



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

The *Mishna* had stated: Oil – (*one is liable if he carries out*) as much as is required to anoint a small limb.

The School of Rabbi Yannai said: Oil - as much as is required to anoint a small limb of an infant one day old.

The *Gemora* asks on this from a *braisa*: Oil - as much as is required to anoint a small limb **and** (*a limb of*) a day-old infant. Surely this means: a small limb of an adult, and a large limb of a day-old infant?

The *Gemora* answers: The School of Rabbi Yannai can reply that this is the meaning of the *braisa*: Oil - as much as is required to anoint a small limb of a day-old infant.

The *Gemora* suggests that this is dependent on the following dispute among *Tannaim*: Oil - as much as is required to anoint a small limb and (*a limb of*) a day-old infant; these are the words of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar. Rabbi Nassan said: As much as is required to anoint a small limb. Now surely they differ in this: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar holds that the amount required is of a small limb of an infant, while Rabbi Nassan holds that the amount required is of a small limb of an adult or a large limb of an infant, but a small limb of a day-old infant would not impose liability?

The *Gemora* disagrees: All agree that (*the amount of oil for*) a small limb of a day-old infant is not sufficient (*to make one liable*), and Rabbi Yannai’s opinion is incorrect; but here they differ regarding the following: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar holds that an adult’s small limb and a day-old infant’s large limb are identical in size, while Rabbi Nassan holds that only an adult’s small limb creates culpability, but not the large limb of a day-old infant.

The *Gemora* asks: What decision was reached regarding this?

The *Gemora* answers by citing a *braisa*: Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: Oil - as much as is required to anoint a small limb of a day-old infant.

The *Mishna* had stated: Water - enough for ‘rubbing’ (*mixing*) an eye salve (*water or other liquid was mixed with a paste to form an ointment*).

Abaye said: Consider the following: Regarding something that has a common use and an uncommon use, the Rabbis followed the common use, even if that would result in a leniency; where it has two common uses, the Rabbis followed the common use which would lead to a stringency. Abaye explains: In the case of wine, the drinking of it is common, while its employment as a remedy is uncommon; therefore the Rabbis followed its drinking use in the direction of leniency. [*The Mishna taught us that the minimum which creates liability for carrying out is the average drink – a revi’is, though a lesser quantity is used for remedial purposes. This is a lenient ruling.*] In the case of milk, the drinking of it is common, while its employment as a remedy is uncommon; therefore the Rabbis followed its drinking use in the direction of leniency. As for honey, both the eating of it and its use as a remedy are common, so the Rabbis followed its use as a remedy although this results in a stringency. But regarding the case of water, let us consider the following: its drinking is common, whereas its use for healing is uncommon; why then did the Rabbis follow its use for healing which results in a stringency?

Abaye said: They learned this with reference to (*the inhabitants of the*) Galilee. [*Since they were poor, they would never use wine or milk for this mixture, but only water, and so this use for water is as common as its drinking use.*]

Rava said: You may even say that this refers to other places, thus agreeing with Shmuel, for Shmuel said: All liquids heal (*eye sickness, when they are mixed with plaster*) but cover (*the eye a bit, and impair the vision slightly*), except water, which heals without covering (*the eye; therefore, its use for healing is also common*).

The *Mishna* had stated: and all other liquids - (*the standard is*) a *revi'is* (*a quarter of a log; this refers to any liquid which is used for drinking*).

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: As for blood, and all other types of liquids, (*the standard is*) a *revi'is*. Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: Blood - as much as is required for applying to one eye, because a speck protruding from the eye is painted (*with blood*).

The *Gemora* notes that the blood of a wild hen is used for that.

Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel said: Blood - as much as is required for applying to one eye, because a cataract is painted (*with blood*).

The *Gemora* notes that the blood of a moles is used for that.

And your mnemonic is: inside (*buildings, for that is where moles are found*) for inside (*the cataract is in the eye*), and outside (*wild hens are found outside of human settlements*) for outside (*the speck protruding from the eye*).

The *braisa* continues: Now this applies only to the one who carries it out; but regarding one who stores it away, no matter how small the amount, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: This applies only to the one who stores it away, but regarding one who carries it out, he is liable only when there is a *revi'is*. And the Sages agree with Rabbi Shimon that if

one carries out waste water into the street, the standard is a *revi'is*.

The master had stated: But regarding one who stores it away, no matter how small the amount, he is liable.

The *Gemora* asks: One who stores it away!?! Does he not carry it out (*as well*)?

Abaye said: The reference here is to an apprentice to whom his master said, "Go, and clear me a place for a meal." Now, if he goes and clears out (*into the public domain*) something that is significant for all, he is liable on its account; if it is something that is not significant for all, the law is as follows: if his master had stored it away, he is liable on its account; if not, he is not liable.

The master had stated: And the Sages agree with Rabbi Shimon that if one carries out waste water into the street, the standard is a *revi'is*.

The *Gemora* asks: For what is waste water fit?

Rabbi Yirmiyah said: It is fit to knead clay with it.

The *Gemora* asks: But it was taught in a *braisa*: Clay - the standard is as much as is required for making the hole of a smelting pot (*which is a very small amount*)?

The *Gemora* answers: There is no difficulty, for in the latter case it was kneaded already, but in the former case, it was not kneaded (*and therefore, a larger amount is necessary*), for no man troubles himself to knead clay only for making the hole of a smelting pot.

He who carries out rope, (*the standard is*) as much as is required for making a handle for a basket; reed-grass, as much as is required for making a hanger for a sifter or a sieve. Rabbi Yehudah said: as much as is required for taking the measure of a child's foot (*for a shoe*). Paper, large enough to write a tax-collector's receipt on it, and he who carries out a tax-collector's receipt is liable. Erased paper (*which cannot be used for writing*), as much as is required to

wrap around the opening of a small flask of balsam oil; hide, enough for making an amulet; parchment, enough for writing upon it the shortest passage of the *tefillin*, which is 'Shema Yisrael.'; Ink, enough for writing two letters; eye paint, enough for painting one eye; glue, enough for putting on the head of a lime board; pitch or sulfur, enough for making a perforation (*the flask in which mercury is kept is closed with a perforated stopper of pitch or sulfur; a small hole was made in that so that the mercury can be removed, and at the same time, not spill*); wax, enough for putting over a small hole; crushed brick, enough for making a hole in a gold refiner's pot. Rabbi Yehudah said: enough for making a tripod. Bran, enough for putting on the mouth of a gold refiner's pot; lime, enough for smearing the smallest of girls. Rabbi Yehudah said: Enough to flatten the hairs on the temple. Rabbi Nechemiah said: enough for smearing on the forehead.

The *Gemora* asks: For a rope as well, let one be liable on account of as much as is required to make a hanger for a sifter or a sieve (*just as by reed-grass*)?

The *Gemora* answers: Since it cuts into the utensil, people do not make it like that (*and therefore the amount needed is that of making a handle for a basket*).

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: As for palm leaves, the standard is as much as is required for making a handle for a basket, one made from palm bark. As for palm bast, Others say: the standard is as much as is required for putting on the opening of a small funnel for straining wine. Grease, as much as is required for greasing under a small wafer. The *Gemora* notes that this (*the size of the wafer*) is as large as a *sela* (coin).

The *Gemora* asks: But it was taught in a *braisa*: As large as a dried fig?

The *Gemora* answers: Both are the same standard.

The *braisa* continues: Cotton, as much as is required for making a small ball. The *Gemora* notes that this (*the size of the ball*) is as large as a nut.

The *Mishna* had stated: Paper, large enough to write a tax-collector's receipt on it.

It was taught in a *braisa*: How much is a tax-collector's receipt? It is the size of two letters in Greek script (*which is larger than the standard Hebrew lettering*).

The *Gemora* asks that the following *braisa* contradicts this: If one carries out blank paper, the law is that if it is large enough for writing two letters on it, he is liable; if not, he is not liable? [*Seemingly, standard lettering is used as the minimum amount!?*]

Rav Sheishes said: What is meant by 'two letters'? It is two letters of a tax-collector's receipt.

Rava said: It means two (*small*) letters of ours, together with a margin for holding, which is the equivalent of a tax-collector's receipt.

The *Gemora* asks on Rava from a *braisa*: If one carries out erased paper or a paid loan document; if its blank portion (*the margin*) is large enough for two letters to be written on it, or if the entire paper is sufficient for wrapping around the opening of a small flask of balsam oil, he is liable; but if not, he is exempt. Now, as for Rav Sheishes, who explained that 'two letters' means two letters of a tax-collector's receipt, it is well (*for the same explanation holds true here as well*), but according to Rava, who said that it means two letters of ours together with a margin for holding, which is the equivalent of a tax-collector's receipt — surely here, no margin for holding is required (*for it can still be held by the erased or written portion*)?

The *Gemora* notes that this indeed is a difficulty.

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: If one carries out a tax-collector's receipt, the law is that if he carried it out before having shown it to the collector, he is liable (*for he still needs it*); but if it was after it was shown to the collector, he is not liable. [*The receipt of tax-exemption was issued by a higher authority and then shown to the actual collector. Once*



shown, he has no further use for it, and is therefore not liable for carrying it out.] Rabbi Yehudah said: Even after it was shown to the collector, he is still liable, because he still needs it.

The Gemora asks: What is the point of issue between them? [Why does R' Yehudah hold that it is still needed?]

Abaye said: They differ in respect to collectors' runners. [They would run after people to see if they actually paid the tax. R' Yehudah argues that the receipt must be shown to these 'runners'; while the Rabbis hold that he would merely return to the collector and receive another receipt.]

Rava said: They differ in respect to the chief collector and the subordinate collectors. [R' Yehudah holds that for this reason, the document is always required, and the Rabbis maintain that it is not needed, for he will rely on the fact that the chief collector will provide him with a password – establishing the truth that he indeed had paid.]

Rav Ashi said: They even differ in respect of one tax-collector, because he needs it (the document) to show to a second collector (at a different location), so that he can say to him, "See, I am a man who has paid his tax (and therefore deserve to be trusted)."

The Gemora cites a braisa: If one carries out a loan document, the law is that if it was before it has been paid, he is liable (for then, it is needed); but if it was after it has been paid, he is not liable. Rabbi Yehudah said: Even after it has been paid, he is liable, because he needs it.

The Gemora asks: What is the point of issue between them? [Why does R' Yehudah hold that it is still needed?]

Rav Yosef said: They differ as to whether it is forbidden for a lender to keep a settled loan document (out of concern that he might demand payment again). The Rabbis maintain that it is forbidden to keep a settled loan document (therefore it is of no value either to the creditor or to the debtor; consequently no liability is entailed in carrying it out), while Rabbi Yehudah holds that one may keep a settled loan

document.

Abaye said: All hold that a settled loan document may not be kept; but here they differ as to whether a loan document, where the debtor admits that it is genuine, must it be validated (by the borrower that the loan was not paid). The first Tanna holds that even when the debtor admits that the document was (validly) written, it must be confirmed. Rabbi Yehudah holds: When he admits that the document was (validly) written, it need not be confirmed (and even if the borrower claims that it was paid, he would not be believed; consequently, the document is of value, and the lender would be liable for carrying it out on Shabbos). And what is the meaning of (the braisa when it states) 'if before it has been paid' and 'if after it has been paid'? [It does not mean that he actually paid or did not pay.] It means: If the debtor claims that it has been paid, or not paid (respectively).

Rava said: All agree that even when the debtor admits that the document was (validly) written, it must be confirmed, but here they differ as to whether we write a receipt. [We are referring to a case where the loan document was validated in Beis Din, and the borrower is not believed to say that he paid. It is a case where he actually paid, but he did not receive the document from the lender. The argument is whether the lender is allowed to write a receipt to the borrower and then he will not be obligated to give the loan document itself, or perhaps, the borrower can claim that he wishes the loan document itself and not the receipt.] The first Tanna holds: We write a receipt (and therefore there is no necessity for the loan document; consequently, one who carries it out is not liable), while Rabbi Yehudah holds: A receipt is not written.

Rav Ashi said: Rabbi Yehudah's reason (in a case where the document was returned to the borrower after he paid the debt) is because he (the debtot) needs it to show to a second creditor, as he can say to him, "See, I am a man who repays" (and therefore, it still has value, and consequently, if he carries it on Shabbos, he is liable). (77b – 79a)