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Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Introduction to Maseches Eiruv

With the conclusion of Maseches *Shabbos*, we now turn our attention to Maseches Eiruv, which focuses primarily on two aspects of *hilchos Shabbos*. The first is the four domains (*reshuyos*) of *Shabbos*, and the prohibition against carrying from one domain to the other. Even in places where the Torah permits carrying, there is an extensive body of Rabbinic decrees that govern how the streets and alleyways must be prepared in order to carry therein. The second aspect is the prohibition against walking beyond the *techum Shabbos* – the perimeter of two thousand *amos* around one’s home or his city. The *Gemora* further discusses the placement of *eiruvei techumin*, which would allow one to walk farther, under certain conditions.

Two eiruv: The title of the Masechta, Eiruv, is the plural form of the word *eiruv*. It refers to the two categories discussed herein: *eiruvei chatzeiros* – which permit one to carry in the courtyards, and *eiruvei techumin* – which permit one to walk farther than two thousand *amos*.

Lechi and Korah: In order to understand the *halachic* discussions of our Sages in this Masechta, it is important first to get a clear picture of how the streets and alleyways were designed in their times. Generally, the main streets of the city (*reshus harabim*) branched off into a number of dead-end alleyways (*mavoi*). The alleyways opened on either side into a number of courtyards (*chatzeir*), each courtyard containing a number of houses. The dead-end alleyways were surrounded by three walls. Therefore, according to most Rishonim they were considered to be *reshus hayachid* (*private domain*), in which the Torah permits carrying.

Nevertheless, our Sages required the alleyways to be affixed with a *lechi* or *korah* at the end of their fourth, open side. The *lechi*, an upright pole, creates a fourth wall of sorts, while the *korah*, a crossbar across the top of the alley, serves as a reminder to prevent people from carrying from the alley into the main street (*some opinions hold that lechi also serves as a ‘reminder’, and not as a wall*).

Eiruvei chatzeiros: Even after the *lechi* or *korah* is affixed, this is still insufficient to permit carrying in the courtyards and alleyways. Our Sages required yet another condition, known as *eiruvei chatzeiros* (literally, the mingling of the courtyards) and *shitufei mevo’os* (*partnership of the alleyway*). In order to carry in a courtyard, all the residents of the courtyard must take common ownership of a loaf of bread, and place it in one of the houses in the courtyard. The courtyard is thereby considered to house one communal group, as opposed to a number of distinct individuals. It becomes, in a way, like a private home that houses one family, and therefore it is permitted to carry there. Similarly, in order to carry in the alleyway, the residents of the courtyards attached to the alley must take common ownership of a piece of food. Although the details of the *eiruvei chatzeiros* and *shitufei mevo’os* differ slightly, they are based on the same principle.

Eiruv wires: In the common vernacular, we are accustomed to calling the wires that surround Jewish communities as “the *eiruv*.” In truth, this is a misnomer. *Eiruv* really means the collective ownership of a loaf of bread that allows carrying in an enclosed courtyard. The wires that surround the community are halachic “walls” known as *tzuross hapesach* (shapes of doorways). In many areas wherein the Torah requires walls to be constructed: carrying on *Shabbos*, building a Sukkah, separating different plants to prevent



kilayim and so on, the Torah suffices with a *tzuras hapesach*. By constructing two posts on either side and a crossbeam or wire above them, we consider this “door” to function as a wall. The wires around the community actually form *tzuros hapesach*, which enclose the community into one giant “courtyard.” Then by means of the *eiruv*, often a box of matzos kept in the shul, one may carry within the confines of the wires. (It is important to note that the Rambam does not hold that *tzuros hapesach* are sufficient to permit carrying. See Shulchan Aruch 365:9).

Obviously, this is only a rudimentary outline. The details of each of these concepts, and the underlying principles that define them are discussed at length in the *Gemora*.

Summary of the chapters before us: Maseches Eiruv consists of ten chapters.

- The first chapter discusses the walls that surround the domains of *Shabbos*, the limited efficacy of *lechi* and *korah* to permit carrying in an alleyway, and the efficacy of *tzuros hapesach* even when *lechi* and *korah* are insufficient.
- The second chapter continues to develop these concepts, and introduces *pasei bira'os* (posts around water pits), which permit drawing water for animals. Also discussed here is the *karfaf*: a large, enclosed area, which was not enclosed with intention to live therein. Our Sages limited to some extent how we may carry in a *karfaf*.
- The third chapter begins the discussion of *eiruv techumin*, which permit one to carry beyond the two-thousand *amos* perimeter of the city.
- The fourth chapter develops *techumin* further, by discussing the halachos of a person who has passed beyond the boundary, and also the halachos of how an *eiruv tachumin* must be set.
- The fifth chapter also discusses the halachos of a person who has passed beyond the boundary, and discusses how exactly the boundary line should be drawn around a city.
- The sixth chapter discusses how to make an *eiruv chatzeiros* when one of the courtyard’s residents is a

gentile, and what to do if one of the Jewish neighbors forgot to participate in the *eiruv*.

- In the seventh chapter, the boundaries that surround the courtyards and separate one from another are discussed, as well as what foods are acceptable for use in an *eiruv*, how much food is necessary, when an *eiruv* is unnecessary, and with whom it is permitted to make an *eiruv*.
- The eighth chapter details additional conditions in regard to *eiruv techumin* and *eiruv chatzeiros*.
- The ninth chapter discusses which areas do not require *eiruv chatzeiros*, and some details of halachically-defined walls.
- The tenth and final chapter discusses certain specifics of carrying on *Shabbos*, including what to do if one finds *tefillin* outside, and how to bring them to a safe place.

Mishna

- *Acceptable dimensions of the height of the korah and width of the mavoi.*

1) The *Mishna* cites an argument if a *korah* (a crossbeam that functions as an adjustment to the courtyard allowing one to carry within the courtyard) placed higher than twenty *amos* in a *mavoi* must be lowered (*Tanna Kamma*) or not (*R' Yehudah*).

2) A *mavoi* wider than ten *amos* must be narrowed.

3) If the *mavoi* has a *tzuras hapesach* (form of a doorway), it does not need to be narrowed even if it is wider than ten *amos*. (2a)

Terminology of the Mishna: “Lower” vs. “passul”

Our *Mishna* states that if the *korah* of a *mavoi* is higher than twenty *amos*, one must diminish the height of the *korah* until it is within twenty *amos*. The *Mishna* in the beginning of *Sukkah*, by contrast, states that if the *schach*, covering, of a *sukkah* is higher than twenty *amos*, then the *sukkah* is *passul*, invalid. Rabbi Yehudah says that it is valid. Now where lies the difference [between the two cases that] in respect of the *sukkah* it was ruled: ‘invalid’, while in respect of the *mavoi*, a remedy was indicated?



The *Gemora* offers two reasons for this distinction in terms. One reason is that the obligation to make a *sukkah* is biblical and the term *passul*, invalid, is appropriate for a commandment that was given to Moshe at Sinai. *Mavoi*, however, is rabbinic in origin, and the term *passul* would not apply to a rabbinic decree.

Alternatively, the *Tanna* of the *Mishna* in *Sukkah* also could have employed a term denoting a rectification of the situation, but since the laws of *sukkah* are numerous, the *Tanna* chose to use a term that would be consistent throughout the discussion regarding the laws of *sukkah*, so the *Tanna* employed the term *passul*. With regard to *mavoi*, however, there are very few laws to discuss, so the *Tanna* used a term that explains how to rectify the situation, and therefore the *Tanna* here said *yima'et*, one should diminish the height of the *korah*. (2a)

• *Rav's explanation of the argument between Tanna Kamma and R' Yehudah. Includes:*

- *Discussion whether the Heichal and Ulam are one kedushah or two.*
- *The terms "mishkan" and "mikdash" are interchangeable.*
- *The height of the curtains of the Chatzer (five amos or fifteen amos), and the width of its entranceway.*
- *R' Yehudah argues on the second halachah of the Mishna, and allows a width of greater than ten amos for the mavoi.*
- *Discussion if R' Yehudah allows the korah to be higher than even forty amos.*

Rav Yehudah said in the name of Rav: *Tanna Kamma* derives the height of an entranceway from the *Heichal*, which was twenty *amos* tall, whereas Rabbi Yehudah learns it from the height of the *Ulam*, which was forty *amos* tall. The *Mishna* in *Middos* states that the entranceway to the *Heichal*, the Sanctuary, was twenty *amos* high and ten *amos* wide, and the entranceway to the *Ulam*, the Antechamber, was forty *amos* high and twenty *amos* wide.

[Now, the verse refers to the entranceway of the *Ohel Mo'ed/Heichal* as a "*pesach*," so from there we know the acceptable dimensions of an entranceway. The *Gemora* offers two ways to explain the argument: Either the issue revolves around the question if the *Heichal* and *Ulam* were two different sanctities or one, or both opinions agree that they are two sanctities; the disagreement centers on whether a verse exists that refers to the entranceway of the *Ulam* as a "*pesach*."] And both based their expositions on the same text: And slaughter it at the entrance of the *Ohel Moed*; the Rabbis being of the opinion that the sanctity of the *Heichal* is distinct [from that of the *Ulam*] and that of the *Ulam* is distinct from [that of the *Heichal*], so that the mention of 'the entrance of the *Ohel Moed*' must refer to the *Heichal* only. Rabbi Yehudah, however, is of the opinion that the *Heichal* and the *Ulam* have the same degree of sanctity so that the mention of 'the entrance of the *Ohel Moed*' refers to both of them. If you prefer I might say: According to Rabbi Yehudah's view also the sanctity of the *Heichal* is distinct from that of the *Ulam*, but the reason for Rabbi Yehudah's ruling here is because it is written: To the entrance of the Antechamber of the House. And the Rabbis? If it has been written: 'To the entrance of the Antechamber' [the implication would indeed have been] as you suggested; now, however, that the text reads: 'To the entrance of the Antechamber of the House', [the meaning is the entrance of] the house that opens into the Antchamber.

The *Gemara* asks: But is not this text written in connection with the Tabernacle/*Mishkan*? — The *Gemora* proceeds to demonstrate that the terms "*Mikdash*" and "*Mishkan*" are interchangeable, so the "*pesach ohel mo'ed*" refers to the entranceway of the *Heichal*. Proof of this is a statement of Rav Yehudah in the name of Shmuel, who said that a *korban shelamim*, peace-offering, that was slaughtered in the morning before the opening of the gates of the *Heichal*, is invalid, as regarding the offering of *shelamim* it is said: *and he shall slaughter it at the entranceway of the Tabernacle*. The term *entranceway* implies that one can slaughter the offering only when the gates are open, and not when they are closed. Although the verse is written with regard to the *Mishkan*, we can still derive a law concerning the *Mikdash* from this verse, as we find in Scripture that *Mikdash* is called

Mishkan and *Mishkan* is referred to as *Mikdash*. We find that *Mikdash* is called *Mishkan* because it is said, *and I will place my Mikdash, Tabernacle, in your midst*. Hashem made this promise to the Jewish People with regard to the Temple that would be built in the future, and this promise was made when the *Mishkan* had already been built in the desert. From where, however, do we infer that the *Mishkan* was called *Mikdash*? If it be suggested: From the Scriptural text: And the Kehasites the bearers of the *Mikdash* set forward that the *Mishkan* might be set up against their coming, that [surely] was written in respect of the [Holy] Ark. — Rather, we find that *Mishkan* is called *Mikdash* because it is said: *and they shall make for Me a Mikdash and I shall dwell in their midst*. The commandment refers to building the *Mishkan* in the desert, yet Scripture refers to the *Mishkan* as the *Mikdash*. (2a – 2b)

Rav's explanation is challenged from a verse that describes the entranceway of the *Chatzer*, the Courtyard, as a "pesach," which the *Gemora* calculates was twenty *amos* wide!

The *Gemora* asks that according to both the Chachamim and Rabbi Yehudah, who base their opinions on verses that discuss entranceways to the *Heichal* or to the *Ulam*, why do we not derive from the verse that states regarding the entranceway of the Courtyard of the *Mishkan* that a *korah* is valid even if the entranceway is more than ten *amos* wide. Just like the courtyard had curtains of fifteen *amos* on each side of the gateway to the courtyard, thus leaving twenty *amos* of open space, so too concerning a *mavoi*, we should say that a *korah* that is adjusted over an opening five *amos* high and twenty *amos* wide should be valid. The implication of the *Mishna* is that the opening of the *mavoi* must be diminished even if the *korah* is no more than five *amos* high. If this is so, then the width of the *mavoi* should be until twenty *amos*, similar to the width of the entranceway of the Courtyard of the *Mishkan*?

The *Gemora* answers that with regard to the Courtyard of the *Mishkan*, the term used is 'the entranceway of the Gateway of the Courtyard,' but it is not called just 'entranceway.'

An alternative answer to the *Gemora's* question that we derive the width of the *mavoi* from the entranceway of the Courtyard of the *Mishkan* is that when the Torah states *curtains fifteen amos for the shoulder*, this refers to the height of the curtains that were fifteen *amos* high. [We therefore have no way of determining how wide the entranceway to the gateway of the Courtyard of the *Mishkan* was.] Although the verse states explicitly that the curtains were five *amos* high, the *Gemora* explains that the five *amos* mentioned in the verse refer to the five *amos* from the upper edge of the Altar and above. [To assure privacy to the Kohen performing the service in the *Beis Hamikdash*, the curtains rose five *amos* above the height of the *Mizbei'ach*, which was ten *amos* high. This is the meaning of the verse that states that the curtains were fifteen *amos* high.]

Rabbi Yehudah disagrees with the Chachamim regarding the height of the *korah* and with regard to the width of the *mavoi*.

We learned previously that Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one is not required to diminish the height of the *korah* when it is above twenty *amos* and Rabbi Yehudah derives his ruling from the entranceway to the *Ulam* that was forty *amos* high. Now, the entranceway to the *Ulam* was twenty *amos* wide, yet we do not see that Rabbi Yehudah disagrees with the Chachamim regarding the law that if the entranceway to the *mavoi* is wider than ten *amos*, it must be diminished. Apparently, even Rabbi Yehudah agrees that a *korah* in a *mavoi* that is more than ten *amos* wide is invalid?

Abaye answers that in a *braisa* Rabbi Yehudah argues with the Chachamim even with regard to the width of the *mavoi*, and Rabbi Yehudah maintains that one need not diminish the width of the *mavoi* entranceway if the entranceway is more than ten *amos* wide. Although this argument is not mentioned explicitly in the *Mishna*, from the fact that Rabbi Yehudah is quoted in the *braisa* as arguing with the Chachamim, we assume that he also disagreed with the Chachamim in the *Mishna*. (2b)

Rabbi Yehudah derives the ruling that there is no maximum height for a *korah* in a *mavoi* from the entranceways to kings' palaces.

We have learned that Rabbi Yehudah derives his ruling that one need not diminish the height of the *korah* when it is more than twenty *amos* because the height of the *Ulam* was forty *amos*. The *Gemora* asks from a *braisa* that states that Rabbi Yehudah validates a *korah* that is up to forty or fifty *amos* high, and Bar Kappara taught that according to Rabbi Yehudah, the *korah* is avidly even if it is up to a hundred *amos* high. Now, according to Bar Kappara's statement, Rabbi Yehudah could very well limit the maximum height of the *korah* to forty *amos*, as he learns this ruling from the *Ulam* that was forty *amos* high. Bar Kappara's use of the term 'a hundred *amos* high' is merely an exaggeration. How are we meant to understand Rabbi Yehudah stating that the *korah* is valid even up to fifty *amos*, if the height of the *Ulam* was only forty *amos*?

The *Gemora* accepts the challenge and Rav Chisda states that Rav had misunderstood a *braisa* that states that if the *korah* is higher than twenty *amos*, it must be diminished to within twenty *amos*. Rav thought that since the Chachamim derive their law of twenty *amos* height from the height of the *Heichal*, Rabbi Yehudah also derived his law that the height of the *korah* can be up to forty *amos* from the height of the *Ulam*. Rav was mistaken, however, because Rabbi Yehudah derives his ruling from the entranceways to kings' palaces that are very high. (2b)

The doors of the *Heichal* served as a means of privacy.

The Chachamim derived from the entranceway to the *Heichal* their ruling that a *korah* higher than twenty *amos* is invalid. The *Gemora* asks that according to the Chachamim, we should extend further from the ruling that we derive from the *Heichal* that a *mavoi* should be required to have doors, similar to the *Heichal* that had doors. Yet we learn later that according to Beis Shammai, a *mavoi* requires a *lechi* and a *korah* at the entrance in order for one to carry inside the *mavoi*, and Beis Hillel maintains that a *lechi* or a *korah* are sufficient. Yet both opinions agree that there is no need for a *mavoi* to be equipped with doors.

The *Gemora* answers that the doors of the *Heichal* were made for the sake of privacy, as the Beis HaMikdash was a holy place. Therefore the doors of the *Heichal* would not qualify as conventional doors.

The *Gemora* asks: The entranceway of the *Heichal* had a *tzuras hapesach*, a doorway frame, yet its width was merely ten *amos*. If so, why does the *Mishna* allow a width of greater than ten *amos* with a *tzuras hapesach*?

The *Gemora* explains that Rav's text of the *Mishna* actually read: "If it had a *tzuras hapesach* and was wider than ten *amos*, one must (*nevertheless*) narrow it." (2b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Decree of a Mavoi

Rashi explains that the reason Chazal instituted the *halachah* of *korah* is because people would confuse a *mavoi* with a public domain. If carrying would be allowed in a *mavoi*, people would eventually come to carry in a public domain as well.

Rabbeinu Yehonasan says a different reason: Without the *korah*, people would carry from the *mavoi* into the public domain and vice versa. The *korah* serves to remind people where the border between the *mavoi* and public domain is, so they won't carry from one to the other.

Beis Meir (363:29) brings a practical *halachic* distinction between these two reasons: In a situation where the *mavoi* dead ends into the sea. According to Rabbeinu Yehonasan, the *mavoi* would not need a *korah*, because there is no reason to be concerned that anyone would come to carry from the *mavoi* into the sea or vice versa. Whereas according to Rashi, the *mavoi* would still require a *korah*, because people would confuse this *mavoi* also with a public domain.

DAILY MASHAL

Story on the Daf



The *Gemora* states that the terms *Mishkan* and *Mikdash* are interchangeable. One must wonder if the terms are interchangeable, why Scripture would not just employ one term, either always using the term *Mishkan* or always using the term *Mikdash*. An answer to this puzzle can be found with a story that occurred many years ago.

Rabbi Stein, an executive director of a well-known Yeshiva, rang the doorbell one evening at the Miller's home. Mr. Miller invited Rabbi Stein inside to partake of supper with Mr. Miller's family. Rabbi Stein began apologizing for interrupting the family, when Mr. Miller said, "Please, I am certain you are here for an important reason. How can I be of help to you?" Rabbi Stein explained that the yeshiva was in desperate need of funds, so Mr. Miller sent his son to bring his checkbook. After writing out a very generous check to the Yeshiva and handing it to Rabbi Stein, Rabbi Stein thanked Mr. Miller and rose to leave. "I would like to apologize again for coming at such an inconvenient time," Rabbi Stein said. "The opposite is true," declared Mr. Miller. "Let me share with you something. Reb Yitzchak Hutner of Yeshivas Chaim Berlin calls me from time to time asking for financial assistance for his Yeshiva. When Rav Hutner once called me while I was eating supper, I told Rav Hutner the following: I am very organized in my method of giving *tzedakah*. I set aside ten percent of my income and I distribute the funds systematically. I would probably give the Rosh HaYeshiva a donation even without the Rosh HaYeshiva calling me, but I actually appreciate the call. I would never interrupt my supper to pay a utility bill, but I will interrupt my supper to give *tzedakah*, because I feel that this is something that is every important for my children to witness. Rabi Stein, I must thank you too for ringing my doorbell as we were about to commence our supper. You could not have arrived at a better time."

This story teaches us that there is a *Mikdash*, a shul, a yeshiva, or any worthy Jewish organization, but there is also a *Mishkan*, from the generosity and beauty of performing the mitzvah of *tzedakah*, that allows the Divine Presence to reside in the homes of those who support the Torah.

Eiruv

The title of this Masechta, *Eiruv*, literally means, "mingling." It refers to the *mitzvah* for residents of a courtyard to join together by taking common ownership of a piece of bread, thereby allowing them to carry. The Talmud Yerushalmi (3:2) explains that our Sages instituted this practice in order to promote friendly relations between neighbors. Too often, neighbors bicker over senseless and trivial matters. Therefore, our Sages decreed that they must share their food together and cooperate in creating an *eiruv*, thereby fostering good relations and fulfilling the *passuk*, "Its ways are ways of pleasantness, and all its paths are peace," (Mishlei 3:17).

Mishkan and Mikdash

The *Gemora* tells us that the titles *Mishkan* and *Mikdash* are interchangeable. The *Mishkan* that was built in the Desert is also called a *Mikdash*, and the Beis HaMikdash in Yerushalayim is also a *Mishkan*.

The Avnei Nezer explained that these two titles refer to two distinct functions. '*Mishkan*' stems from the word *shochein*, which means to dwell, similar to the word, '*Shechinah*.' It is the dwelling place for Hashem, to the extent that He reveals Himself in this lowest of worlds. '*Mikdash*' stems from the word *kadosh*, which means sanctified. It is the place where the Jewish people gather together to serve Hashem, thereby sanctifying ourselves. These two functions in essence are one. To the extent that we sanctify ourselves by performing *mitzvos* and abstaining from *aveiros*, Hashem's glory is revealed in the world (Shem MeShmuel, Parshas Vayikra).