

Daf Notes

Insights into the Daily Daf
Me'ilah Daf 15

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Daily Daf

Mishna

Things consecrated for the Altar can combine with one another with regard to the law of *me'ilah*¹ (to make up the requisite legal size of an olive's volume, e.g., if he ate half of an olive volume from one olah offering and half of an olive volume from a different olah, or, according to another opinion, the required legal value of a perutah), and to render one culpable (to kares) for transgressing the laws of *piggul*², *nossar*³ and *tumah*.

Things dedicated for the Temple repair can combine with one another (regarding *me'ilah*).

Things consecrated for the Altar and things dedicated for temple repair can combine with each other with regard to the law of *me'ilah*. (15a)

Combinations

The Gemora asks: Since things consecrated for the Altar can combine with things dedicated for Temple repair,

¹ one who has unintentionally benefited from *hekdesh* or removed it from the ownership of the *Beis Hamikdosh* has committed the transgression of *me'ilah*, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a *korban asham*

² a *korban* whose *avodah* was done with the intention that it would be eaten after its designated time

³ sacrificial meat that has been leftover beyond the time that the Torah designated for its consumption

although one is consecrated with physical sanctity and the other only for monetary sanctity, was it then necessary to mention at all that things consecrated for the Altar can combine with others of the same nature?

The Gemora answers: Since the Tanna of the Mishna had to state the addition in connection with the ruling that one is culpable (to kares) for transgressing the laws of *piggul*, *nossar* and *tumah*, which does not apply to things dedicated for Temple repair, therefore he stated separately (that offerings for the Altar combine with other Altar offerings). (15a)

Me'ilah - by what Type of Dedications?

Rabbi Yannai said: It is clear that one cannot be liable for the law of *me'ilah* except in the case of (benefitting from) the Temple repair and an olah offering, since it is written: A person who commits *me'ilah* and sins through ignorance against the holies of Hashem, which means such dedications that are exclusively to Hashem (for an olah is completely burned on the Altar, and dedications to *Bedek HaBayis* are completely for *hekdesh*); but Altar offerings (are not dedicated exclusively to Hashem), for the *Kohanim* have a share and the owners have a share.

The *Gemora* asks from our *Mishna*: Things consecrated for the Altar can combine with one another with regard to the law of *me'ilah*!?

The *Gemora* answers: This applies only by Rabbinical enactment.

The *Gemora* asks from another *Mishna*: *Kodshei kodashim*⁴ that were slaughtered in the south (*when the slaughtering and receiving of the blood is supposed to occur in the north*) are still subject to the laws of *me'ilah*!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is by Rabbinical enactment.

The *Gemora* asks from another *Mishna*: If one benefited from a (*blemished*) *chatas* offering (*by plucking of its wool, or plowing with it*) - if it was still alive, he is not guilty of *me'ilah* until he has diminished its value (*by a perutah; for the law is that something that deteriorates through use, there is no me'ilah until one benefits from it and he diminishes its value by at least a perutah*), but if it was dead, he is guilty of *me'ilah* as soon as he had benefitted from it!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is by Rabbinical enactment.

The *Gemora* asks: And by Biblical law, are Altar offerings excluded from the laws of *me'ilah*? But it was taught in a *braisa*: Rebbe says: The verse, '*all cheilev is for Hashem*' includes the sacrificial parts of *kodashim kalim*⁵ – that they are subject to the law of *me'ilah*!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is by Rabbinical enactment.

The *Gemora* asks: But doesn't he derive this from a Scriptural verse?

The *Gemora* answers: It is a mere *asmachta* (*a Scriptural support for a Rabbinical decree*).

⁴ *sacrifices of a higher sanctity; such as chatas, asham, olah and communal shelamim - they may only be eaten within the Courtyard*

⁵ *sacrifices of a lesser sanctity; they may be eaten anywhere within the city of Yerushalayim*

The *Gemora* persists: But Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that sacrifices which died were, as far as Biblical law rules, excluded from the law of *me'ilah*? Now, to what does this refer? It cannot be referring to animals dedicated for Temple repair, for then the law of *me'ilah* should apply to them even after they have died!? For this should be similar to a case where a man dedicated a pile of trash for the Temple repair; would the law of *me'ilah* not apply to it? It must then refer to animals consecrated for the Altar. Evidently, Altar offerings are subject to *me'ilah* by Biblical law!?

Rather, the *Gemora* says: This is what the School of Rabbi Yannai said: From that verse you can only derive things dedicated for Temple repair (*and olah offerings*); but animals consecrated for the Altar you cannot derive from it (*but rather, it is derived from a different source*). (15a)

Mishna

Five parts of an *olah* offering can combine with one another: The meat, the fat, the flour, the wine and the oil. And six parts (*combine with each other*) in a *todah* offering: The meat, the fat, the flour, the wine, the oil and the breads. [*If one eats an olive-size volume of any of these things combined, and the offering is piggul, nossar or tamei, he will be liable to kares. The same would apply if he offered them up outside the Courtyard, or with respect of me'ilah.*] (15b)

An Olah and its Parts

Rav Huna recited the *Mishna* to Rava: Five parts of the world (*'olah,' instead of 'olah'*) can combine with one another. Rava said to him: Did you say 'in the world'? The *Mishna* teaches of a *todah* offering: And six parts (*combine with each other*) in a *todah* offering: The meat, the fat, the flour, the wine, the oil and the breads. Rather, the *Mishna* should read 'of an *olah* offering.'

The *Gemora* notes: We have learned here in our *Mishna* what our Rabbis have taught in a *braisa*: An *olah* offering and its sacrificial parts combine towards an olive's volume, in respect of offering them up outside, and in respect of being liable through them on account of *piggul*, *nossar*, and *tamei*. The inference is that this is not the *halachah* with respect of a *shelamim* offering. The *Gemora* asks: The *halachah* stated in the *braisa* and the inference implied from it is understandable regarding offering outside, for the *olah* offering is completely burned (*and therefore its meat and sacrificial parts combine to a k'zayis*) and a *shelamim* is not (*and therefore its meat and sacrificial parts do not combine*); however, what is the reason for *piggul*, *nossar*, and *tamei*? Surely it was taught in a *Mishna*: All foods that are *piggul* combine, and all foods that are *nossar* combine!?! [The rulings on *piggul* and *nossar* are contradictory!?!]

The *Gemora*, therefore, explains the *braisa* as follows: The meat of an *olah* offering and its sacrificial parts combine towards an olive's volume, in respect of its blood being thrown on the Altar on account of them. [The entire animal, except half a *k'zayis* of the meat and the same of the sacrificial parts, was lost or destroyed before the sprinkling of the blood. Now, if this happened by an *olah*, we would have as much as a *k'zayis* for burning on the altar, and therefore the sprinkling is valid to render it *nossar*, in the sense that if it was left over until after its time and then eaten, one would be liable. In the case of a *shelamim*, however, there is only half a *k'zayis* for the burning on the altar and the same for human consumption. These do not combine to permit the sprinkling. If one did sprinkle, therefore, the sprinkling is not valid to render it *nossar*. The same applies to *tumah*.]

And who is the *Tanna* of this *braisa*? It is Rabbi Yehoshua, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Yehoshua said: All the sacrifices of the Torah (*which was lost or destroyed*) of which as an olive's volume of meat or an olive's volume of *cheilev* (*sacrificial parts*) remains, he sprinkles the blood. If there remains half an olive's volume of meat and half an olive's volume of *cheilev*, he

may not sprinkle the blood. But in the case of an *olah*, even if there remains half an olive's volume of meat and half an olive's volume of *cheilev*, he sprinkles the blood, because it is completely burned. By a *minchah* offering, however, even if it is completely in existence, he must not sprinkle the blood.

Rav Pappa explains that the *minchah* case refers to the libation *minchah* which accompanies an animal sacrifice. (15b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

A concluding berachah after half a portion of ice cream

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Our *Mishna* explains that “five things pertaining to an *olah* combine with each other: the meat, the fat, the fine flour, the wine and the oil”. In other words, different prohibitions pertaining to sacrifices depend on certain measures, that if the amount of a *kezayis* is lacking, he who transgresses the prohibition is not punished (for example, he who eats *nosar* or *pigul* or offers a sacrifice outside the Temple). The *Mishna* explains that one can make up a *kezayis* from two types of things offered on the altar.

Tosfos remark (Zevachim 109a, s.v. *'Olah*) that the amount of wine and oil is a *revi'is* (some say 86cc and some say about 150cc) and the amount of meat is a *kezayis* (about 27cc) and therefore a mixture of wine and meat is not regarded as having the proper amount even though it contains more than a *kezayis* or more than a *revi'is* as long as one of them in itself doesn't have the required amount whereas in our case, the wine got the *halachah* of solid food after they soaked the meat in wine and then the wine is regarded as solid food, whose amount is a *kezayis*, and it combines with the meat.

We proceed to the matter of *berachos* on food. The obligation to pronounce a *berachah* after eating depends on the amount eaten: he who eats a *kezayis* or drinks a *revi'is* must pronounce a concluding *berachah*. However, he who eats less than a *kezayis* or drinks less than a *revi'is* does not have the obligation to say a concluding *berachah*. What about a person who ate somewhat less than a *kezayis* **and** drank somewhat less than a *revi'is*? Do the two almost-required amounts combine to obligate him to say a concluding *berachah*? *Magen Avraham* (210, S.K. 1) relies on the above Tosfos and states that if the combination of the drink and the solid food is made by soaking the solid food in the drink, they may be combined for an amount of a *kezayis* to make one obligated to pronounce a concluding *berachah*! (See *ibid*, that the basis for the halachah is explained in the *Gemora* concerning the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur and was ruled in *Shulchan 'Aruch*, 612).

It must be stressed that defining "food" and "drink" is not so simple. A liquid that congealed, such as ice cream, is widely discussed by *Poskim* as to if it should be considered solid or liquid (see *Vezos Haberachah* p. 44).

adding a *chomesh* (literally a fifth but since this means a fifth of the amount taken with the fifth added on, we would refer to it in our language as a fourth) and offering a ram as a *korban asham me'ilah* sacrifice.

Rambam, at the conclusion of his codification of the laws pertaining to this subject, draws this powerful lesson for us in how to relate to Torah statutes that defy our comprehension: "It is proper for a person to ponder the laws of the Torah in order to comprehend them as much as he can. But he should not view disrespectfully those laws whose reasons he fails to grasp. His thoughts about them must not be like the thoughts one has of secular matters. Let us take a look at how severely the Torah deals with the transgressor of *me'ilah*. If sticks and stones, dust and ashes become sacred simply because the Name of G-d has been declared upon them, and anyone who utilizes them for a secular purpose has transgressed and requires atonement even if he did so involuntarily; how much more so is this true in regard to the commands which G-d legislated that one should not disrespectfully reject them just because he fails to understand the reason for them."

By: Ohr Somayach Institutions

DAILY MASHAL

Respect for What We Don't Understand

Me'ilah - the name of the *Mesechta* - means transgressing by using for private purposes an animal, funds or any other property which has been consecrated for the use of the *Beis Hamikdash*.

One who transgresses by thus misappropriating even the value of a *perutah* must atone for his sin in the following way: If he was aware that the property was sacred and intentionally misappropriated it, he is punished with flogging and he must repay the amount he took. If he was unaware that this was sacred property and mistakenly thought he was using his own, then he achieves atonement by repaying the amount taken and