

# Daf Notes

Insights into the Daily Daf  
Me'ilah Daf 7

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## Daily Daf

### *Me'ilah Until When?*

The *Gemora* explains that the *Mishna* had to teach the dispute in both the case of *kodshei kodashim* meat and the case of the fats of *kodshim kalim*, since we may have thought that it is easier for any type of blood application to introduce *me'ilah* than to remove it. Therefore, we may have thought that Rabbi Eliezer agrees to Rabbi Akiva in the case of the fats, or that Rabbi Akiva agrees to Rabbi Eliezer in the case of *kodshei kodashim* meat.

Rabbi Yochanan says that Rabbi Akiva only says that the blood application takes effect if some of the meat still remained inside, but not if all of it left.

Rav Assi challenged Rabbi Yochanan, as his colleagues in the Diaspora taught that if one had improper plans for a part of the sacrifice which is lost or burned, it renders the sacrifice *piggul*, implying that even something that is totally unfit is still considered part of the sacrifice.

The *Gemora* asks how Rav Assi could ask this question, as he asked Rabbi Yochanan whether improper plans while spilling the leftover blood makes *piggul*.

Rabbi Zeira answered that we see from the status of the neck sinews of a carcass, which combines with other

food to become impure, but is not itself impure as part of the carcass, that something which is insubstantial as food does not have the status of proper meat. Similarly, this blood, which is being discarded, is not considered part of the sacrifice. From this answer, Rav Assi should have also said that meat which is unfit is not considered part of the sacrifice.

Rava answers that the statement Rav Assi cited refers to meat which eventually was lost or burnt, but was fit at the time of applying the blood.

Rav Pappa says that Rabbi Akiva's position is limited to a case where the meat left the courtyard, but not when the blood which was applied first left.

He supports this with a *braisa*, which says that if one properly slaughtered a sacrifice, and then blood left, even if he returned the blood inside and applied it, he did nothing. Therefore, one still is liable for *me'ilah* on the meat, if it was *kodshei kodashim*, and one is not liable for *me'ilah* on the sacrificial fats, if it was *kodshim kalim*. (6b – 7a)

### *Rabbi Akiva's Position*

The *Mishna* had stated: [Rabbi Akiva says that it has the standard effect, removing *me'ilah*, and introducing

liability for *piggul*, *nosar*, and impurity.] Rabbi Akiva supports his position from the case [of one who designated an animal as a *chatas*, and then designated a replacement when it got lost. If he finds the first one, when he applies the blood of one of them, neither meat is prohibited in *me'ilah*. If the blood of one *chatas* can remove *me'ilah* from the meat of another animal, surely the blood of a sacrifice can remove *me'ilah* from its own meat].

Rabbi Elozar said: Rabbi Akiva held his view (that the *zerikah* of one *chatas* removes the status of *me'ilah* from the other one) only if both *chatas* offerings were slaughtered simultaneously (not literally, according to *Tosfos*, but rather that the blood of both offerings were thrown one after the other), but if one was slaughtered after the other (in such a manner that the throwing of the blood of the first one was completed by the time the blood of the second one was received), Rabbi Akiva did not hold his view (for since the blood of the second one was not ready to be thrown at the time that the blood of the first one was thrown, the status of *me'ilah* could not be removed from the meat of the second one).

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa* supporting this distinction: Rabbi Shimon said: When I went to the Village of Panei, an elderly man found me and asked me: Is Rabbi Akiva of the opinion that the throwing of the blood can be effective for meat that went out of the Courtyard (that it removes its status from being subject to *me'ilah*)? I said to him: Yes, he does. When I came and quoted these words before my colleagues in Galilee, they asked me: But isn't the meat disqualified? How can the throwing of the blood be effective with a disqualified offering? When I left and brought up these words before Rabbi Akiva himself, he said to me: My son, do you not hold the same view (so why didn't you respond)? Behold, if one designated an animal as a *chatas*, and then designated a replacement when it got lost. If he finds the first one, so that both are ready to be slaughtered, both are still subject to the law of *me'ilah* (for they both can be offered). If they were slaughtered and their blood was sitting in two separate receptacles (after being accepted), the law of *me'ilah* still applies to both (for

they both can be offered). If the blood of one of them was thrown, do you not agree that just like the throwing of its blood removes its meat from the law of *me'ilah*, so too it removes the meat of the other animal from the law of *me'ilah* (even though it is disqualified, now that the blood of the first one has been thrown)? Now, if it can remove the meat of another offering from the law of *me'ilah*, though it is disqualified, how much more so must it remove its own meat (from *me'ilah*, even though it is disqualified)? [This proves that R' Akiva issued his ruling only when they were slaughtered at the same time.]

Rish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Oshaya: Concealed was the reply that Rabbi Akiva gave to that disciple (for we can infer from R' Akiva's words that) only if they were slaughtered simultaneously (would the *zerikah* of one remove the *me'ilah* status from the meat of the other), but not if they were slaughtered one after the other. Now (in truth it should emerge that) since the other offering (even when they were slaughtered simultaneously), at any event was disqualified, what difference would there be between 'simultaneously' and 'successively'?

Rabbi Yochanan said to Rish Lakish: And you, do you not make this distinction? Suppose one designated two *asham* offerings for security (for each other), and he slaughtered them both, and he prematurely brought up the sacrificial parts of one of them upon the Altar before the throwing of the blood, would you not agree that although those sacrificial parts were already placed upon the Altar they must be brought down? Now, if it would enter your mind that they (the two offerings) are considered in such a case as one offering, why must they be brought down? Didn't Ulla rule: Sacrificial parts of *kodashim kalim* that were offered before the sprinkling of the blood should not be taken off the Altar, as they have become the "bread of the Altar."!?

Thereupon Rish Lakish remained silent. Rabbi Yochanan said: I have cut off the legs of the child. [I have proved his argument that R' Akiva considers the two *chatas* offerings as one body to be wrong. Rish Lakish was

younger than R' Yochanan, and that explains the designation 'of the child.'](7a – 7b)

## **Mishna**

The act of throwing the blood (*zerikah*) of *kodshei kodashim* may have either a lenient or a stringent effect, but with *kodashim kalim*, it has only a stringent effect.

How so? With *kodshei kodashim*, before the *zerikah*, the law of *me'ilah* applies both to the sacrificial parts and to the meat; after the *zerikah*, it applies to the sacrificial parts but not to the meat. In respect of both (*the sacrificial parts and the meat*), one is liable (*to kares for the consumption*) of *nossar*, *piggul* and *tumah*. It emerges that with *kodshei kodashim*, the act of *zerikah* has a lenient as well as a stringent effect. With *kodashim kalim* it has only a stringent effect. How so? With *kodashim kalim*, before the *zerikah* the law of *me'ilah* applies neither to the sacrificial parts nor to the meat; after the *zerikah* it applies to the sacrificial parts but not to the meat. In respect of both (*the sacrificial parts and the meat*), one is liable (*to kares for the consumption*) of *nossar*, *piggul* and *tumah*. It emerges that with *kodashim kalim*, the act of *zerikah* has only a stringent effect. (7b)

## **Effectiveness of Zerikah**

The *Gemora* asks: The *Mishna* had stated that (*after the zerikah*) there is no *me'ilah* with respect to the meat (*of kodshei kodashim*); this would imply that there is no *me'ilah*, but a prohibition (*of benefitting from the meat*) still remains. But why? Is it not the possession of the *Kohen*?

The *Gemora* answers: This is not difficult, since in the opening clause the *Tanna* needed to use the phrase that "the law of *me'ilah* applies," he uses also in the concluding clause the phrase that "the law of *me'ilah* does not apply."

The *Gemora* asks: But let us consider then the latter section of the *Mishna*: But with *kodashim kalim*, it has

only a stringent effect. How so? Regarding the meat of *kodashim kalim*, before the *zerikah* the law of *me'ilah* applies neither to the sacrificial parts nor to the meat; With *kodshei kodashim*, before the *zerikah*, the law of *me'ilah* applies both to the sacrificial parts and to the meat, and one is not liable (*to kares for the consumption*) of *nossar*, *piggul* and *tumah*. After the *zerikah*, *me'ilah* applies to the sacrificial parts but not to the meat. This implies that there is no *me'ilah*, but a prohibition (*of benefitting from the meat*) still remains. But why? Is it not the possession of the owners?

Rabbi Chanina answers: It refers to meat (*of kodashim kalim*) that was taken out of the Courtyard (*prior to the zerikah*) and the *Mishna* stands in accordance with Rabbi Akiva (*mentioned previously that while the meat is not subject to me'ilah, it is forbidden for benefit*), for when Rabbi Akiva said that *zerikah* is effective in the case of an offering that was taken out of the Courtyard (*with respect that it is removed from being subject to me'ilah*), but he does agree that it needs to be burned, and in regard to eating (*the meat which went out*), the *zerikah* does not render it permitted for consumption. (7b – 8a)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, *KODSHEI KODASHIM*