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Pesachim Daf 60

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

**1. One who slaughtered a *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake, or received, walked with, or threw its blood on the *mizbeiach* not for its own sake, or if initially the Kohen intended that the offering be for the *Korban Pesach*, and then he intended for a different offering, or if initially the Kohen intended not for the sake of the *Korban Pesach* and then he intended for the *Korban Pesach*, the *Korban Pesach* is invalid.**

If one slaughters a *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake, which means that he intended for a different offering, i.e. a *shelamim*, or if he received, walked with, or threw the blood on the *mizbeiach* not for its own sake, or if initially he intended for its own sake and then he intended not for its own sake, or if initially he intended not for its own sake and then he intended for its own sake, the *Korban Pesach* is not valid. The reason the sacrifice is invalid is because it is said *you shall say*, “*It is the Pesach sacrifice*,” which implies that the offering must be slaughtered for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*. The word *hu*, meaning *it*, teaches us that if the offering was not slaughtered for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*, then the offering is invalid even after the fact. (59b)

**2. There is a dispute whether a person is responsible only for his first words or even for his final words.**

The Gemara wonders if when the Mishnah stated that one had a proper intention and improper intention regarding the *Korban Pesach*, that means that the Kohen had a proper and improper intention in the same *avodah* (service) and the *Korban Pesach* is still invalid, or does the Mishnah refer to a case where he had two intentions in two distinct *avodos*.

If the Mishnah refers to two intentions during one *avodah*, then the Mishnah is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yose who maintains that one is held responsible even for his final words. An example of this in a Mishnah learned elsewhere that discusses one who says “this animal is an exchange for an *olah*, an exchange for a *shelamim*” (known as *temurah*, literally meaning *exchange*. When an animal is exchanged for an offering, both animal now have sanctity). According to Rabbi Yose, the words “an exchange for a *shelamim*,” is binding like the first words “an exchange for an *olah*.” Rabbi Yose thus maintains that one is responsible for any statement that he makes, so when he one has an intention for a *Korban Pesach* for its sake and not for its sake, the offering is

invalid. Rabbi Meir, however, maintains that regarding the case of exchanging sanctity for an animal, we only concern ourselves with his first statement, which was “an exchange for an *olah*, and similarly, when the Kohen initially had an intention for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*, the offering will be valid, as we are not concerned with the second intention which is not for its own sake.

If the Mishnah is referring to a case where one had two intentions during two *avodos*, then even according to Rabbi Meir, who maintains that we follow the first statement, that is only said regarding two intentions in one *avodah*. Regarding two intentions in two *avodos*, even Rabbi Meir would agree that the offering is invalid. This is because an improper intention in any of the four *avodos* can cause the offering to be invalid, and performing one *avodah* with proper intention has no relevance to an invalid intention in a later *avodah*, so even Rabbi Meir would agree that the offering is invalid. (59b - 60a)

**3. The first part of the Mishnah refers to a case where one is performing a service and intending for the same service, and the end of the Mishnah refers to where he is slaughtering the sacrifice and intends for the throwing of the blood.**

The Gemara assumed that the first case of the Mishnah refers to a case where one slaughtered the *Korban Pesach* not for its own sake, or if one slaughtered the *Korban Pesach* for its own sake but received the blood, walked it to the *mizbeiach*, and threw the blood on the *mizbeiach* not for its own sake. Alternatively, he slaughtered the *Korban*

*Pesach*, received its blood and walked it to the *mizbeiach* for its own sake, but he threw the blood not for its own sake. This would be a case of performing two *avodos*. The end of the Mishnah where one slaughters for its own sake and not for its own sake and the *Korban Pesach* is invalid, must then be referring to a case where one had two intentions for one *avodah* and this would be in accordance with Rabbi Yose who maintains that one is responsible even for his final words.

The Gemara rejects this thesis and states that the end of the Mishnah refers to a case where one had two intentions concerning two *avodos*. The difference between the two cases in the Mishnah is that the first part of the Mishnah refers to a case where he is performing the slaughtering and his intention is regarding the slaughtering, or he is involved in throwing the blood and his intention is regarding throwing the blood. This means that the first case is when he slaughtered the *Korban Pesach* intending that the slaughtering is for a different offering, but he threw with blood for the sake of the *Korban Pesach*. The next case in the first part of the Mishnah is when he slaughtered the offering for the sake of the *Korban Pesach* but threw the blood with the intention for different offering. The end of the Mishnah, however, refers to a case where he is involved in slaughtering and intends regarding the throwing of the blood, so he is stating, “I am slaughtering the *Korban Pesach* for its own sake with the intent of throwing the blood not for its own sake.” The offering is invalid because his second intent regarding the throwing of the blood is not relevant to his first intention which is regarding the slaughtering of the offering. This teaches us even if he intends while slaughtering the

offering that the throwing of the blood should not be for its own sake (*from one avodah to another avodah*), the *Korban Pesach* is immediately invalidated (*and this was Rav Pappa's inquiry in Tractate Zevachim*), even if he does not end up throwing the blood not for its own sake. (60a)

Come and hear from the last part of our Mishnah: or for another purpose and for its own purpose, it is disqualified. What is meant there? If we say that it is referring to a case of two *avodos*, then seeing that where if the first is for its own purpose and the second is for another purpose, you say that it is disqualified; is it necessary to state it where it is first for another purpose and then for its own purpose (*for the very first improper intention invalidated it; how then is it to regain its validity with a proper intention in the next avodah*)? Therefore it must surely refer to one *avodah*, and since the second clause refers to one *avodah*, the first clause as well refers to one *avodah* (*proving that the Mishnah is in accordance with Rabbi Yose, who maintains that a person is held accountable even for his latter intention*)!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: No, it refers to two *avodos*, and logically indeed it is not required, but the Mishnah speaks of 'for its own purpose and for another purpose,' it also mentions 'for another purpose and for its own purpose.'

Come and hear from the next Mishnah: If he slaughtered the *korban pesach* for those who cannot eat it or for those who were not registered for it, for uncircumcised or for *tamei* people, it is disqualified. Now here it obviously refers to one

*avodah* (*for only one intention is mentioned*), and since the second clause refers to one *avodah*, the first clause as well refers to one *avodah* (*proving that the Mishnah is in accordance with Rabbi Yose*)!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: What proof is this? This one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature; the end of the Mishnah refers to one *avodah*, while the beginning of the Mishnah may refer either to one *avodah* or to two *avodos*.

Come and hear from the next part of the Mishnah: If he slaughtered it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid. What are the circumstances of the case? Shall we say that it is referring to two *avodos*, and the reason that it is valid is because he intended it (*for those who cannot eat it*) at the sprinkling, for there can be no effective intention regarding those who eat at the sprinkling; therefore, if it were at one *avodah*, e.g., at the slaughtering, where an intention with reference to those who eat is effective, it would be disqualified, but we have an established law that if there are some who eat, it is not disqualified? Rather, it surely refers to one *avodah*, and since the end of the Mishnah refers to one *avodah*, the first part as well refers to one *avodah*!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: What proof is this? This one is according to its nature, while the other is according to its nature; the end of the Mishnah refers to one *avodah*, while the beginning of the Mishnah may refer either to one *avodah* or to two *avodos*.

The scholars inquired: What is the law of a korban pesach which he slaughtered at any other time of the year for its own purpose and for another purpose? Does the other purpose come and remove its own purpose, and therefore make it valid, or not?

The *Gemora* answers: When Rav Dimi came, he said: I stated the following argument before Rabbi Yirmiyah: Since slaughtering it for its own purpose makes it valid at its own time (*on the fourteenth of Nissan*), while slaughtering it for another purpose makes it valid at a different time; then just as the slaughtering for its own purpose, which makes it valid at its own time, does not remove it from the disqualifying effect of another purpose, so as well, the slaughtering for another purpose, which makes it valid at a different time, does not remove it from the disqualifying effect of its own purpose, and it is invalid. Whereupon he said to me: It is not so (*for the following reason*): You may say like that in respect to another purpose, because it operates in the case of all sacrifices; will you say the same where it is slaughtered for its own purpose, seeing that it does not operate as a cause of invalidation in the case of all other sacrifices, but only in the case of the korban pesach alone?

The *Gemora* asks: What is our conclusion regarding this?

Rava said: A korban pesach which he slaughtered at any other time of the year for its own purpose and for another purpose is valid. This is because it stands, without it being specified, to be slaughtered for its own purpose, yet even so, when he

slaughters it for another purpose, it is valid, which proves that the other purpose comes and removes it from its own purpose. Therefore, when he slaughters it for its own purpose and for another purpose as well, the other purpose comes and removes it from its own purpose.

Rav Adda bar Ahavah said to Rava: Perhaps where he (*explicitly*) states it, it is different from where he does not state it? For if he slaughters it for those who can eat it and for those who cannot eat it, it is valid, yet when he slaughters it for those who cannot eat it alone, it is invalid. And why is this so; surely it stands, without it being specified, for those who can eat it? Rather, you must admit that where he (*explicitly*) states it, it is different from where he does not state it; so here as well, where he states it, it is different from where he does not state it.

Rava replied: Is this a proof at all? As for there, it is understandable, for as long as he does not expressly undermine it at the slaughtering, its destiny, without being specified, is certainly to be slaughtered for its own purpose. But here, does it, without it being specified, stand for those who are registered to eat it? Perhaps these will withdraw and others will come and register for it, for we learned in a Mishnah: They may register and withdraw from it until he slaughters it. (60a – 60b)