

Daf Notes

Insights into the Daily Daf

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Menachos Daf 3

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Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler

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Daily Daf

Rabbah:

What Intent Contradicts Actions?

The *Gemora* continues to discuss Rabbi Shimon's position that one who takes the *komeitz* –handful of the *minchah* – meal offering for the sake of the wrong type of *minchah* is valid, as it is clear from his actions that his intent is nonsensical. The *Gemora* asks why Rabbi Shimon does not similarly say that one who slaughtered an animal of the more severe *kodshei kodashim* in its place (the north side of the courtyard) for the sake of the less severe *kodashim kalim* should be valid, as its location proves that it is not *kodashim kalim*.

The *Gemora* answers that while *kodashim kalim* may be slaughtered in the south, they also may be slaughtered in the north, so his actions do not contradict his intent.

The *Gemora* asks why Rabbi Shimon does not say that one who slaughtered *kodashim kalim* in the south for the purpose of *kodshei kodashim* is valid, as his actions contradict his intent.

The *Gemora* answers that the actions do not contradict the intent, as perhaps he is slaughtering it for *kodshei kodashim*, but violating the rule that it must be done in the north.

The *Gemora* says that if we can resolve the seeming contradiction by considering him to violate the regular requirements, why doesn't Rabbi Shimon similarly say that one who took a *komeitz* of a fried *minchah* for the sake of a deep fried one is not contradicting his intent, but simply offering his deep fried *minchah* the wrong way? The *Gemora* cites a *Mishna* which says that if one pledged one form of *minchah*, and then brought the other, it is valid, but he must still fulfill his original pledge.

The *Gemora* answers that once it is brought in one form, it becomes that type of *minchah*, even if he had pledged a different form. Therefore, if he takes the *komeitz* for a different type of *minchah*, it contradicts the actual *minchah*, and does not invalidate it.

The *Gemora* asks why don't we assume he pledged to bring this *minchah* in a specific form (e.g., deep fried), and then brought it the wrong way, and took the *komeitz* according to his first assumption? The *Gemora* cites a *Mishna* which says that if one pledged a specific *minchah* in a specific form, he may not change the form, and doing so makes it invalid. In this case, his intent and actions are consistent, but he violated his pledge.

The *Gemora* answers that Rabbi Shimon, who says that if one pledged one form and then brought the other, he

has fulfilled his pledge, for the form need not match the pledge. Therefore, even if he pledged to bring a specific *minchah* in one form, and then brought it in the other, Rabbi Shimon says that it is valid, and he has fulfilled his pledge. Since it is valid in the form he has brought, his intent contradicts his actions, and has no effect.

The *Gemora* asks why Rabbi Shimon does not say that one who offers an *olah* – burnt offering for the sake of a *chatas* – sin offering contradicts his actions, as a *chatas* is a female animal, and an *olah* is male.

The *Gemora* answers that a *Nasi's chatas* is a male goat, so the intent is not contradictory.

The *Gemora* asks about the following cases, where the intent is contradictory, due to the different gender of the sacrifices:

1. An *olah* (male) for the intent of a private individual's *chatas* (female).
2. A *chatas* (female) for the intent of an *olah* (male). Although a sheep *chatas* has a tail, which hides the gender, a goat *chatas* does not.

The *Gemora* answers that people do not notice the gender, so it does not make the intent contradictory to the actions.

The *Gemora* asks about the following cases, where the intent is contradictory, due to the different ages of the animals being sacrificed:

1. A *pesach* sacrifice (one year old) for the intent of an *asham* – guilt offering (two years old). Although some *asham* sacrifices (for a *nazir* or *metzora*) are one year old, if one offers it for the intent of an *asham* for robbery or *me'ilha* – misuse of sanctified property, which are brought from a two year old animal, it is contradictory.
2. An *asham* (two years old) for the intent of a *pesach* (one year old).

The *Gemora* answers that people do not notice the age of an animal, since some one year old animals look old, and some two year olds look young.

The *Gemora* asks about one who slaughtered a goat sacrifice for the intent of an *asham*, which is brought from a sheep, since a goat has hair, and a sheep has wool.

The *Gemora* answers that the difference is not apparent, as people may think the goat is simply a black sheep.

The *Gemora* asks about one who slaughters a calf or bull sacrifice for the intent of a *pesach* or *asham*, which are only brought from sheep and goats.

The *Gemora* says that Rabbi Shimon would actually agree in this case, and he only meant that in *most* cases of animal sacrifices, the intent does not contradict the actions. (3a – 3b)

Rava : Zos Toras Haminchah

The *Gemora* continues with other answers to the contradiction in Rabbi Shimon's statements.

Rava says that Rabbi Shimon only says that one who took the *komeitz* of one form of *minchah* for the intent of another form is valid, since the verse says *zos toras haminchah* – this is the rule of the *minchah*. By including all *minchah's* in one statement, the verse teaches that changing intent from one form to another is not considered a change. However, Rabbi Shimon agrees that if one took the *komeitz* for the intent of an animal sacrifice, it is invalid. When Rabbi Shimon says that animal sacrifices are not like *minchah*, he is saying that although all animal sacrifices are slaughtered in the same way, there is no verse putting them in one category, and therefore intending for a different sacrifice is invalid.

The *Gemora* challenges Rava's explanation from the *braisa*, in which Rabbi Shimon says that the contradiction between the intent and the action (*not the verse cited by Rava*) is the reason that taking a *komeitz* for the sake of a different type of *minchah* is valid.

Rava answers that Rabbi Shimon is saying that *although* the intent and actions are contradictory, making it more likely to be invalid, it is still valid, because of the verse.

The *Gemora* says that according to Rava, we should say that one who sacrificed a *chatas* for the intent of a different type of *chatas* should be valid, as the verse says *zos toras hachatas – this is the rule of the chatas*.

The *Gemora* answers that according to Rabbi Shimon, it is indeed valid. According to the Sages, it is invalid, in at least some cases.

Rava says that an atoning *chatas* offered for the sake of a non-atoning *chatas* (e.g., for a *nazir* and *metzora*) is invalid, since they are like an *olah* sacrifice.

Rav Acha the son of Rava says any *chatas* offered for the sake of a different *chatas* is invalid, as it must be offered for the actual *chatas* it is being brought for. (3b)

Rav Ashi : for the Sake of a Pan?

Rav Ashi says that Rabbi Shimon says a *minchah* is valid when one takes the *komeitz* from a *marcheshes* – shallow pan *minchah* for the intent of a *machavas* – deep fry pan, since the intent is for the pan itself, which cannot itself become invalid. However, if he intends to take the *komeitz* for a *minchah* of the wrong form (e.g., deep-fry pan), Rabbi Shimon says it is invalid, as his intent is for a sacrifice which can be invalid (e.g., if offered for the wrong time or place).

Just like Rava, Rav Ashi explains that in the *braisa*, Rabbi Shimon was saying that *although* the intent and actions are contradictory, it is still valid, since his intent was for a utensil, and not a sacrifice. When Rabbi Shimon says that animal sacrifices are different, he means that although they all share the actions of slaughtering, receiving and applying the blood, all of these actions are ones that can be invalid, and therefore intending for the wrong slaughtering, receiving, or applying make the sacrifice invalid.

Rav Acha the son of Rava asked Rav Ashi how he would explain the case of one who took the *komeitz* of a dry *minchah* for a *belulah* – *minchah mixed [with oil]*, as *belulah* is a type of *minchah*, which can become invalid.

Rav Ashi said that *belulah* itself just means “mixing”, which is an action, but not the sacrifice itself, and therefore is like the pan, which cannot become invalid.

Rav Acha asked why we don’t say the same for one who slaughtered a sacrifice for the intent of a *shelamim*, as we can understand that to mean “peace,” which is like a pan.

Rav Ashi answered that the verse itself refers to the sacrifice as a *shelamim*, as in the phrase that refers to the *dam hashlamim* – blood of the *shelamim*, but the verse only refers to a *minchah* as *belulah vashemen* – mixed in oil, but never just *belulah*. (3b)

Comparing the Answers

The *Gemora* analyses each of the answers offered for the contradiction, explaining why each *Amora* did not accept the other answers:

1. Rav Ashi and Rava did not accept Rabbah’s answer, that a contradiction between the intent and action makes the intent irrelevant, since they say that a contradiction between intent and action is *more* of a reason to invalidate the sacrifice.
2. Rav Ashi and Rabbah did not accept Rava’s answer, since they do not agree that a general verse referring to “*Toras* – the rules of” puts all types of sacrifices listed in the same category.
3. Rava and Rabbah did not accept Rav Ashi’s answer, due to Rav Acha the son of Rava’s question from the case of intent for *belulah*. (3b)

Rav Hoshaya

The *Gemora* says that the case of intent and actions that contradict, which Rabbah says makes the intent irrelevant, and which Rava says would make the sacrifice invalid, is a case that Rav Hoshaya questioned.

The *Gemora* says that Rav Hoshaya asked Rav Assi what Rabbi Shimon would say in the case of one who took the *komeitz* of a *minchah* for the intent of an animal sacrifice. Does Rabbi Shimon say taking a *komeitz* of one *minchah* for the intent of another is valid because the actions and intent contradict, and therefore he would say this case is valid, or is it because of the verse which refers to *Toras haminchah*, and therefore he would say this case is invalid?

Rav Assi answered that we haven't even resolved Rabbi Shimon's position, as there is a contradiction between the two *braisos* that cite his opinion.

The *Gemora* explains that Rav Assi didn't accept any of the answers to the contradiction, because each had a problem:

1. Rabbah's answer was challenged by Abaye, who said that the verse invalidates a *minchah* with the wrong intent, without qualification.
2. According to Rava's answer, a *chatas* offered for a different type of *chatas* should be valid.
3. Rav Ashi's answer was challenged by Rav Acha the son of Rava. (3b – 4a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Zos Toras Haminchah

The *Gemora* cites Rava's answer to the contradiction between the two *braisos* of Rabbi Shimon. Rava says that Rabbi Shimon says that taking a *komeitz* of a *minchah* of one form for the sake of another form is valid, since the verse says *zos toras haminchah* – this is the law of the *minchah*, grouping them all together. However, if one takes the *komeitz* for the sake of an animal sacrifice, it is invalid, since this is not included in the grouping of the verse.

Tosfos (3b kan) says that Rava could also have said, like Rabbah, that Rabbi Shimon says that taking the *komeitz* of one person's *minchah* for the sake of someone else is invalid, as that is not included by the grouping of the verse. Tosfos offers two reasons why Rava did not use that example:

1. Rava wanted to clarify that even taking the *komeitz* for the right person, but the wrong purpose, can be invalid, if it is done for the purpose of an animal sacrifice.
2. The *braisa* which says that Rabbi Shimon says it is invalid refers to one who took the *komeitz* "not for its sake", which implies that the issue was not *whom* it was taken for, but *what* it was taken for. The *Gemora* could have cited this as the reason Rava did not agree with Rabbah's answer, but instead cited a reason common to Rava and Rav Ashi.

Recognizable or Not?

The *Gemora* explains that Rav Ashi and Rava both explain the *braisa* of Rabbi Shimon to be saying that *although* the *Kohen's* intent contradicts his action, the *minchah* is still valid. When Rabbah explained this clause in the *braisa*, he referred to an intent that contradicted an action as one that was recognizable, while Rava and Rav Ashi refer to it as *not* recognizable.

Rashi explains that Rabbah is referring to the fact that intent is recognizably *false*, while Rava and Rav Ashi are referring to the fact that the intent is *not* recognizably coherent.

Tosfos (3b Af al gav) notes this discrepancy in terminology, and suggests that each position is focusing on their understanding of the significance of an intent inconsistent with the action. Rabbah, who considers this type of intent as meaningless, and therefore not invalidating the *minchah*, refers to it as *recognizably false*, since this is the reason for disregarding it. Rava and Rav Ashi, who consider this type of intent as more problematic, since it is inconsistent, refers to it as *unrecognizable*, since the fact that it is irreconcilable with the action makes it more likely to invalidate the *minchah*. Finally, when the *Gemora* explains why Rava and Rav Ashi do not agree with Rabbah's answer, the *Gemora* refers to this intent as "recognizable," since it is referring to Rabbah's position, which they do not accept.