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Zevachim Daf 10

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Apply one Service to Another

If one who slaughtered a sacrifice for its sake, planning to apply the blood not for its sake, Rabbi Yochanan invalidates the sacrifice, while Rish Lakish says it’s valid.

The *Gemora* explains that Rabbi Yochanan says that we learn from *pigul* (*intent to eat the sacrifice at the wrong time*) to apply the incorrect intent (*not for its sake*) about one service (*applying the blood*) to another (*slaughtering*), while Rish Lakish says we do not learn that from *pigul*.

The *Gemora* says that this is similar to another dispute they have about one who slaughters an animal planning to apply the blood or offer the fats for the sake of idolatry. Rabbi Yochanan says that this is prohibited, as it is tantamount to slaughtering for idolatry, since we learn from *pigul* to apply the intent about one service to another service, while Rish Lakish says we do not learn from *pigul*, and it is permitted.

The *Gemora* explains that we need both disputes, since we may have thought it more likely to learn from *pigul* in the case of a sacrifice slaughtered with invalid intent, which is a sacrifice like the case of *pigul*. Without both cases, we may have thought that Rabbi Yochanan agrees to Rish Lakish in the case of idolatry, or that Rish

Lakish agrees to Rabbi Yochanan in the case of a sacrifice with intent not for its sake.

Rav Dimi came and said that Rav Yirmiyah attempted to support Rabbi Yochanan, while Rabbi Ila attempted to support Rish Lakish. Rav Yirmiyah argued that in the case of *pigul*, if one slaughtered intending the slaughtering to be in the wrong time it is valid, yet if he slaughtered intending to apply the blood at the wrong time it is invalid. Therefore it follows that in the case of intent not for its sake, where one who slaughters intending the slaughtering to be not for its sake it is invalid, certainly if one slaughters intending the application of the blood not for its sake, it should be invalid.

Rava bar Ahilai challenges this reasoning, since *pigul* is a more severe issue, as one is punished with *kares* for eating a *pigul* sacrifice. Rather, the argument is from intent to perform the service in the wrong place, which does not incur *kares*. While slaughtering a sacrifice with intent to sacrifice it in the wrong place does not invalidate it, slaughtering it with intent to apply the blood in the wrong place does. Therefore, slaughtering with intent to apply the blood not for its sake should certainly be invalid, as slaughtering not for its sake is itself invalid.

Rav Ashi challenges this argument, since the issue of intent of the wrong place is more extensive, since it applies to all sacrifices, while intent not for a sacrifice's sake is only invalidates a *chatas* and *pesach* sacrifice.

Rather, Rav Ashi says the argument is from the invalidation due to intent for another person. While slaughtering a sacrifice intending the wrong person does not invalidate it, slaughtering it intending to apply the blood for the wrong person does. Therefore, slaughtering it intending to apply the blood not for its sake should certainly invalidate, as slaughtering it with intent not for its sake should invalidate it.

Rabbi Ila argued for Rish Lakish, since the verse could have omitted the verse that requires application of the blood for its sake, and we would still have learned it from the slaughtering and receiving the blood. The extra verse teaches that each service stands on its own, and we do not apply the intent for one to another.

Rav Pappa challenged this argument, since perhaps the verse teaches that we *do* apply the intent for one service to another.

The *Gemora* answers that without the verse we would have assumed that, because of Rav Ashi's argument above. Rabbi Yochanan, however, would counter that we would not have learned application of the blood from the slaughtering and receiving the blood, since these two are both services that require the north side of the courtyard (*for the more severe kodshei kadashim sacrifices*) and apply to all sacrifices, including inner *chatas* ones (*whose blood is sprinkled inside the Heichal building*), as opposed to applying the blood, which is not in the north, nor applies to inner *chatas* sacrifices.

Rish Lakish counters that the verse requiring intent for the sake of the sacrifice is in the section of a *shelamim*, which has neither of these attributes in its slaughtering or receiving of the blood, so these would not prevent us from extrapolating to application of the blood.

The *Gemora* concludes with the same dispute about one who slaughtered a sacrifice for its sake, intending to apply the blood not for its sake, with Rav Nachman saying it's invalidated, and Rabbah saying it's valid. The *Gemora* says that Rav Nachman reversed himself, due to Rav Ashi's argument. (9b – 10a)

Asham vs. Chatas

Rabbi Eliezer says in the *Mishna* that an *asham* sacrifice slaughtered not for its sake is also invalid.

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*, with a dialogue between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua about the status of *asham*. Rabbi Eliezer says that both *asham* and *chatas* are brought for transgressions, so just as a *chatas* is invalid when slaughtered not for its sake, so an *asham* is invalid when slaughtered not for its sake. Rabbi Yehoshua replies that a *chatas* is different, since its blood is applied on the top half of the Altar. Rabbi Eliezer replies that a *pesach* is also invalid when slaughtered not for its sake, although its blood is not applied on the top half, proving that this distinction is irrelevant. Rabbi Yehoshua replies that the *pesach* has a set time, while an *asham* does not. Rabbi Eliezer replies that a *chatas* does not, and still is invalid, proving that this distinction is also irrelevant, but Rabbi Yehoshua replies that he can repeatedly challenge both the *chatas*

and *pesach* source with each one's respective distinction.

Rabbi Eliezer offers another argument, from the verses. Just as the verse of *chatas* says *chatas hee* – it is a *chatas*, and the verse of the *pesach* says *pesach hu* – it is a *pesach*, and these teach that they are only valid when offered for its sake, so the verse of the *asham* which says *asham hu* - it is an *asham* teaches that it is invalid when offered not for its sake. Rabbi Yehoshua replies that while these verses of *chatas* and *pesach* are in the context of slaughtering, which are required, the similar verse of *asham* is in the context of placing the sacrifice on the Altar. If the sacrifice is never placed on the Altar, it is still valid, so that verse cannot be teaching anything that will invalidate it. Rabbi Eliezer finally says that the verse says *kachatas ka'asham* – like the *chatas* and like the *asham*. This association of the two teaches that they are equivalent, in that both are invalid when slaughtered not for their sake.

The *Gemora* reviews the *braisa*: The *Gemora* asks why Rabbi Yehoshua does not learn an *asham* from the combination of *chatas* and *pesach*, since each distinction he raised was present only in one, indicating it cannot be relevant.

The *Gemora* answers that *pesach* and *chatas* share an aspect of *kares* – a *chatas* is brought for a transgression which is liable for *kares* when done intentionally, and if one did not offer a *pesach* when he was fully able to, he is punished with *kares* - as opposed to an *asham*.

Rabbi Yehoshua challenged learning from *chatas* to *asham*, since a *chatas*' blood is applied to the top half of the Altar.

The *Gemora* offers other distinctions, and explains why Rabbi Yehoshua did not challenge with those:

1. Some blood of *chatas* sacrifices enter the *Heichal*. The *Gemora* says that we are learning from *chatas* sacrifices that are applied on the outer Altar.
2. If the blood of outer *chatas* sacrifices enter the *Heichal*, it is invalid. The *Gemora* says that Rabbi Eliezer says the same is true of an *asham*.
3. *Chatas* atones for *kares* transgressions. The *Gemora* says that the *oleh v'yored chatas* also atones for non *kares* transgressions, e.g., denying knowledge of testimony.
4. A *chatas* requires four applications of blood. The *Gemora* says that Rabbi Yehoshua follows Rabbi Yishmael, who says that all sacrifices require four applications.

The *Gemora* concludes that there are other valid distinctions that Rabbi Yehoshua could have used (e.g., a *chatas*' blood is applied to all four corners of the Altar, it must be done by finger, directly on the top of the corner), but he just chose one representative one.

The *Gemora* asks why Rabbi Eliezer does not say that an *asham*'s blood is applied on the top half, due to the verse which associates a *chatas* and *asham*. Abaye says that he cannot say that, since the more severe *olah* (which is totally consumed) has its blood on the bottom half. Although an *asham* atones, and an *olah* does not, a *chatas* from a bird does atone, and its blood is on the bottom half. Although a bird *chatas* is not slaughtered like an *asham*, an *olah* is. From the combination of *olah* and a bird *chatas*, we can learn that severe *kodesh kadashim* sacrifices like them apply their blood to the bottom half.

The *Gemora* challenges this, since an *asham* has a minimum value assigned to it, while these do not, making it impossible to learn *asham* from them.

Rather, the *Gemora* says that the verse about *chatas* refers to the *kohen hamechatai osah* – who applies it. The extra word *osah* – it excludes anything else from its method of application. Although the verse about *chatas* similarly states that he will slaughter *osah* – it, teaching that it is invalid if not slaughtered for its sake, which should exclude other sacrifices, we know that this is not true, since a *pesach* is invalid when sacrificed not for its sake. Although a bird *olah* is applied in the top half of the Altar, this is not an exception, either because no other normally slaughtered sacrifice is applied there, or because Rabbi Eliezer follows Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon, who says that a bird *olah's* blood is applied just above the mid line of the Altar, while a *chatas'* blood is applied on the top corner of the Altar, making it unique.

The *Gemora* cites another *Mishna* about the invalidation of sacrifices whose blood entered the *Heichal*. Rabbi Akiva says that the blood of all sacrifices that entered the *Heichal* invalidates them, the Sages say that this only invalidates a *chatas*, and Rabbi Eliezer says it invalidates both *chatas* and *asham*, as the verse associates the two in the verse stating *kachatas ka'asham* – like a *chatas*, like an *asham*.

Rava explains that the Sages say that an *asham* cannot be invalidated, since even the more severe *olah* is not invalidated. Although an *olah* does not atone, and an *asham* does, the *minchas choteh* (brought for transgression) does atone, and is not invalidated by

entering the *Heichal*. [We cannot prove this from a bird *chatas*, since it is unresolved question whether it is invalidated by its blood entering the *Heichal*.] Although a *minchas choteh* is not like an *asham*, since it is not slaughtered, an *olah* is. Between the combination of the two, we learn that an *asham* is not invalidated by its blood entering the *Heichal*. (10a – 11a)

DAILY MASHAL

The Importance of an Olah from a Bird and a Chatas from a Large Animal

Some sacrifices have their blood sprinkled on the Altar above the *chut hasikra* and some have their blood sprinkled below it. The blood of an '*olah* from a bird is sprinkled above the *chut hasikra* while the blood of a *chatas* from a bird is sprinkled below it. On the other hand, the blood of an '*olah* from a large animal is sprinkled below the *chut hasikra* while the blood of a *chatas* from a large animal is sprinkled above it.

The Chozeh of Lublin zt"l said: The poor, who cannot afford to buy cattle or sheep, bring sacrifices from birds while the rich bring sacrifices from large animals. Since it is no *chidush* that a rich person should bring an '*olah* sacrifice from a large animal, the blood of his sacrifice is sprinkled below. But if he belittled himself, admitted his sin and brought a *chatas*, his sacrifice is highly regarded and its blood is sprinkled above. The opposite is true of a pauper. He is already belittled and if he brings a *chatas*, there is no *chidush* that he belittled himself and the blood of his sacrifice is sprinkled below. But if he brings an *olah*, which is a voluntary sacrifice, it is highly regarded and its blood is sprinkled above.