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Sotah Daf 23

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishna (cont.)

If the daughter of a *Yisroel* is married to a *Kohen*, her *minchah* is burned; however, if a *Koheness* is married to a *Yisroel*, her *minchah* is eaten.

What is the difference between a *Kohen* and a *Koheness*? The *minchah* of a *Koheness* is eaten, whereas the *minchah* of a *Kohen* is not eaten (*it must be burned*). A *Koheness* can be rendered a *chalalah* (*a Koheness who cohabits with a man that she is prohibited from marrying; she cannot eat terumah and she becomes forbidden from marrying a Kohen*), but a *Kohen* cannot. A *Koheness* may become *tamei* from the dead, but a *Kohen* cannot. A *Kohen* may eat from *kodshei kodoshim* (*such as a chatas or an asham*), but a *Koheness* cannot.

What is the difference between a man and a woman? A man (*who is a confirmed metzora*) is required to let his hair grow and rend his garments, but a woman does not have these requirements. A father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son. A man shaves (*he may complete his nezirus, i.e. bring the korbanos, using the money that his father set aside for his own korbanos*) on the *nezirus* of his father, but a woman does not (*a person’s father was a nazir who separated money for his korbanos without specifying which parts of the money should be used for each korban; the father then died; if his son states, “I am a nazir on the condition that*

I will shave using the money of my father,” he may use his father’s korbanos; a daughter cannot do this). A man may betroth his daughter, but a woman cannot. A father can sell his daughter as a maidservant, but a mother cannot. A man is stoned without clothes, but a woman is not (*if she needs to be stoned, it is done while clothed*). A man is hanged (*after being executed*), while a woman is not. A man can be sold as a slave for his theft (*if he cannot afford to pay it back*), but a woman cannot be sold. (23a)

Minchah of a Kohen’s Wife

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: The flour-offerings from women who are married to a *Kohen* must be burned. What is the case? If a *Koheness*, *Leviah* or a *Yisraelis* is married to a *Kohen*, her *minchah* cannot be eaten because the *Kohen* has a share in it (*and a minchah from a Kohen cannot be eaten*). It cannot be burned completely on the *mizbe’ach* (*without a kemitzah*) because she has a share in it (*and therefore should require kemitzah*). Rather, the *halacha* is that the *komeitz* is brought on the *mizbe’ach* by itself, and the remainder of the *minchah* is brought on the *mizbe’ach* by itself.

The *Gemora* asks: Isn’t there a law that if the appropriate part of a *korban* has been offered, the rest of it (*that is not supposed to be burned*) is explicitly forbidden to be burned on the altar?

Rav Yehudah, son of Rabbi Shimon Ben Pazi answers

that it can nonetheless be offered like a wood offering without transgressing this prohibition, in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elozar whom explicitly states that this is permissible in a *braisa*.

The *Gemora* asks: Although this ruling will fit the opinion of Rabbi Elozar, can it fit the opinion of the *Chachamim* who argue on him?

The *Gemora* says it can, in light of the position of Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon regarding the way a *Kohen* brings a *minchas chotei* (flour offering for a *Kohen* who sins). Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon understands that the *minchas chotei* of a *Kohen* must undergo *kemitzah*, while the rest of it is simply placed on the *beis hadeshen* (where the ashes of the altar were placed). Although the *Chachamim* argue on Rabbi Elozar son of Rabbi Shimon regarding a *minchas chotei*, that is because they understand that a regular *minchas chotei* of a *Kohen* must be completely offered on the altar, without having some of it placed in a place usually reserved for ashes. However, they would agree that in our case (by the wife of a *Kohen*), where there is no regular solution (as we are unsure what type of *minchah* she is supposed to bring, and perhaps we would regard it as her *minchah*, and therefore the remainder should not be burned on the *mizbe'ach*), one should place the leftovers on the *beis hadeshen*. (23a – 23b)

Scriptural Sources

The Mishna had stated: If the daughter of a *Yisroel* is married [to a *Kohen*, her *minchah* is burned; however, if a *Koheness* is married to a *Yisroel*, her *minchah* is eaten. The *minchah* of a *Koheness* is eaten, whereas the *minchah* of a *Kohen* is not eaten (it must be burned)].

The *Gemora* asks: What is the reason?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *And every minchah of the Kohen shall be completely burned; it shall not be eaten* — ‘of the *Kohen*’ but not of a *Koheness*.

The Mishna had stated: A *Koheness* can be rendered a *chalalah* (a *Koheness* who cohabits with a man that she is prohibited from marrying; she cannot eat *terumah* and she becomes forbidden from marrying a *Kohen*), but a *Kohen* cannot.

The *Gemora* asks: From where is this known?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *He shall not profane his seed among his people* — his seed may become profaned, but he himself cannot become profaned.

The Mishna had stated: A *Koheness* may become *tamei* [from the dead, but a *Kohen* cannot].

The *Gemora* asks: What is the reason?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *Tell the Kohanim, the sons of Aaron* — ‘the sons of Aaron,’ but not the daughters of Aaron.

The Mishna had stated: A *Kohen* may eat from *kodshei kodoshim* [(such as a *chatas* or an *asham*), but a *Koheness* cannot].

For it is written: *Every male among the children of Aaron shall eat of it*.

The Mishna had stated: What is the difference between a man [and a woman? A man (who is a confirmed



metzora) is required to let his hair grow and rend his garments, but a woman does not have these requirements].

The Gemora cites a braisa: *A man [afflicted with tzaraas]*. I know only of a man (that he can become tamei with this type of tzaraas); from where is it known (that the law applies to) a woman? When it states: *And the one afflicted with tzaraas*; behold here are two. If so, what does the word 'man' indicate? It is to be applied to the subject matter of what follows: it is a man who rends his clothes etc (but not a woman).

The Mishna had stated: A father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son.

Rabbi Yochanan said: This (that a father may impose nezirus upon his son but not a mother) is a Halachah (received by Moshe at Sinai) regarding a nazir.

The Mishna had stated: A man shaves (*he may complete his nezirus, i.e. bring the korbanos, using the money that his father set aside for his own korbanos*) on the *nezirus* of his father, but a woman does not (*a person's father was a nazir who separated money for his korbanos without specifying which parts of the money should be used for each korban; the father then died; if his son states, "I am a nazir on the condition that I will shave using the money of my father," he may use his father's korbanos; a daughter cannot do this*).

Rabbi Yochanan said: This is a Halachah (received by Moshe at Sinai) regarding a nazir.

The Mishna had stated: A man may betroth his daughter, but a woman cannot.

This is because it is written: *I gave my daughter to this man*.

The Mishna had stated: A father can sell his daughter as a maidservant, but a mother cannot.

This is because it is written: *And if a man shall sell his daughter*.

The Mishna had stated: A man is stoned without clothes [but a woman is not (*if she needs to be stoned, it is done while clothed*)].

The Gemora asks: What is the reason?

The Gemora answers: The verse says: *And they will stone him*. Why does it say "him?" If you will tell me this is to say "him" and not "her," doesn't the verse say: *And you will take out that man or that woman* etc.? Rather, it must be teaching us that he is stoned without his clothes and she is stoned with her clothes.

The Mishna had stated: A man is hanged [(*after being executed*)], while a woman is not].

The Gemora asks: What is the reason?

The Gemora answers: The verse says: *And you shall hang him on a tree* — 'him' but not her.

The Mishna had stated: A man can be sold as a slave for his theft (*if he cannot afford to pay it back*), but a woman cannot be sold.

The Gemora asks: What is the reason?

The Gemora answers: The verse says: *Then he shall be sold for his theft* — ‘for his theft’ but not for her theft. (23b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, HAYAH NOTEIL

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

NEZIRUS OF A SON

The *Mishna* states: A father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son.

Rashi comments that the son remains a *nazir* even after he becomes an adult.

Tosfos in *Nazir* (28b) disagrees and maintains that as soon as the son becomes an adult, he is no longer a *nazir*.

Tosfos *Yom Tov* asks on Rashi: If a father cannot impose *nezirus* on his adult son, why would the *nezirus* that he imposed upon him as a minor remain when he becomes an adult?

The Reshash explains that there is a clear distinction between the two cases. A father does not have the authority to impose *nezirus* upon his adult son. However, when the father imposed *nezirus* upon his minor son, the child became a *nazir*. Once he is a *nazir*, why should we say that the *nezirus* goes away when he becomes an adult? Since he was a *nazir* up until now, nothing changes and he remains a *nazir*.

DAILY MASHAL

Speak it Out!

The *Gemora* in *Zevachim* states: Rabbi Elozar bar Rabbi Yosi said, I have heard that the owner causes *piggul*. In his opinion, not only a *Kohen* can disqualify a sacrifice with a thought of *piggul* (*that it will be eaten not in its*

proper time or place) but the owner of a sacrifice can disqualify it in the same way.

A question that originated in the *beis midrash* of Rabbi Chayim Berlin zt”l, the Netziv’s son, was discussed in all centers of learning everywhere. In his *Sedei Chemed*, HaGaon Rav Chizkiyah Medini zt”l collected the replies to this question from outstanding *talmidei chachamim* in Teveria, Vilna, Germany, etc. The question even graced the world of Torah with the work *Gevuros Shemonim* which, according to its author HaGaon Rav Yosef Engel zt”l (author of *Beis HaOtzar*, *Asvan D’oraissa*, etc.), “discusses one question and answers it in 80 ways”. His pupils related that he had many more answers but he sufficed with publishing 80 of them to give his book its unique name.

The question: If the owner causes *piggul*, we cannot test a *sotah* (a woman suspected of adultery) in the Temple, as before she drinks the cursing water, the *Kohen* has to offer the *minchah* that she must bring. The *sotah*, who surely wants to be saved from the curse, will cause the *minchah* to be *piggul* and without offering the *minchah*, the water does not test her (Sotah 20b)! Rav Berlin continues that this question is only according to Rambam, that *piggul* can be caused also by thought but according to Rashi, that *piggul* is caused only by speech, the *sotah* can be prevented from saying anything.

The Kohen dispels her thought: In the 18th answer we find an idea based on a fine proof from Rashi on our *sugya* (s.v. *Shama’ti*), that the owner causes *piggul* only if the *Kohen* remains silent. But if the *Kohen* announces his pure intentions, the owner cannot cause *piggul*.

We can learn from there that if someone has pure intentions, speak it out; it will then carry more weight.