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DAF Notes
Insights into the Daily Daf
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Shabbos Daf 102

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o"h

Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o"h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishna

One who throws an object four *amos* in a public domain and remembered that it was *Shabbos* before the object hit the ground, and someone else or a dog caught it, or it was burned, the thrower is exempt.

When one throws an object four *amos* in a public domain and it is intercepted by another person or a dog, the thrower is exempt because he only made an *akirah*, an uprooting of the object, whereas the *hanachah*, the placement of the object, was performed by the interceptor. This is considered an act performed by two people and both are exempt. When the dog intercepts the object, the thrower is exempt because the dog's mouth is less than four *tefachim* and thus it is not considered a *hanachah*. Similarly, if the object landed in a furnace whose opening is less than four *tefachim*, the thrower is also exempt.

One who throws an object with the intent of wounding a person or an animal, and before inflicting the wound, he remembers it was *Shabbos*, he is exempt.

One is forbidden to wound a person or animal on *Shabbos*. If he throws an object in a private domain or in a *karmelis*, however, and the beginning was done inadvertently and in the end the thrower was aware that it was *Shabbos* and that he was desecrating the *Shabbos*, he is exempt from a chatas offering.

This is the rule: One is only liable a *chatas* offering if the beginning and end of his act were done inadvertently. If the beginning was done inadvertently but the end was done deliberately, or if the beginning was done deliberately but the end was done inadvertently, he is exempt, unless the beginning and end of his act were done inadvertently.

To be liable a *chatas* offering for desecrating the *Shabbos*, one must have performed the forbidden act inadvertently from beginning to end. If the beginning of the act was inadvertent and the end of the act was deliberate, or if the beginning of the act was deliberate and the end of the act was inadvertent, the person is exempt. In the case when the thrower was aware that he had desecrated the *Shabbos* before the object struck his intended target, he is exempt from a *chatas* offering. (102a)

Remembering in the Middle

[*The Mishna had stated: One who throws an object four amos in a public domain and remembered that it was Shabbos before the object hit the ground, and someone else or a dog caught it, or it was burned, the thrower is exempt.*] The *Gemora* infers from here that if it landed (*after he remembered that it was Shabbos*), he is liable. The *Gemora* therefore asks: But surely he did not remind himself, and we learned in our *Mishna*: One is only liable a *chatas* offering if the beginning and end of his act were done inadvertently!?

Rav Kahana answers: The last clause (*where the Mishna stated the rule*) is applicable to a clamp and a cord. [*The Mishna's rule regarding the non-liability to a chatas refers only to one who throws a clamp (around the barrels which are hung on the sides of animal used for transporting barrels of wine) while retaining the cord in his hand. If he retracts before it reaches the ground, he can pull it back; therefore, if he does not pull it back the end (its landing) is deliberate (and he would not be liable for a chatas). However, if the object has*

left his hand entirely and he cannot prevent its falling, the end too is regarded as inadvertent. Accordingly, the Mishna's addition of the fellow's "remembering" is not really relevant; it merely comes to teach us that even if he did remember that it was Shabbos, he is only exempt if someone else intercepted it, or it landed in the mouth of a dog.]

The *Gemora* asks: A clamp and a cord, you say? But isn't the object still in his hand (*and when one does not leave go of the object being thrown, it is not regarded as a transfer, and he would not be liable – even if it would be completely inadvertent*)?

The *Gemora* answers: It (*the Mishna's rule*) refers to a case where he intended to inflict a wound (*and the fact that he is still holding on to it makes no difference*).

The *Gemora* asks: But this too we learned in our *Mishna*: One who throws an object with the intent of wounding a person or an animal, and before inflicting the wound, he remembers it was *Shabbos*, he is exempt?

Rather, said Rava: It (*the Mishna's rule*) refers to a case where one who carries (*an object four amos in a public domain; since he can stop before he has traversed four amos, the entire act must be performed inadvertently in order to be liable to a chatas*).

The *Gemora* asks: But the statement (*of the Mishna*): 'this is the rule,' is stated with reference to throwing (*and not to carrying*)?

Rather, said Rava: Two teachings are taught (*in the first clause*), as follows: If one throws an object (*four amos in a public domain*) and remembered (*that it was Shabbos*) after it left his hand *(before the object hit the ground*), or even if he does not remember (*that it was Shabbos*), but someone else or a dog caught it, or it was burned, the thrower is exempt. [*According to this explanation, one is exempt from a chatas if he remembered that it was Shabbos before the act was completed – even if he could not retract it.*]

Rav Ashi said: It is as if the *Mishna* is missing words, and it is teaching, as follows: If one throws an object (*four amos in a public domain*) and remembered (*that it was Shabbos*) after it left his hand *(before the object hit the ground*), and someone else or a dog caught it, or it was burned, the thrower is exempt, but if it would have landed, he still would have been liable. When are those words said? That is only if he forgot again (*that it was Shabbos*), but if he did not forget again (*i.e., it landed without him forgetting again*), he is not liable, because one is only liable a *chatas* offering if the beginning and end of his act were done inadvertently. [*Rav Ashi maintains that merely remembering that it was Shabbos as the object was in mid-flight will not exempt him from a chatas; it is only if that knowledge remained with him until it landed. If, however, he forgot again before it landed, he will be liable to a chatas.*] (102a)

Two Amos Deliberately inside of Four

There is a dispute regarding one who transfers an object in a public domain where the first two *amos* he carried the object inadvertently, the next two *amos* he carried deliberately, and the final two *amos* he carried the object inadvertently.

When one transfers an object in a public domain, and the first two *amos* are transferred inadvertently, the second two *amos* are transferred deliberately, and the final two *amos* are transferred inadvertently, there is a dispute if he is exempt or not.

Rabbah maintains that he is exempt, and his reasoning is as follows: We will learn later (105a) that there is a dispute regarding one who was unaware that it was *Shabbos*, then he wrote one letter, became aware that he had desecrated the *Shabbos*, then forgot that it was *Shabbos*, and wrote a second letter next to the first letter. Rabban Gamliel maintains that the writer is liable while the Chachamim maintain that he is exempt. Rabban Gamliel reasons that *ain yediah lechatzi shiur*, there is no awareness for half a measure, and since the person was only aware that he wrote one letter, this awareness is not considered an awareness to exempt him from the complete performance of writing two letters. Rabban Gamliel only maintains this opinion in that case

where the person completed the writing inadvertently. With regard to our case of transferring in a public domain, however, where the person completed the four *amos* transfer of an object deliberately, Rabban Gamliel exempts the person because the person was aware of his transgression at the time he completed the act. The *Gemora* explains that this opinion maintains that the transfer occurred carrying the object four *amos* in a public domain, not throwing the object. Once the object is thrown, we view the entire act as one complete inadvertent act, as the thrower can no longer prevent the object from being thrown further. With regard to carrying the object, however, we say that since he can stop after carrying the object four *amos*, the act is completed when the object has been carried four *amos*.

Rava maintains, however, he is liable for the transfer. The Chachamim maintained with regard to writing the letters that *yeish yediah lechatzi shiur*, there is awareness for half a measure. Nonetheless, we say that the Chachamim only held this view with regard to writing one letter while unaware of *Shabbos* and the transgression, and then becoming aware, and then forgetting again and writing the second letter inadvertently. This is because concerning writing, it was in the writer's control to not write the second letter so we say that the second stage of unawareness renders the writing of the second letter inadvertently a separate act, thus preventing him from being liable a *chatas* offering. With regard to the transfer, that the *Gemora* explains refers to throwing an object, he is liable, because once he throws the object, it no longer in his control to prevent the object from traveling four *amos*. His awareness that he violated the *Shabbos* after he threw the object does not divide the first two *amos* thrown and the last two *amos* thrown into an act performed inadvertently. (102a)

Intercepted!

Rava states: One who throws an object in a public domain and the object lands in a dog's mouth or is burned by fire, the thrower is liable a *chatas*.

We learned in our *Mishna* that one who throws an object in a public domain and the object is intercepted by another person or a dog, the thrower is exempt because the object did not land in an area of four *tefachim* wide. In that case, the thrower did not intend that the object should be intercepted. In a case where the thrower intended that the object land in the dog's mouth or in the opening of a furnace, then the intended area where the object will land is considered to be an area that is four *tefachim* wide.

Rav Bibi bar Abaye cites a *Mishna* as proof to this: One can eat once and be liable four *chatas* offerings and one *asham* offering. If a person who is *tamei* eats *cheilev*, (*forbidden fats of an animal that was slaughtered*) and the fats were *nossar* (*left over from kodoshim, consecrated sacrifices*), and the eating occurred on *Yom Kippur*, he will be liable four *chatas* offerings and one *asham* offering. He is liable for the prohibition of a *tamei* eating food that is consecrated, for eating *cheilev*, for eating *nossar*, and for eating on *Yom Kippur*. He is also liable an *asham* offering because he has been *mo'el behekdesh*, using consecrated property illegally. Rabbi Meir maintains that if the act occurred on *Shabbos* and he carried the food in his mouth outside, he is liable for transgressing the *Shabbos*. Rabi Meir maintains that although he has violated the prohibition of carrying on *Shabbos*, eating catalyzed the sin. The Chachamim, however, maintain that the sin is carrying and not related to the eating.

Rav Bibi asks: But why is this so? Surely this is not the normal way of carrying out? You must say that since he intended (*to eat the food while walking*), his intent renders it (*his mouth*) a (*normal*) place (*for transferring*); so here (*by the thrower*) too, since he intended (*for this; i.e., that the object should land in the dogs mouth or the fire*), his intent renders it (*the mouth of the dog or of the furnace*) a place (*as if it would be four tefachim*). [*When one carries food outside on Shabbos, we would say that this is not the conventional method of carrying, as people do not carry objects in their mouth. Nonetheless, since he intended to eat the food while carrying it, his intention renders his mouth a place to be considered as a hanachah, placing an object. Similarly, when one throws an object into a dog's mouth or into a furnace, his intention renders the dog's mouth or the opening of the furnace a valid place similar to an area of four tefachim wide.*] (102a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, HAZOREIK
(The Chapter is Concluded)

Mishna

One who builds, chisels a stone, finishes a product with a hammer's blow, or drills any amount is liable for performing a forbidden act of labor on *Shabbos*.

One who builds even a small amount on *Shabbos* is liable. Similarly, one who prepares a stone for building, even a small amount, is liable. One who finishes any task is liable for *makeh bepatish*, striking the final blow, which was performed with stone quarrying. One who drills a hole in stone or wood, even a small amount, is liable. Anyone who performs an act of labor, and the act continues to exist, he is liable. The *Mishna* also quotes Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel who maintains that one who hammers on the anvil while he is working is also liable, because he is rectifying his labor. (102b)

Building a Small Amount

There is a dispute as to what the benefit is in building a small amount.

Rabbi Yirmiyah maintains that even a small amount of building is beneficial, as we see that a poor man digs a hole to store his money. In the Tabernacle, those who sewed the curtains would hide their needles in a hole that they dug.

Abaye disagrees with this, as the needles would have collected rust had they been stored in the ground. Rather, we find that a poor man will fashion a stand for a stove to place a small pot of food on, and similarly in the Tabernacle, those who cooked the herbs to dye the curtains would fashion a stand for a small stove to place a small kettle of dye. This was done if they required more dye to be boiled.

Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: There must be no display of poverty in a place of wealth (*and therefore, in the Mishkan, they always prepared more than they needed*). Rather, it is because a householder who finds a hole in his mansion closes it up (*with clay*). Similarly, in connection with the Tabernacle, (*such a labor was performed*) because when a board was attacked by a worm, one dropped molten lead into it and closed it. (102b)

Building a Wall

There are three stages with regard to building a wall.

Shmuel said: One who places a stone firmly in the ground is liable. This is because a foundation for a stone wall only requires that the stones be placed firmly in the ground. The rows of stones that are laid on top of the foundation need to be cemented in place to keep the stones firm, and one will then be liable for cementing the stones. One will be liable for the stones placed on top of the wall, even if they are not cemented, because we are not worried that the stones will fall. (102b)

There is a dispute regarding which *melachah*, act of labor, one is liable, if he chisels a stone.

Rav says that one who chisels a stone is liable for building, as chiseling the stone is considered preparing the stone for construction. Shmuel maintains that chiseling a stone, even any amount, falls under the category of striking the final blow.

If one makes a hole in a chicken coop (*in order for the fumes from the droppings to escape and not damage the chickens*), Rav says that he is liable for building while Shmuel said that it is on account of striking the final blow.

If one inserts a pin through the eyelet of a hoe (*in order that the handle should not slip out*), Rav says that he is liable for building while Shmuel said that it is on account of striking the final blow.

The *Gemora* notes that these are all necessary, for if we were informed of the first, I would say that in that case Rav rules (*that he is liable on account of building*), because such is the normal mode of building, but if one makes a hole in a chicken coop, seeing that this is not a normal mode of building, I would maintain that he agrees with Shmuel. And if we were

informed of this (*second case only*), here Rav rules (*that he is liable on account of building*), because it is similar to a building, since it is made for ventilation, but (*as for inserting*) a pin through the eyelet of a hoe, which is not a normal mode of building, I would say that he agrees with Shmuel. And if we were told of this (*last case only*), only here does Shmuel rule (*that he is liable on account of striking the final blow*), but in the former two (*where it resembles building somewhat*), I would maintain that he agrees with Rav; therefore, they are necessary.

Rav Nassan bar Oshaya inquired of Rabbi Yochanan: On what grounds (*which primary labor*) is one who chisels liable? He intimated to him with his hand: On account of striking the final blow.

Rav Nassan asked: But we learned in our *Mishna*: One who chisels a stone and one who finishes a product with a hammer's blow**?**

Rabbi Yochanan answered: The *Mishna* means as follows: One who chisels a stone, who finishes a product with a hammer's blow.

The *Gemora* asks from our *Mishna*: One who drills a hole in stone or wood, even a small amount, is liable. As for Rav, it is well, for it looks like boring a hole for a building; but according to Shmuel, surely this is not striking the final blow?

The *Gemora* answers: The meaning here is that he pierces it with an iron nail and leaves it there (so people could hang things on it), so that that is the striking of the final blow.

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Carrying and Building

Tosfos wonders what the association of the act of building has with the previously discussed acts of throwing and carrying.

The Tosfos Yom Tov writes that the author of the *Mishna* wished to discuss the act preceding the act of carrying, which is *makeh bepatish*, delivering a final blow. Since delivering the final blow is associated with the act of building, and building is more common that the act of delivering the final blow, the *Mishna* commenced with the act of building.

The Magenei Shlomo writes that in the *Mishkan* the Jewish People first carried the donations through the public domain, and then they built the *Mishkan*. This is the reason why the author of the *Mishna* discusses the act of carrying before discussing the act of building.

Alternatively, the author of the *Mishna* first discusses the common act of carrying and then discusses a similarly frequent act, which is building, that is reflected in different actions.

Perhaps there is another reason for the association of carrying and building. When one carries on *Shabbos*, one would assume that this is not considered an act of labor, as no exertion is required. Nonetheless, there are Halachic authorities who deliberate if one can walk long distances on *Shabbos*, as this is considered over exertion, and there are even those who suggest that studying Torah in depth should be forbidden on *Shabbos*, as one creates worlds when studying Torah properly. Although in actuality one is permitted to study Torah on *Shabbos*, one must bear in mind that every action on *Shabbos* must be weighed within the framework of Halachah. For this reason, the author of the *Mishna* associates the mere act of carrying with the labor intensive act of building.