

24 Iyar 5778  
May 9, 2018



Zevachim Daf 26

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

**Inside and Out**

Rabbi Ami says in the name of Rabbi Elozar: If the animal is inside the Temple Courtyard and its foot is outside - if he first cut off its foot and then slaughtered it, the sacrifice is valid. If he slaughtered it and then afterwards cut off its foot, it is invalid. [This is because immediately after it is slaughtered, the blood of the legs becomes disqualified; it then circulates through the body and becomes mingled with the rest of the blood in the basin and disqualifies it all.]

The Gemora asks: How can the first case be valid? Cutting off the foot of an animal causes it to have a blemish, rendering it invalid to be offered as a sacrifice!?

Rather, the Gemora answers: He means that if he cut off its foot after slaughtering it and then accepted the blood, it is valid. [The Gemora seems to hold now that the blood which was outside at the time of the slaughtering does not disqualify the remaining blood in the basin.] If he accepted the blood before cutting off its feet, it is invalid.

The Gemora asks: How could it be valid if he cut off the foot before accepting the blood? Didn't Rabbi Zeira say If the Kohen nicked the bull's ear (after it was slaughtered) and then receives its blood, it is unfit, for it is written: *And the anointed Kohen shall take from the blood of the bull.* This teaches us that he must receive the blood from the bull as it was before (when it was slaughtered)!?

Rav Chisda says in the name of Avimi: It must be that the case where he cuts the foot is when he inserts the blade in the foot until it gets to the bone (cutting through the flesh are arteries

*stems the flow of blood, but it is not a blemished animal unless the bone is cut).*

The Gemora stated that if he accepted the blood and then cut the foot, it is invalid.

The Gemora asks: This indicates that blood that is absorbed in the limbs still has the status of blood (otherwise it would not make a difference that it was outside the Temple Courtyard)! [However, this is contradicted by the halachah that if one consumes such blood he is not liable to kares!?!]

The Gemora answers: Perhaps the reason it is invalid is because of the fats (considered meat of the korban) that are in the foot (that are carried by the blood to the rest of the body).

The Gemora asks: This indicates that meat of *kodshim kalim* that goes out of the Temple Courtyard before sprinkling of the blood renders the *korban* invalid (even though it can be eaten anywhere in Yerushalayim). [This is unlike the opinion of Rabbi Yochanan below (89b)!?!]

The Gemora answers: Perhaps this is only referring to *kodshei kodashim*.

The Gemora cites a braisa: *Kodshei kodashim* are slaughtered in the north of the Temple Courtyard and their blood is accepted in a service vessel in the north of the Temple Courtyard. If he stood in the south and stretched out his hand into the north and slaughtered, it is valid. If he accepted the blood in this fashion, it is invalid. If his head and most of his body entered the northern part of the Temple Courtyard, it is as if his entire body entered into that area. If the animal convulsed after being slaughtered and entered the south of the Temple Courtyard and

then returned, it is valid. *Kodshei kalim* must be slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard and have their blood accepted in the Temple Courtyard. If he stood outside the Temple Courtyard and brought his hand out and slaughtered in the Temple Courtyard, it is valid. If he accepted the blood in this fashion, it is invalid. If his head and most of his body entered the Temple Courtyard, it is as if he did not enter into that area. If the animal convulsed after being slaughtered and went out of the Temple Courtyard and then returned, it is invalid.

The *Gemora* asks: This indeed teaches that if *kodashim kalim* went out of the Temple Courtyard before sprinkling, it is invalid!?

The *Gemora* answers: Perhaps this is only the law regarding the tail area, diaphragm, and two kidneys (*which are considered kodshei kodashim to an extent, even when part of kodashim kalim; this is because they are burned on the Altar; the meat of the korban, however, would not become unfit for going out of the Courtyard*).

Shmuel's father inquired of Shmuel: Can one slaughter an animal (*lechatchilah*) if it is in the Temple Courtyard and its feet are outside?

Shmuel answered: The verse states: *And they will bring them to Hashem*, indicating that they must bring them totally in to the Temple Courtyard (*in order to fulfill their obligation*).

Shmuel's father continued: What if he suspended the animal in the airspace of the Temple Courtyard and slaughtered it? Shmuel replied that it would be valid. Shmuel replied: You have made a mistake, as one must slaughter the *korban* on the side of the Altar, and it is not on the side (*as it is suspended in the air*).

Shmuel's father inquired: If the slaughterer was suspended in the air, is it valid? Shmuel replied: No. Shmuel's father said: You have made a mistake, as the slaughtering must be next to the Altar, but the one slaughtering does not have to be next to the Altar.

Shmuel's father inquired of him: What if the animal was suspended in the air while he accepted the blood? Shmuel said this is valid. Shmuel's father replied: You have made a mistake, as this is not a proper way of performing service.

Shmuel's father inquired of him: What if the *Kohen* was suspended in the air while accepting the blood? Shmuel said this is invalid. Shmuel's father replied: You have made a mistake, as the slaughtering must be next to the Altar, but the acceptance does not have to be next to the Altar.

Abaye says: In all of these cases, if they involved *kodshei kodashim* they are invalid, besides for the case where the slaughterer was suspended in the air when he slaughtered the animal. If they involved *kodashim kalim* they are all valid, unless he was suspended in the air while accepting the blood.

Rava says: Why is it valid if he suspended the animal and then accepted the blood if the *korban* was *kodashim kalim*? This is because all of the airspace of the Temple Courtyard is considered as it is inside. Why don't we say that all of the airspace in the north of the Temple Courtyard is considered like the north?

Rather, Rava says: Whether the cases involve *kodashim kalim* or *kodshei kodashim*, they are valid. The exceptions are if one suspended a *kodshei kodashim* animal and then slaughtered, and if he was suspended in the air while accepting the blood of an animal that was either *kodshei kodashim* or *kodashim kalim*.

Rabbi Yirmiyah asked Rabbi Zeira: What is the law if the animal was inside the Temple Courtyard, but strands of its hair were outside? Rabbi Zeira replied: Didn't you say that the verse: *And he will bring them to Hashem*, indicates that he must bring them totally in to the Temple Courtyard? Here, too, the verse states: *When they enter the Tent of the Meeting* indicates that the animal must be totally inside the Tent of the Meeting. (25b – 26a)

**Mishna**

If he applied the blood on the ramp or not opposite the base (of the Altar; a side provided with a foundation; this excludes the south-east corner, which had no base), or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied below the *chut hasikra* (a red line on the Altar at the point where it was five amos high; this was the dividing line between the two halves of the Altar) above the *chut hasikra*, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied above the *chut hasikra* below it, or if he applied blood that was supposed to be applied in the *Heichal* outside of it, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied outside the *Heichal* inside of it, the sacrifice is invalid, but there is no punishment of *kares* (if one eats from the sacrifice). (26a)

#### **Wrong Place**

Shmuel says: When the *Mishna* says it is invalid, it means that the meat cannot be eaten. The atonement, however, is valid. What is the reason for this? The verse states: *And I gave it for you upon the Altar to provide atonement*. This indicates that once blood reached the Altar, the owner receives atonement.

The *Gemora* asks: If so, why can't the meat be eaten?

The *Gemora* answers: The verse states, *to provide atonement* indicating that it is only to atone, and not for anything else (such as permitting the meat for consumption).

The *Gemora* observes: This implies that blood sprinkled in the wrong place is as if it was sprinkled in the right place (with respect to atonement).

The *Mishna* states in the next chapter (32a): If he applied the blood on the ramp or not opposite the base, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied below the *chut hasikra* above the *chut hasikra*, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied above the *chut hasikra* below it, or if he applied blood that was supposed to be applied in the *Heichal* outside of it, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied outside the *Heichal* inside of it, if there is still lifeblood from the animal, a valid *Kohen* should accept it (and do a proper sprinkling in the right place). Now, if you maintain that blood sprinkled in the wrong place is as if it was sprinkled in the right place, why should

he repeat the process? And if you will say that it is in order to permit the meat, this seems difficult. Is there such a thing as a sprinkling that does not effect atonement but permits the meat of the *korban* to be eaten?!

The *Gemora* answers: If a valid *Kohen* did the original sprinkling in the wrong place, it indeed is not necessary to sprinkle again. The case of the *Mishna* later is when a non-*Kohen* did the sprinkling.

The *Gemora* asks: Why isn't this considered as if the sacrifice is now permanently rejected? This is as the *Mishna* states: If any disqualified person accepted the blood with a thought of beyond its time or outside of its place, if there is still lifeblood from the animal, a valid *Kohen* should accept it (and do a proper sprinkling in the right place). This implies that it is only valid if a valid *Kohen* accepts it (and sprinkled it), not just if he sprinkles it. This must be because the remaining blood is permanently rejected, proving that there is such a concept of sacrifices being permanently rejected!?

The *Gemora* answers: No. The reason why the service cannot be repeated is because the non-*Kohen* disqualified it with his improper intent.

The *Gemora* asks: He similarly would disqualify it with an improper intent during the acceptance of the blood (and yet we rule that the service of receiving the blood can be repeated)!? Additionally, a non-*Kohen* cannot disqualify a *korban* with his improper intent!?! This is as stated by Rava: An improper intent is only effective by someone who is appropriate to serve, and regarding something that is fit for the service, and in a place that is fit for the service!?

The *Gemora* answers: Don't say that the *Mishna* implies that it is only valid if the *Kohen* accepts it, but not if he sprinkles it. Rather, it means it is not valid if he slaughters it (with an improper intent; nothing can be repeated).

The *Gemora* asks: Is this teaching us that a non-*Kohen* can disqualify the *korban* if he slaughters it with an improper

thought? Have we not learned this in a *Mishna* below (31b) that anyone who slaughters can disqualify the *korban* with an improper thought?

The *Gemora* answers: This must be teaching us that from the acceptance of the blood and onward, a non-Kohen cannot invalidate the *korban*. Why? This is as explained (*above*) by Rava. (26b)

### INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

#### *Is the Ramp like the Altar?*

The *Mishna* discusses cases where a *Kohen* applied the blood in the wrong place. The *Mishna* states: If he applied the blood on the ramp or not opposite the base (*of the Altar; a side provided with a foundation; this excludes the south-east corner, which had no base*), or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied below the *chut hasikra* (*a red line on the Altar at the point where it was five amos high; this was the dividing line between the two halves of the Altar*) above the *chut hasikra*, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied above the *chut hasikra* below it, or if he applied blood that was supposed to be applied in the *Heichal* outside of it, or he applied blood that was supposed to be applied outside the *Heichal* inside of it, the sacrifice is invalid, but there is no punishment of *kares* (*if one eats from the sacrifice*).

The *Gemora* cites the opinion of Shmuel, who says that when the *Mishna* says it is invalid, it means that the meat cannot be eaten. The atonement, however, is valid. What is the reason for this? The verse states: *And I gave it for you upon the Altar to provide atonement*. This indicates that once blood reached the Altar, the owner receives atonement.

Tosfos says that Shmuel does not refer to the case of a *Kohen* who applied the blood on the ramp of the Altar. Although the *Gemora* later (87a) considers the ramp like the Altar with regard to the consecration of parts of sacrifices brought there for burning, it is not considered like the Altar with regard to the application of blood. This is apparent from the *Gemora* later (64b) which derives from the verse: *the wall of the Altar*, that the application of blood cannot be done on the wall of the ramp.

However, Tosfos, in his conclusion posits that perhaps the ramp should be considered like the Altar in respect of this *halachah*.

The Sfas Emes asks on Tosfos' suggestion that the fact that the ramp is like the Altar regarding the limbs of sacrifices, it should also be considered like the Altar with regard to the application of blood. The reason why the ramp is like the Altar with respect to the sacrificial limbs is because the limbs are brought to the Altar via the ramp. Hence, it is understandable that the Altar should already start at the ramp. In contrast, the application of blood has absolutely nothing at all to do with the ramp!?

He answers that the application of blood is, in some way, related to the ramp. The *Mishna* (53a) says that the *Kohen* goes up the ramp when he offers a *korban chatas*. Rashi explains that for a *chatas*, the *Kohen* must go onto the ramp because he must apply the blood at the corners of the Altar. This would explain why the ramp would be included in Shmuel's list as a place which is related to the application of blood on the Altar, and therefore it can effect atonement.

#### Daily Mashal

On the *seder* night, we conclude the section of "*maggid*" with a praise of Hashem and a blessing. In it we make the request that we should merit the eating of the sacrifices - those whose blood is applied on the walls of the Altar for its intended purpose.

The Brisker Rav uses our *Gemora* to explain this most unusual request, one which we do not find elsewhere.

The *Gemora* cites the opinion of Shmuel, who says that when the *Mishna* says that if the blood of a sacrifice was not applied its proper place on the Altar, it is invalid, it merely means that the meat cannot be eaten. The atonement, however, is valid. It emerges that regarding ordinary sacrifices, atonement can be achieved without the proper blood application, and atonement is not affected by the fact that one is forbidden to eat from its meat. However, by the *pesach* offering, it (*along with the chagigah that comes with it*) needs to be fit for consumption in order for their owners to fulfill their obligation. This is why this specific request is included in the blessing.