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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Generic Intent

The *Gemora* asks how we know that a *get* written with generic intent at all is invalid for divorce.

The *Gemora* suggests a series of cases that the *Mishna* invalidates, but challenges each as a proof:

Case	Challenge
Scribes were writing a <i>get</i> with the same names as the man and his wife	This is a case of scribes who were practicing, so the <i>get</i> was not written for divorce at all
He wrote a <i>get</i> , regretted, then gave it to someone else with same name, wife’s name, and city	This was done with intent for the wrong people, which is worse than no intent
He wrote a <i>get</i> for one wife, regretted, and then used it for his other wife with the same name	It was done with intent for the wrong wife, which is worse than no intent
He told the scribe to write the <i>get</i> for whichever wife he decides to divorce	This relies on <i>bereirah</i> – retroactive clarification, which is ineffective

The *Gemora* finally proves this from the *Mishna* which states that a scribe who is writing templates of documents for use as *gittin* must leave blank spaces for the names of the husband and wife, witnesses, and date. Rav Yehudah quotes Shmuel saying that he must also leave a blank space for the core statement, “you are permitted to marry any man.” Although the scribe is writing these templates to be used as *gittin*, he may not fill them out without specific intent for the couple which will use it, proving that generic intent is invalid for a *get*. (2b – 3a)

Similar, but not the Same

Rava raised another contradiction. Rav Yehudah quoted Rav saying that if one slaughtered a *chatas* for the sake of an *olah*, it is invalid, but if he slaughtered it for the sake of *chulin* – non consecrated meat, it is valid. This implies that only something which is in the same category, but not identical, is an issue. However, the *Mishna* says that a *get* that was not written for the woman being divorced is invalid. This implies that even if one wrote it for a non Jew, who is not even in the same category as the woman being divorced, it is still invalid, contradicting the principle of Rav.

He answered that changing to something in a separate category is like doing it with generic intent. In the realm



of sacrifices, this is valid, so the *chatas* slaughtered for *chulin* is valid, but in the realm of *gittin*, this is invalid, so the *get* written for a non Jew is invalid.

Rava further raised a similar contradiction with a *braisa*. An earthenware vessel with impurity in it causes anything in its airspace to be impure, but if another vessel is inside it (*with its top above the outer top*), the contents of the inner vessel remain pure, since the verse says that anything *b'socho* – *in it* is impure, excluding *toch tocho* – *something inside its inside*. The *braisa* says that even if the inner vessel is not earthenware, it prevents anything in it from impurity. This implies that even something in a different category can block a process, contradicting Rav's statement that *chulin* cannot invalidate a *chatas*.

Rava answered that *chulin vis a vis chatas* is so different that it is not analogous to a different type of vessel, but to planks inside an earthenware stove.

Rava cites the *Mishna* which states that if one split the airspace of an earthenware stove with planks or a curtain, impurity travels from one side to the other. Similarly, a vessel with holes (*even if the holes are stopped up with straw*) is not a bona fide vessel, and therefore, when it is in the airspace of an earthenware stove, it does not block impurity from spreading from it or to it. Rabbi Eliezer says that these divisions surely block the impurity, since they block impurity even in the more severe form of impurity from a corpse. The Sages disagree, and say that walls block impurity from a corpse since that spreads in tents, and people divide tents with walls. However, people do not divide vessels with walls, so they do not block impurity in a vessel.

The *Gemora* asks that Rava's answer is valid according to the Sages, but seems to be incompatible with Rabbi Eliezer, who says that even a wall blocks impurity in a stove.

The *Gemora* answers that Rabbi Eliezer only says so due to his logical argument from impurity of a corpse, but would otherwise agree with Rav's principle.

The *Gemora* rejects this, since the same type of argument could be made in the case of *chatas* – if the intent for a sacrifice invalidates, surely the intent for *chulin* should invalidate.

Rather, the *Gemora* says that Rav's statement is based on the verse which states that "they shall not profane the sacrifices of *Bnei Yisroel*," implying that actions of *chulin* will not profane the sacrifices, which overrides the logical argument.

The *Gemora* challenges that there is similarly an extra verse which states that *tocho* – *inside it [the earthenware vessel]* is impure, which should override Rabbi Eliezer's logical argument.

The *Gemora* answers that Rabbi Eliezer says this verse only teaches that anything directly in the airspace of impurity in a stove – including food covered with clay – is impure, but not something blocked with a division. The Sages say that no verse is necessary for this case, since they are in the same airspace as the impurity. (3a – 3b)

For what and whom?

Rav Yosef bar Ami raised a contradiction between two

statements of Rav. Rav says that if one slaughtered a *chatas* for the intent of a different *chatas* (i.e., *transgression*), it is valid, but if one slaughtered it for the intent of a different type of sacrifice (e.g., *olah*), it is invalid. This implies that intent only invalidates when it is for something different.

Rav also says that if one intended a *chatas* for someone else who was obligated in a *chatas*, it is invalid, but if he intended for someone else who was obligated in an *olah* it is valid. This implies that intent only invalidates when it is for something similar, the opposite of the first statement's implication.

He answered that Rav's statements are based on the verses invalidating each intent. The verse states "and he will slaughter it for a *chatas*", requiring the intent to be for a *chatas*. Therefore, as long as the intent was for a *chatas*, even the wrong one, the verse has been fulfilled. The verse also states "and he will atone for him [the owner]", implying that he must have the owner in mind, and not someone else. The person the verse excludes must be similar to the owner, i.e., obligated in a *chatas*. Anyone not similar to the owner is not excluded, and does not invalidate the *chatas*. (3b)

How Similar?

Rav Chaviva raised a contradiction with Rav's statement that intent for someone else who is not obligated in a *chatas* does not invalidate, implying that only something similar can invalidate. The *braisa* (cited by Rava earlier) says that an inner vessel inside an earthenware vessel's airspace blocks impurity, even if the inner vessel is not earthenware, implying that even a dissimilar item can block. He answered that in the case

of inner vessels, the verse explicitly excludes inner items from impurity. The verse twice stipulates that items that are *tocho* – in it are impure, effectively making four statements, since each verse could have simply said *toch* – in, without explicitly stating in *it*. These four statements teach:

1. The basic rule that items in the airspace become impure.
2. The airspace is the medium for an impure earthenware vessel to make things impure, but also for the vessel itself to become impure (e.g., if a dead rodent is in its airspace, but doesn't touch the vessel).
3. Airspace is not a medium for transferring impurity in vessels that are not earthenware.
4. Only its airspace, but not the airspace of a vessel inside it, even if the vessel is not earthenware.

DAILY MASHAL

Reasons for the Sacrifices

Starting Zevachim, we should examine the Rishonim's reasons for the sacrifices. The *Remo* devoted a whole book to the topic, *Toras Ha'Olah*, in which he counts 12 reasons for the *mitzvah*.

The Temple is meant to rectify people's hearts: *Sefer HaChinuch* (*mitzvah* 95) expands on the subject and explains that all the Creator's mitzvos are only meant to benefit His creatures. Thus the building of the Temple was not meant to avail Him, so to speak, as "the heavens...do not contain Him and they stand with His breath, so does He need a house built by people?" The Temple is meant to rectify people's hearts and, as he

says, “people are influenced by their actions: by constantly repeating good deeds, the thoughts of one’s heart become pure.” Therefore, Hashem commanded us to set aside a clean and pure place where people can rectify their ways. The *Chinuch* continues to the topic of sacrifices: “If a person sins, his heart will not be purified well by mere words, facing a wall and saying, “I’ve sinned and shall not repeat my action.” But by doing a great action because of his sin, to take goats from his folds and exert himself to bring them to the designated sanctuary to the *kohen* and do all that is written concerning the sacrifices of sinners, by all that major activity he will realize the evil of the sin and refrain from it another time.” There is need, then, to incorporate significant action with repentance to arouse a sinner to forsake his evil ways.

There is a sharp difference of opinions between Rambam and Ramban concerning the reason for sacrificing animals. Rambam (*Moreh Nevuchim*, III, Ch. 32 and 46) writes that since the peoples among whom the Jews lived worshiped animals, we were commanded to sacrifice them to detach ourselves from their ways. Ramban (Vayikra 1:9) disagrees, wondering if so why Adam and his sons offered sacrifices as they weren’t in the company of idolaters. Therefore, he tends more to agree with Ibn Ezra (see *Hashmatos* and *Miluim* at the end of Ramban’s commentary on the Torah, Mosad HaRav Kook ed.) that a sacrifice comes as “a soul instead of the sinner’s soul.” He points out that this reason stems from *agadah* but that the deeper reason is a “hidden secret”, summed up by the author of *Meshech Chochmah* in his preface to Vayikra: “Ramban and his companions said that it is to bring together all the powers of the worlds, and it is a kind of **spiritual electricity** that, by the action of the *kohen*, he works

high matters in different worlds.”

HaGaon Rav Meir Simchah HaKohen of Dvinsk zt”l (*Meshech Chochmah*, *ibid*) tries to minimize the intensity of the difference of opinions between Rambam and Ramban and writes that the two reasons could live together in peace. Adam offered sacrifices to accomplish their highest aim and likewise we are commanded to offer sacrifices in the Temple to “bring the worlds together” – in other words, to perform great actions in the high worlds. However, the sacrifices allowed to be offered on a *bamah* (a place for sacrifices other than the *mishkan* or the Temple) were meant to keep Jews away from idolatry. (Indeed, we find support for this view in Rambam himself, who explains in another place [*Hilchos Me’ilah*, 8:8]: “and all the sacrifices are included in the *chukim* [the *halachos* which cannot be understood]. *Chazal* said that the world exists in the merit of the service of the sacrifices, that by performing the *chukim* and *mishpatim* [*halachos* which can be understood], the honest earn the World to Come”).

It is interesting to note that the words *uchshanim kadmonios* - as in ancient years - in the verse “and the *minchah* of Yehudah and Yerushalayim should be sweet to Hashem as since forever and as in **ancient** years” (Malachi 3:4) are explained by the Midrash as referring to Hevel’s era, when sacrifices were offered for a sweet scent and good will.