



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

**Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h**

**Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h**

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### **Mishna**

If one of the loaves (*of Shavuot*) became *tamei*, or one of the arrangements (*from the lechem hapanim*) became *tamei*, Rabbi Yehudah said: Both of them need to go out to the place of burning, for we cannot separate a communal offering. The Sages, however, said: Those which are *tamei* are *tamei* (*and should be burned*), and those which are *tahor* may be eaten. (14b)

### **Splitting the Breads**

Rabbi Elozar said: The dispute in the *Mishna* is regarding a case where they became *tamei* before the throwing of the blood (*by the loaves, and before the burning of the levonah by the lechem hapanim*); but if they became *tamei* after the throwing of the blood, everyone agrees that those which are *tamei* are *tamei* (*and should be burned*), and those which are *tahor* may be eaten.

The *Gemora* asks: And before the throwing, what is the point of issue between them?

Rav Pappa said: They argue if the *tzitz* (*the head-plate of the Kohen Gadol*) can provide acceptance for the parts of the offering that are eaten. The Sages maintain that it can (*and therefore the throwing of the blood is a valid one – of course, though, the tamei loaves may not be eaten*), and Rabbi Yehudah holds that it cannot (*and therefore the throwing of the blood is invalid, and even the tahor loaves cannot be eaten*).

Rav Huna the son of Rav Nassan asked Rav Pappa: Everyone holds that the *tzitz* provides acceptance for things that (*have*

*become impure and*) are destined to go on the altar, and yet Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages still argue in those cases as well! [*How can it be that the argument between Rabbi Yehudah and the Sages is solely dependent on whether or not one holds that the tzitz atones in these cases?*] This is as the *braisa* states: If one of the spoons of *levonah* became *tamei*, Rabbi Yehudah says that they (*both spoons*) can both be brought while *tamei*, as a public sacrifice is not divided. The Sages say: Those which are *tamei* are *tamei* (*and should be burned*), and those which are *tahor* are *tahor*.

Additionally, Rav Ashi says: Rabbi Yehudah says that even if one tribe is *tamei* and the other tribes are *tahor*, they can all offer the *pesach* sacrifice while *tamei*, as there is no division by communal offerings. In this case, the concept of the *tzitz* atoning does not even apply (*as the tzitz only atones on impurity of a sacrifice, not of people, and yet Rabbi Yehudah still argues*)!

Additionally, didn't Ravina say: The *Mishna* states that if one of the loaves or spoons of *levonah* became *tamei*, Rabbi Yehudah says that they all are burned, for we cannot separate a communal offering. The Sages say: Those which are *tamei* are *tamei* (*and should be burned*), and those which are *tahor* are *tahor*. If the argument is whether or not the *tzitz* atones to make the sacrifice valid, why didn't Rabbi Yehudah state that this is his reasoning?

Rather, Rabbi Yochanan says: [*Their argument is not regarding the atonement of the tzitz.*] Rather, Rabbi Yehudah has a tradition from his teachers that a communal offering is not separated. (14b – 15a)

### **Mishna**

A *piggul* intention regarding the *todah* sacrifice (i.e. animal being offered) can render the breads brought with it to become *piggul*, but a *piggul* intention regarding the breads does not render the sacrifice *piggul*. What is the case? If a person slaughtered the *todah* with the intention of eating from it the next day, both the sacrifice and its breads are *piggul*. If he intended (i.e. while slaughtering) to eat the breads the next day, the breads are *piggul* but the sacrifice is not *piggul*.

A *piggul* intention regarding the lambs offered on *Shavuos* can render the breads brought with it to become *piggul*, but an intention regarding the breads does not render the sacrifice *piggul*. What is the case? If a person slaughtered the lambs with the intention of eating from them the next day, both the sacrifice and its breads are *piggul*. If he intended (i.e. while slaughtering) to eat the breads the next day, the breads are *piggul* but the sacrifice is not *piggul*. (15a)

### **Breads are Secondary to the Sacrifice**

The *Gemora* asks: What is the reason for this law? One might suggest that this is based upon Rav Kahana's dictum, for Rav Kahana said: How do we know that the breads of a *todah* are called a *todah*? This is because the verse states: *And he will offer on the todah sacrifice loaves etc.* If this is the reason, then *piggul* intentions regarding the bread should also render the sacrifice *piggul*!?

The *Gemora* answers: This question is not difficult, as the verse merely proves that breads are called a *todah* sacrifice, but not that a *todah* sacrifice is called bread!

The *Gemora* asks: If so, when the *Mishna* states that a *piggul* intention regarding the lambs offered on *Shavuos* can render the breads *piggul*, but a *piggul* intention regarding the breads does not render the sacrifice *piggul*, where do we see a verse stating that the breads of the lambs are called a lamb sacrifice?

Rather, the *Gemora* answers: The reason (that breads are secondary to the sacrifice) is because the breads are secondary to the *todah*, and the *todah* is not secondary to the breads. Similarly, the breads are secondary to the lambs, and the lambs are not secondary to the breads.

The *Gemora* notes: Both cases are necessary (despite the fact that the reasoning behind them is similar). If the *Mishna* would only discuss the *todah*, we would say that the *piggul* intention about the bread of a *todah* does not affect the sacrifice, as the breads and sacrifice are not waved together. However, being that the lambs of *Shavuos* are waved together with the loaves, perhaps we would say that a *piggul* intention about the loaves would render the lambs *piggul*. [Rashi explains that if the *Mishna* would only have stated the case of the lambs of *Shavuos*, one would think that the *piggul* intention about the sacrifice only makes the loaves *piggul* because they are waved together, and that this would not apply to a *todah*. This is why both cases are stated.]

Rabbi Elozar inquired of Rav: If someone slaughtered a *todah* with intent to eat a *k'zayis* of the *todah* and its bread (half a *k'zayis* from each) on the next day, what is the law? It is clear that the sacrifice does not become *piggul*. Being that the sacrifice will not become *piggul* if the intent was regarding an entire *k'zayis* of bread, it will certainly not become *piggul* if the intent was regarding half a *k'zayis* of bread and half a *k'zayis* of sacrifice. The inquiry is whether or not the bread is *piggul*. Do we say that the sacrifice combines with the bread to make the bread *piggul*, or not?

Rav answered: In this case as well, the bread is *piggul* while the sacrifice is not *piggul*.

The *Gemora* asks: Why should this be? Let us apply the following *kal vachomer*: If what causes the *piggul* (the sacrifice) does not itself become *piggul*, certainly something (the bread) which cannot render something else (sacrifice) *piggul* should not make the bread *piggul*!?

The *Gemora* asks: Is this deemed to be a valid *kal vachomer*? The *braisa* states: There was an incident regarding someone who planted seeds in the vineyard of his friend, which had already grown small grapes (*a violation of kilayim*). The Sages forbade the seeds of the crops, but permitted the grapes (*for one cannot render forbidden something that does not belong to him*). Why? We should say a similar *kal vachomer*. If that (*the grapes*) which prohibits others is not itself forbidden, then that (*the seeds*) which tried to prohibit others and did not succeed, should certainly not be forbidden!

The *Gemora* answers: The Torah only forbade *kanvas* and *luf* (*types of legumes*) as being *kilayim* with grapes. Other similar seeds are only forbidden as *kilayim* with grapes according to Rabbinic law. Accordingly, the Torah only forbade the crops or seeds of the person who sinned (*the person planting the seeds*) and not the owner of the orchard. However, regarding the sacrifice, we should still be able to say this *kal vachomer*.

Some say this question was regarding the lambs of *Shavuos*. Rabbi Elozar inquired of Rav: If someone slaughtered the lambs of *Shavuos* with intent to eat a *k'zayis* of the lamb and its bread (*half a k'zayis from each*) on the next day, what is the law? It is clear that the sacrifice does not become *piggul*. Being that the sacrifice will not become *piggul* if the intent was regarding an entire *k'zayis* of bread, it will certainly not become *piggul* if the intent was regarding half a *k'zayis* of bread and half a *k'zayis* of sacrifice. The inquiry is whether or not the bread is *piggul*. Do we say that the sacrifice combines with the bread to make the bread *piggul*, or not?

Rav answered: In this case as well, the bread is *piggul* while the sacrifice is not *piggul*.

The *Gemora* asks: Why should this be? Let us say a *kal vachomer*. If what causes the *piggul* (*the sacrifice*) does not itself become *piggul*, certainly something (*the bread*) which cannot render something else (*sacrifice*) *piggul* should not become *piggul*!?

The *Gemora* asks: Is this deemed to be a valid *kal vachomer*? The *braisa* states: There was an incident regarding someone who planted seeds in the vineyard of his friend, which had already grown small grapes (*a violation of kilayim*). The Sages forbade the seeds of the crops, but permitted the grapes (*for one cannot render forbidden something that does not belong to him*). Why? We should say a similar *kal vachomer*. If that (*the grapes*) which prohibits others is not itself forbidden, then that (*the seeds*) which tried to prohibit others and did not succeed, should certainly not be forbidden!

The *Gemora* answers: The Torah only forbade *kanvas* and *luf* (*types of legumes*) as being *kilayim* with grapes. Other similar seeds are only forbidden as *kilayim* with grapes according to Rabbinic law. Accordingly, the Torah only forbade the crops or seeds of the person who sinned (*the person planting the seeds*) and not the owner of the orchard. However, regarding the sacrifice, we should still be able to say this *kal vachomer*.

The *Gemora* notes: The one who understands that this discussion was regarding the *todah* will certainly say this applies to the lambs of *Shavuos*. However, the one who says this applies to the lambs will say that this is only because the lambs and bread are waved together. This is as opposed to the *todah* and its breads that are not waved together.

Rabbi Abba Zuti understood that Rabbi Elozar inquired of Rav in the following manner: If someone slaughters one of the lambs from the lambs of *Shavuos* in order to eat from "its friend" on the next day, what is the law? Does "its friend" indicate the other lamb and therefore it is not *piggul* (*as one lamb cannot render the other lamb piggul*), or does "its friend" indicate the bread, which indeed becomes *piggul*?

Rav answered: We learned that if he slaughtered one of the lambs with the intention of eating from it the next day, it is *piggul* but its friend is not. If he slaughtered it with intent to eat from its friend the next day, both of them are valid. This indicates clearly that "its friend" implies the other lamb.



The *Gemora* rejects this proof, as perhaps this is referring to a case where he explicitly mentioned, “its friend – the other lamb.” (15a – 15b)

### **Mishna**

A sacrifice renders the libations brought with it *piggul* if the libations already were sanctified in a vessel; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Libations do not render the sacrifice *piggul*. What is the case? If someone slaughters a sacrifice with the intention of eating from it on the next day (*after its allotted time*), both the sacrifice and its libations are *piggul*. If he slaughtered it with intent to offer the libations tomorrow, the libations are *piggul* but the sacrifice is not *piggul*. (15b)

### **Together or Ten Days Later**

The *braisa* states: One is liable for *piggul* if the libations of an animal become *piggul*, as the blood of the sacrifice allows it to be offered. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. They asked Rabbi Meir: Can't a person offer his sacrifice and offer his libations ten days later? Rabbi Meir replied: I said this law only if they are brought together with the sacrifice. They replied: It is possible to transfer the libations so that they will be used for a different sacrifice (*even though they were already sanctified*).

Rava explained: Rabbi Meir understands that libations are established as being solely for a specific sacrifice after that sacrifice has been slaughtered, just like the slaughtering of a *todah* established the breads of the *todah* as being together with the *todah*.

The *braisa* states: The *log* of oil of a *metzora* can be rendered *piggul*, being that the blood of the *asham* permits the oil to be applied on the thumbs of the *metzora*. These are the words of Rabbi Meir. They asked Rabbi Meir: Can't a person bring his sacrifice and bring his oil ten days later? Rabbi Meir replied: I only said this law if it is brought together with the sacrifice. They replied: It is possible to transfer the oil so that

it will be used for a different sacrifice (*even though it was already sanctified*).

Rava explained: Rabbi Meir understands that oil is established as being solely for a specific *asham* sacrifice after that sacrifice has been slaughtered, just like the slaughtering of a *todah* establishes the breads of the *todah* as being together with the *todah*. (15b)

### **DAILY MASHAL**

#### ***A Todah – Only for That Day***

The *halachah* of a *todah* – thanksgiving offering differs from that of a *shelamim*. The time allotted for eating a *shelamim* is two days and a night whereas that for a *todah* is only a day and a night. The Gerer Rebbe zt"l, author of *Imrei Emes*, said that the matter is very simple: How can one eat a *todah* today for yesterday? The new day needs new thanksgiving.