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Eiruvin Daf 42



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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o"h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

1. The Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Nechemia argue regarding whether or not one can eat fruits that have left the techum Shabbos.

There are two variables in this braisa. One is whether the fruits were taken out of the techum accidentally or on purpose, and one is whether the fruits were brought back to their place. If they were taken out accidentally and brought back to their place, everyone agrees they can be eaten. If they were taken out on purpose and not brought back, everyone agrees they cannot be eaten. They argue if they were taken out accidentally and not brought back, or if they were taken out on purpose and brought back. In these last two cases, the Tanna Kamma is lenient while Rabbi Nechemia is stringent.

2. If someone does not know exactly where the techum is, he can walk two thousand medium sized steps and consider that the techum.

Rav Nachman understands that being that a medium sized step is equivalent to an amah, one can count on this to measure the techum.

3. If someone's eiruv techumin went into a city, he can only go into that city as far as his eiruv permits.

When someone dwells in a city on Shabbos, the city is considered to be his place, otherwise known as his four amos, and his two thousand amos start outside the city. However, if someone made an eiruv outside a city and the two thousand amos go into a city, the city is not considered like a mere four amos, and he may not walk past his actual two thousand amos in the city. However, he may pull things toward him that are outside his two thousand amos. He may also go into half of a yard that is within his two thousand amos, even though half of it is not within his two thousand amos (we do not suspect he will go into the other half).

4. While everyone agrees the law follows Rabban Gamliel in the case of the boat, there is an argument whether the law is like his opinion in other similar cases.

Rav and Shmuel agree that the law follows Rabban Gamliel in the case of the boat in our Mishna (41b). However, they argue whether the law is indeed like him in the case of the barn or







jail (ibid.). Rav says the law follows Rabban Gamliel, while Shmuel says it does not.

5. There is an argument as to why the law is like Rabban Gamliel in the case of the boat.

Rabah states that because the people in the boat were in a place surrounded with walls before Shabbos entered, they can walk in that entire domain on Shabbos. Rabbi Zeira says the reason is that there is no concept of being within four cubits on a boat. This is because a boat jumps more than four cubits at a time. Accordingly, it is not understandable to say that a person should only have four cubits within the boat.

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The Rashba asks that Rabbi Akiva, who is stringent and argues that even someone who was on a boat before Shabbos can only walk in his four cubits on Shabbos, seems very difficult. Rabah's explanation for Rabban Gamliel, that being in a place surrounded with walls before Shabbos entered is reason to permit walking in that entire domain on Shabbos, seems like a very strong reason. Why would Rabbi Akiva argue?

The Rashba suggests that Rabbi Akiva is stringent because the person went in before Shabbos knowing that he was going to be taken out of his techum on Shabbos.

Alternatively, the Rashba gives a broader view of the argument. He states that the Gemara dealt with three cases. In the case of a person who was in a valley on Shabbos, and the valley was then surrounded on Shabbos with walls (by gentiles), even Rabban Gamliel holds that he only has four cubits. This is because the walls were not up before Shabbos. Rabban Gamliel and Rabbi Akiva argue in a case where a person was forcibly taken to a place with walls, such as a jail. In that case, our Gemora suggested that Rabbi Akiva decrees he only has four cubits lest one come to be lenient in the case of the valley. Rabban Gamliel did not make this decree. Despite the fact that the Gemora asked a question on understanding their argument in this fashion, the Rashba concludes that it could be a valid way to understand their argument.

In our case, there is the similar argument of whether to extend this decree to the case of the boat. Rabbi Akiva extends it, while Rabban Gamliel, of course, does not. The Rashba therefore answers his question by explaining that while Rabbi Akiva does not have a straight halachic objection to the case of the boat, he does hold that the decree should be extended.

