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Yoma Daf 7

Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o"h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

- 1. If a Kohen was bringing the Omer offering and the offering became tamei in his hand, he tells his colleagues and they bring another Omer in its stead.**

If a Kohen was standing and bringing the Omer offering and the offering became tamei in his hand, the Kohen tells his colleagues and they bring another Omer offering in its stead. If there is no other barley from the crop available, we tell the Kohen to offer the Omer in a state of tumah, but he should not publicize the matter, because we do not want people to erroneously assume that one can also offer a private Minchah in a state of tumah. From here we see that tumah is only overridden for the community but not completely permitted. Rav Nachman said that he agrees that in a case where there are remnants that one can eat, it is preferable that a communal offering not be offered in a state of tumah. (7a1)

- 2. If a Kohen was offering the Minchah of bulls, rams or lambs and it became tamei in his hand, he tells his colleagues and they bring another one in its stead.**

If a Kohen was offering the libation Minchah of bulls, rams or lambs and the Minchah became tamei in his hand, the Kohen tells his colleagues and they bring another Minchah in its stead. If this Kohen is the only one available, we tell him to be smart and keep silent. The Gemara assume that this case refers to the Minchah that was brought with bulls, rams and lambs of the Mussaf offerings on the festival, which are communal offerings. Nonetheless, we see that tumah is merely overridden regarding the community, because initially one must attempt to find a substitute Minchah that is tahor. The Gemara rejects this assumption by stating that the case can be referring to the Minchah that is brought with other offerings. Bulls refer to the olah bull that is brought if the majority of the community serves idols because of a mistaken ruling by the Great Sanhedrin, where the law is that the community must bring as an atonement an olah bull and a chatas goat. This bull is accompanied by a Minchah libation. Although the bull is a communal offering, we still try to offer the Minchah libation in a state of taharah because it does not have a set time for being offered. Rams refer to the ram of Aharon which is the olah ram that the Kohen Gadol brought on Yom

Kippur. Although this offering does have a set time, we try to offer the Minchah libation in a state of taharah because it is a private offering. Lambs refer to the lambs that are brought with the Omer and the Minchah is not the Minchah libation but the Omer itself, where there are remnants that are left over for eating. The reason we try to offer the Minchah in a state of taharah is so that the remnants will be permitted to be eaten. (7a1-7a2)

3. If blood of an offering became tamei and a Kohen nevertheless threw it against the mizbeiach, if this was unintentional, the offering is accepted.

If the blood of a sacrifice became tamei and a Kohen nonetheless threw the blood against the mizbeiach, if the blood became tamei unintentionally, the offering is accepted, but if the blood became tamei intentionally, the offering is not accepted. We will learn that the tzitz can effect acceptance for offerings that are tamei even when tumah is not overridden. The tzitz effects acceptance biblically in all cases, but the Chachamim decreed that if the tumah was intentional, then the offering is unacceptable regarding the meat being prohibited for consumption. The owner nonetheless has received atonement because the tzitz effects acceptance in all cases. The Gemara assumes that this is proof that tumah is not completely permitted. If tumah was permitted, there would be no need for the tzitz to effect

acceptance and there would be no reason to draw a distinction between unintentional and intentional. The Gemara answered that this law was taught regarding an individual offering and not regarding a communal offering, so this case has no connection to the dispute of tumah being overridden or permitted. (7a2)

4. The tzitz effects acceptance for the blood, meat or cheilev of an offering that became tamei.

A Baraisa states that the tzitz effects acceptance for the blood, meat or cheilev that became tamei and then the avodah was done. This law applies whether the blood, meat or cheilev became tamei unintentionally or intentionally, through a mishap or willingly, and whether the offering was offered by an individual or by a community. Thus we see that even a communal offering is acceptable in a state of tumah because of the tzitz. If tumah was permitted for the community, we should not need the tzitz to effect acceptance for communal offerings. (7a2)

5. The tzitz only effects acceptance of a private sacrifice.

The Gemara answers that when the Baraisa states that the tzitz effects acceptance, this is only regarding a private offering, and communal offerings are only mentioned to teach us that they are also valid whether they became tamei unintentionally, intentionally,

through a mishap or willingly. Whereas private offerings are dependant on the effect of the tzitz, communal offerings are valid because tumah is permitted regarding the community. (7a2-7a3)

6. The tzitz can effect acceptance for a communal sacrifice that does not have a fixed time.

Alternatively, the Gemara answers that the Baraisa is referring to communal offerings but it is referring to offerings that do not have a set time. These offerings, even when brought for the community, do not override the laws of tumah, so they will only be valid through the effect of the tzitz and only when the offering itself is tamei. (7a3)

7. The tzitz only bears the sin of tumah.

It is said regarding the tzitz *it shall be on Aharon's forehead, so that Aharon shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings*. This teaches us that if the avodah of a sacrifice is done in a way that is normally forbidden, the tzitz removes the invalidation and makes the offering acceptable. The verse cannot be referring to the sin of *piggul* because it is already said regarding *piggul*, *it shall not be accepted*, which means that the offering is invalid. The verse cannot be referring to *nossar*, because regarding an offering that is *nossar* it is already said *it shall not be considered*, which means that this offering is invalid. We must therefore assume that the

verse refers to the tzitz only bearing the sin of tumah which is unique in that it is permitted regarding the community. (7a3-7b1)

8. There is a dispute whether the tzitz effects acceptance for sacrifices if it is not on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol.

Rabbi Shimon maintains that the tzitz effects acceptance for offerings whether it is on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol or not. Rabbi Shimon maintains that as long as the tzitz was intact when the offering became tamei, the offering will be valid, regardless of whether the Kohen Gadol was wearing the tzitz at the time the offering became tamei. Rabbi Yehudah, however, maintains that the tzitz only effects acceptance when it is on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol, but when the tzitz is not on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol, it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Shimon said to Rabbi Yehudah that the Kohen Gadol does not wear the tzitz on Yom Kippur when he performed the "inner" avodah, i.e. the burning of the Ketores and the sprinkling of the blood of the chatas bull and the he-goat. The "inner" avodah, even if performed in a state of tumah, is acceptable, even though the Kohen Gadol is not wearing the tzitz at that time. This is proof that the tzitz effects acceptance even when the Kohen Gadol is not wearing it. Rabbi Yehudah responded that there is no proof from the Kohen Gadol on Yom Kippur, because tumah is permitted for him regarding the community so there is no need to have the tzitz effect

acceptance for communal offerings. The implication from this dialogue is that Rabbi Shimon maintains that tumah is only overridden regarding the community and the tzitz is required to effect the acceptance of communal offerings. (7b1)

9. The dispute regarding the tzitz effecting acceptance is only when the tzitz is intact and hanging on a peg.

If the tzitz is broken, both Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Shimon agree that it does not effect acceptance. If the tzitz is intact and is hanging on a peg i.e. the Kohen Gadol is not wearing it, then Rabbi Yehudah maintains that it does not effect acceptance. Rabbi Yehudah's reasoning is because it is said *it shall be on Aharon's forehead, so that Aharon shall bear a sin of the sacred offerings*. This implies that the tzitz only effects acceptance when it is on the forehead of the Kohen Gadol. Rabbi Shimon, however, maintains that the tzitz effects acceptance even when the Kohen Gadol is not wearing it, because it is said *it shall be on his forehead always to bring them favor before HaShem*. The verse cannot mean that the Kohen Gadol wears the tzitz constantly, because he must go to the bathroom and he must sleep, and those are times when he is forbidden to wear the tzitz. The word *tamid, always*, must mean that the tzitz always effects acceptance, whether the Kohen Gadol is wearing it or not. (7b1-7b2)

10. One is required to touch his Tefillin constantly.

According to Rabbi Yehudah, the reason it is said regarding the tzitz the word *tamid, always*, is to teach that the Kohen Gadol should never divert his attention from the tzitz. This is in accordance with the law that a person is required to touch his Tefillin constantly so that he should not divert his attention from them. This law is derived through a *kal vachomer* from the tzitz, because the tzitz only has one mention of HaShem's Name, and the Torah states *it shall be on his forehead always*, which teaches us that the Kohen Gadol should not divert his attention from the tzitz, so certainly regarding Tefillin, which contains numerous mentions of HaShem's Name, a person should not divert his attention from his Tefillin. (7b2-8a1)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Tzitz and Tefillin

Rabba bar Rav Huna teaches that while wearing tefillin, one must not let his attention wander from them. This is learned by *kal v'chomer* from the Tzitz worn by the Kohen Gadol. The Tzitz had only one Name of Hashem inscribed upon it, and yet the Torah tells us, "It shall be upon his brow constantly," to teach us that he must constantly be aware that it rests on his brow. Tefillin have

Hashem's Names written upon them numerous times. *Kal v'chomer*, one must constantly focus his attention on them. According to the Rambam, this *kal v'chomer* has the status of a Torah prohibition against being distracted from the tefillin while wearing them (Hilchos Tefillin 4:14; see Chayei Adam 14:15). Tosefos (s.v. *Uma tzitz*), on the other hand, understood that this is only a Rabbinic prohibition. This debate has very relevant consequences. The Nimukei Yosef writes that if diverting one's attention from tefillin is a Torah prohibition, then a person who is unable to maintain his concentration should not wear tefillin at all. If however diverting attention from tefillin is a Rabbinic prohibition, they would not wish for us to forego a Torah obligation of tefillin, in order to observe a Rabbinic prohibition (see Minchas Eliyahu 33:2, citing R' M.D. Soloveitchik, *shlita*).

Kal v'chomer: *Kal v'chomer* is one of the thirteen tools through which we analyze the Torah in order to derive halachic conclusions. On several occasions the Torah itself makes use of this tool. For example, Moshe Rabbeinu said, "If Bnei Yisroel do not listen, how will Pharaoh listen, for my speech is impaired" (Shemos6:12). If Bnei Yisroel did not wish to heed Moshe's message, even though it was for their benefit, then *kal v'chomer* Pharaoh would not wish to listen (Maharal, GurAryeh, *ibid*). *Kal v'chomer* is essentially a rule of logic. If a logical imperative applies to a limited degree in one case, and still is successful in bringing about a certain result; then if that same imperative applies to an even greater degree elsewhere, it will certainly bring about the

same result. When making use of a *kal v'chomer*, one must always analyze what is the logical imperative, and why it is reasonable to assume that it should bring about the said result. In the case of the Tzitz, we find a *kal v'chomer*: the Tzitz has only one Name of Hashem, and one must focus his attention on it; tefillin have many Names of Hashem, *kal v'chomer* that one must focus his attention on it. What is the logical imperative of this deduction? Presumably, since the Names of Hashem are so holy, one may not wear them without focusing his attention on them. However, this is an invalid *kal v'chomer*. The logical imperative that one must focus his attention on the Name of Hashem applies equally to one Name, as it does to several Names. Therefore, there is no *kal* and no *chomer*. Both are equally *chamur*.

To illustrate this point: could we say that if a person with one home must attach mezuzos to his doors, *kal v'chomer* a person with two homes must attach mezuzos? True, both homes require mezuzos, but the two homes are no more *chamur* than the one. The obligation of mezuzah applies equally to them all.

Based on this argument, the Brisker Rav, R' Y.Z. Soloveitchik *zt"l*, suggested a different premise to the *kal v'chomer* from Tzitz. We had previously assumed that the Kohen Gadol had to focus his attention on the Name inscribed on the Tzitz. Not so. The Kohen Gadol had to focus his attention on the Tzitz, since it was sanctified by the Name. Now we can understand the *kal v'chomer*. If one Name has the power to sanctify the Tzitz, requiring the Kohen Gadol to focus his attention

upon it, then certainly the many Names inscribed upon the tefillin sanctify them, requiring us to focus our attention upon them (Peninei HaGriz, p. 247; Toras Ze'ev, 14).

DAILY MASHAL

Tefillin: a constant reminder

The Gemara states that one is required to touch his Tefillin constantly so he will not divert his attention from them.

The *Tiferes Yisroel* in Menachos (4:1; 2) writes that the word Tefillin is derived from the word *pallel*, which means thought. This teaches that when one is wearing Tefillin, he is forbidden to be distracted by thoughts other than Torah and prayer.

The *Tur* (O.C. 25) writes that the word Tefillin is derived from the word *pelilah*, which means a sign and a testimony, as Tefillin are a sign to the world that the Divine Presence rests on the Jewish People.

It is interesting to note that the word for prayer is *Tefillah*, which has the same etymology as the word Tefillin. Thus, although it is preferable to wear Tefillin all day, one should at least wear Tefillin for the entire Shacharis prayer.

2. **Kal vachomer** Literally translated as light and heavy, or lenient and stringent. An a fortiori argument. It is one of the thirteen principles of biblical hermeneutics. It employs the following reasoning: if a specific stringency applies in a usually lenient case, it must certainly apply in a more serious case. The opposite argument is also a kal vachomer.
3. **Nossar** Part of a sacrifice that is left over after the time to eat it has passed
4. **Omer** An obligatory Minchah offering brought on the sixteenth of Nissan, which allowed the eating of the new crop
5. **Piggul** Literally translated as rejected. An offering that is rendered invalid because of an improper intent
6. **Tzitz** Golden head-plate worn by the Kohen Gadol which was two fingers in width and reached from ear to ear
7. **Tumah** Legally defined state of ritual impurity affecting certain people or objects

GLOSSARY

1. **Cheilev** Forbidden fats of cattle
sheep and goats