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Beitzah Daf 11

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

1. Rabbi Chanina maintains that when the principles of rov, the majority, and karov, close in proximity, conflict with each other, then we follow the principle of majority. Our Mishnah states that if one designated black doves prior to Yom Tov and on Yom Tov he found white ones, or if he designated white ones prior to Yom Tov and then on Yom Tov he found black ones, the doves that he found on Yom Tov are prohibited. Rabbah qualified this to mean that he designated black doves and white doves and on Yom Tov he found black doves where the white doves should have been and white ones where the black ones should have been. Instead of saying that the doves are the same ones that he designated and they changed location in the birdhouse, we say it is possible that the doves that he designated left and other doves came in their stead. This would be proof to the opinion of Rabbi Chanina that we follow the majority and we assume that the birds are like the majority of birds that came from somewhere else.

The Gemara rejects this supposition and maintains that the Mishnah refers to a case

where the birdhouse has a ledge where birds from other locations come to roost and thus all the birds, both on the ledge and inside the birdhouse, are in close proximity, but they are forbidden because we follow the majority of birds that are muktzeh. (10b)

2. We learned in the Mishnah on 10b that if one designated doves before Yom Tov and they were inside the birdhouse and then on Yom Tov he found them on the ledge in front of the birdhouse, they are prohibited. The Gemara again seeks to bring a proof to the opinion of Rabbi Chanina who maintains that when the principles of rov, the majority, and karov, close in proximity, conflict with each other, then we follow the principle of majority. In the case of the Mishnah, we say that the birds that are found on the ledge on Yom Tov are from the majority of birds and are prohibited.

Abaye rejects this proof and maintains that the Mishnah refers to a case where there is a ledge before the birdhouse, so even if the birds are from close by, we still say that they are forbidden, because the majority of all the birds are muktzeh.



Rava maintains that the Mishnah refers to a case where there are two pigeonholes, one above the other, and prior to Yom Tov he designated the birds of one pigeonhole. On Yom Tov he found some birds on the ledge before the pigeonhole that he had designated, so the birds that he found are prohibited, because we are concerned that the birds on the ledge are from the pigeonhole that was not designated. Thus, we are not following the majority. Rather, we assume that the doves come from the other pigeonhole. (11a)

3. The Mishnah stated that if prior to Yom Tov there were no birds near the birdhouse besides these, then we assume that the birds that he designated are the same ones that he found now, although he found the birds on Yom Tov on the ledge.

The Gemara establishes that the Mishnah refers to a case where there is another birdhouse within fifty amos of the first one, but the other birdhouse is situated in a way that it cannot be seen from the other birdhouse. One may have thought that the doves hopped from one birdhouse to the other because of their proximity, so the Mishnah therefore teaches us that we are not concerned for this, because a bird will only hop if it sees its pigeonhole. Since the birdhouses are fifty amos from each other,

there is no concern that the doves found on Yom Tov are from the other birdhouse. (11a)

4. Bais Shammai maintains that if an animal was far from the slaughterer's knife on Yom Tov, one cannot take the knife to the animal on Yom Tov because if he changes his mind and does not slaughter the animal, he will have exerted himself unnecessarily. Similarly, one cannot take the animal to the slaughterer and his knife on Yom Tov. Bais Hillel, however, maintains that one can bring the knife to the animal and one can take the animal to the knife. (11a)

5. Bais Shammai maintains that one cannot take spices and a pestle to a mortar on Yom Tov, and one cannot take a mortar to spices and a pestle, whereas Bais Hillel maintains that one is allowed to take one to the other. (11a)

6. Bais Shammai and Bais Hillel agree that one can salt meat over a hide on Yom Tov, although the salt will fall on the hide. The reason Bais Shammai agrees that this is permitted is because of joy on Yom Tov, for if one could not preserve the hide, he would not want to slaughter an animal on Yom Tov.

This ruling is qualified to mean that salting is permitted when one salts the meat for roasting, and one does not need to salt the meat to remove the blood. Rather, one merely salts the meat to give it taste. If one salts the meat for cooking, however, it is

forbidden, because cooking requires a large amount of salt. This qualification comes to teach us that even if one salted the meat for roasting, but he salted the meat as if he was going to be cooking the meat, it is forbidden. (11a)

7. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Shmuel that one can salt a few pieces of meat together on Yom Tov, despite the fact that he only needs one piece of meat on Yom Tov. The reason that this is permitted is because he is only exerting himself once.

Rav Adda bar Ahavah would salt one piece of meat on Yom Tov and then he would pretend that he had changed his mind and he would salt another piece of meat, and so on. The reason that this is permitted is because if people were not permitted to salt meat on Yom Tov to preserve the meat, they would not slaughter meat on Yom Tov because of the concern that the meat would spoil. (11b)

8. Bais Shammai maintains that one cannot bring challah and the Matnos Kehunah, the Priestly gifts of meat, to a Kohen on Yom Tov. There is no distinction whether the challah and gifts were separated prior to Yom Tov or if they were separated on Yom Tov. Despite the fact that the Chachamim permitted one to separate challah and the Priestly gifts on Yom Tov, they did not allow one to deliver them to the Kohen on Yom Tov. Bais Hillel, however, maintains that one can

deliver the challah and Priestly gifts to the Kohen on Yom Tov. (11b)

9. The reason that we need to be taught that a Kohen can replace his bandage on Shabbos or Yom Tov is because one would think that even if a Kohen is not performing the avodah – the service, he would be allowed to replace the bandage. For this reason it was necessary to state that the Chachamim only allowed a Kohen who will be performing the avodah to replace the bandage, because otherwise he may refrain from performing the avodah. A Kohen who is not performing the avodah, however, is prohibited from replacing the bandage on Shabbos or Yom Tov. (11b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Unnecessary Exertion

Bais Shammai rules that one is not allowed to take the knife to the animal on Yom Tov with the intention of slaughtering the animal. Bais Hillel disagrees and permits one to take the knife to the animal on Yom Tov. Rashi explains that the knife and the animal are far apart from each other. Bais Shammai maintains that since there is a possibility that the slaughterer might change his mind and not slaughter the animal, it would be deemed an unnecessary exertion on Yom Tov.

Rav Elchonon Wasserman hy" d wonders what the concern is according to Bais Shammai, because even if one decided not to slaughter the animal, nonetheless, when he held the knife, his intention was to slaughter the animal which at the time was a necessary act. If one was to cook food on Yom Tov and subsequently he was to decide not to eat it, he certainly would not be liable retroactively for cooking on Yom Tov. Rabbah maintains that if one cooks food on Yom Tov with the intention of eating after Yom Tov, he would not be liable because guests may arrive at his house on Yom Tov and he will offer them to eat from the food that he had cooked. This ruling is true even if no guests arrived, and it is clear that if he intended to cook for guests, he will not be violating a prohibition, regardless of the guests arriving or not. Why, then, is there a concern in our case that he may change his mind and not slaughter the animal?

Rav Menachem Kohn zt"l in his sefer Ateres Avi suggests that perhaps there is a distinction between the melacha of cooking and the prohibition of one exerting himself unnecessarily on Yom Tov. The Torah permits one to perform melachos on Yom Tov that are necessary in the act of food preparation. The act of cooking is completely permitted on Yom Tov and even if the food was subsequently not eaten, we will say that retroactively, one is liable for cooking on Yom Tov. With regard to the prohibition of one unnecessarily exerting

himself on Yom Tov, however, the Chachamim only permitted one to exert himself regarding the preparation of food. If we see that retroactively his exertion was not for the preparation of food, then we will deem his act as an unnecessary exertion and for this reason, Bais Shammai was concerned that the one slaughtering the animal would change his mind and not slaughter the animal, thus exerting himself unnecessarily.

DAILY MASHAL

No Ignorance on Yom Tov

Rashi writes that *amei haaretz*, ignorant people, despite the fact that they are suspected of laxity in observing the laws of taharah, ritual purity, on a Yom Tov they are not suspected of being lax, and if an *am haaretz* touched food on Yom Tov, it does not become tamei. We find that an *am haaretz* is believed on Shabbos to say that he tithed produce, as even an ignorant Jew is in awe of Shabbos.

We should utilize the Shabbos and the Yomim Tovim for Torah study, as even ignorant Jews are on a higher spiritual plane on these holy days, so certainly one who studies Torah on these holy days will be greatly uplifted.