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Shabbos Daf 153

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o"n

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

One can know from the eulogy delivered for someone if the deceased is worthy of a share in the World to Come.

When a person is eulogized, one can tell from the effect the eulogy has on the audience whether the deceased has earned a share in the World to Come. If the audience is moved to tears, then we can assume that the deceased has earned a share in the World to Come.

Rav instructed Rav Shmuel bar Shilas to deliver a moving eulogy at his funeral because Rav's spirit would be in attendance, and this appears to contradict the idea that one could tell from the effect the eulogy has on the audience whether the deceased has earned a share in the World to Come.

The *Gemora* resolves this difficulty by stating that when the eulogizer delivers a moving eulogy for someone who was truly righteous, like Rav, then the audience is moved by his words. If the deceased was not so righteous, then even when the eulogizer attempts to move the audience, they will not be moved. (153a)

There was a difference in custom between the Galileans and the Judeans.

The verse in Koheles states: *So man goes to his eternal home while the eulogizers go about the streets.* Employing this verse, the people of Galilee would say that one should perform good deeds before his coffin, i.e. one should perform good deeds while he is alive, so the eulogizer will have good things to say about the deceased. In Judea, using the same verse, the people would say, perform good deeds after your coffin.

The *Gemora* explains that there is no disagreement here. Rather, in the Galilee the custom was to eulogize the deceased in front of his coffin, and in Judea the eulogizer would stand behind the coffin. (153a)

One should repent a day before his death.

Rabbi Eliezer said that one should repent one day before his death. Rabbi Eliezer's students questioned this statement, because how can one know the precise day of when he will die.

Rabbi Eliezer responded that a person should repent today because he may die tomorrow, and in this way he will always be in a state of repentance.

The *Gemora* states that this is implied in the verse that states: *At all times let your garments be white, and your head never lack oil.* The garments referred to are the souls that should always be white and pure. This is likened to a king who invites his servants to a banquet. The smart servants dress properly and wait at the entrance to the palace, because they know that the king is not lacking anything to commence the festivities. The foolish servants, however, ignore the king's invitation, thinking that the king still has to prepare for the banquet. Suddenly, the king calls his servants to arrive at the banquet. The smart servants are dressed properly and are ready to attend, so the king invites them to eat and drink. As for the foolish servants, who are not properly dressed and are unprepared, the king only allows them to watch the smart servants indulging in the meal. A



dissenting opinion maintains that if the foolish servants are allowed to attend, then they appear to be attending to the other servants. A more appropriate analogy would be that the smart servants and the foolish servants sit at the banquet, but the smart ones are allowed to eat and drink, while the foolish servants go hungry and thirsty. (153a)

One should always wear Tzitzis and Tefillin.

An alternative interpretation of the verse, at *all times let your garments be white, and your head never lack oil*, is that the white garments refers to ones *tzitzis*. [*The Biblical obligation of wearing tzitzis is to wear both white threads and threads made out of techeiles, a blue-dyed wool secreted by a land-sea animal called chilazon. Even when the techeiles is unavailable, one should ensure that he always wear the white threads of the tzitzis.*] The latter part of the verse, and *your head never lack oil*, refers to the *tefillin* one wears on his head. [*The word for oil is shemen, and the Gemora elsewhere (Brachos 6a) interprets the verse: then all the peoples of the world will see that Hashem's Name is called upon you to be referring to the tefillin shel rosh, the tefillin worn on the head. The word Name is Shem, so there is a correlation of oil to tefillin. Alternatively, one should wear the tefillin shel rosh, tefillin of the head, at all times, even if one lacks the tefillin shel yad, the tefillin worn on the hand.*] (153a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, SHO'EIL

One who was traveling and Shabbos arrives, should give his wallet to a gentile.

One who was traveling on the road and *Shabbos* approaches, he should give his wallet to a gentile to carry for him before *Shabbos* arrives. If, however, there is no gentile with him, he places it on his donkey.

When he reaches the outermost courtyard (*of the city*), he removes the objects which may be handled on the *Shabbos*, and regarding those which may not be handled

on the *Shabbos*, he unties the cords and the sacks fall off automatically.

The *Gemora* explains: Normally, one is not allowed to have a gentile perform an act of labor for him on *Shabbos*, and in this case the Jew is asking the gentile to carry for him on *Shabbos*. Nonetheless, this is permitted, because since a person is concerned about his money, if we do not allow him to instruct the gentile to carry his wallet for him on *Shabbos*, he will come to carry the wallet himself on *Shabbos* four *amos* in a public domain, thus violating a Biblical prohibition. [*The issue with having a gentile carry the wallet for him is only a rabbinical prohibition of amirah lenachri, instructing a gentile during the week or on Shabbos to perform forbidden labor for a Jew, and the Chachamim relaxed their injunction for the sake of not having the Jew violate a biblical prohibition.*] (153a)

One cannot ask a gentile to carry something that the Jew found before Shabbos.

When a Jew is traveling immediately prior to *Shabbos*, Rava said that one is permitted to ask a gentile to carry his wallet for him on *Shabbos*, but he cannot ask the gentile to carry for him an object that he found on the road. Regarding a found object, we are not concerned that if we do not let the gentile carry the object for him, then the Jew will carry the object himself four *amos* in a public domain, because the found object was not obtained through his efforts, so he will be willing to forgo the object. This law only applies when the Jew found the object on *Shabbos*, but if he found the object before *Shabbos*, then he can give it to a gentile to carry for him on *Shabbos*.

An alternative version in the *Gemora* is that Rava is unresolved regarding a found object that one obtained before *Shabbos*, whether one can give the object to a gentile to carry for him on *Shabbos* or not. (153a)



If there is no gentile available, he may place the wallet on his donkey.

If one is traveling immediately prior to *Shabbos* and there is no gentile available for him to give his wallet to carry on *Shabbos*, he may place the wallet on his donkey. He cannot allow his donkey to carry the wallet initially, because one is commanded to let his animal rest on *Shabbos*, as opposed to a gentile, one is not commanded to let the gentile rest on *Shabbos*. [*Having a gentile carry the wallet is a Rabbinical prohibition of asking a gentile to perform a forbidden act of labor on Shabbos, whereas having ones animal carry a load for him on Shabbos is a Biblical prohibition. (The Gemora on 153b will discuss how one can place the wallet on the donkey, which is a Biblical prohibition.)*]

If there is a donkey, a deaf-mute, imbecile, or minor, he must place it on the donkey and not give it to the deaf-mute, imbecile or minor. What is the reason? The latter are human beings, whereas the former is not. In the case of a deaf-mute and an imbecile, he must give it to the imbecile; in the case of an imbecile and a minor, - to the imbecile.

The scholars asked: What of a deaf-mute and a minor? The *Gemora* notes: According to Rabbi Eliezer's view there is no question, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Yitzchak said in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: The *terumah* which was separated by a deaf-mute should not be recognized as unconsecrated (*but rather, it must be treated with the stringencies of terumah*), because we are uncertain regarding the competence of a deaf man (*and perhaps the terumah is indeed valid*). [*According to that view, the purse must certainly be given to the minor, and not the deaf-mute.*] The question is according to the view of the Rabbis (*who disagree with R' Eliezer*), for we learned in the following *Mishna* (Terumos 1,1): There are five people who should not separate *terumah*, and if they did separate *terumah*, it is not valid. The five are the following: A deaf-mute, an imbecile, a minor, one who separates *terumah* from produce that is not his, and if an

idolater separates *terumah* from produce belonging to a Jew, even if he had permission. What then (*regarding the purse*)? Must he give it to the deaf-mute, seeing that the minor will arrive at an age of understanding; or perhaps he must give it to the minor, because a deaf-mute may be confused with an intelligent adult?

The *Gemora* concludes: Some rule that he must give it to the deaf-mute; others maintain that he must give it to the minor.

An alternative solution is to carry the wallet in a public domain less than four amos.

Rabbi Yitzchak said that there is an alternative solution of one carrying a load before *Shabbos*, but the Chachamim did not wish to reveal the solution, because it is said: *concerning the honor of Hashem, you should conceal the matter, but regarding the honor of kings, you should investigate a matter*. The solution is that the owner of the object carry it himself less than four *amos* at a time in a public domain. [*Although Rabbinically this would be forbidden, one is Biblically permitted to carry something in a public domain as long as he does not carry four or more amos at a time. The Chachamim were concerned that if they promulgated this solution, one would come to carry four amos in a public domain, thus violating a Biblical prohibition.*]

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: Rabbi Eliezer said: On that day (*when they entered the attic of Chananyah ben Chizkiyah for the eighteen enactments*) they overfilled the measure (*by building fences around the Biblical law; like the one inferred from our Mishna that one carrying a load at the onset of Shabbos should not transport it himself – even in increments of less than four amos - if there is a gentile around*). Rabbi Yehoshua said: On that day they leveled the measure (*for they imposed so many prohibitions as to defeat their own purpose, for by a reaction, some violated the Biblical law*).

It was taught in a *braisa*: As an illustration, the following parable resembles the view of Rabbi Eliezer: A basket full



of melons and gourds: a man puts mustard seed in it and it holds it (*well*). As an illustration, the following parable resembles the view of Rabbi Yehoshua: A tub full of honey: if one puts pomegranates and nuts in it, the tub will overflow. [Similarly, in our instance, a Jew may not trust a gentile with his wallet, and by not allowing him to carry the wallet less than four amos at a time himself, he may end up carrying it four amos in a public domain, in violation of a Biblical prohibition.] (153b)

One is prohibited from leading an animal with a load on it on *Shabbos*.

The *Mishna* stated that if there is no gentile available and one is carrying a load before *Shabbos*, he should place the wallet on his donkey. The difficulty with this ruling is that this appears to be a violation of the prohibition of *mechamer*, leading an animal with a load on it on *Shabbos*.

The *Gemora* resolves this issue by stating that the *Mishna* refers to a case where the Jew places the wallet on the donkey while the donkey is walking, so the donkey is not considered to have performed an *akirah*, lifting up of the object, and therefore the Biblical violation of having an animal perform a *melachah* for a Jew has not been violated. Although the donkey needs to stop and urinate and defecate, and this will result in an *akirah* and a *hanachah*, a placing down, the solution is to place the wallet on the donkey while it is walking and to remove the wallet when the donkey stops to urinate or defecate, thus the donkey will not be performing an *akirah* or a *hanachah*.

The *Gemora* asks: If so, the same may be done even to his Jewish friend as well? Rav Pappa answered: Where one is liable to a *chatas* if he did it himself, in the case of his friend, though he is exempt (*from a chatas*), nevertheless it is forbidden; and wherever in the case of one's friend (*when he performed the melachah together with him*), he is exempt (*from a chatas*), nevertheless it is forbidden, if

he did it with his donkey, it is permitted at the outset. (153b)

One can run with a pack on his shoulder immediately prior to *Shabbos* until he reaches his house.

There is another solution for one carrying a load while on the road immediately prior to *Shabbos*. If the burden is on his shoulder, he can run with it without stopping until he arrives at his house. The leniency is only allowed if he runs, but if he walks at a regular pace, it is forbidden, because he may forget and come to perform an *akirah* and a *hanachah*. Although when he arrives at his house, it is inevitable that he will pause momentarily before entering the house, and this will be a violation of carrying an object from a public domain into a private domain, the solution to this issue is to throw the load into his house in an unusual manner, so he will not be violating any *melachah*. (153b)

One only is liable a *chatas* offering for performing a prohibited action on *Shabbos*.

Rami bar Chama maintains that one who performs *mechamer*, leading an animal carrying a load on *Shabbos*, if done unintentionally, the owner is liable a *chatas*, and if done intentionally, then the owner is liable *sekilah*, death by stoning.

The reason for this, says Rabbah, is that the verse juxtaposes an animal and the owner in the same Biblical prohibition of performing *melachah* on *Shabbos*. Just like when the man does *melachah* on *Shabbos*, he is liable a *chatas* for an unintentional act and he is liable *sekilah* for an intentional act, so too when one goads his animal to carry a burden on *Shabbos*, the owner is liable a *chatas* for the unintentional act and *sekilah* for the intentional act.

Rava refutes this logic for two reasons. First, because the whole Torah is compared to idolatry, and by idolatry one is not liable a *chatas* unless he unintentionally performs an action, so the same holds true with regard to a



violation of *Shabbos*, and one will not be liable a *chatas* for performing a *melachah* unintentionally on *Shabbos* unless he performs an action. This would exclude *mechamer*, where he is only leading the animal, and this does not constitute a *melachah*.

Rava's second rebuttal of Rami bar Chama is that there is a *Mishna* in Sanhedrin (66a) that states that one who violates the *Shabbos* by performing an unintentional act and being liable a *chatas*, will be liable *sekilah* when performing the act intentionally. The implication for this statement is that there is an act that one can perform on *Shabbos* where he will not be liable a *chatas* for committing the act unintentionally, and subsequently he will not be liable *sekilah* for performing the act intentionally. Rava assumed that this act would be *mechamer*.

The *Gemora* refutes this by stating that the act that the *Mishna* would be implying is walking beyond the *techum*, the boundary of two thousand *amos* from a person's resting place. Rabbi Akiva maintains that *techumin* are biblically ordained, yet Rabbi Akiva concedes that one is not liable a *chatas*, *sekilah*, or *kares* (excision when performing an act intentionally but without warning or witnesses) for violating the laws of *techumin*, because walking outside the *techum* is not considered a *melachah*.

Alternatively, the *Mishna* could be implying the case of *havarah*. [Lighting a fire on *Shabbos*, which according to Rabbi Yosi, the *melachah* of lighting a fire is unique in that one who lights a fire on *Shabbos* is only in violation of a negative prohibition, but would not be liable a *chatas*, *sekilah*, or *kares*.] (153b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Two Horses Working Together

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Working an animal on *Shabbos* involves two distinct prohibitions. The first is based on the possuk "In order

that your ox and your donkey may rest," (Shemos 23:12). Even if we do not participate in the animal's *melachah*, it is a Torah prohibition to allow our own animals to perform *melachah*. Furthermore, there is also a prohibition of *mechamer*, based on the possuk, "Do not perform any *melachah*, you... and your animal," (Shemos 20:9). This forbids a Jew from working his animal on *Shabbos* (*Mishna Berura* 266 s.k. 7). According to most Rishonim, it is forbidden to work even another person's animal (see *Minchas Chinuch*: 32). When a wagon driver causes his horses to pull the wagon, he violates both prohibitions.

R' Yaakov of Lissa, the author of *Nesivos HaMishpat*, sought a solution for the plight of wagon drivers who were caught on the road as *Shabbos* began. Unable to drive their horses on *Shabbos*, due to the prohibitions discussed above, they faced the decision of either abandoning their horses and wagon, or spending *Shabbos* together with them by the roadside. R' Yaakov suggested that if more than one horse was hitched to the wagon, it may be permitted to drive them on *Shabbos* (*Commentary on Magen Avraham* 266 s.k. 7, printed in *Mekor Chaim*).

In our *Gemora*, we find that if the situation demands, one may carry together with an animal, lifting up the load each time the animal pauses to rest, and placing back on its back after it begins to walk. In this way, the person performs half of the *melachah*, *akira* (lifting up an object), and the animal performs the other half, *hanacha* (bringing an object to rest). This leniency is known as "two who perform a *melachah* together." The *Gemora* rules that when two people perform a *melachah* together, it is prohibited only according to Rabbinic law. When a person performs a *melachah* together with an animal, it is permitted.

Theoretically, the same is true when two horses pull a wagon together. Since each horse would have been able to pull the load itself, and they instead pull it together, it



is considered as if each performed only half the *melachah*. As we see in the *Gemora*, the Rabbinic prohibition of “two who perform a *melachah* together,” does not apply to animals.

R' Yaakov then rejects this reasoning, explaining that there are two different ways of performing half of a *melachah*. A person may begin the *melachah* by himself, and let someone else complete it. Alternatively, two people may perform the entire *melachah* in cooperation from beginning to end. In the first case, we can well understand that neither partner violates a Torah prohibition. Neither performs a complete action. In the second case, each person performs the complete action, from beginning to end, with the help of his partner.

The second scenario is more severe. In this case, although both partners are exempt from offering a korban in atonement, they transgress a Torah prohibition nonetheless. The *Gemora* only permitted the first case, of lifting up the burden each time the horse rests, but it does not permit driving two horses in tandem.

The Or Samei'ach (*Shabbos* 20:11) cites a proof from the Mishkan that driving two animals at once is forbidden. As we know, the laws of *Shabbos* are learned from the the construction of the Mishkan. When the boards and curtains of the Mishkan were transported, wagons hitched to teams of two oxen each were used. Clearly, the leniency of “two who performed a *melachah* together” cannot be applied here (See Avi Ezri, who questions this proof).

Lazy horses: The Ksav Sofer (Commentary on Chasam Sofer O.C. 266) further objects that even if the leniency of “two who performed a *melachah* together” applies here in theory, in practice it is unrealistic. Often, when horses work together as a team, one horse slacks off and allows the other to pull the full burden, while he walks at a slightly slower pace. The wagon driver eventually notices, and taps the lazy horse with his stick to prompt it to pull.

Therefore, there is no guarantee that the horses are in fact performing the *melachah* together for the entire distance of the trip.

DAILY MASHAL

Healing and Repentance

The *Gemora* states one should repent on the day before he dies, and since man never knows when his demise will be, he should repent every day, thus he will always be in a state of repentance.

The story is told of Reb Yehoshua Zanvil who was very diligent in his study of Torah. When Reb Yehoshua Zanvil reached a mature age, he was married off to Sarah Pessil, the daughter of the wealthy Reb Shmuel Rivkind, one of the wealthiest men residing in Vilna. Shortly after his marriage, Reb Yehoshua Zanvil was forced to take on the responsibility of supporting a family, as his father-in-law died suddenly. Although Reb Yehoshua Zanvil resisted this new burden, his Rabbis advised him to listen to his mother-in-law who insisted that Reb Yehoshua Zanvil take on the burden of providing an income for himself and his new wife.

Reb Yehoshua Zanvil became quite successful in business, and he soon became one of the wealthiest men in the area. His travels took him to the city of Mezeritch, which was a stronghold for Chassidus, and well known for its famous Rebbe, The Maggid of Mezeritch. Reb Yehoshua Zanvil was prepared to test the Maggid with his most difficult questions in *Gemora*, but upon arriving before the Maggid, he lost all courage upon being face to face with the holy personage of the Maggid. The Maggid spoke cryptically to Reb Yehoshua Zanvil, telling him that it was not medicines that healed, but the doctors are accompanied by heavenly angels, and it is the angles that heal the person. Reb Yehoshua Zanvil could not understand what the Maggid was referring to, and the

Maggid bid Reb Yehoshua Zanvil goodbye without uttering another word.

Some time later, Reb Yehoshua Zanvil became deathly ill, and no doctor was able to heal him. All of Vilna was engaged in prayer on behalf of Reb Yehoshua Zanvil, their pride and joy, not to mention the supporter of many charitable institutions that were in danger of collapsing if Reb Yehoshua Zanvil would not support them.

One day the news got out that no less than the Czar of Prussia himself would be passing through the city of Vilna. A quick thinker amongst the Jews figured that the Czar always travels with his personal physician, and perhaps the Jews could request that the royal physician visit the ailing Reb Yehoshua Zanvil. Although such requests were unheard of, the Czar granted permission, and the royal physician stepped inside the home of Reb Yehoshua Zanvil. The physician took one look at Reb Yehoshua Zanvil, and cried out, "Why do you bring me to a dying man? Let me out of here." It was no easy task for the physician to leave, as the room was crowded with hundreds of people who were blocking his exit. After a few minutes of unsuccessful attempts to leave the house, the physician threw a backwards glance at the patient and to his utter chagrin, he noticed a slight improvement in Reb Yehoshua Zanvil's condition. The physician quickly prescribed a prescription for one of the family members to fill, but the family member was recalled when the physician realized that Reb Yehoshua Zanvil was improving right in front of his eyes. The physician then prescribed a weaker prescription, which he soon recalled because Reb Yehoshua Zanvil was looking even better than before. When the messengers returned with the bottles of medicine, the physician spilled the contents on the ground, declaring, "This man was cured by miracle! I had nothing to do with his return to good health." Reb Yehoshua Zanvil, smiling for the first time in a long time, said, "The opposite is true. It was your presence, along with the presence of the healing angel Raphael that cured my illness." Reb Yehoshua Zanvil then related to the

physician the words that the Maggid of Mezeritch had uttered to him, and the physician wondered aloud, "Who is this man? Only a man upon whom the Heavenly Spirit rests could say such things!"

The physician, whose name was Dr. Aaron Grida, had been brought up by Torah-observant parents, had been caught up in the secular winds sweeping through Europe, and he had almost forgotten his Jewish past. He immediately tendered his resignation to the Czar of Prussia, and made his way to Mezeritch. When the Maggid saw him, he beamed, proclaiming, "I have waited for you for a long time. You will heal my body, because the Maggid suffered from many ailments, especially in his legs, and I will heal your soul." It is said that Dr. Grida stayed with the Maggid from then on, until the Maggid left this world. The physician repented completely, and he was known as the famous Reb Aharon, one of the greatest students that the Maggid of Mezeritch ever had.

Spotless Clothes

The possuk in Koheles (9:8) states, "Let your garments always be white, and let your head not lack oil." The *Gemora* explains that the garments are a metaphor for a person's neshama. It descends to this world perfectly spotless from the stains of iniquity. Hashem expects us to return our neshamos to Him as pure and clean as we received them. The Kotzker Rebbe added that the real difficulty here lies in the conclusion of the possuk; our heads never lack oil. Man in this world is like a person dressed in a white suit with a cup of oil balanced precariously on his head. He must guard his every movement with perfect balance and precision, to ensure that the oil does not spill onto his clothes.