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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishna

If the blood from one of the *korbanos* was sprinkled on her (*his wife's*) behalf, the husband may not revoke her *nezirus* any longer (*for he is only allowed to revoke nedarim that involve self-affliction, and since after the bringing of one korban, she is permitted to drink wine, she is afflicted no longer*). Rabbi Akiva says: Even if they slaughtered one of her *korbanos*, the husband may not revoke her *nezirus* any longer (*as a Rabbinic decree; they did not want the korban to go to waste*). This ruling only applies upon the conclusion of her *nezirus*; however, if she was bringing the *korbanos* because she became *tamei*, the husband may revoke her *nezirus*, for her husband can say, “I am not interested in having an abstinent wife.” Rabbi Meir said: Even upon the conclusion of her *nezirus taharah*, he may revoke her vow, for the husband can say, “I am not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.” (28a)

Explaining the Mishna

The *Gemora* notes: The *Mishna* is not following the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer. For he holds that the shaving of the head is an integral part of the *nezirus* process, and without it, the *nezirus* prohibitions are still intact. Accordingly, as long as she didn't shave

yet, she is still forbidden in wine, and the husband may therefore still revoke her vow.

The *Gemora* explains the dispute between the *Tanna Kamma* and Rabbi Akiva of our *Mishna*: Our *Tanna* holds that once the blood from one of the *korbanos* was sprinkled on his wife's behalf, she is immediately permitted to drink wine, and since she is not abstaining from wine, the husband cannot revoke her vow any longer (*for it is not regarded as self-affliction anymore*). Rabbi Akiva holds that even if the animal was only slaughtered (*and the blood was not sprinkled yet*), the husband may not revoke her *nezirus* any longer as a Rabbinic decree, because they did not want the *korban* to go to waste.

Rabbi Zeira asks: Why would the *korban* go to waste (*if the husband revoked her nezirus after the animal was slaughtered*)? Why couldn't we allow the blood to be sprinkled for the sake of a different *korban*, and its meat will be permitted to be eaten (*like the halachos of an olah or shelamim; even if their blood was sprinkled for the sake of a different korban, it is a legitimate korban and its meat may be eaten*)? The *Gemora* cites the following *braisa*: If one slaughtered the two lambs of Shavuos *shelo lishmah*, not for their own sake, or if he slaughtered them before or after their time, one can throw the blood on the Altar and then he can eat the meat. If one slaughtered the

lambs on Shabbos, however, he cannot throw the blood (*since it is not an obligatory Yom Tov sacrifice*), and if he did throw the blood, it is effective, and he should burn the sacrificial parts after Shabbos. (*It emerges that in certain situations, one is permitted to sprinkle the blood for a designation other than its own; why don't we allow this option here?*)

The *Gemora* answers: Our *Mishna* is discussing a case where the *chatas* was the first *korban* slaughtered (*and a chatas sprinkled for the sake of a different korban is invalid*). For we learned in a *Mishna*: A *nazir* who shaves off his hair after bringing any one of the three *korbanos* brought by a *nazir* has fulfilled his vow (*although he is still obligated to bring the remaining korbanos*). (28a – 28b)

Wearing a Wig

The *Mishna* had stated: This ruling only applies upon the conclusion of her *nezirus*; however, if she was bringing the *korbanos* because she became *tamei*, the husband may revoke her *nezirus*, for her husband can say, "I am not interested in having an abstinent wife." Rabbi Meir said: Even upon the conclusion of her *nezirus taharah*, he may revoke her vow, for the husband can say, "I am not interested in having a wife with a shaven head."

The *Gemora* explains the *Tanna Kamma* of the *Mishna*: Since it is possible for her to wear a wig, he cannot claim that he is not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.

Rabbi Meir would hold that the husband is not interested in having his wife wear a wig (*his wife*

wearing someone else's hair is repulsive to him). (28b)

Mishna

A father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son. If he shaves his head, or his relatives shaves his head, or he protests, or his relatives protest on his account (*immediately upon hearing of the father's declaration, which stops his nezirus*); if the father had designated an unspecified amount of money for his son's *korbanos*, they are to be used for voluntary communal offerings. If the money was specified, the *halacha* is as follows: The money set aside for the *chatas* must be cast into the Dead Sea. It is prohibited to benefit from it, but one does not commit *me'ilah* by using it (*since it is not destined to be brought on the Altar*). The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*, and one does commit *me'ilah* if he uses it. The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*. The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day, but it does not require the breads. (28b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Sheitel

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her *nezirus taharah*, he may revoke her vow, for the husband can say, "I am not interested in having a wife with a shaven head."

The *Gemora* explains the *Tanna Kamma* of the *Mishna*: Since it is possible for her to wear a wig, he cannot claim that he is not interested in having a wife with a shaven head.

Rabbi Meir would hold that the husband is not interested in having his wife wear a wig (*his wife wearing someone else's hair is repulsive to him*).

The Beis Yitzchak asks on the *Tanna Kamma*: Even though she can wear a wig, it will still not be pleasing for the husband, because she will not be permitted to go outside in a public domain on *Shabbos* with it!

The *Mishna Lemelech* answers: The reason why a woman is forbidden to walk outside on *Shabbos* with a wig is because she might take it off and carry it four *amos* in a public domain. Here, where she has no hair, we are not concerned that she will show her wig to her friends because it is humiliating to her.

It is brought in the name of the *Shiltei Geborim* that our *Gemora* is a proof that married women are permitted to be seen publicly with a wig on their head. Some *poskim* held that it was forbidden because the hair of a woman is regarded as *ervah*, and cannot be seen.

The Be'er Sheva disagrees and refutes the proof. He maintains that it is only permitted if she wears a covering besides the wig. And on the contrary; it is evident from our *Gemora* that only women without

hair would wear a wig. This was to appease the husband, for otherwise she would be repulsive to him. An ordinary woman, however, would not wear a wig, and it is in fact forbidden.

The Magen Avraham rules that a wig is permitted.

DAILY MASHAL

Chanah and Elkanah

The *Mishna* had stated: A father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son.

The Redak (*Shmuel I*, 1:11) asks: How could Chanah's vow of *nezirus* for Shmuel her son be effective? Our *Mishna* rules explicitly that only a father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son! Furthermore, he is astounded that Chazal do not discuss this matter at all; not in the *Medrash* or *Gemora*!

In the *sefer Ziv Halevanon*, he cites the *Sforno*, who says that when Elkanah (*Shmuel's father*) said (*ibid.* v.23), *Do whatever is good in your eyes*, he was in essence agreeing to his wife. By demonstrating his consent, it was regarded as if he declared the *nezirus* for his son.