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Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

**Mishnah:** A man may take up his son while he has a stone in his hand or a basket with a stone in it; and terumah that is tamei may be handled together with [terumah] that is tahor or with chullin. Rabbi Yeudah said: one may also remove one part [of terumah in chullin] from a mixture when one [part is neutralized] in a hundred [parts].

**A living creature supports its own weight.**

Rava says: One who takes a child that is alive in to a public domain and the child has a pouch hanging from his neck, the person is liable for taking out the pouch. If the child was dead, and the child has a pouch hanging from his neck, then the person who took the child out is not liable.

One who takes a child that is alive in to a public domain and the child has a pouch hanging from his neck, the person is liable for taking out the pouch. Let him be liable for taking the child out as well? Rava holds like Rabbi Nassan who maintains that a living creature supports its own weight. And why isn't the pouch viewed as an accessory to the child? Did we not learn in a Mishnah: [If one carries] a live person in a bed, he is exempt even for the bed, for the bed is viewed as an accessory to the person! The person is liable for the pouch, because although one who carries a live person out on a bed is entirely exempt, this is because the bed is considered part of the person (for it is serving him), whereas the pouch on the child is not considered part of the child (rather, it is merely a toy).

**One can carry his son in a courtyard on Shabbos even though his son is holding a stone in his hand.**

If the child was dead, and the child has a pouch hanging from his neck, then the person who took the child out is not liable. But let him be liable because of the child? Rava agrees with Rabbi Shimon, who maintained: One is not culpable on account of a labor unrequired per se.

It was taught in our Mishnah: A man may take up his son while he has a stone in his hand!<sup>1</sup> It was said in the school of Rabbi Yannai that the Mishnah refers to a case where the child has a longing for his father, so the Chachamim provided a special dispensation that the father can lift the child even though the stone that the child is holding is muktzeh. If so, why state a stone, even a coin!? Why then did Rava say this was taught only by a stone, but a coin would be forbidden? - When the child is holding the stone, if the stone falls from the child's hand, the father will not carry it, so we permit the father to carry the child holding the stone. If the child is holding a coin, however, if the coin falls from the child's hand, the father would come to carry the coin. For this reason, we do not allow the father to carry the child who is holding a coin, even if the child has a longing for his father.<sup>2</sup> It was taught in accordance with Rava: If one carries out his garments folded up and lying on his shoulder, or his sandals or his rings in his hands, he is liable; but if he was wearing them, he is not culpable. If one carries out a person with his garments' upon him, with

<sup>1</sup> This proves that the man is not regarded as himself holding the stone, which would be forbidden. Hence by analogy he does not carry out the pouch suspended around the child's neck; why then is he culpable on its account?

<sup>2</sup> One would not even be allowed to hold the hand of his child who is holding a coin on Shabbos, as we are concerned that the child will drop the coin and the father will come to carry the coin that is muktzeh.



his sandals on his feet and his rings on his hands, he is not culpable. Hence if he carried them as they are he would be culpable.<sup>3</sup> (141b - 142a)

**One can carry a basket that contains a stone and fruits that become ruined easily.**

The Mishnah stated that one may carry a basket that has a stone inside it. The Gemara asks: But let the basket be considered a base to a forbidden object? Rabbah bar Bar Chanah said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The basket is not considered a *basis*, base for a forbidden object, because the basket also contains produce, which is not muktzeh, and the basket is primarily a base for permitted objects. But let him spill the produce and the stone on the ground, and take the produce by hand? This is as Rabbi Ilai said in the name of Rav (regarding a similar case): It is referring to produce that will become ruined if they are spilled on the ground; here too we are dealing with a case that the produce will become ruined if spilled on the ground. But let him shake the basket and all that's inside of it (besides the produce)? Rav Chiya bar Ashi aid in the name of Rava: We are referring here of a broken basket, so that the stone itself becomes a wall for the basket. (142a)

**One can move *Terumah* that is *tamei* with *Terumah* that is *tahor*.**

The Mishnah states that one can move *Terumah* that is *tamei* with *Terumah* that is *tahor* on Shabbos. Rav Chisda explains that this ruling only applies when the *Terumah* that is *tahor* is at the bottom of the basket and the *Terumah* that is *tamei* is on top of it. If the *Terumah* that is *tahor* is on top and the *Terumah* that is *tamei* is on the bottom, however, then one is required to remove the *Terumah* that is *tahor* out of the basket and the *Terumah* that is *tamei* remains in the basket. The Gemara asks: But even if the *Terumah* that is *tahor* is on top, let him spill all the *Terumah* out and then place the *Terumah* that is *tahor* in the basket? Rabbi Ilai said in the name of Rav: It is

referring to produce that will become ruined if they are spilled on the ground. The Gemara objects from a Baraisa that states that one can move both the *Terumah* that is *tahor* and the *Terumah* that is *tamei*, and even of *chullin*, regardless of the position of either *Terumah* – whether the *tahor* is on top and the *tamei* on bottom, or the *tamei* on top and the *tahor* on bottom. This is a refutation of Rav Chisda!? Rav Chisda will answer you: Our Mishnah refers to a case where one needs the *Terumah* that is *tahor* for its own use, i.e., to eat it, so when there is no other option available, he can move the *Terumah* that is *tamei* also. The Baraisa refers to a case where one needed the basket for its place. [Since the *Terumah* that is *tahor* is more valuable than the *Terumah* that is *tamei*, one can move the entire basket.] What compels Rav Chisda to interpret our Mishnah as meaning that it is required for itself? — Said Rava, Our Mishnah, by deduction, supports him. For the second clause states: If money is lying on a cushion, one shakes the cushion, and it falls off. And Rabbah bar Bar Chanah said in Rabbi Yochanan's name: They learnt this only if it [the cushion] is required for itself; but if its place is required, one removes it while it [the money] is upon it. And since the second clause means that it is required for itself, the first clause too means that it is required for itself. (142a)

**One can remove one part of *Terumah* from a mixture that contains one hundred parts of *Chullin* on Shabbos.**

Rabbi Yehudah maintained in the Mishnah that one can remove one part of *Terumah* from a mixture that contains one hundred parts of *Chullin*. The Gemara finds difficulty with this, as it should be considered that the person is repairing the mixture, because by removing the part that is *Terumah* from the mixture, he is allowing the rest to be eaten. Rabbi Yehudah agrees with Rabbi Eliezer, who maintains: The *terumah* lies as a [separate] entity.<sup>4</sup> For we learnt: If a *se'ah* of *terumah* falls into less than a hundred, and thus they become a [forbidden] mixture, and then some of the mixture falls elsewhere, Rabbi Eliezer said: It

<sup>3</sup> This is analogous to Rava's dictum, for a pouch 'suspended from a child's neck is not in the position of being worn.

<sup>4</sup> Since one part is to be removed, it is as though the *terumah* in it lay separate and distinct, and therefore the whole mixture is fit for use in any case.

creates a [forbidden] mixture as though it were certain terumah,<sup>5</sup> but the Sages maintain: The mixture creates a [forbidden] mixture only in proportion.<sup>6</sup> [But] say that you know him [to rule thus] with stringency; do you know him [to rule thus] with lenience? — Rather [reply thus]: He [Rabbi Yehudah] rules as Rabbi Shimon, as we learnt: If a se'ah of terumah falls into a hundred,<sup>7</sup> and one has no time to remove [it] until another falls in, it is [all] forbidden,<sup>8</sup> but Rabbi Shimon permits it.<sup>9</sup> Yet how [does this follow]? Perhaps there they differ in this: viz., the first Tanna holds: Though they fell in consecutively it is as though they fell in simultaneously, so that each falls into fifty; whereas Rabbi Shimon holds: The first is neutralized in the hundred, and this one is neutralized in a hundred and one?<sup>10</sup> —The Gemara concludes that Rabbi Yehudah follows the opinion of Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, who maintains that when a mixture contains one part Terumah and one hundred parts of Chullin, one can look with his eyes at one side of the mixture and eat from the other side without actually having removed the necessary portion. But does he agree with him? Indeed, he disputes him in the following Baraisa: Rabbi Yehudah said: One removes one part [of terumah in chullin] when one part [is neutralized] in a hundred and one parts; Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar said: One casts his eyes at one side and eats from the other? - Rabbi Yehudah in our Mishnah is even more lenient than that of Rabbi Shimon ben Elozar [for he maintains that one can eat from the mixture without actually removing the portion, and since the 'repair' of the mixture can be performed without actually performing a physical action, it follows that the actual removal is not forbidden. Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar, however, maintains that one cannot physically remove the necessary portion from the mixture, whereas according to

Rabbi Yehudah, since one can designate the portion mentally, he can also physically remove the portion]. (142a – 142b)

**One can remove a stone from on top of a barrel by tilting the barrel and having the stone fall off.**

Mishnah: If a stone was on top of a barrel, one may tilt the barrel so that the stone falls off.<sup>11</sup>

**One can move a barrel from amongst other barrels and then tilt the barrel so that the stone should fall off.**

If the barrel of wine was amongst other barrels (and he is concerned that the stone may break the barrels), he may lift the barrel and place it elsewhere, and then tilt the barrel so that the stone falls off.<sup>12</sup>

If money is lying on a cushion, one shakes the cushion, and it falls off. If dirt is upon it, one wipes it off with a rag; if it is of leather, water is poured over it until it disappears. (142b)

Rav Huna said in the name of Rav: One may only tilt the barrel to remove the stone if he unintentionally left the stone on top of the barrel. If he left the stone intentionally on top of the barrel, however, then the barrel is a base to a forbidden object (to the stone) and he cannot move the barrel at all. (142b)

**There is a dispute regarding separating beans from a mixture on Yom Tov.**

If the barrel of wine was amongst other barrels etc. Which Tanna holds that wherever there is something permitted and something forbidden, one must occupy oneself with

<sup>5</sup> Sc. as though it were all terumah and therefore it can only be neutralized by a hundred times its quantity. Thus he regards the terumah as distinct.

<sup>6</sup> E.g., if a se'ah of terumah falls into nine se'ahs of chullin in the first place, and then a se'ah of the mixture falls into another heap of produce, this second se'ah is regarded as containing one tenth of a se'ah of terumah only, and if the second pile contains ten se'ahs it neutralizes it.

<sup>7</sup> Hence it is neutralized, but that one se'ah of the whole must be removed.

<sup>8</sup> Since here are now two se'ahs of terumah in one hundred of chullin.

<sup>9</sup> It is now assumed that his reason is because he regards the first se'ah as lying distinct and apart, and therefore the second se'ah alone is counted, and that too is neutralized.

<sup>10</sup> Hence on the contrary, instead of regarding the terumah as a thing apart, he maintains that it becomes entirely one with the chullin.

<sup>11</sup> This is permitted because he is not moving the stone, which is muktzeh, directly, and he is moving the muktzeh in order to obtain wine that is not muktzeh.

<sup>12</sup> Removing the barrel requires less exertion than removing the stone, because removing the stone will not enable the person to take all the wine from the barrel. Therefore, it is preferable to remove the entire barrel from amongst the other barrels and then tilt the barrel so that the stone falls off.



what is permitted, not with what is forbidden? — Said Rabbah bar Bar Chanah in Rabbi Yochanan's name, It is Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. For we learnt: If one wants to separate beans from a mixture that contains muktzeh on Yom Tov, Beis Shammai maintains that one must select the food from the objects that one does not desire and eat the food. Beis Hillel, however, maintains that one can even remove the undesired objects from the food, and he does this by spreading the mixture on a plate and he tilts the plate so the beans are separated from the undesirable objects contained in the mixture. And it was taught in a Baraisa: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel states that Beis Hillel only permits removing undesired objects from the food when the food is more than the undesired objects (as in such a case, removing the muktzeh does not involve much exertion). If the undesired objects are more than the food, however, then even Beis Hillel agrees that one must remove the food and leave the undesired objects. The Gemara asks: But here it is analogous to where the edible exceeds the non-edible?<sup>13</sup> -Since he cannot take [the whole of] the wine, should he desire it, unless he lifts it up, it is analogous to where the non-edible exceeds the edible.<sup>14</sup> (142b)

If it is [standing] among the barrels, he lifts it out. It was taught, Rabbi Yosi said: If the barrel is lying among a store [of barrels], or if glassware is lying under it, he lifts it out elsewhere, tilts it on a side, so that it falls off, takes from it what he requires, and replaces it.

If money is lying on a cushion: Rabbi Chiya bar Ashi said: They learnt this only where one forgot [it there]; but if he placed [it there], it [the cushion] became a stand for a forbidden article. Rabbah bar Bar Chanah said: They learnt this only when it is required for itself; but if its place is required, one may remove it [the cushion] while they [the coins] are yet upon it. And thus did Chiya bar Rav of Difti

recite: They learnt this only when it is required for itself; but if its place is required, one may move it while they are yet upon it. (142b)

### **One can shake off a pillow that had money on it when Shabbos began.**

The Mishnah states that one can shake off a pillow that had money on it when shabbos began. Rabbi Oshaya said that if one forgot a purse in the courtyard, he can place a loaf of bread or a child on the purse and move it (where it will not be stolen).<sup>15</sup> Rav Yitzchak said: If one forgets a brick in a courtyard, he places a loaf or a child on it and moves it. Rabbi Yehudah bar Shila said in Rabbi Assi's name: They once forgot a saddlebag full of money in the street, and went and consulted Rabbi Yochanan and he told them: Place a loaf or a child on it and move it.<sup>16</sup>

Mar Zutra said: The law is as all these rulings, where one forgets. Rav Ashi said: Even if one forgets, this is still not [permitted], and they permitted [the expedient of] a loaf or a child only in connection with a corpse.

Abaye placed a ladle on a pile of sheaves; Rava placed a knife on a young dove and handled it. Said Rav Yosef: How keen are the rulings of children! Assume that the Rabbis ruled thus when one forgets: but was it said [that it is permitted] at the very outset? Abaye retorted: But that I am a person of importance, would I need a ladle on sheaves: surely they are fit for reclining on. Rava retorted: But that I am a person of importance, would I need a knife on a young dove? Surely it is fit for me as raw meat.<sup>17</sup>

### **Rava's Position On Muktzeh**

The *Gemora* infers from Rava's explanation that if not for the fact that the dove meat is edible raw, he wouldn't be allowed to move it, implying that he rules like Rabbi

<sup>13</sup> For there is more trouble in lifting out the whole barrel than in simply removing the stone.

<sup>14</sup> Eventually he must lift out the barrel and tilt it in order to obtain the wine at the very bottom; hence there is no more trouble in lifting it out now.

<sup>15</sup> The rationale behind this ruling is that the loaf of bread or the child are non-muktzeh items, and by placing them on the muktzeh item, one is essentially

moving the non-muktzeh item and the muktzeh item is now secondary to the non-muktzeh item.

<sup>16</sup> Less than four cubits at a time, since carrying in a street is forbidden; or, within a barrier formed by a chain of Persons.

<sup>17</sup> Which used to be eaten in his days.



Yehudah, who says that something meant for human food is not considered prepared for an animal.

The *Gemora* challenges this from a time that Rava told his servant on Yom Tov to roast a goose, and throws its innards to a cat, even though the whole goose was meant to be eaten by people.

The *Gemora* explains that this was also consistent with Rabbi Yehudah. Since the innards will rot if left until the evening, people always planned to give it to animals, making it already prepared for animal use.

The *Gemora* cites another statement of Rava which also indicates that he rules like Rabbi Yehudah. Rava said that a woman should not enter the pen of firewood to take a piece of wood to be used to stoke coals, and if a stoker broke on Yom Tov, it may not be used as firewood, since one may use a vessel for firewood, but not one which broke, which is considered a new item, which was not prepared beforehand. This restriction on using an unprepared item follows Rabbi Yehudah's position on *muktzeh*. (142b – 143a)

#### DAILY MASHAL

##### ***Choosing between a Good Beverage and a Bad One***

The prohibition of *borer* is that one cannot select from a mixture something that he does not desire while leaving the object that he does desire. Essentially, this process of selection is a microcosm of life, as one is always choosing between good and bad. One must choose the good and leave the impurities behind. The story is told with Rabbi Dovid HaLevi Segal, the author of the Taz on Shulchan Aruch, who began his rabbinical career as the Rav of the city of Potolich. The Taz would stay up late learning Torah but was overcome by hunger pangs. His solution to this predicament was to drink whiskey in the local tavern, which would warm him temporarily and stave off his hunger pangs. The Taz was forced to buy whiskey on credit, and when the townspeople discovered that the

rabbi whom they despised was a drinker like the simple folk, they dismissed him from his position. The Taz went on to become the Rav of the city of Ostroh, home of the famous Maharsha, and a city whose inhabitants respected Torah scholars. When the Taz was writing his commentary to Shulchan Aruch and he arrived at the laws of Kiddush, the Taz wrote that the Shulchan Aruch rules that when wine is unavailable, one can make Kiddush on beer as beer is considered *chamar medinah*, a commonly drunk beverage. Nonetheless, the Taz ruled that the people who live in Potolich cannot recite Kiddush over beer or whiskey, because they are loathe to anyone who drinks these beverages. When the Taz's writings were published, the inhabitants of Potolich had their livelihood snuffed out, as all the liquor merchants heard about the Taz's ruling and they all assumed that the people of Potolich had a change of heart and now despised alcoholic beverages. This could not have been further from the truth, as not only did the residents of Potolich not despise whiskey and beer, but they actually made a nice living through the sale of these drinks. After discovering that their ignorance had been the cause of the Taz being forced to seek alleviation of his hunger through whiskey, the residents of Potolich sent a delegation to the Taz begging his forgiveness and the Taz, upon reprinting his commentary on the Shulchan Aruch, deleted the ruling regarding the people of Potolich not being allowed to recite Kiddush over wine and beer. The moral of the story is that the residents of Potolich chose to hire a good rabbi but they failed to recognize his value, until they were forced to appreciate him, and the Taz assumed that the residents despised something, and in truth it was something that they really loved. Good and bad are sometimes just a matter of perspective, and one with a positive attitude will see everything in life as an opportunity for spiritual growth.