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### ***Deriving a Minchah from a Minchah***

[Rabbi Elozar had stated: In order for the blood of an animal sacrifice to become sanctified, the Kohen must accept the minimum amount necessary for sprinkling in one vessel.] The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Elozar really say this? But the following was stated: Rabbi Yochanan said: The *chavitin* of the Kohen Gadol (a *minchah* offering prepared on a shallow pan, consisting of a tenth of an ephah of flour; it was offered daily by the Kohen Gadol - half in the morning and half in the evening) cannot be sanctified in halves. Rabbi Elozar disagreed and said: Since it is offered in halves, it may be sanctified in halves as well. Now, if the blood cannot be sanctified in halves, why aren't the *chavitin* derived from blood?

And if you will answer that Rabbi Elozar does not derive one thing from the other; but Rabbi Elozar said: Rabbi Elozar said: If the *komeitz* of a *minchah* offering was separated in the Sanctuary, it is valid, for like so we find regarding the removal of the spoons of *levonah* (which, in a sense, is like a *kemitzah* of a *minchah*, for the removal of the spoons is the act which permits the *lechem hapanim* for consumption).

The Gemora answers: He derives a *minchah* offering from another *minchah*, but He does not derive a *minchah* from blood.

The Gemora asks: Does he derive a *minchah* from another *minchah*? The *braisa* states: If before the *lechem hapanim* (showbread) was taken off the *shulchan* (table) it broke into pieces, the bread is considered invalid, and the spoons of

*levonah* (frankincense) cannot be burned. If it broke into pieces after it was taken off the *shulchan*, the bread is considered invalid but the spoons of *levonah* can be burned. Rabbi Elozar says: This does not mean that it was actually taken off, but rather that it was time for it to be taken off the *shulchan*, and it therefore is as if it was taken off. Why should this be? Shouldn't it be compared to a *minchah* that lost some of its volume before the *kemitzah*, which makes it totally invalid? [This shows we do not derive a *minchah* from another *minchah*!]

The Gemora answers: This is not difficult, as it is not clear what part of a *minchah* will be the *komeitz*, while the *komeitz* of the *lechem hapanim* is already established. This is why when it comes time for it to be taken off the *shulchan*, it is as if it already was taken off.

The Gemora asks: If so (that we learn a *minchah* from a *minchah*), it should be considered like remnants that were reduced between the *kemitzah* and the burning, which should cause the *komeitz* to be unable to be burned!?

The Gemora answers: Isn't this law the subject of an argument? Rabbi Elozar can hold like the opinion that one does burn the *komeitz* in this situation. (7b – 8a)

### ***Halves***

The Gemora discusses a previous statement. Rabbi Yochanan said: The *chavitin* of the Kohen Gadol cannot be sanctified in halves. Rabbi Elozar disagreed and said: Since it is offered in halves, it may be sanctified in halves as well.

Rav Acha states: What is the reasoning of Rabbi Yochanan? The verse states: *A flour offering... half of it.* This indicates one should first bring the *minchah* in one vessel, and only then split it in half.

The *Gemora* asks a question on this from a *braisa*. The *braisa* states: The *chavitin* of the *Kohen Gadol* were not brought as halves, but rather were brought as an entire *isaron* of flour that was later split into two. Another *braisa* states: If it would say *flour offering ... half*, I would say that one could bring half an *isaron* in the morning from his house and offer it, and then later do the same towards evening. This is why the verse states: *half of it in the morning*, indicating that it should be brought in its entirety in the morning (*and then halved*).

The *Gemora* answers: These *braisos* only teach that it is a *mitzvah* to do so, not that the *chavitin* are invalid if it is not done this way.

Rav Geviha from Bei Kasil said to Rav Ashi: Does the verse say *the law (indicating that the absence of bringing both halves originally cause it to be invalid)*?

Rav Ashi answered: This only teaches that one should bring both halves together from his house in the morning, not that they should be put together to be sanctified simultaneously in the same vessel.

The *Gemora* asks: Did Rabbi Yochanan say this? It was taught: If he set aside half of an *isaron* (*for a regular minchah which has a minimum of an isaron*) and he intended to add more, Rav says this half is not yet sanctified. Rabbi Yochanan says: It is sanctified. If Rabbi Yochanan held it does not become sanctified by the *chavitin*, why doesn't he derive from the *chavitin* that it indeed is invalid? If you will say that Rabbi Yochanan does not derive one thing (*i.e. minchah*) from another, didn't Rabbi Yochanan say that if one slaughtered a *shelamim* in the Sanctuary it is valid? This is as the verse states: *And they will slaughter it by the entrance of the Tent*

*of Meeting.* Logic would dictate that the secondary area (*the Courtyard*) should not be more stringent than the primary area (*the Sanctuary*). [*This shows that he derives one thing from another, as he is deriving the slaughtering in the Sanctuary to be valid from the Courtyard.*]

The *Gemora* answers: If he intends to add from the outset, it is a different case, and that is why he says it is valid. This is as the *braisa* states: *Full* means complete. [*This indicates that the minchah is only sanctified when the entire amount is in the vessel.*] Rabbi Yosi says: This is when he does not intend to add more. However, if he intends to add more, whatever he puts in becomes holy.

The *Gemora* asks: Who does Rav hold like regarding *chavitin*? If he holds like Rabbi Elozar, why doesn't he derive from *chavitin*? If you will say that Rav does not derive one thing from another thing, this seems difficult, for Rav says: The flour of a *minchah* that is placed into a vessel without oil has already become sanctified. We derive that oil is not needed for sanctifying from the *lechem hapanim*. We derive that *levonah* is not required from the *minchah* of libations. We derive that even if both oil and *levonah* are not present it is sanctified, as this is the case regarding a sinner's *minchah*.

The *Gemora* therefore concludes that Rav must hold like Rabbi Yochanan regarding the *chavitin* of the *Kohen Gadol*. (8a – 8b)

### **Without Oil and Levonah**

The *Gemora* discusses a previous statement. Rav says: The flour of a *minchah* that is placed into a vessel without oil has already become sanctified. We derive that oil is not needed for sanctifying from the *lechem hapanim*. We derive that *levonah* is not required from the *minchah* of libations. We derive that even if both oil and *levonah* are not present it is sanctified, as this is the case regarding a sinner's *minchah*.

The *Gemora* remarks: Oil and *levonah* also do not require each other to become sanctified. This is apparent regarding oil, as we find that oil alone is brought for the *log* of oil of a *metzora*. This is also apparent regarding *levonah*, as spoons of *levonah* are brought for the *lechem hapanim*. Rabbi Chanina argues that all three ingredients (*flour, oil, and levonah*) are required in the vessel (*when all three are brought for this minchah*) in order for any of them to be sanctified.

The *Gemora* asks: According to Rabbi Chanina, why was it necessary for the vessel containing an *isaron* of flour to be inaugurated with the anointing oil (*to give it the status of a kli shares*)? It never caused anything to become sanctified!?

The *Gemora* answers: It caused the sinner's *minchah* (*only requiring flour*) to become sanctified.

The *Gemora* asks: Why was the *log* of oil anointed?

The *Gemora* answers: This was for the *log* of oil brought for the *metzora*.

The *Gemora* notes: Even Shmuel holds like Rav in this matter. This is as the *Mishna* states: The vessels designated for liquids sanctify liquids, and the measures designated for solids sanctify solids. Vessels for liquids do not sanctify solids, nor do the measures for solids sanctify liquids. Shmuel said: This (*that vessels designated for liquids do not sanctify solids*) was only learned regarding measures, but basins (*for liquids*) can sanctify (*even solids*), as it is written: *both of them (bowl and basin) filled with fine flour*.

Rav Acha from Difti asked Ravina: But the *minchah* offering was moist (*since it is said by it that it is mixed with oil; it therefore should be like a liquid*)!?

Ravina answered: We are referring to the dry substances inside the offering. Alternatively, you can answer that a

*minchah* offering – in relationship to blood, is regarded as dry. (8b)

### ***In the Sanctuary***

The *Gemora* discusses a previous statement. Rabbi Elozar says: If *kemitzah* was done to a *minchah* in the Sanctuary, it is valid. This is as we find that the removing of the bowls of *levonah* from the *shulchan* was done in the Sanctuary.

Rabbi Yirmiyah asked a question on this from a *braisa*, which states: It is written: *And he shall separate his handful from there* - that is, from the place where the feet of a non-Kohen may stand. Ben Beseirah said: From where do we know that if he took the *kemitzah* with his left hand, he should return it to the vessel and then take it out with the right hand? It is because it is written: *And he shall separate his handful from there* - that is, from the place from which he has already taken from. [*The first opinion indicates that kemitzah in the Sanctuary would not be valid, as a non-Kohen cannot stand there!?*]

There are some who state that Rabbi Yirmiyah raised the challenge, and answered it himself, whereas others state that Rabbi Akiva said to Rabbi Yirmiyah: Son of Tachlifa! I will explain it to you: The *braisa's* purpose is only to affirm that the entire Courtyard is fit for *kemitzah*; for I might argue as follows: Since an *olah* offering is *kodshei kodashim* and a *minchah* offering is *kodshei kodashim*; just as an *olah* offering requires the north, so does a *minchah* offering require the north. Therefore the Scriptural text informs us otherwise.

The *Gemora* asks: How could we have compared it to an *olah* offering, which is completely burned?

The *Gemora* answers: We can derive it from a *chatas* offering.



The *Gemora* asks: How could we have compared it to a *chatas* offering, which atones for those who are liable to *kares*?

The *Gemora* answers: We can derive it from an *asham* offering.

The *Gemora* asks: How could we have compared it to an *asham* offering, which is a blood sacrifice.

The *Gemora* answers: We derive it from all three of them.

The *Gemora* asks: We could not have learned it from all three of them, because they are blood sacrifices!?

The *Gemora* answers: Rather, the Scriptural text is necessary for the following: I might have thought that since it is written: *And he shall bring it close to the altar...and he shall separate from there his komeitz*. Just as it must be brought near the southwestern corner, so must the *komeitz* be separated by the southwestern corner. Therefore the Scriptural text informs us otherwise.

Rabbi Yochanan had stated: If one slaughtered a *shelamim* in the Sanctuary it is valid. This is as the verse states: *And they will slaughter it by the entrance of the Tent of Meeting*. Logic would dictate that the secondary area (*the Courtyard*) should not be more stringent than the primary area (*the Sanctuary*).

The *Gemora* asks from a *braisa*: Rabbi Yehudah ben Besirah said: How do we know that if idolaters surrounded the entire Courtyard (*and they were shooting arrows and missiles into it*), the *Kohanim* may enter the Sanctuary and eat there *kodshei kodashim*? It is because it is written: In the most holy place shall you eat it. Now, why is this text necessary? Let us apply the same reasoning: since it is written: *In the Courtyard of the Tent of Meeting they shall eat it*, and the secondary cannot be stricter than the primary?

The *Gemora* answers: The cases cannot be compared, for there (*in Rabbi Yochanan's case*), we are dealing with a service, therefore we can say, "Do not allow the secondary to be stricter than the primary." This is because a man can perform a service in the presence of his master. But regarding eating, where a man would not eat in the presence of his master, we do not say, "Do not allow the secondary to be stricter than the primary." (8b – 9a)

### INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

#### ***Eating Sacrifices in the Kodesh HaKodoshim!***

When Hashem gave Aaron and his sons the priestly gifts from the sacrifices, He commanded them to carefully observe their sanctity and the Torah commands: "In the **holy of holies** you shall eat it; every male will eat it; holy it will be for you" (Bemidbar 18:10). Our *Gemora* cites Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah, who expounds from the verse: "How do we know that if gentiles surround the *Azarah* (courtyard) that the *kohanim* enter the *Sanctuary* (Temple) and eat the *kodshei kodashim* and the remains of the *menachos*? – the verse says "in the holy of holies you shall eat it." In other words, *kodashim kalim* are eaten throughout Yerushalayim and *kodshei kodashim* are eaten only in the *Azarah*, but if enemies surround the *Azarah*, the *kohanim* are allowed to eat the sacrifices in the *Sanctuary*.

Learners certainly wonder why Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah interpreted from this verse the permission to eat only in the *Sanctuary* and not in the *kodesh hakodoshim* as the verse refers to the *kodesh hakodoshim*. The Rishonim addressed this question. Ramban (Bemidbar 18:10) explains that, indeed, this permission is also valid for the *kodesh hakodoshim* but Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah mentioned the *Sanctuary* to instruct the *kohanim* not to rush to the *kodesh hakodoshim* if they can stay in the *Sanctuary*, whose sanctity is not as strict as that of the *kodesh hakodoshim* (see the Netziv's commentary on Sifrei). Still, Rabbi Eliyahu Mizrachi

disagrees: it cannot be, he says, that a *kohen* would eat in the *kodesh hakodoshim* and though the verse says “holy of holies,” this means the *Sanctuary*, whose sanctity is stricter than that of the *Azarah*.

HaGaon Rav Yitzchak Zeev of Brisk zt”l discussed an important issue needing clarification and that emerges from our *sugya*. At first the *Gemora* understood that Rabbi Yehudah ben Beseirah meant that the meat of sacrifices is not disqualified when it enters the *Sanctuary* and if not for the verse, we would disqualify that meat just as the meat of *kodoshim* that leaves the *Azarah* to a mundane place is disqualified (see Rashi, s.v. *Nichnasin laSanctuary*).

**Two distinct prohibitions of taking a sacrifice out its place:** Apparently, how could we have thought that a sacrifice that leaves a holy place for a holier place would be considered *yotzei*: meat that has “gone out” and become disqualified?

Rav Yitzchak Zeev explains that the Torah’s command concerning meat that goes out contains two separate warnings that stem from two verses: (1) the meat of a sacrifice that goes out to a place less holy than the place where it should be eaten is disqualified; (2) it is forbidden to take out the sacrifice from the place it is eaten (as Rambam wrote in *Hilchos Pesach*, 9:2, that the meat of a *pesach* that left a *chavurah* becomes disqualified; see *ibid* and Rashi, *Zevachim* 26a, s.v. *Pirkesah*). Therefore, if not for the verse, we would disqualify the meat of the sacrifice because it left the place of its being eaten! This meat certainly left for a holy place but its very departure from the place of its being eaten disqualifies it. Therefore the Torah said “in the holy of holies you will eat it” to inform us that the *kodesh hakodoshim* is also considered the place of its being eaten in certain cases (*Kisvei HaGriz* and see *Chidushei Maran Riz HaLevi*, *Hilchos Pesulei HaMukdashin*).

## DAILY MASHAL

### *Old-time Modernization*

Our *Gemora* recounts that Avimi forgot tractate Menachos and therefore turned to his pupil Rav Chisda to learn it. The *Gemora* explains that he didn’t summon his pupil but took the trouble to go to him as he thought that his trouble would help him to remember his learning, as the saying goes: “If you toiled and found, believe” (see Rashi). We find a similar example in *Leket Yosher* (II, p. 94), where the pupil of the *Terumas HaDeshen* recounts: “I remember that he said, “Those rich, spoiled boys who made themselves special tables (revolving bookshelves) – while they sit, they turn the table where they want with many *seforim*. They do not behave well. On the contrary, if one seeks a *sefer* and fetches it with much trouble, one remembers by that act what one wants to learn.”