘ride on prosperously’ [successfully]. One might think [that this is so] even if it is not for its own sake, therefore it is taught, ‘In behalf of truth’. I might think [that this is so] even if he becomes conceited; therefore it is taught, ‘and meekness of righteousness’. But if they do thus, they are privileged to acquire the Torah, which was given by the right Hand, as it is said, and your right hand shall teach you awe-inspiring things.⁷

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: They will obtain the things which were promised at the right hand of the Torah, for Rava bar Rav Shila said, and others state that it was Rav Yosef bar Chama who said in the name of Rav Sheishes: What is meant by the verse: *Length of days is in her right hand, in her left hand are riches and honor?* Is there in her right hand length of days only, but not riches and honor? Rather, it refers to those who go to the right hand (*that search for the reasons behind the Torah’s laws and clarify them; this is similar to the right hand which perform in a skillful manner*), there is length of days, and certainly riches and honor; but for those that go to the left hand (*by not delving in Torah*), thereof there is riches and honor, but not length of days.

Rabbi Yirmiyah said in the name of Rish Lakish that when Torah students learn respectfully of one another, Hashem pays attention. [See *Rashi, who brings an alternative*

interpretation – two Torah students who lead each other to the truth.] This is proven from the following verse: *Then those who fear Hashem will speak* etc., and the word ‘speak’ means pleasantness, as it is written: *He shall humble people beneath us.*

The verse cited above concludes: *and for those who ponder His Name.* Rabbi Ami says that one who intends to do a *mitzvah*, but is prevented by circumstances out of his control, is rewarded as if he did the *mitzvah*.

Rav Chinnina bar Idi said that one who does a *mitzvah* properly will not be given evil tidings, as it is stated: He who guards a commandment shall know no evil thing, and Rav Assi or Rabbi Chanina said that Hashem will even erase an evil decree on this account, as it is stated: For the word of the king has authority, and who can say to him, “What are you doing?”, and next to that it states: He who guards a commandment shall know no evil thing. (63a)

Rabbi Abba cited Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish as saying that when two Torah students accept each others’ words,⁸ Hashem listens to them, as it is said: You who dwell in the gardens, the companions hearken to your voice; Cause me to hear it. If they do not, the Divine presence leaves the Jewish people, as it is said: Flee, my Beloved, and be like, etc. (63a)

The *Gemora* now cites a number of statements by Rabbi Abba in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: When two disciples form an assembly in halachah, the Holy One, Blessed be He, loves them, as it is said: and his banner over me was love. Said Rava: Providing that they understand at least something of the basics of the laws

⁷ He taught that when Torah students war with one another to determine the truth, Hashem makes them successful, brings them to greatness, and grants them long life, wealth, and honor, but only if they do so for the right reasons - lishmah. (the meaning of this term is the subject of debate, and might mean for the sake of knowing the law, or

for the sake of finding truth and knowing the Torah) and without becoming haughty.

⁸ *Makshivin*, pay attention to one another. See Rashi, however, who implies that it might mean “who cause each other to pay attention,” i.e. who gently lead each other to the truth.

they are attempting to understand,⁹ and that they have no teacher to teach them.

Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: He who lends [money] is greater than he who performs charity; and he who forms a partnership is greater than all.¹⁰ Rabbi Abba also said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: [Even] if a scholar is vengeful and bears malice like a serpent, gird him to your loins; [whereas even] if an am ha-aretz is pious, do not dwell in his vicinity.¹¹

Rav Kahana said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish — others state, Rav Assi said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish — others state, Rabbi Abba said in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish: He who breeds a wild dog in his house keeps loving kindness away from his house, as it is said: [Whoever keeps] a [bad] dog [lamos] [withholds] kindness from his friend; and in Greek a dog is called lamos. Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak said: He also casts off the fear of Heaven from himself, as it is said: and he forsakes the fear of the Almighty.

A certain (*pregnant*) woman entered a house to bake. As she entered, the dog of the house barked and startled her, causing her fetus to be uprooted. The dog's owner said to the woman, "don't be afraid, for the dog's fangs (incisor teeth) and its claws have been removed" (*and it therefore posed no danger*). She said to him. "The gratitude for you is taken away and cast onto thorns, for the fetus has already been uprooted." (63a – 63b)

Rav Huna said: What is meant by the verse: *Rejoice, young man, in your childhood; and let your heart cheer you in the days of your youth, and walk in the ways of your heart, and in the sight of your eyes; but know that*

for all these things God will bring you into judgment? Up until here (*the final phrase*) are the words of the Evil Inclination (*for he wants the person to sin*); thereafter are the words of Good Inclination (*warning one not to sin*). Rish Lakish said: Up until here is the reference is to Torah; thereafter, it is to good deeds. (63b)

4. Rav Yehudah said that a *biris* is an armlet. Rav Yosef asked from our Mishnah: A *biris* is tahor and one may go out with it on Shabbos, yet we know that an armlet is susceptible to tumah!? Thus, the *Gemora* understands that Rav Yehudah meant that a *biris* is like an armlet (but that it goes on the thigh to hold up a stocking).

Ravin and Rav Huna were sitting before Rabbi Yirmiyah, and Rabbi Yirmiyah was dozing. Now Ravin sat and said: A *biris* is on one [leg]; while *kevalim* [ankle-chain] is on two. Said Rav Huna to him: Both are on two, but a chain is placed between them and they become *kevalim* [anklets]. Does then the chain turn it into a utensil? And should you answer that this is in accordance with Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini, for Rabbi Shmuel bar Nachmeini said in Rabbi Yochanan's name: How do we know that a metal object which causes sound is susceptible to tumah? Because it is said: Anything [davar] that has come into the fire, [you shall make go through the fire] even speech [dibbur — i.e., sound] is implied. — As for there, it is well: it [the utensil] is needed for sound and it performs an action; but here, what action does it perform? — Here too it performs an action, for Rabbah bar Bar Chanah said in Rabbi Yochanan's name: There was a certain family in Jerusalem that had large steps, whereby their virginity was destroyed. So they made them leg-suspenders and placed a chain between them, that their steps should not be large, and then their virginity was not destroyed. Rabbi Yirmiyah awoke at that

9 It seems this *Gemora* refers to determining the practical law, for it does not seem to make sense that two students may not learn independently — the system of having students learn together is as old as the Talmud. If a Rav is available, a student has no right to "try his hand" at issuing a ruling. Even if no Rav is available, one should not start from scratch. If, however, one has the basic of the laws he is attempting to understand, and no Rav is available, and he needs to know what to do in a particular situation, this *Gemora* seems to indicate that one may

look up *all* the relevant information from the Talmud and poskim, and then attempt to determine the practical law — at least until he can contact a Rav to find out if he was right.

¹⁰ Lending money to a poor person is even greater than giving him charity, since he saves face, but the greatest *mitzvah* is to invest money or merchandise with him, so that he can build a business.

¹¹ One should associate with a Torah scholar even if he is a nasty person, but one should stay far away from even a pious ignoramus.

and exclaimed to them: Well spoken! and thus did Rabbi Yochanan say [too]. (63b)

When Rav Dimi came, he said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: How do we know that woven [material] of whatever size is [liable to become] tamei? From the tzitz. Said Abaye to him: Was then the tzitz woven? But it was taught: The tzitz was a kind of golden plate two fingerbreadths broad, and it stretched round [the forehead] from ear to ear, and upon it was written in two lines 'yod hey' above and 'Holy lamed' below. But Rabbi Eliezer son of Rabbi Yosi said: I saw it in the city of Rome, and 'Holy to Hashem' was written in one line. When Rav Dimi went up to Nehardea, he sent word: The things that I told you were erroneous. But in truth it was thus said on Rabbi Yochanan's authority: How do we know that an ornament of whatever size is [liable to become] tamei? From the tzitz. And how do we know that woven material of whatever size is tamei? From [the phrase] or a garment. (63b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Biris - Koveles

The *Gemora* describes a *biris* as similar to an armlet, but going on the thighs.

Rashi explains that the reason the *biris* is not susceptible to *tum'ah*, as opposed to the armlet, is that the *biris* is used to hold up one's clothing, while the armlet is for adornment. Rashi then implies that, according to Ravin, there is no difference at all between a *biris* and a *koveles* except that the *biris* only goes on one leg.

Tosafos questions why this difference should make the *koveles* susceptible to *tum'ah*, since it also only services another article of clothing.

Tosafos therefore says that the *koveles* is similar to a *biris* used on both legs, but that its purpose is adornment rather than to hold up one's clothing.

Tosafos points out that for this reason, one may go out on *Shabbos* with a *biris*, but not with a *koveles*. Since the *biris* is designed to hold up clothing, there is no concern that one might remove it – then his clothing would fall down. A *koveles*, on the other hand, is a type of adornment, and might well be removed to show someone.

Perhaps Rashi's answer to this latter question is that since a *koveles* is essentially two *birios*, one for each leg, there is a concern that he will remove one and let the other hold up his clothing. If this is true, that the second *biris* is essentially superfluous, this might answer Tosafos' first question as well. Since the *koveles* in its entirety is not necessary to hold up one's clothing, it must be considered an adornment, even though it is composed merely of two *birios*, objects used to service clothing by keeping them in place. Once it is considered an adornment, it is susceptible to *tum'ah*.

Tzitz

The *Gemora* cites a debate about how the *tzitz*, the headplate of the Kohen Gadol, was inscribed. The text on the *tzitz* read "*kodesh laShem*,"¹² but there is debate about how it looked. According to an anonymous *braisa*, the name of Hashem was inscribed on an upper line, and the phrase "*kodesh la*" was written on a lower line, so that the Name was the highest word on the *tzitz*. R' Eliezer bar Yosi, however, said that he saw the *tzitz*, and the phrase was written in one line. Rashi cites an alternate text by Rabbeinu Halevi.

Mesoras Hashas writes that Rashi's alternate text was that the Tanna Kamma held that the lower line contained only the word "*kodesh*," while the upper line read "*laShem*." Tosafos comments that it would seem that the word *kodesh* (*la*) came before the name of Hashem from right to left, for otherwise the phrase would make no sense.

Dogs

Rabbi Eliezer Hagadol stated that one who raises dogs is equivalent to raising pigs, and he therefore is included in the curse of the Sages.

¹² The word *Shem* is being used in the text to represent the Ineffable Name.



The Shitah (*in Bava Kamma*) quotes Rav Yehonasan who says that the opinion in the first *braisa* agrees that a dangerous dog may not be raised, but only due to the verse of *ma'akeh* (*a fence*), which states *lo tasim damim – you shall not introduce blood in your house.*, which was quoted on BK 15.

The Maharshah (BK 7:45) discusses why the prevalent custom in his time was for Jews to have dogs in their property. He first considers the possibility that since we live amongst non Jews, some of whom are hostile to us, we may raise the dogs for protection, just as the *Gemora* allows this for border towns, including Nehardea. He rejects this possibility, since even when kept for protection, the dog must be chained down during the day (*when people walk around and may get hurt*), and only let loose at night (*when people are not walking around*). The prevalent custom is to keep the dogs unchained even during the day. He therefore states that the *Gemora's* statements on daf 15 and 83 are referring solely to a *kelev ra* – a bad dog, which can harm and scare people, by harming or barking. The *Mishna* therefore referred to one who raises Hakelev – the dog, i.e., the prohibited *kelev ra* – and not just *kelev* – a dog. However, our dogs, which are docile and do not scare or hurt people, are not included. Instead, they are included in the category of *kelev kufri* (80a), which Rashi explains as either small or docile dogs. People are used to these dogs, and are not even scared of them. Any dog that scares people – even if it cannot harm them - is forbidden, as indicated in the story of the pregnant woman.

Carrying a Decorative Sword on Shabbos

According to the dictates of the Swiss Army, all soldiers must wear full military uniform, even during their furloughs when they visited their homes. Since their uniform included a sword that hung from their belts, Jewish soldiers approached the Chelkas Yaakov, Rav of Zurich, to ask whether they may carry their swords in the street on *Shabbos*, in places where there was no *eiruv*.

The Chelkas Yaakov (Teshuvos, 67) begins his response by citing our *Mishna*, "A person must not carry a sword or bow out...and if he does so, he is obligated to bring a *chatas* offering. Rabbi Eliezer permits carrying them, since they are

like ornaments. The Chochamim answered that they are nothing other than a disgrace, as the *possuk* says, 'Nation will not wave sword against nation, they will no longer learn to wage war.'" The opinion of the Chochamim is accepted in Shulchan Aruch (O.C. 301:7).

Although it would seem from here that the Swiss soldiers are forbidden to carry their swords in the streets, the Chelkas Yaakov writes that this would require them to remain home for the entire *Shabbos*, and forgo davening in shul and hearing the Torah reading. Therefore, one must not be too hasty to render such a stringent ruling. If there is any acceptable reason to be lenient, it must be found and applied.

Using a walking stick to cross a frozen river: The Chelkas Yaakov quotes the Taz (301, s.k. 12), who permits carrying a walking stick to cross a frozen river on *Shabbos*. The Taz explains that since it is dangerous to cross a frozen river without a stick, the stick becomes like a person's shoe, which assists him to walk and is therefore permitted. So too, it is dangerous for the soldiers to be seen without their swords, since they might be caught and punished. Therefore the swords become like garments. Furthermore, it is even more reasonable to compare the swords to garments, since they are actually attached to the soldiers' belts.

The Chelkas Yaakov then rejects this comparison. A stick actually assists a person to walk, therefore it becomes a part of him, like his foot. This is not true of a sword. The soldiers' obligation to wear their uniforms does not make their swords a part of them.

The Chelkas Yaakov then suggests another possible leniency. Rabbi Eliezer and the Chochamim argue whether a sword is considered an ornament. Perhaps the Chochamim only reject this view with regard to a sword worn as a weapon. This is a disgrace, and not an ornament. However, the swords worn by Swiss soldiers are not their weapons, but merely decorative parts of their uniform. Therefore, perhaps the Chochamim would concede here with Rabbi Eliezer that such swords are ornaments, and may be carried on *Shabbos*.



In conclusion, the Chelkas Yaakov presents the most persuasive argument of all. Last week, we learnt that a slave may wear a clay seal that labels him as the property of his master (58a). Although the seal is not actually a garment, since he must always wear it as a symbol of his servitude, it becomes part of his attire. The same is true of the swords worn as symbols of allegiance to the Swiss army.

One might think to distinguish between the two cases. A slave is the material property of his owner. Therefore the symbol of servitude that his master demands him to wear becomes part of his attire. However, soldiers are not property of the army. Though their superiors may demand them to carry their swords, this does not necessarily make the swords part of their attire. However, one of the earliest Poskim, the Ohr Zaru'ah (II, 84:3), set a precedent many generations ago to permit Jews to wear the "green circles" that identified them as Jews, as the gentile governments demanded. He cited the case of servants with their clay seals as proof for this ruling. We see, thus, that he did not hold of the distinction. Just as he applied the case of the clay seals to permit wearing the green circles on *Shabbos*, so may we apply it to permit wearing decorative swords, as the army demands. The Ohr Zaru'ah's ruling is the accepted halacha in Shulchan Aruch (301:23).

Identity Tags: Today, many armies require their soldiers to wear metal identity tags, facilitating identification in case of death, God forbid. The Poskim were asked to rule whether such tags may be carried on *Shabbos* in places where there is no *eiruv*. They responded that since the army strictly requires its soldiers to wear their tags at all times, they are considered part of their attire, like the clay seals and Swiss army swords discussed above (See Shemiras *Shabbos* K'Hilchosa 18:22 in the name of Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach *zt"l*. See also Shulchan Shlomo 301:4 and footnote).

[It is worth noting that the Bach and Magen Avraham (s.k. 34) interpreted the Ohr Zaru'ah's leniency to apply only to symbols that are attached to one's clothes, like the green circles that were sewn on. They thus become part of one's clothes. According to this interpretation, there is no basis to permit wearing decorative swords or identity tags that are

not attached to the clothes. (See Chelkas Yaakov (*ibid.*) who queries this interpretation of the Ohr Zaru'a)].

DAILY MASHAL

A Person Should First Learn and Then Surmise

Rav Kahana said, "When we were 18 years old, we learnt the whole Talmud but didn't know that a verse should be interpreted in its simple sense till now. What does this inform us? That a person should first learn and then surmise."

Chazal instruct us that the desired order of learning is, first of all, to repeat the rav's statements and then understand them and delve deeply into their reasons. The exact meaning of the expression "a person should first learn and then surmise" is that a person should learn and then understand. Also in Rav Kahana's story the meaning of "we learnt the whole Talmud" is "we learnt the whole Talmud" and not "I finished the whole Talmud". The root of the words "gemor, gemirna, ligmar" is the Aramaic "gmr", which parallels the Hebrew root "lmd" (thus, in the linguistic sense, "*Gemora*" means "Talmud") and has nothing to do with the Hebrew root "gmr", common in Chazal's statements (as in Avos 2:16: "The labor is not up to you to finish"; Bava Metzi'a 7:2: "gemar melachah"; Berachos 3:2: "...if they can start and finish (ligmor) before they approach the row, they should start").