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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

[The Gemora (above 54b) had inquired: When the Rabbis decreed the lands of the nations to be *tamei*, was it because of the airspace (they wanted people to remain in Eretz Yisroel), or was it on account of the ground (there were graves that were unmarked)?]

The Gemora attempts to demonstrate that this question is in fact a matter of the following Tannaic dispute: If one enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, Rebbe rules that he is *tamei* and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that he is *tahor*. Let us say that Rebbe maintains that the decree was because of the airspace (and although he is inside a box, he is still regarded as being in the airspace of the land of the nations) and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that the *tumah* is on account of the ground (and being inside of the box serves as a barrier between him and the unmarked graves).

The Gemora rejects this comparison: The Tannaim both hold that the *tumah* is on account of the ground. Their dispute is as follows: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that a moving *ohel* (roof) is considered an *ohel* and therefore it will prevent the *tumah* of the land from rendering the person *tamei*. Rebbe maintains that a moving *ohel* (roof) is not considered an *ohel* and therefore it will not prevent the *tumah* of the land from rendering the person *tamei*.

The Gemora asks on this explanation: We learned in the following *braisa*: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah said: If a box is full of utensils and someone throws it over

a corpse in a tent, it becomes *tamei*, whereas if it were resting on the ground, it remains *tahor*. [Evidently, he holds that a moving *ohel* is not regarded as an *ohel* and that is why the box and its contents will be rendered *tamei*!]

It must therefore be that they both hold that the *tumah* is on account of the airspace. They argue regarding the following: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that since traveling inside a chest is uncommon, the Rabbis did not intend for the decree to apply in such a situation. Rebbe holds that although it is unusual, the Rabbis decreed *tumah* in this case as well.

The Gemora cites a supporting *braisa*: If a person enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, he remains *tahor*, but if he enters in a wagon, boat, or a ship with a mast, he becomes *tamei*. [The *braisa* distinguishes between a usual form of traveling, such as a wagon or a boat, and an unusual method, such as inside a chest or closet.]

Alternatively, we can answer that they both hold that the *tumah* is on account of the ground and their dispute is regarding the concern that he might put his head and most of his body out from the box (Rebbe is concerned and Rabbi Yosi is not).

The Gemora cites a supporting *braisa*: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah said: If a person enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, he remains

*tahor* unless he puts his head and most of his body out from the box. (55a)

### **Nazir and Metzora**

The *Mishna* had stated: If the *nazir* becomes *tamei*, he can start counting right away (immediately after he concludes the purification process). [The *Mishna's halacha* is referring to the case where a *nazir* became a *metzora*. There are times when it was unclear if the person was indeed inflicted with *tzaraas*. He was then kept in isolation for one or two weeks until the *Kohen* could decide if he was a *metzora* or *tahor*. Once the *tzaraas* goes away, the *metzora* gets sprinkled from the blood of a bird together with water. Afterwards, he is required to have all the hair on his body shaved with a razor. He then immerses in a *mikvah*, counts seven days, and on the seventh day shaves again and immerses himself in a *mikvah*. On the next day, he brings the special *korbanos* and becomes *tahor*. The *Mishna* mentioned two cases of a *metzora*. When the *Mishna* said, "the days that a *metzora* is counting," that is referring to the seven days which are in between his two "shavings." When the *Mishna* said, "the days that he is closeted," that is referring to the time after the *Kohen* declared that he was a *metzora* until the *tzaraas* went away.]

Rav Chisda said: The *Mishna's halacha* only applies with respect to a short *nezirus* (thirty days), however, with respect to a long *nezirus*, these days (the days that a *metzora* is counting or the days that he is closeted) are included in his counting (towards his *nezirus* term). [The explanation is as follows: Rav Chisda holds that the reason that a *nazir* who becomes a *metzora* cannot count those days towards his *nezirus* is not because the *tzaraas* is in conflict with the *nezirus*; rather, it is because of the shaving. A *nazir* cannot complete his *nezirus* without having a thirty-day growth of hair. He must therefore count another thirty days after he shaves for the second time, and only then, can he conclude his *nezirus*. If,

however, he declared a long *nezirus* upon himself, he would not necessarily be required to wait another thirty days after his purification process. If, for example, he declared to be a *nazir* for one hundred days and he became a *metzora* after twenty days, the days that he is a *metzora* can be included in the one hundred days of his *nezirus*, for he has thirty days of hair growth after his purification process is complete.]

Rav Sheravya asks from our *Mishna*, which stated that he does not have to redo the days of *nezirus* that he had already observed and he can start counting right away. Now, if the *Mishna* is referring to a case of a thirty-day *nezirus*, how can it rule that he does not forfeit the days that he had already observed? He needs to count another thirty days in order for him to have a thirty-day growth of hair! It must be referring to a case where he declared a long *nezirus*, but the *Mishna* states that he can start counting right away. [This implies that the days of *tzaraas* are not counted towards his term of *nezirus*. This is direct contrast to Rav Chisda's ruling!]

Rav Sheravya himself answers the question: The *Mishna* is referring to a case where he declared to be a *nazir* for fifty days, and he became a *metzora* after twenty days. He must undergo the purification process for a *metzora* and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair. (55a – 55b)

### **INSIGHTS TO THE DAF**

#### ***Merely Growing his Hair***

Rav Sheravya asks from our *Mishna*, which stated that he does not have to redo the days of *nezirus* that he had already observed and he can start counting right away. Now, if the *Mishna* is referring to a case of a thirty-day *nezirus*, how can it rule that he does not forfeit the days that he had already observed? He needs to count another thirty days in order for him to have a thirty-day growth of



hair! It must be referring to a case where he declared a long *nezirus*, but the *Mishna* states that he can start counting right away. [This implies that the days of *tzaraas* are not counted towards his term of *nezirus*. This is direct contrast to Rav Chisda's ruling!]

Rav Sheravya himself answers the question: The *Mishna* is referring to a case where he declared to be a *nazir* for fifty days, and he became a *metzora* after twenty days. He must undergo the purification process for a *metzora* and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

Tosfos notes that the *Gemora* could have stated a case where he declared to be a *nazir* for forty days, and he became a *metzora* after ten days. He must undergo the purification process for a *metzora* and then he counts another thirty days, for then he will have a thirty-day growth of hair.

The Brisker Rav asks: Couldn't the *Mishna* be referring to a case where he declared to be a *nazir* for one hundred days, and he became a *metzora* after seventy days. He would not forfeit the original days, and the days that he was a *metzora* will not count towards his *nezirus*, for he needs to have a thirty-day growth of hair. When the purification process is completed, he will be compelled to count another thirty days!

He answers that if there are not thirty days remaining from the time that the purification process is completed, the days that he was a *metzora* will not count at all, and the days that he observes afterwards will be days of an actual *nezirus*; not only days where he is growing his hair. This is true only if he did not have a fulfillment of thirty days before he became a *metzora*; however, if he became a *metzora* after thirty days, then even if when the purification process is completed, he does not have thirty days remaining, the days that he was a *metzora* counts towards the *nezirus*, and the days of waiting afterwards

are merely days where he is growing his hair. They are not regarded as days of *nezirus*!

## DAILY MASHAL

### *Leaving Eretz Yisroel*

The *Gemora* cited a *braisa*: If one enters the land of the nations inside of a carriage, chest or closet, Rebbe rules that he is *tamei* and Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that he is *tahor*.

The *Gemora* suggested that the basis for their argument is as follows: Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Yehudah holds that since traveling inside a chest is uncommon, the Rabbis did not intend for the decree to apply in such a situation. Rebbe holds that although it is unusual, the Rabbis decreed *tumah* in this case as well.

The question is asked: How can this be their argument? Do we not find all throughout *Gemora* that the Rabbis did not intend that their decree should be applicable in cases that are uncommon? We do not find any *Tanna* that disagrees with this principle! Why in this specific case would they dispute this well-established principle?

The *Mishna* L'melech answers: In this case, the Rabbis decreed a *tumah* on anyone entering the land of the nations, even if they enter in an unusual manner. This is because they wished to prevent people from leaving *Eretz Yisroel*. Their original decree was on all situations!