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Pesachim Daf 62

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There is an argument regarding the law in a case where a person slaughtered the korban pesach for the sake of circumcised people, but sprinkled the blood for the sake of uncircumcised people.

Rabbah and Rav Chisda argue about this in the Gemora. Rav Ashi explains the argument as follows: They differ based on the following verse: *And it shall be accepted for him to make atonement for him*: 'for him', but not for his fellow. Rabbah holds: His fellow must be like himself: just as he is capable of atonement, so must his fellow be capable of atonement, thus excluding this uncircumcised person, who is not capable of atonement. Rav Chisda, however, maintains: This uncircumcised person as well, since he is subject to the obligation, he is also subject to atonement, 'since' if he wishes, he can make himself fit (*by circumcising himself*).

There is an argument whether or not someone who bakes on Yom Tov for the purpose of using the food during the week receives lashes.

The Gemora quotes an argument between Rabbah and Rav Chisda in the case above. Rabbah says that he does not receive lashes. Rabbah maintains: 'Since' it is possible that guests might come to his house and he would now be able to feed them food, he does not clearly transgress preparing for a weekday on Yom Tov (*as he still might use the food today*). Rav Chisda argues that this possibility is not enough to save this sinner from what he is actually

doing, which is preparing for a weekday on Yom Tov, punishable by lashes.

The *Gemora* asks: As for Rabbah, it is understandable, and there is no difficulty, for here (*in the case of circumcision*), an action is wanting (the act of circumcision, and therefore the korban is invalid), whereas there, an action is not wanting (for he merely needs to orally invite guests). But Rav Chisda is self-contradictory (if he holds the principle of 'since' or not)?

The *Gemora* answers: I will tell you: Rav Chisda rejects the argument of 'since' where it leads to a greater leniency; but where it results in a stringency, he accepts it.

Mar Zutra son of Rav Mari said to Ravina: The braisa teaches: since (intention for) uncircumcision invalidates, and (intention for) tumah invalidates; then just as tumah, part tumah was not made tantamount to entire tumah, so uncircumcision, part uncircumcision was not made tantamount to entire uncircumcision.

The *Gemora* explains: How is this tumah meant? Shall we say that it means tumah of the person, and the meaning of 'part tumah was not made tantamount to entire tumah' means that if there are four or five tamei people and four or five tahor people, the tamei do not invalidate the korban pesach for the tahor. But then in the case of uncircumcision as well, they do not invalidate, for we learned in a Mishnah: for circumcised and uncircumcised. . . it is fit: how then is tumah different, that he is certain about it, and how is uncircumcision different, that he is uncertain (about its law)?

Rather, it must refer to tumah of the meat, and the meaning of 'part *tumah* was not made tantamount to entire *tumah* is referring to a case where one of the limbs becomes *tamei*; that which becomes *tamei* we burn, while the others we eat.

The *Gemora* asks: To what have you referred it? To tumah of the meat! Then consider the end of the *braisa*: you judge that which does not apply to all sacrifices by that which does not apply to all sacrifices; and do not allow time to disprove it, since it applies to all sacrifices. Now what does '*tumah*' mean? Shall we say, tumah of the meat; why does it not apply to all sacrifices? Rather, it is obvious that it refers to tumah of a person, and 'it does not apply to all sacrifices' means as follows: For whereas in the case of all other sacrifices, an uncircumcised person and a *tamei* person can send their sacrifices, in the case of the *korban pesach*, an uncircumcised person and a *tamei* person cannot send their sacrifices. Shall we say then that the first clause refers to tumah of the meat, while the second clause refers to tumah of the person?

Ravina answered to him: he argues from the designation of *tumah* (in general).

Alternatively, the end of the *braisa* as well refers to the tumah of meat. And when the *braisa* said that 'it does not apply to all sacrifices,' it meant as follows: for whereas in the case of all other sacrifices, whether the fat (the sacrificial parts) became *tamei* while the meat remained *tahor*, or the meat became *tamei* while the fat remained *tahor*, the Kohen sprinkles the blood; in the case of the *korban pesach* if the fat became *tamei* while the meat remained *tahor*, he sprinkles the blood; but if the meat becomes *tamei* while the fat remained *tahor*, he must not sprinkle the blood.

The *Gemora* asks: To what have you referred it - to tumah of the meat? Then consider the end of the *braisa*: 'you derive something (an uncircumcised person) which was

not granted an exception from its general interdict by something which was not granted an exception from its general interdict, and do not let tumah disprove it, seeing that it was granted an exception from its general interdict.' What type of *tumah* is being referred to? Shall we say that it refers to the case of tumah of the meat; where was it permitted? Rather, it obviously refers to tumah of the person, and where was it permitted? It was permitted in the case of a community? It emerges that the first clause refers to tumah of meat, while the second clause refers to the tumah of the person!?

The *Gemora* answers: Yes; he argues from the designation of tumah.

Alternatively, the entire *braisa* refers to tumah of the meat; and pertaining to the question of 'where was it permitted,' it was permitted in the case of the tumah of the *korban Pesach*, for we learned in a *Mishnah*: The *korban pesach* which comes (if offered) in tumah is eaten in tumah, for at the very outset it did not come for anything except to be eaten.

Rav Huna son of Rabbi Yehoshua raised an objection from the following *braisa*: A *pesach* offering whose year has passed (*and is therefore considered a shelamim*) and it was slaughtered in its set time (*the fourteenth of Nissan*) for its own sake (*for a pesach*), and similarly, if one slaughters other sacrifices for the sake of a *pesach* offering in its set time, Rabbi Eliezer disqualifies them, while Rabbi Yehoshua says that they are valid. [The *Gemora* in Zevachim explains: Rabbi Eliezer proposed the following argument: We find that a residual *pesach* comes as a *shelamim*, whereas a residual *shelamim* does not come as a *pesach* offering. Now if the *pesach* offering, whose residual comes as a *shelamim*, is invalid if one slaughters it in its set time as a *shelamim*; then a *shelamim*, whose residual does not come for a *pesach* offering, is it not logical that if it was slaughtered in its set time for the sake of a *pesach* that it should be invalid?!] Now, the reason



that Rabbi Eliezer invalidates it is that it is in its specific time, but if it were slaughtered at a different time, it would be valid; yet why would that be so? Let us say that since he invalidates it in its own time, he also invalidates it at a different time?

Rav Pappa said: There it is different, because the Torah has written: Then you shall say: It is the pesach sacrifice. Let it retain its own nature: neither may it be slaughtered for the sake of other sacrifices, nor may others be slaughtered for its sake; in its time when it is disqualified if slaughtered for the sake of others, others are disqualified if slaughtered for its sake; at a different time, when it is valid if slaughtered for the sake of others, others are valid if slaughtered for its sake.

There are many reasons why a korban pesach that is also intended as another korban is invalid, while if it is brought for the owners and people that are not members of the group, it is still valid.

Rabbi Yochanan gave many reasons why this is so. One reason is that additional bad intent of the description of a korban makes the korban integrally invalid, while intent for others who are not owners is not an intent that is about the korban itself. Another reason is that we see intent for the description of a korban is possible by any of the four avodos of a korban, whereas intent of who will eat the korban is not effective when sprinkling the blood.

The book of everyone's ancestry was hidden, and had a bad effect on Torah learning.

When Ezra came from Bavel to Eretz Yisroel, he knew the lineage of both the Babylonian Jews and the Jews in Israel. This was recorded in a book. The purity of their ancestry helped Bnei Yisroel learn Torah.

The Gemora states that the book of ancestry was hidden, and had a bad effect on Torah learning. This raises many questions. Why was the book of ancestry hidden? Why did it have a bad effect on the Torah learning of Bnei Yisroel?

The Maharsha explains that it is possible that this is due to the threats that started to arrive from people who were as powerful as their lineage was poor. They did not want these facts recorded and spread. This could be why, the Maharsha explains, we find that the Chachamim only told their trusted students once every seven years which families they should stay away from.

The Maharsha explains further that we know that Torah wisdom is actually regarded as being on a higher plane than prophecy. Being that prophecy is only allowed to people of kosher lineage, it is certain, the Maharsha says, that Torah wisdom is similarly affected and does not rest (in a strong fashion) on people with unkosher lineage.

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