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### **Multiple Violations**

Rava said: If one reaped and ground (*produce*) of the size of a dried fig (*that is the minimum for which one is culpable on Shabbos*) with inadvertence regarding the *Shabbos*, but with deliberateness in respect of the labors (*so that he is liable to only one sacrifice*), and then he again reaped and ground (*produce*) of the size of a dried fig with deliberateness regarding the *Shabbos* but with inadvertence in respect of the labors (*in which case, he is separately liable to a chatas on account of each; in the interval between his first act and his second he did not realize that he had sinned*), and then he was apprised of the reaping or grinding (*performed*) with inadvertence regarding the *Shabbos* but with deliberateness in respect of the labors (*whereupon he designated one sacrifice on account of both labors; this being before he became aware of his second series of transgressions*), and then he was apprised of the reaping or grinding (*performed*) with deliberateness regarding the *Shabbos* but with inadvertence in respect of the labors, the law is that (*the atonement for*) the (*first*) reaping draws (*atonement for*) the (*second*) reaping (*and the same chatas will suffice*) and (*the atonement for*) the (*first*) grinding draws (*atonement for*) the (*second*) grinding. [*The sacrifice for his first two acts of reaping and grinding is an atonement for his second two acts, since all were performed in one state of inadvertence, without any appraisal in the interval (just as the law would be that one chatas is sufficient for a case, e.g., where he ate cheilev two times in one lapse of awareness), notwithstanding that his first inadvertence differed in kind from his second inadvertence.*] However, if he was (*first*) apprised of his reaping (*performed*) with deliberateness regarding the *Shabbos* but inadvertence with respect of labors (*this was the second act committed*), then the law is that (*the atonement for*) this (*second*) reaping draws (*atonement*


*for*) the (*first*) reaping and its accompanying grinding; but the corresponding (*second*) grinding remains in its place (*and a second chatas offering will be necessary*).

Abaye said: (*Atonement for the first*) grinding draws atonement for the second grinding as well, for the designation of grinding is the same prohibition. [*Abaye maintains that the principle of "drawing" may be used twice: the second reaping may draw the first reaping and its accompanying grinding, and then the first grinding draws the second grinding.*]

The *Gemora* asks: Now, does Rava truly hold of the principle of "drawing" (*that the atonement for one can draw the atonement of the other*)? But it was stated: If one eats two olive-sized pieces of *cheilev* (*forbidden fat*) in one lapse of awareness, and he is apprised of one of them, and he then eats another olive-sized piece while still unaware of the second, Rava said: If he offers a sacrifice for the first, the first and second are atoned for (*for those two acts were done in the same lapse of awareness*), but the third is not. If he brings a sacrifice for the third, the third and second are atoned for (*for those two acts were done in the same lapse of awareness*), but not the first. [*Evidently, Rava does not maintain the principle of "drawing," for if he would, once the second one was atoned for, it should be able to draw along the first or the third – even if they were not performed in the same lapse of awareness.*] If he offers a sacrifice for the middle one, all are atoned for. Abaye said: Even if he offers a sacrifice for the first, all are atoned for.

The *Gemora* answers: After hearing (*the principle*) from Abaye he adopted it.

The *Gemora* asks: If so, let (*the first*) grinding as well draw along (*the second*) grinding?



The *Gemora* answers: He accepts the principle of drawing, but something that itself was drawn cannot subsequently draw something else.

The *Gemora* notes: The matter that was clear to Abaye and Rava (*that deliberateness of the Shabbos and ignorance of the forbidden nature of one's labors followed by the reverse - deliberateness of the labor and ignorance of the Shabbos, constitute a single state of inadvertence, and a sacrifice for one makes atonement for the other, though the first differs in kind from the second*) was uncertain to Rabbi Zeira, for Rabbi Zeira inquired of Rav Assi, and others state, Rabbi Yirmiyah inquired of Rabbi Zeira: What if one reaped or ground (*produce*) of the quantity of half a dried fig with inadvertence regarding the *Shabbos*, but with deliberateness in respect of the labors, and then he again reaped or ground (*produce*) of the quantity of half a dried fig with deliberateness regarding the *Shabbos* but with inadvertence in respect of the labors; can they be combined? [*Are the two acts of reaping or grinding regarded as a single state of inadvertence, so that they do combine for a liability to a chatas, or as two states of inadvertence, since they differ in kind and they do not combine, in which case he will be exempt from offering a chatas? Thus, he was doubtful of what was clear to Abaye and Rava.*]

He said he to him: They are distinct in respect of *chatas* offerings (*and if there was the required amount in each act, he would be liable to two chatas offerings*), and therefore they do not combine (*in this case, when there was not a required amount for liability in each act, and therefore he is not liable to a chatas*).

The *Gemora* asks: Now, wherever acts are distinct in respect of *chatas* offerings, do they not combine? Surely we learned in a *Mishna*: If one eats *cheilev* and (*then again*) *cheilev* in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for only one (*chatas offering*). If one eats *cheilev*, blood, *nossar*<sup>1</sup>, and *piggul*<sup>2</sup> in one lapse of awareness, he is liable for each separately. Regarding this, many kinds (*of forbidden food*) are more stringent than one kind. But in

<sup>1</sup> *sacrificial meat that has been leftover beyond the time that the Torah designated for its consumption*

<sup>2</sup> *a korban whose service was done with the intention that it would be eaten after its designated time*

the following, one kind is more stringent than many kinds: If one eats half the size of an olive and then eats half the size of an olive of the same type of prohibition, he is liable (*to a chatas*), but (*if they were*) of two different prohibitions, he is not liable. Now, we had questioned this: Why does the *Mishna* need to teach the case where one eats half the size of an olive and then eats half the size of an olive of the same type of prohibition, as it is obvious, since he ate one full olive size of the prohibition? And Rish Lakish had answered in the name of Bar Tutni that the *Mishna* is referring to a case where the two half olives were in different dishes. The *Mishna* follows Rabbi Yehoshua, who says that each dish is considered a separate unit which can obligate one in a sacrifice. The *Mishna* is teaching that Rabbi Yehoshua only says this as a stringency, obligating one in multiple sacrifices for multiple olive's eaten in different dishes, but not as a leniency, to prevent two half olive's from combining. The *Gemora* concludes its question: But here, though distinct in respect of *chatas* offerings (*when the two dishes are each the size of an olive*), yet they combine (*when they are each less than the size of an olive*)?

He said to him: You learn this (*the above discussion*) in reference to the first clause; therefore it presents a difficulty to you, but we learn it in reference to the second clause, and it presents no difficulty to us. The *Gemora* elaborates: Why does the *Mishna* need to teach the case where one who ate two half olive pieces of different types of prohibitions that he is not obligated in a sacrifice; is this not obvious? And Rish Lakish had answered in the name of Bar Tutni that the *Mishna* is referring two half olive's of the *same* prohibition, but in different dishes, and it is following Rabbi Yehoshua. The *Mishna* is teaching that Rabbi Yehoshua considers each dish a separate unit, even as a leniency, preventing the two halves from combining.

The *Gemora* asks that if the *Mishna's* case of two types of prohibitions refers to one prohibition in two dishes, then the case of one prohibition is two half olive's in the same dish. The *Mishna's* statement that one is obligated in that case would be obvious!?

Ravina answers that the case is when he realized the prohibition in between the two halves, and the *Mishna* is following Rabban Gamliel, who says that a realization of

half a unit is not considered a realization, making both halves part of the same error.

It was stated: If one eats two olive-sized pieces of *cheilev* in one lapse of awareness, and he is apprised of the first and subsequently of the second, Rabbi Yochanan maintains that he is liable to two (*chatas offerings*); while Rish Lakish rules that he is liable to only one.

The *Gemora* explains their reasoning: Rabbi Yochanan maintains that he is liable to two, for it is written: *for his sin, he shall bring (a sacrifice)*. [For each sin, a separate sacrifice is required.] Rish Lakish rules that he is exempt (*for the second*), for it is written: *from his sin, and he shall be forgiven*. [Even if he offers a sacrifice for only part of his sin, he is totally forgiven.]

The *Gemora* asks: But according to Rish Lakish as well, surely it is written: *for his sin, he shall bring (a sacrifice)*?

The *Gemora* answers: That refers to (*a sin which was only discovered*) after atonement (*with a chatas; he then must bring another chatas for the other sin*).

The *Gemora* asks: But according to Rabbi Yochanan as well, surely it is written: *from his sin, and he shall be forgiven*?

The *Gemora* answers: That refers to a case where one ate an olive and a half (*of cheilev*), and was apprised concerning the size of an olive (*that it was cheilev*), and then ate again as much as half an olive in the same lapse of awareness as the other (*half*). Now you might have said that these (*two halves should*) combine; therefore it teaches us otherwise.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: Do they disagree where it (*the eating of the second piece*) became known to him before designating (*a sacrifice*) for the first, and they differ regarding the following: one master (*R' Yochanan*) holds that appraisements divide (*meaning that the knowledge first obtained concerning one piece separates this piece from the second, and necessitates a sacrifice for each act*), while the other master (*Rish Lakish*) holds that only designations of sacrifices divide (*and since, in this case, a sacrifice was not designated until he became aware of the second piece, it atones for both*); but (*if he became aware*

*of the second piece*) after designating (*a sacrifice for the first*), Rish Lakish would admit to Rabbi Yochanan that he is liable to two. Or perhaps they disagree where it became known to him after the designation (*of the chatas*), and they differ regarding the following: One master (*R' Yochanan*) holds that designations of sacrifices divide, while the other master (*Rish Lakish*) holds that only acts of atonement divide; but if (*he became aware of the second piece*) before designating (*a sacrifice for the first*), Rabbi Yochanan would admit to Rish Lakish that he is liable only to one (*sacrifice*). Or perhaps they differ in both cases?

Rav Ashi said to him: It is logical that they differ in both cases, for should you think that they differ before the designation of a sacrifice, whereas after 'designation' Rish Lakish would admit to Rabbi Yochanan that he is liable to two sacrifices, then instead of interpreting the verse as referring to after atonement, let him interpret it as referring to after 'designation'! However, if they differ after 'designation,' whereas before designation Rabbi Yochanan agrees with Rish Lakish that he is liable only to one (*sacrifice*); instead of interpreting the verse as referring to (*one who ate*) as much as an olive and a half, let him explain it to be referring to (*discovery of the second*) before 'designation'?

The *Gemora* counters: But perhaps that itself is in doubt, and it is stated in the form of "if you want to say," as follows: If you want to say that they differ before 'designation,' how can Rabbi Yochanan interpret the verse? It is as referring to (*one who ate*) the quantity of an olive and a half. And if you would say that they differ after designation, how can Rish Lakish interpret the verse? It is as referring to after atonement. (70b – 71b)