

18 Iyar 5773
April 28, 2013



Eiruvin Daf 51

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

“Let my Shabbos Residence be...”

The *Mishna* had stated: if, however, he said, “Let my *Shabbos* residence be at its trunk,” he may walk from the place where he stands to its trunk - a distance of two thousand *amos*, and from its trunk to his house another two thousand *amos*. Thus, he can walk four thousand *amos* after dark.

Rava explained: This (*ruling that if a man had specified a particular spot, he acquires it as his Shabbos residence, and may travel there during the Shabbos and proceed to go another two thousand amos beyond it to his home*) applies only where by running towards the trunk, he can reach it (*before darkness*). [*If, however, he cannot reach it - even by running, he cannot acquire it as his residence.*]

Abaye said to him: Was it not in fact stated: It was (*quickly*) becoming dark for him? [*Does this not indicate that he could not reach that place before dark?*]

Rava replied: The meaning is that it was (*quickly*) becoming dark for him as far as his house was concerned (*for he could not reach his house before dark*); the trunk of the tree, however, he could well reach before dark.

Others say that Rava replied as follows: The meaning is that it was (*quickly*) becoming dark for him as far as walking slowly (*he would not be able to reach that spot before dark*); but by running, he could very well reach the trunk.

Rabbah and Rav Yosef were once under way (on Friday afternoon before dark) when Rabbah said to Rav Yosef, “Let our *Shabbos* residence be under the palm tree that is supporting another tree,” or, as others read, “under the palm tree that releases its owner from the burden of taxes (*by the abundance of its fruit and the proceeds derived from their sale*).” Rav Yosef replied, “I do not know the tree.” Rabbah said, “Rely then on me,” for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Yosi said: If two people were traveling, and only one of them knew of a landmark (*to be used as a Shabbos residence*), the other one can designate his residence there also, relying on his partner, for the one who knew the landmark declares, “Let our *Shabbos* residence be in such and such a place.”

The *Gemora* notes: This, however, was not exactly correct. He (*Rabbah*) attributed the teaching to Rabbi Yosi with the sole object that Rav Yosef should accept it from him, since Rabbi Yosi was known to have sound reasoning for his rulings.

The *Mishna* had stated: If he does not know of any landmark (*to designate as his Shabbos residence*), or if he is not familiar with the laws etc. (*his location*



acquires two thousand amos for him in every direction).

The Gemora asks: Where in Scripture are these two thousand amos prescribed?

The Gemora answers: It was taught in a braisa: Sit, every man in his place. This refers to the four amos (which every man is allowed as his resting place for the Shabbos); let no man go out of his place. This refers to the two thousand amos.

The Gemora asks: From where do we derive this (that the distance is two thousand amos)?

Rav Chisda replied: We derive 'place' (let no man go out of his place) from 'place' (I will designate for you a place where he – someone who had murdered inadvertently - may flee), where 'place' (I will designate for you a place where he may flee) and 'flee' (are written in the same verse); we may then derive 'flee' from 'flee' (and if the murderer should go outside the border of his city of refuge to which he will flee), where 'flee' and 'border' (are written in the same verse); we may then derive 'border' from 'border' (and the avenger of the blood finds him outside the border of his city of refuge to which he will flee), where 'border' and 'outside' are written; we may then derive 'outside' from 'outside,' where it is written: And you shall measure from outside the city for the east side, two thousand amos etc. [It is through this derivation that we may assert that 'place' refers to a distance of two thousand amos.]

The Gemora asks: But why shouldn't we derive it from the verse: From the wall of the city and outwards, one thousand amos?

The Gemora answers: The expression 'outside' is derived through a *gezeirah shavah* from 'outside,' but we do not derive 'outside' from 'outwards.'

The Gemora asks: But why should that make a difference? Wasn't it taught by the Academy of Rabbi Yishmael that one can derive a *gezeirah shavah* from "v'shav ha'Kohen" and "u'va ha'Kohen" as they are both terms meaning "and he will come/return?"

The Gemora answers: This variation makes no difference only where there is no alternative analogy based on identical expressions, but where there is an alternative analogy based on identical expressions, we must then make the analogy from the identical expressions.

The Mishna had stated: Two thousand amos that form a circular area (these are the words of R' Chanina ban Antigonus; the Sages, however, said: two thousand amos that form a square).

The Gemora asks: As to Rabbi Chanina ban Antigonus, what possible justification is there for his view? If he accepts the *gezeirah shavah*, doesn't Scripture speak of 'corners'? If, however, he does not accept the *gezeirah shavah*, from where does he derive that the *techum* of Shabbos is two thousand amos?

The Gemora answers: He does in fact accept the *gezeirah shavah*, but here (by *techum*), the case is different, since it is written (by the law of the Levite cities): This shall be to them, the open land of the cities, which implies: In this case only, corners must be allowed (forming the shape of a square), but corners are not allowed for those who observe the Shabbos (but rather, it forms the shape of a circle).



The *Gemora* explains the Sages' opinion: Rav Chananya taught in a *braisa*: Like this measurement (*square, as in the case of the Levite cities*) shall be that of all who observe the *Shabbos*.

Rav Acha bar Yaakov said: A man who carries an object a distance of four *amos* in a public domain is not liable unless he carries it a distance equal to 'them and their diagonal.' [*The man is given the benefit of the corners – five and three-fifths amos, in agreement with the view of the Rabbis, as explained by Rav Chananya.*]

Rav Pappa related: Rava tested us with the following question: With regard to a pillar in a public domain ten *tefachim* high and four *tefachim* wide, is it necessary that its width shall be equal to 'them and their diagonal,' or is this unnecessary? And we replied: Isn't this case identical with that of Rav Chananya, who taught: Like this measurement (*square, as in the case of the Levite cities*) shall be that of all who observe the *Shabbos*?

The *Mishna* had stated: This is that which the Rabbis have said: a poor man may make his *eiruv* with his feet. Rabbi Meir said: We can apply this law only to a poor man etc. [*R' Yehudah said: This can be applied for a rich man as well.*]

[*It is unclear from the Mishna if the argument is regarding a case of eiruv, where the traveler designated his residence at a landmark, or if it is referring to a case where he designated his residence in his place.*] Rav Nachman said: They differ only where he said, ["Let my *Shabbos* residence be] in my place," since Rabbi Meir holds that the essence of an *eiruv* is bread (*and not by his personal presence*), and that, therefore, it is only for a poor man (*one who was travelling on a journey and had no bread with him*) that the Rabbis ruled leniently, but not for a rich man (*who*

must make an eiruv using bread); while Rabbi Yehudah holds that the essence of an *eiruv* is with his feet (*being present at the eiruv location*), irrespective of whether one is poor or rich; but where he arranged the *eiruv* by declaring, "Let my *Shabbos* residence be by the landmark in that place," all agree that only a poor man is allowed such an *eiruv*, but not a rich man. And who was it that taught (*the statement in the Mishna*): This is that which the Rabbis have said: [*a poor man may make his eiruv with his feet*]? It is Rabbi Meir. And what case does he refer to? It is to the case where he does not know of any landmark (*to designate as his Shabbos residence*), or if he is not familiar with the laws (*and designates his residence at his current location*). And who was it that taught (*the statement in the Mishna*): The Rabbis' enactment that an *eiruv* is to be prepared with bread having the only purpose of making it easier (*for the rich man*)? It is Rabbi Yehudah.

Rav Chisda, however, said: They differ only where he said, ["Let my *Shabbos* residence be] by the landmark in that place," for Rabbi Meir maintains that the Rabbis ruled leniently only for the poor, but not for the rich, while Rabbi Yehudah holds that they ruled leniently for both the poor and the rich man; but where he declared, ["Let my *Shabbos* residence be] in my place," all agree that they ruled leniently for both the poor and the rich man, since the essence of an *eiruv* is with his feet (*being present at the eiruv location*). And who was it that taught (*the statement in the Mishna*): This is that which the Rabbis have said: [*a poor man may make his eiruv with his feet*]? It is Rabbi Meir. And what case does he refer to? It is to the case where he was traveling on the road and it was (*quickly*) becoming dark for him (*and he knew of a landmark, and said, "Let my Shabbos residence be at its trunk," concerning which it was ruled that the man acquires that place though he was not at the time standing on it; according to R' Meir, this applies only to a poor man*). And who

was it that taught (*the statement in the Mishna*): The Rabbis' enactment that an *eiruv* is to be prepared with bread having the only purpose of making it easier (*for the rich man*)? It is according to both of them.

The *Gemora* notes: A *braisa* was taught in agreement with Rav Nachman: Both a poor man and rich man must prepare their *eiruv* with bread. A rich man, furthermore, must not proceed beyond the *Shabbos* limit and make the declaration, "Let my *Shabbos* residence be where I stand now," because it is only for the benefit of one who was traveling when it became dark that the Rabbis have enacted that an *eiruv* may be prepared with one's feet; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehudah said: Both a poor man and rich man must prepare their *eiruv* with their feet. A rich man could, therefore, proceed beyond the *Shabbos* limit and make the declaration, "Let my *Shabbos* residence be where I stand now," and this is the essence of an *eiruv*. The Sages, however, allowed a householder to send his *eiruv* in the hand of his servant or by the hand of his son or by the hand of any other agent in order to make it easier for him.

Rabbi Yehudah related: It once happened that the people of Beis Memel and Beis Goryon in Aroma distributed dried figs and raisins to the poor in a time of famine, and the poor men of the village of Sheechin and the village of Chananyah (*villages that were just within four thousand amos from Aroma and that could, therefore, be joined to it by an eiruv prepared on the boundary between the two Shabbos limits that intervened between them*) used to come and wait at their *Shabbos* limit until dark (*thus acquiring a Shabbos residence within both limits*), and on the following day, they got up early and proceeded to their destination. [*Now the poor men in question, having come from their own homes, were presumably in possession of some bread that sufficed for the two meals prescribed for an*

eiruv. They were, in consequence, subject, as far as the preparation of an *eiruv* is concerned, to the same restrictions as those imposed upon a rich man. Yet it was not by a deposit of bread, but by their personal attendance at the place they desired to designate as their *Shabbos* residence that their *eiruv* was effected. Thus it follows that the ruling in practice is in agreement with Rav Nachman's interpretation of R' Yehudah's view - that a person's presence at the very location he wishes to acquire as his *Shabbos* residence is the essence of an *eiruv*.]

Rav Ashi said: An inference from the wording of a *Mishna* also supports this view, for it was taught: If a man left his home (*on Friday*) to proceed to a town with which they may make an *eiruv* with (*for the two towns were within four thousand amos of each other*), but a friend of his convinced him to return home, he himself is allowed to proceed to the other town, but all the other townspeople (*who did not begin to travel*) are forbidden; these are the words of Rabbi Yehudah. And the *Gemora* there asked: In what respect does he differ from them? And Rav Huna replied: We are here dealing with the case of a man who had, for instance, two houses between which two *Shabbos* limits intervened. As far as he is concerned, since he had set out on his journey, he has the status of a poor man. They, however, have the status of rich men. Evidently, it is only a poor man, but not a rich man, who is allowed to prepare an *eiruv* by the declaration, "Let my *Shabbos* residence be at such and such a place." This is indeed conclusive.

Rav Chiya bar Ashi taught the *Mishna* to Chiya bar Rav in the presence of Rav that the law (*of establishing a Shabbos residence without actually placing food down*) applied to both poor and rich people. Rav said to him: Conclude this also with the statement: The *halachah* is in agreement with Rabbi Yehudah.

Rabbah bar Rav Chanan was in the habit of going from Artivna to Pumbedisa by declaring, “Let my *Shabbos* residence be at Tzinta.” Abaye said to him: Do you think that in a dispute between Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah, the *halachah* is in agreement with Rabbi Yehudah, and that Rav Chisda said that they differed only where he declared, “Let my *Shabbos* residence be in such and such a place”? Surely, there is Rav Nachman (*who differed with Rav Chisda*), and it (*a braisa*) was taught in agreement with him? Rabbah bar Rav Chanan replied: I withdraw (*my ruling*). (51a – 52a)

clear to any thinking person that this should be used only in absolutely desperate situations. If a person will just make up Torah sources, nobody will trust him, even if he says that he does so for good reason. This is clearly not the way Torah is supposed to be passed down. Additionally, if the person will find out that the source is incorrect, it will likely cause him to lose respect for the person who told him this lie, just as lying for the sake of preserving peace is usually only effective if the lie will not be found out. Accordingly, it is clear that this leniency is for emergency only.

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Desperate Situation

The Gemora relates that Rabbah and Rav Yosef were traveling together when *Shabbos* was going to arrive. Rabbah said his law in the name of Rabbi Yosi, despite the fact that Rabbi Yosi never said it. On the surface, he seems to have done this in order to ensure that Rav Yosef would accept the law Rabbah stated that Rabbah knew to be correct, but that Rav Yosef would not accept without a great source.

However, upon further analysis, it seems quite clear Rabbah only did this due to a desperate circumstance. *Shabbos* was arriving, and if Rav Yosef would not clearly believe him, they would not be able to travel to where they needed to go on *Shabbos*. It seems plausible that Rabbah therefore quickly told him that Rabbi Yosi said this law, in order to ensure that Rav Yosef would indeed rely on him for his “place” for *Shabbos*.

While there are some that codify that this is a permitted thing to do (see Magen Avraham 156), it is