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Zevachim Daf 8

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Stipulation by Communal Offerings

The *Mishna* had stated: A *chatas* brought with the wrong intent is invalid.

The *Gemora* explains how we know this: The verse states: *And he will slaughter it as a chatas* implying it must be brought for the sake of a *chatas*.

The *Gemora* asks: This is a valid source regarding slaughtering. How do we know that the receiving of the blood must be done for the sake of a *chatas*?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *And the Kohen will take from the blood of the chatas* indicating that the receiving of the blood must be performed for the sake of a *chatas*.

The *Gemora* asks: This is a valid source regarding slaughtering and receiving. How do we know the sprinkling of the blood must be done for the sake of a *chatas*?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *And the Kohen shall provide atonement for him from his chatas (i.e. sin)* indicating that the blood must be sprinkled for the sake of a *chatas*.

The *Gemora* asks: This is a valid source regarding having intent for a different sacrifice. How do we know the sacrifice is invalid even if he has intent for the wrong person?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *on him* indicating the intent cannot be for his fellow.

The *Gemora* asks: These are valid sources that one should not have wrong intentions. How do we know that these intentions prevent the sacrifice from being valid?

The *Gemora* answers: This is as Rav Huna, the son of Rav Yehoshua taught from the verse: *from his sin*. The word (*letter vav indicating*) *his* indicates regarding the sprinkling that it renders the sacrifice invalid (*if done with intent for a different owner*). This also applies to this verse of *from his chatas*. [*This teaches that sprinkling is not only wrong, but clearly makes the sacrifice invalid if done for another owner.*]

The *Gemora* asks: We find that it is clearly forbidden to change the intent to a different sacrifice, and that it even prevents the sacrifice from being valid if the sprinkling is done for a different owner. How do we know that change of intent for a different sacrifice makes all services performed with this intent invalid? How do we know that change of intent for a different owner makes all other services (*aside from sprinkling, which we already know*) done with this intent invalid?

Rabbi Yonah answers: We derive this from the *chatas* of a *nazir*. The verse states: *And the Kohen will bring the sacrifice close before Hashem, and he will perform the service of his chatas and his olah*. This indicates that all service done with the *chatas* has to be for the sake of a *chatas*.

The *Gemora* asks: This is a valid source for offering a *chatas* with intent that it is a different type of sacrifice. How do we know that this applies to having intent for a different owner?

The *Gemora* answers: This is as Rav Huna, the son of Rav Yehoshua taught from the verse: *from his sin (and not the sin of another)*.

Ravina asked: If this derivation is correct, we should also say that an *olah* brought with these improper intentions is invalid, as the verse states: *his olah!*?

The *Gemora* asks on Ravina's question: Why didn't the words *his minchah* and *his libation* also bother Ravina?

The *Gemora* answers: Those words are required to teach that the accompanying flour offering and libations can be brought at night or even the next day.

The *Gemora* asks: What do we do with the verse *his olah*? Additionally, can we indeed derive from one sacrifice to another? We should not be able to derive regarding a *chatas* offered to atone for eating forbidden *cheilevs* from the *chatas* of a *nazir*, as the *chatas* of a *nazir* requires that other sacrifices be brought with it as well. We similarly should not be able to derive regarding a *chatas* of a *nazir* from a *chatas* for *cheilev*, as a *chatas* for *cheilev* involves a sin punishable (*if done intentionally*) with *kares!*?

Rather, Rava answers: (*We do not derive from his chatas.*) We derive from the *chatas* of a *metzora*. The verse states: *And the Kohen will perform the service of the chatas* indicating that all service done with it must be with the intent that it is a *chatas*.

The *Gemora* asks: This is a valid source for switching intent for a different type of sacrifice. How do we know one cannot switch intent to a different person?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states: *And he will effect atonement for the one being purified etc.* This indicates that the intent must only be for the one being purified, not for his fellow.

The *Gemora* asks: Can we derive a regular *chatas* from the *chatas* of a *metzora*? The *chatas* of *cheilev* should not be able to be derived from that of a *metzora*, as the *chatas* of a *metzora* has other sacrifices that must be brought with it. We similarly should not be able to derive regarding a *chatas* of a *metzora* from a *chatas* for *cheilev*, as a *chatas* for *cheilev* involves a sin punishable (*if done intentionally*) with *kares!*

The *Gemora* answers: While we cannot derive from either *nazir*, a *metzora*, or *cheilev* individually, we can learn one of these from the other two. Which one could we learn from the other two? If it would not say this (*that the wrong intent renders the sacrifice invalid*) regarding the *chatas* of a *cheilev*, and we would derive it from a combination of *nazir* and a *metzora*, this is not possible. This is because *nazir* and a *metzora* are different in that they require accompanying sacrifices.

If it would not say this (*that the wrong intent renders the sacrifice invalid*) regarding the *chatas* of a *nazir*, and we would derive it from a combination of *cheilev* and a *metzora*, this is not possible. This is because *cheilev* and a *metzora* are different in that they cannot be permitted through permitting a vow! [*Technically, a nazir might be able to undo his vow, causing him not to be considered a nazir, and hence not have to bring these sacrifices.*]

If it would not say this (*that the wrong intent renders the sacrifice invalid*) regarding the *chatas* of a *metzora*, and we would derive it from a combination of *cheilev* and a *nazir*, this is not possible. This is because *cheilev* and a *nazir* are different in that the sacrifice is standard, and is not changed if one is poor (*as opposed to the sacrifice of a metzora*).

Rather, the *Gemora* states: The verse states: *this is the laws for the olah, minchah, chatas etc. (shelamim etc.)*. The Torah compares a *chatas* to a *shelamim*. Just like we know that a *shelamim* should be brought with the proper intent, both for the right type of sacrifice and the right owner, so too this applies to *chatas*. The verses we quoted above teach us that

if this happens regarding a *chatas*, it renders the sacrifice invalid.

The *Gemora* asks: We know this is true regarding a *chatas* for *cheilev* where the verse says: *for a chatas*. How do we know this is true for a *chatas* brought for idolatry, denying knowing testimony, false oaths, and *tumah* of the Temple and its holy things?

The *Gemora* answers: The *chatas* for idolatry is derived from the *chatas* for *cheilev*, as both are subject to *kares*. The others are derived from a *tzad hashaveh* (the common characteristic of two or more *halachos*) from *cheilev* and idolatry. (7b – 8b)

Wrong Intent for a Pesach Offering

The *braisa* states: If a *pesach* sacrifice is brought at its proper time (*erev pesach*) with intent that it is a *pesach*, it is valid. If the intent is for the sake of a different sacrifice, it is invalid. During the rest of the year, if it is brought for the sake of a *pesach*, it is invalid, and if it is brought for the sake of a different sacrifice it is valid.

The father of Shmuel explains how we know this: The verse states: *And if from the flock is his sacrifice for a shelamim sacrifice to Hashem* etc. This implies that something that comes from flock (*i.e. a pesach*) should be considered a *shelamim* (*if it is not brought in its proper time*).

The *Gemora* asks: Perhaps this teaches us that it is only valid if brought for the sake of a *shelamim*, not a different sacrifice?

Rabbi Ila answers in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: *For a sacrifice* includes all types of sacrifices.

The *Gemora* asks: Why don't we say that whatever it was slaughtered for should be what it becomes (*i.e. if for an olah it should be considered an olah*)?

The *Gemora* answers: If the verse would state *for shelamim and you will sacrifice*, I would agree. However, now that it says, *for a sacrifice that is a shelamim*, the indication is that it always becomes a *shelamim*.

The *Gemora* asks: Why don't we say that *for a sacrifice* is a general word, as opposed to *shelamim* which is a specific type of sacrifice. We should therefore use the generalization-specification rule teaching that the general is only like the specific example. This should teach us that it should only be valid if it is thought to be a *shelamim*!

The *Gemora* answers: The word *for Hashem* adds a generality (*indicating that it should not be derived in this fashion*). [*In such a case, we say that the rule should be similar to what is specific.*]

Rav Yaakov from Pakod River asked: The first generality and the second are incomparable! The first only includes all (*animal*) sacrifices, while the second includes everything sacrificed to Hashem, including birds and flour offerings!?

The *Gemora* answers: The *Tanna* of Rabbi Yishmael's study house taught that we can derive a generalization-specification derivation in this manner. This is therefore considered a generalization – specification - generalization derivation, meaning we derive that the general is similar to the specific. The specific is a case where a sacrifice (*like a shelamim*) was brought without correct intent, yet is still valid. So too, the *pesach* brought without correct intent is valid (*as opposed to if it is brought during the year with intent for a pesach, in which case it is invalid*).

The *Gemora* asks: We should say that this only applies to intent that it is a different donated sacrifice such as a *shelamim* and *olah*, excluding a *chatas* and *asham*!?



The *Gemora* answers: Rather, we derive this because *for a sacrifice* is an inclusive word, indicating that if one has intent (*that this pesach is*) for any *korban*, it is a *shelamim*.

The *Gemora* asks: But let us say that the *pesach* should become whatever type of offering it was slaughtered for?

Rabbi Avin answers: We cannot transfer sacrifices that may be eaten to sacrifices that cannot be eaten.

The *Gemora* asks: But a *chatas* and *asham* may be eaten!?

The *Gemora* answers: We cannot transfer sacrifices that may be eaten by everyone to sacrifices that cannot be eaten by everyone.

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Avin answers: We cannot transfer sacrifices that are *kodashim kalim* to sacrifices that are *kodshei kodashim*. (8b – 9a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Specifications, Generalizations, Limitations and Extensions

Generalization and a specification – only the specifics mentioned are included.

Specification and a generalization – everything is included.

Generalization, specification and a generalization – other cases must resemble the specifications mentioned at least in one way.

Specification, generalization and a specification - other cases must resemble the specifications mentioned in two ways.

Limitation and extension – everything except for one thing is included.

Extension and limitation - other cases must resemble the limitations mentioned.

Extension, limitation and extension - everything except for one thing is included.

Limitation, extension and limitation – there is no such type. (Hame'or)

DAILY MASHAL

The Difference Between a Pauper and a Rich Person

In the *parashah* concerning the atonement of a rich leper (*metzora'*), we are told "...and the *kohen will atone* for him before Hashem" (Vayikra 14:18) whereas concerning the atonement of a poor *metzora'*, the Torah says "**to atone** for him before Hashem" (ibid, 29). *Meshech Chochmah* says that this change in language stems from that *tzara'as* afflicts a person because of pride. Therefore, we can understand a rich person who is proud and when he is anointed with oil, "the *kohen will atone* for him" – his atonement is complete. However, a proud pauper is one of those whom Hashem rejects, as the *Gemora* says in Pesachim 113b: "Four are not tolerated: a proud pauper," etc. Therefore, his sin his great and about him we are told "**to atone** for him before Hashem" – his atonement is not over yet.