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Zevachim Daf 14

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Service Circumvented

The *Mishna* had stated: Rabbi Shimon holds that it is valid in the case of carrying (*with the wrong intent, because the it is impossible to offer a sacrifice without slaughtering, without receiving and without sprinkling, but it is possible to offer it without bringing the blood*).

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: Rabbi Shimon agrees that a wrong intention disqualifies (*the sacrifice*) during the carrying of the blood of the inner *chatas*, because it is a service which cannot be omitted (*because the blood must be sprinkled on the Paroches and the horns of the Inner Altar (which is inside the Heichal – the Inner Sanctuary) and it is not proper to slaughter it in the Heichal. It is therefore slaughtered in the Courtyard and the blood is then carried into the Heichal*).

The *Gemora* asks: But Rabbi Shimon said: Any sacrifices which are not offered on the outer Altar, such as the *shelamim*, are not subject to the law of *piggul*!?

Rabbi Yosi the son of Rabbi Chanina answers: He agrees that (*although it is not piggul*) it disqualifies it. This he derives from the following *kal vachomer*: If an intention for the sake of a different sacrifice is valid by a *shelamim*, but disqualifies a *chatas*; then, is it not logical that a *piggul* intent, which disqualifies a *shelamim* should certainly disqualify a *chatas*?!

The *Gemora* asks: We have found that the intention of consuming it after its proper time (*piggul*) disqualifies it (*the inner chatas*). How do we know that the intention of consuming eat it outside of its place (*chutz lim'komo*) disqualifies it? It cannot be derived through an analogy from the intention of “past its time,” for you may refute it by saying that the disqualification of “past its time” involves *kares* (*when the meat from this korban is eaten; perhaps that is why we are strict that it applies by the inner chatas as well, “outside its place” however, does not involve kares, and therefore would not apply by the inner chatas*). It cannot be derived through an analogy from the intention of slaughtering it for the sake of something else, for that is a disqualification that operates by a *bamah* as well. [*Slaughtering for the sake of a different sacrifice is a disqualification that is applicable by a private Altar, when such was permitted; but slaughtering it with an “outside its place” intention would not disqualify a sacrifice by a bamah.*]

The *Gemora* answers: Where does the slaughtering for the sake of a different sacrifice operate as a disqualification? It is in the case of the *pesach* offering and the *chatas*; and the *pesach* offering and the *chatas* were not offered by a *bamah* (*for only voluntary sacrifices were offered by a bamah; therefore the refutation falls away*).

Alternatively, we can answer that it is derived from a *hekeish* from the disqualification of “past its time” (*and we cannot ask logical questions on a hekeish*).

Rava said: If you will say that Rabbi Shimon agrees with his son (*Rabbi Elozar*), who maintains that between the *Ulam* (*the Antechamber of the Sanctuary*) and the Altar is (*regarded as*) north (*with respect to the slaughtering of kodshei kodashim, which are required to be in the north section of the Courtyard; though actually this location is to the west of the Altar*), Rabbi Shimon will then hold that a wrong intention is effective in the case of the bringing of the blood of an inner *chatas* only from within the entrance of the *Ulam*. [*He maintains that a wrong intention expressed during the bringing of the blood from the place of slaughtering to the Ulam is disregarded, since this passage could altogether have been circumvented by slaughtering at the entrance of the Ulam. But if he agreed with the other Tanna, Rabbi Yosi, that the sacrifice must be slaughtered actually between the northern side of the Altar and the northern wall of the Courtyard, the bringing of the blood would be an indispensable service, and therefore a wrong intention during that passage would disqualify it.*]

Rava continues: And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon agrees with Rabbi Yehudah who maintains that the entire floor of the inner part of the Courtyard (*between the Ulam and the Altar*) is sanctified (*and the sacrificial parts may be burned on the floor instead of the Altar*), he will then hold that a wrong intention is effective during the conveying of the removal of the *bezichin* (*the spoons which contained the levonah - frankincense*) only from the entrance of the *Heichal* (*Sanctuary*) and out (*until he leaves the Ulam, for the rest of his passage until the Altar is unnecessary, since he could have burned the levonah on the floor*).

Rava continues: And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon holds that the sanctity of the *Heichal* and that of the *Ulam* is one (*and the shulchan, where the bezichin were placed, could be positioned in the Ulam as well*), then a wrong

intention is effective only from the doorway of the *Ulam* (*for his passage in the Heichal was unnecessary*) and out (*until the end of the doorway; which was a thickness of five amos*).

Rava continues: And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon holds that within the doorway is (*the same sanctity*) as within the *Heichal*, then a wrong intention is not effective even for one step (*for the shulchan could be situated at the end of the doorway, and the levonah could be burned right in the beginning of the Courtyard*), except within the stretching out of his hand (*from the doorway of the Ulam to the floor of the Azarah*).

Rava continues: And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon holds that carrying not by foot is not regarded as carrying (*eluding to the stretching out of his hand*), then a wrong intention is not effective at all. (14a)

Non-Kohen Conveying the Blood

Abaye said to Rav Chisda's interpreter: Ask Rav Chisda what is the *halachah* regarding a non-Kohen bringing the blood? Rav Chisda replied that it is valid and a Scriptural verse supports me: *And they slaughtered the pesach offering, and the Kohanim sprinkled the blood from their hand* (*from those who slaughtered it, referring to the non-Kohanim*), and the Levites skinned them.

Rav Sheishes challenged him from a *braisa*: A non-Kohen, an *onein* (*one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet*), one who is intoxicated, or one with a blemish who receives the blood, brings it to the Altar, or sprinkles it disqualifies the sacrifice. One who performs the service sitting or with his left hand also disqualifies it. This is indeed a refutation (*for we see that a non-Kohen who brings the blood disqualifies the sacrifice*)!



The *Gemora* asks: But Rav Chisda quoted a Scriptural verse!?

The *Gemora* answers: It means that the non-Kohen acted like a post (*a Kohen received the blood and gave it to the non-Kohen, who held it until another Kohen took it from him and brought it to the Altar*).

Rabbah and Rav Yosef both said: A non-Kohen carrying the blood is a subject of dispute between Rabbi Shimon and the Rabbis. According to Rabbi Shimon who says that a service which can be circumvented is not a service, the carrying of a non-Kohen would be valid. But according to the Rabbis it is invalid.

Abaye said to them: But slaughtering is a service which cannot be circumvented, and yet it is valid when done by a non-Kohen!?

They answered: Slaughtering is not a service at all.

Abaye asked them: Is it not? Surely Rabbi Zeira said in the name of Rav that the slaughtering of the red heifer by a non-Kohen is invalid!?

The *Gemora* answers: The red heifer is different, because it is like the holy things designated for the Temple repair (*which is merely a monetary sanctity; it is therefore not regarded as a service*).

The *Gemora* asks: But can we not make a *kal vachomer*: If slaughtering is a service in the case of the holy things designated for the Temple repair (*the Gemora is retracting from its previously held position*), yet it is not a service in the case of holy things designated to the Altar!?

Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi answered: Let it be compared to the examination of *tzara'as* afflictions, which is not a service, and yet requires a *Kohen*!

The *Gemora* asks: But the carrying of the limbs to the ramp (*of the Altar*) is a service which can be circumvented, and yet it is invalid when done by a non-Kohen, for it is written: *He shall bring it all...on the Altar*. The master explained this verse to be referring to the bringing of the limbs to the ramp.

The *Gemora* answers: Where the Torah has revealed (*that a Kohen is required*), it is revealed, but where the Torah has not revealed it, it has not.

The *Gemora* asks: But can we not make a *kal vachomer*: If the bringing of the limbs to the ramp requires a *Kohen*, though it is not essential for atonement, how much more so should the bringing of the blood require a *Kohen*, seeing that it is essential to atonement!?

The *Gemora* notes: It was stated likewise: Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Elozar: The bringing of the blood by a non-Kohen is invalid even according to Rabbi Shimon.

They inquired: Is carrying the blood not by foot (*when one Kohen hands the blood to another, bringing it closer to the Altar*) called carrying or not? [*Would a wrong intention during this time disqualify the sacrifice?*]

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from the following *braisa*: One who performs the service (*the bringing of the blood*) sitting or with his left hand also disqualifies it. It would seem that standing similar to sitting (*without moving his feet*) is valid!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: Perhaps sitting means that he drags himself along, and then a case of standing which is similar to sitting would mean that he moves slightly.

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from the following *Mishna*: A *Yisroel* slaughtered it and the *Kohen* received the blood, passed it to his fellow, and he passed it to his fellow.

The *Gemora* rejects this, saying that they each moved slightly, and the *Mishna* is teaching us: *With the multitude of people is the glory of the king.*

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from the following *Mishna*: If a qualified *Kohen* received the blood and passed it to an unqualified person, the latter must return it to the qualified one.

The *Gemora* rejects this, saying that the qualified person should continue and receive the blood. (14a – 14b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Slaughtering the Parah Adumah and the Bull of the Kohen Gadol

The *Gemora* (Yoma 42) records an argument between Rav and Shmuel as to whether the bull of the *Kohen Gadol* or the *parah adumah* can be slaughtered by a non-*Kohen*. Rav says that the *parah adumah* cannot be slaughtered by a non-*Kohen* and Shmuel holds that the bull of the *Kohen Gadol* cannot be slaughtered by a non-*Kohen*. At first glance it appears that the rules that govern the *parah adumah* according to Rav, also govern the bull according to Shmuel. They appear to be parallel. However, the *Gevuros Ari* points out differences between the two. According to the opinion that the *parah adumah* does not have to be slaughtered by a *Kohen*, a non-*Kohen* can be used *lechatlilah* (can be a preferable option). In the case of

the bull of the *Kohen Gadol*, however, a non-*Kohen* would be *bedieved* (not preferable but valid). Even though the slaughtering would be valid by anyone, it should preferably be done by the *Kohen Gadol*. The reason for this is the verse says it should be done by Aaron. Although this opinion holds that slaughtering is not technically part of Temple Service, and therefore, cannot be essential, it should, nevertheless preferably be done the way it says in the verse, by the *Kohen Gadol*.

Another difference pointed out by the *Gevuros Ari* is according to the opinion that the *parah adumah* must be done by a *Kohen*, it also must be done with the garments of a *Kohen*. However, this is not the case according to the opinion that the bull must be slaughtered by the *Kohen Gadol* himself. According to this opinion, the reason why he was required to slaughter the bull himself was not due to a requirement for *kehunah* (priesthood), but rather the need for the owner of the sacrifice to do the entire service. Since the *Kohen Gadol* was considered the owner of the bull, and it was considered his, he was required to slaughter it. It did not, however, require priestly garments, since it was not essentially a requirement of the priesthood.

Is the Mitzvah of Sprinkling the Blood like the Mitzvah of Taking a Lulav?

What does the *mitzvah* of *lulav* have to do with *Zevachim*? It turns out that a fascinating *halachic* issue connects two completely different topics: taking the *lulav* and sprinkling the blood of a *chatas* on the Altar. The Torah says “and you shall **take** for yourselves...the fruit”, etc. (Vayikra 23:40) and therefrom we learn that one must **take** the four species to observe their *mitzvah*.

Should a *lulav* be taken or held? Let’s examine the matter. “You shall take” means taking the *lulav* into the hand or perhaps this action is not part of the *mitzvah* but holding

the *lulav* is the main point of the *mitzvah*. Let us examine the following instance: an eager person held the four species in his hands from midnight till morning. When morning comes, does he observe the *mitzvah* by merely holding them or must he put them down and take them (another example: a person paralyzed in his arms into whose hands the four species were placed). This question was first discussed by the author of *'Aroch Laneir (Bikurei Ya'akov, 652, S.K. 10)* and the leaders of the generations have considered it and revealed many aspects thereof, of which one is directly connected with our *sugya*.

One of the four *avodos* (services) of a sacrifice is *zerikah*: sprinkling the blood on the Altar. Our *sugya* explains that as the Torah says "and the *Kohen* shall **take** of its blood with his finger..." (Vayikra 4:30), he must take the blood from the vessel. If a drop of blood falls on his finger in some way, it must not sprinkle it on the Altar. We learn therefrom that taking is not performed by merely holding an object. Apparently, we should therefore take up the four species and not only hold them (Responsa *Divrei Mordechai* and Responsa *Binyan Shlomo, 48*).

Liquids cannot be held: However, this proof from our *sugya* is rejected by two *halachic* authorities, each for his own reason. HaGaon Rav Naftali Tzvi Yehudah Berlin zt"l (Responsa *Meishiv Davar, I, 40*) rejects this proof by carefully differentiating between taking up a *lulav* and *zerikah*. Indeed, when the Torah commands "you shall take" or "he shall take," a person must perform a certain action to be considered as taking the object. Someone who holds a *lulav* grasps it with his fingers, using his muscles the whole while for if not so, it would fall. Therefore, holding a *lulav* is an action done to the object. On the other hand, a person cannot **hold** a liquid. If he would try to do so, it would escape between his fingers. In other words, a liquid's being on a person's hand has nothing to do with any action done to it. Therefore, the

Kohen must take the blood from the vessel for if not so, how could he observe the Torah's command "he shall take"?

The Chazon Ish zt"l (*O.C. 149, os 2*) also rejects this proof for a simple reason. About the four species, the Torah commands "you shall take for yourselves" but doesn't specify from where. But when the Torah commands "he shall take" the blood, it specifies to take it from a sanctified vessel. Therefore, it is obvious that the Torah's command "you shall take" a *lulav* has nothing to do with taking the four species **from** a certain place but taking them **to** a certain place – i.e., one's hands. If the blood, however, were to reach the *Kohen's* hand without being taken from a vessel, he must not perform *zerikah* thereby. (It is important to mention that the Stiepler Gaon [*Kehilos Ya'kaov, Berachos, §6*] remarks that the above question has a bearing on the question as to if someone who holds the four species for a long while observes a continual *mitzvah* or if the *mitzvah* is observed only at the first moment when they are taken up. If the *mitzvah* is bringing them into one's hands, their continually being held surely constitutes no *mitzvah*).

DAILY MASHAL

Two Types of Bringing

Our *sugya* distinguishes between bringing (*holachah*) **blood** to the Altar and bringing **limbs**. While bringing the blood was usually performed by one *Kohen*, bringing the limbs was performed by many. We find a hint for such in the description of Aaron's service on the eighth day of the inauguration of the Altar (*miluim*): About bringing the blood, we are told "the sons of Aaron gave (*vayamtziu*) him the blood" while the word *vayamtziu* is missing a *yud* (Vayikra 9:12), indicating the singular, whereas about bringing the limbs to the Altar, we are told "and they gave (*himtziau*) him the 'olah", with a *yud*, indicating the plural (*Ta'ama Dikera*).