

# Daf Notes

Insights into the Daily Daf

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Me'ilah Daf 3

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Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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## Daily Daf

### *Offerings that Die*

[Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan that sacrifices which died were, as far as Biblical law rules, excluded from the law of *me'ilah* (for they are no longer fit for the altar, and have no monetary value either, for they cannot be redeemed). Rabbah said that if the sacrificial parts of *kodshei kodashim* that were slaughtered in the south were placed on the Altar they should be taken down. This is because they are similar to *kodashim* that died.] The *Gemora* asks: May we then infer (that according to Rabbah) that the statement of Ulla in the name of Rabbi Yochanan has already been taught in our *Mishna* (for the same way *kodshei kodashim* that have been slaughtered in the south are not subject to Biblical *me'ilah*, so too, *kodashim* that died are not subject to Biblical *me'ilah*)?

The *Gemora* answers: Although it has been learned, Ulla's statement is still necessary, for it might otherwise have entered your mind to say that in the instance of our *Mishna*, the Rabbis decreed Rabbinic *me'ilah*, because people do not distance themselves from those sacrifices (for, after all, they were slaughtered), but in the case of sacrifices which died, since people distance themselves from them, I might have thought that even Rabbinic *me'ilah* does not apply to them; therefore Ulla informed us of his opinion.

The *Gemora* asks: But hasn't the case of sacrifices which died also been taught already, for we have learned in a *Mishna*: If one benefited from a (blemished) *chatas* offering (by plucking of its wool, or plowing with it) - if it was still alive, he is not guilty of *me'ilah* until he has diminished its value (by a *perutah*; for the law is that something that deteriorates through use, there is no *me'ilah* until one benefits from it and he diminishes its value by at least a *perutah*), but if it was dead, he is guilty of *me'ilah* as soon as he had benefitted from it (which obviously refers to *me'ilah* on a Rabbinic level).

The *Gemora* answers: Ulla's statement is still necessary, for it might otherwise have entered your mind to say that in the case of a (blemished) *chatas* (or any blemished offering), since it cannot provide atonement, people do not distance themselves from it (and therefore the Rabbis needed to impose a Rabbinic *me'ilah* on it); but unblemished sacrifices, however, since they provide atonement, people will distance themselves from them and there was, therefore, no necessity for the Rabbis to decree Rabbinic *me'ilah* in regard to them. Therefore Ulla informed us that the Rabbis imposed the law of *me'ilah* by all offerings that died.

The *Gemora* asks: But is it indeed so that the law of *me'ilah* applies to a *chatas* which died? Has it not been taught in a *braisa*: Concerning the five kinds of *chatas* offerings which must be left to die, and all moneys that must be cast into the Dead Sea, one must not derive any benefit from them, nor is one guilty of *me'ilah* if one has used them (*for they cannot be offered to Hashem*)?

The *Gemora* answers: Concerning the five kinds of *chatas* offerings which must be left to die, people distance themselves from them even while they are still alive (*and they are unlikely to touch them after they have died, and therefore the Rabbis did not need to impose a Rabbinic me'ilah on them*). This excludes the case (*of a chatas that died*) from which people do not distance themselves while they are alive. [*Therefore, the Rabbis imposed the law of me'ilah by them.*] (2b – 3a)

## ***Slaughtered in the South***

**[If the sacrificial parts of *kodshei kodashim* that were slaughtered in the south were placed on the Altar, Rabbah said that they should be taken down, while Rav Yosef stated that they should not be taken down.]** Rav Yosef asked to Rabbah (*by way of inference*) from one *Mishna* to another and again from that one to a third: [*The Mishna there discusses different cases of the service of a bird chatas and olah, in terms of where it was offered, for what purpose, and how the service was done. A bird chatas is supposed to be offered at the bottom of the altar, for a chatas, severing only one of the pipes, and spraying the blood on the wall of the altar. A bird olah is supposed to be offered at the top of the top of the altar, severing both pipes, and squeezing the blood on the wall of the altar.*] The *Mishna* continues: And in all of the cases above, the birds do not render one and his clothes *tamei* by way of his throat (*generally, when one eats the carcass of a kosher bird, his garments become tamei; in these cases, although a melikah – not a shechitah was performed to kill the bird, it is nevertheless accomplishes that the carcass of the bird will not transmit tumah through the throat*), nor does the prohibition of *me'ilah* apply, except for the case of a bird *chatas* sacrificed correctly. And then in

connection with this, the next *Mishna* taught that this is the rule: Any bird that is invalid in the Holy (*after being brought to the Courtyard; a disqualification related to its service or holiness*) does not contaminate a person and his clothing with *tumah* through the throat. Any bird that is not invalid in the Holy contaminates a person and his clothing with *tumah* through the throat. And we have furthermore learned in another *Mishna*: If its disqualification was in the Holy, if they went up on the Altar they are not taken down. Is this not a refutation of Rabbah's view? **[From the first *Mishna* we learn that a bird *chatas* whose melikah was performed in the wrong place, i.e., below the red line (a case which corresponds to the cases of our *Mishna*, where the *kodshei kodashim* were slaughtered in the wrong place, i.e., in the south part of the Courtyard) do not transmit *tumah* to the person and his garments through the throat; we then may infer that when the second *Mishna* speaks of disqualification that occurred in the Holy, the reference is likewise to a melikah performed in the wrong place, and similarly the third *Mishna* which states that whatever becomes disqualified in the Holy does not need to be brought down when they were brought upon the Altar includes such a disqualification as melikah performed in the wrong place, and similarly a slaughtering in the wrong place, which refutes Rabbah.]** It is indeed a refutation!

The *Gemora* notes that the point which had been disputed by Rabbah and Rav Yosef was obvious to Rabbi Elozar, for Rabbi Elozar said: If one took an *olah* offering of a minor *bamah* (*in the times when it was permitted to offer private sacrifices on a private altar*) inside (*the partitions of the major bamah, where all communal offerings needed to be offered*), its partitions receive it in respect of all things (*and it must be offered there by Kohanim wearing their priestly vestments, and it must be slaughtered in the north; these laws would not have applied had he not brought it inside these partitions*). And Rabbi Elozar then inquired: If an *olah* offering of a minor *bamah* that was brought inside became disqualified (*for it was slaughtered in the south*), what is the law if their parts were placed upon the altar; must they be brought down? May we not infer from the fact

that Rabbi Elozar inquired only regarding this special case that the other case (*of an ordinary olah*) was obvious to him, either confirming to the view of Rabbah or to the view of Rav Yosef, and he inquired about this special case from within his conclusion regarding the ordinary case?

The *Gemora* explains both of these ways: I could argue, on the one hand, that perhaps Rabbah maintained that when (*an ordinary olah was slaughtered on the south side and*) the parts were brought up on the Altar they must be brought down, for the partition of the Temple, which is in accordance with the *olah's* initial standard (*of an ordinary olah*), disqualifies them (*entirely, for the strength of its partition accomplishes that if one departs from the prescribed method and slaughters them on the south, even if they are brought upon the altar, they must be taken down*); but perhaps, a partition which was not in accordance with the *olah's* initial standard (*for an olah offering of a minor bamah is not subject to any partition*), does not disqualify them (*for the partition of the major bamah does not have strength to disqualify them to such an extent that if they were slaughtered on the south side that if they are brought upon the altar, they should be taken down*).

Or I could argue, on the other hand, that perhaps, Rav Yosef maintained that when (*an ordinary olah was slaughtered on the south side and*) the parts were brought up on the Altar they do not need to be brought down, for the partition of the Temple, which is in accordance with the *olah's* initial standard (*of an ordinary olah*), captures them (*with sanctity, for the strength of its partition accomplishes that even if one departs from the prescribed method and slaughters them on the south, if they are brought upon the altar, they do not need to be taken down*); but perhaps, a partition which was not in accordance with the *olah's* initial standard (*for an olah offering of a minor bamah is not subject to any partition*), does not consecrate them (*for the partition of the major bamah does not have strength to consecrate them to such an extent that if they were slaughtered on the south side that if they are*

*brought upon the altar, they should not be taken down, but rather, they should be taken down*).

The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved. (3a – 3b)

## ***Piggul and Me'ilah***

Rav Gidal said in the name of Rav that the sprinkling of a *piggul* offering does not remove a status of *me'ilah* from meat of *kodshei kodashim* (*for generally, kodshei kodashim is subject to me'ilah once it is dedicated, and its meat that is supposed to be eaten by Kohanim only become free of me'ilah after a kosher sprinkling of blood; a throwing of blood when the korban has already been rendered piggul does not remove the status of me'ilah*), nor does it bring it to a status of *me'ilah* for limbs of *kodashim kalim* (*there is no status of me'ilah for the limbs of kodashim kalim that are supposed to be burned on the altar until after a kosher sprinkling of their blood, being that until then, they are considered to belong to the owner*).

Abaye was sitting and quoting this teaching, when Rav Pappa asked Abaye from the following *Mishna*: If one slaughters a *todah* sacrifice inside the Courtyard when the accompanying bread is outside the wall, the bread is not sanctified. [*Ordinarily, the breads are sanctified with the slaughtering of the todah offering.*] If he slaughtered it before the outside of the bread became crusted in the oven, even if all the loaves were crusted besides one, all of the breads are not sanctified. If one slaughtered the *todah* with intent that he would eat it beyond its allotted time or outside of its prescribed area, the bread is sanctified. Does this not prove that (*the performance of the acts of offering of a sacrifice rendered*) *piggul* brings *sacrifices of kodashim kalim* into the scope of the law of *me'ilah*?

Abaye was silent. When he came before Rabbi Abba, the latter replied: It is through the sprinkling (*that it becomes piggul*). [*Rav Gidal said that the sprinkling of a piggul offering does not bring it to a status of me'ilah for limbs of kodashim kalim, for it is the throwing of the blood that effects the disqualification of piggul, and*

therefore such a sprinkling cannot sanctify it to become subject to *me'ilah*; however, the Mishna is referring to the slaughtering of the *todah* offering with a beyond-its-time intent; it is not rendered *piggul* until the throwing of the blood, and therefore the slaughtering can still sanctify the breads.]

Rav Ashi said to Rava: But Ulla ruled that a *kometz* (fistful) of *piggul* that was placed on the altar loses its status of *piggul*? Now, the *kemitzah* (taking the scoopful of flour with one's hand from the *minchah*) corresponds to the slaughtering of an animal!?! [Evidently, the *piggul* takes effect at the beginning!?!]

Rava replied: Ulla's ruling is to be understood in the following manner: The prohibition which will lead to *piggul* will be removed when the *kometz* is placed upon the altar. (3b)

## DAILY MASHAL

### *Sanctifying the Bread*

If a person feels that he must bring a *todah* sacrifice for miracles that occurred to him but doesn't have a similar feeling about the food he gets daily from Hashem, he has "not sanctified his bread" (livelihood) with complete faith (*Meorah shel Torah*, Vayikra 7:12).

Rav Yankel Galinsky, shlit"a, cited in Daf Digest, illustrated this through a lesson that a certain woman taught the bochurim who were learning in Novardhok. "It used to be that the average yeshiva boy had to take his meals at the homes of the local Jews. In Novardhok, the bochurim would pay a few pennies for the privilege of eating 'teg' locally. There was a certain woman who would receive the bochurim kindly and provide a hearty meal for whoever wanted. She also provided a marked lesson in how to view the proper relationship between bitachon and hishtadlus. "Whenever a bochur would come to her home she would say, 'You should know that you are eating for free.' And when they would pay she would say, 'You are giving me this money for nothing.'"

The Beis Halevi, zt"l, explained the need for hishtadlus very well. "After the sin of Adam, the yetzer hara became a part of mankind. Since that time, a person who was not kept occupied by some productive activity would be drawn to all sorts of things which are harmful to his soul. As our sages say, 'Idleness leads to lewdness.' To ensure that most people avoid such a pitfall, people must work. As the Mishnah states, 'It is good to combine Torah study with productive labor, since being busy with both makes one forget to sin.' But we should realize that it is not our efforts that provide us with a livelihood— it is Hashem. A person's attitude toward his work should be that he is doing so to fulfill God's decree that one who does not work will not have *parnassah*. Yet one should still look to God since it is He who provides *parnassah*."