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Shabbos Daf 111

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

**Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h**

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

## ***Becoming Sterile***

The *Gemora* had stated: For healing jaundice, two of those ingredients (*Alexandrian gum, liquid alum and garden saffron*) should be mixed with beer, and he will then become sterile.

The *Gemora* asks: And is this permitted (*to drink something that will render one sterile*)? But it was taught in a *braisa*: From where do we know that castration is forbidden by a person? The verse states: And in your land, you shall not do this (*castrate an animal*). It is read: It shall not be done to you; these are the words of Rabbi Chanina.

The *Gemora* answers: It is only forbidden where he intends for it to happen; here, however, it happens by itself. [*The prohibition applies when the castration is performed on the reproductive organ itself; here it is done via drinking.*]

This is supported by that which Rabbi Yochanan said: One who wants to castrate a rooster should remove its crest, and it will be rendered castrated by itself.


The *Gemora* asks: But Rav Ashi said: A rooster is seized by arrogance (*due to its crest; it grieves that its crest is removed and refuses to copulate, but actually, it is not castrated*)!?

The *Gemora* answers (*its initial question*): We are referring to one who is already castrated (*he may drink the potion that causes sterility*).

The *Gemora* asks: But Rabbi Chiya bar Abba said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: All agree that whoever leavens a *minchah* offering after it was already leavened is liable. This is derived from a Scriptural verse. All agree as well that whoever castrates an animal after it was already castrated (*if he detached its testicles after they were cut*) is liable. This is derived from a Scriptural verse, as follows: The Torah states an animal “*whose testicles are squeezed, crushed, detached or cut... you shall not do this*.” The Torah needed to state the word ‘detached’ even though if one is liable for testicles that are cut, certainly one will be liable for testicles that are detached. The word ‘detached’ teaches us that one who detaches testicles after they were cut is liable. [*One cannot castrate someone who has already been castrated, and similarly, one who has been castrated cannot drink a potion that causes him to become sterile.*]

The *Gemora* answers: It is referring to an old man who can no longer have children. [*He would be allowed to drink a potion that causes sterility.*]

The *Gemora* asks from that which Rabbi Yochanan declared that he utilized a cure for impotency that proved to be effective, and we see from this that an old man is also capable of fathering children, so even



an old man would be forbidden to drink a potion that causes sterility.

Rather, the *Gemora* answers: It refers to a woman (*for she is not prohibited from being castrated*). Nonetheless, there is an opinion in the *Gemora* (*R' Yochanan ben Berokah*) who maintains that Hashem instructed both a man and woman to be fruitful and multiply. If so, then a woman is obligated to bear children, and she would be forbidden to drink a potion that causes sterility.

The *Gemora* therefore states that an old woman who cannot bear children would be permitted to drink a potion that causes sterility, and similarly, a woman who is barren would be allowed to drink a potion that causes sterility. (110b -111a)

**One can dip his food in vinegar to cure his toothache.**

One cannot sip vinegar on *Shabbos* to soothe his toothache, because this is clearly a therapeutic act that is forbidden on *Shabbos*. Rather, he can dip his food in vinegar, and if this cures his toothache, this is acceptable, as it was common to dip food in vinegar, and no one will assume that his act has medical connotations. According to one opinion in the *Gemora*, one would also be permitted to sip vinegar and swallow it, but this is not as common as one who dips his food in vinegar. (111a)

**One who has pain in his loins can smear his loins with regular oil.**

One who anoints himself with wine or vinegar is clearly engaging in medical practices. Thus, one who has pains in his loins may not smear his loins with wine or vinegar, but he may smear his loins with oil, as even healthy people smear their loins with oil. (111a)

**There is a dispute if Jews are considered princes or not.**

The *Mishna* states that one may not smear his loins that ache with rose oil. Given the rarity and expensiveness of rose oil, one who is smearing himself with rose oil must be doing so for medicinal purposes. Princes, however, would be permitted to smear their wounds on *Shabbos* with rose oil, as a prince would smear himself even during the weekday with rose oil even if he did not have a wound or an ache. Rabbi Shimon maintains that all Jews are like princes, and any Jew can smear his wounds with rose oil on *Shabbos*. (111a)

**Anything that is permitted on *Shabbos* is permitted on Yom Kippur as well.**

One is permitted to immerse in a *mikvah* on *Shabbos*. This is permitted because it does not appear that one is repairing his body. Rather, he appears to be bathing. Although one is not allowed to wash his body for pleasure on Yom Kippur, Rava posits that we apply the concept of *hoil*, literally defined as 'since.' 'Since' we permit one to immerse in a *mikvah* on *Shabbos*, we also permit one to immerse in a *mikvah* on Yom Kippur. One who violates the *Shabbos* is liable the death penalty, whereas one who violates Yom Kippur is punished with *kares*, excision. The rule regarding immersion applies to both Tisha Ba'av and Yom Kippur, days when bathing is normally forbidden. (111a)

**One is forbidden to stop up a barrel on Yom Tov.**

One is forbidden to push a cloth into a barrel on Yom Tov, although he does not intend to perform a prohibited act of labor. The issue at hand is that when one presses on the cloth, he will be squeezing out

wine, which is forbidden to do on Yom Tov. The prohibition involved is either *melaben*, whitening the cloth by cleaning it, or a derivative of the *melachah* of *dash*, threshing, as taking the wine out of the cloth is akin to one who remove kernels of grain from their husks. Since it is inevitable that wine will be removed from the cloth, even Rabbi Shimon, who maintains that one is not liable for an unintentional act, will agree that here one is liable. (111a -111b)

**The *halachah* is like Rabbi Shimon that one can apply rose oil to his wounds on *Shabbos*.**

Rabbi Abba bar Zavda stated in the name of Rav that the Halacha follows Rabbi Shimon that even Jews who are not princes may use rose oil on *Shabbos*. Following a contradiction in the rulings of Rav, where Rav was quoted as stating that the *halachah* is like Rabbi Yehudah with regard to performing an act of labor unintentionally, Rava explained Rav's statement as follows: Rav stated that the *halachah* follows Rabbi Shimon but not for Rabbi Shimon's reasoning. Rabbi Shimon maintains that rose oil heals, and Rav maintains that rose oil does not heal, and that is why Rav permits one to use rose oil on *Shabbos*. The *Gemora* rejects this explanation and states that Rabbi Shimon permits one to use rose oil on *Shabbos*, although it is not the custom to use rose oil, because all Jews are considered princes. Rav maintained, however, that only if rose oil is common, then one can use it on *Shabbos*, and where Rav resided, it was common to use rose oil, so Rav permitted its use on *Shabbos*. (111b)

**One is liable for tying a camel driver's knots and a sailor's knots on *Shabbos*, and one is also liable for untying such knots on *Shabbos*.**

One is only liable for tying a knot that will remain tied for an extended period of time, similar to the knots tied in the Mishkan. Examples of these knots are the camel driver's knots and the sailor's knots. The *Gemora* states that the *Mishna* does not refer to the knot tied through the nose ring, which is the knot that connects the leash to the nose ring, nor to the knot tied through the ship's ring, which is the knot connecting the anchoring rope to the ship's ring. These knots are not permanent knots and one would not be liable for tying such knots on *Shabbos*. Rather, the *Mishna* refers to the knot of the nose ring itself, which is the knot where the thong is formed into the nose ring, and the knot of the ship's ring itself, which is the knot by which the thong is formed into the ship's ring. These are permanent knots, which one is liable for tying or untying on *Shabbos*. (111b)

## INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

### ***Be Fruitful And Multiply.***

The *Gemora* states that the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah is that regarding both man and woman is to be fruitful and multiply.

When is it considered that one has fulfilled his obligation of procreation? The *Minchas Chinuch* suggest that one has not fulfilled his obligation of procreation until his children themselves bear children, as this is then considered a continuity of the world. The simple form of fulfilling the *mitzvah*, however, is by fathering a son and a daughter.

Rabbi Elchonan Wassermann zt"l hy"d assumed simply that if one marries according to the dictates of the Torah, then he has fulfilled the *mitzvah* of be fruitful and multiply, and heaven will determine if he will father children or not. Man only has to do what is

within his capabilities, and the rest is in the hands of Hashem.

What would be with regard to a convert to Judaism who already fathered children from his previous status as a gentile? Do we posit that he has already fulfilled his obligation of fathering children, or do we say that he is obligated to marry a Jewess and bear more children to fulfill the *mitzvah*?

The Rosh<sup>1</sup> writes that one's children also would have to convert in order that he should be able to fulfill the *mitzvah* of be fruitful and multiply. The Rambam and the Shulchan Aruch concur with this view.

If one converts to Judaism and his children do not convert, apparently he will not have fulfilled the *mitzvah* of be fruitful and multiply. On the other hand, the Rosh himself writes<sup>2</sup> that a gentile who had fathered children and then he converts, has fulfilled the *mitzvah* of be fruitful and multiply. From the words of the Rosh it appears that he has already fulfilled his obligation of bearing children even if his children do not convert.

Rabbi Yaakov Moiln writes<sup>3</sup> that one has fulfilled his *mitzvah* of be fruitful and multiply by converting to Judaism, and his children do not have to convert for him to fulfill the *mitzvah*.

This view is echoed by the Chelkas Mechokek<sup>4</sup>, who writes that there is no difference whether one's children converted or not.

The Rama writes that one fulfills the *mitzvah* of be fruitful and multiply even if his child is a *mamzer*, an illegitimate child, or a *cheresh*, a deaf-mute.

The Minchas Chinuch<sup>5</sup>, Aruch LeNer<sup>6</sup> and the Maharit Algazi<sup>7</sup> all question the ruling regarding a *mamzer*, as this is considered a *mitzvah habaah b'aveirah*, a *mitzvah* that is a result of an *aveirah* that is performed.

<sup>1</sup> Yevamos 61b §8

<sup>2</sup> Ibid 6:8

<sup>3</sup> Teshuvos Maharil 2223 (Machon Yerushalayim editions 196)

<sup>4</sup> Even HaEzer 1:9

<sup>5</sup> Mitzvah 1:8

<sup>6</sup> Yevamos

<sup>7</sup> Bechoros 56b and Chapter 8, page 89:65 s.v. vulam