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Zevachim Daf 29

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### **Scriptural Sources**

Rav Pappa said to Rava: According to you, what do we derive from the verse, *third (day)* stated in Kedoshim?

Rava answered: This verse is required to teach that one is only liable if he has intent to eat outside of a place that is “*meshulash*” with blood, meat, and limbs. [There are many explanations regarding the definition of *meshulash*. Rashi here understands that a thought of *chutz l’mikomo* can only take effect if his intention is regarding a place where blood, meat, and limbs were at some time fit for consumption. An intention of consumption outside of the Courtyard will be effective to invalidate the sacrifice, for at a time when people were allowed to offer sacrifices on private altars, it was a place that was fit for the sprinkling of blood, eating the meat and burning the sacrificial limbs. However, one would not be liable if they intended to consume these sacrifices in the Heichal, as it is not a place that meat is eaten and sacrificial parts are never burned there. See Tosfos for many other explanations.]

Rav Pappa counters: Why can’t you derive that from the earlier verse where it also says *shlishi* (in Parshas Tzav)?

Rav Ashi says: I related this discussion to Rav Masnah, and he said that this cannot be derived from there. If it would be, I would think that the word *shlishi* is a specification and the word *piggul* is a generalization. This would mean that the generalization is adding to the specification, and we would have to include other places as well (such as an intention to consume the offering inside the Heichal, according to Rashi).

This is why the verse states *shlishi* in Kedoshim (to teach us that other places, such as the Heichal, are not included). (29a)

### **“Eat” means “Intended to Eat”**

The Gemora cites a braisa: And if any of the meat of the *shelamim* offering will be consumed. Rabbi Eliezer says: Bend your ear to hear (the following teaching). The verse is discussing someone who intends to consume from his sacrifice on the third day. But perhaps it is referring to someone who actually eats from his sacrifice on the third day? Rabbi Eliezer continues: Can this possibly be said? How can the sacrifice be declared valid, and then later turn invalid (on the third day after he eats from it)?!

Rabbi Akiva replied: It is possible. We see that a *zav*, *zavah*, and *shomeres yom* (this is the law during these days: If she saw blood only one day, she must observe one day in cleanness, corresponding to the day of uncleanness, i.e., she immerses on the day following the day of uncleanness, and if she does not see blood on this day, then she is clean in the evening) are presumed to have a status of *taharah* (during the time that they must wait before they are considered fully pure, which is one day for a *shomeres yom* and seven days for a *zav* and *zavah*), yet if they see another emission they retroactively are ruled impure (and any vessels they touched during this waiting period are ruled to be *tamei*). Therefore, you should not think that it is out of the question for a sacrifice to be considered valid, and then ruled invalid after someone eats from it on the third day.



Rabbi Eliezer replied: The verse states, *the one who offers*, indicating that it becomes invalid already when it is being offered, not on the third day. Perhaps *the one who offers* refers to the person offering (*that the Kohen becomes disqualified from further service*), not the offering itself? This is not so, as the verse continues (*the one who offers*) *it*. *It* indicates that the verse is referring to the offering itself, not the one offering the sacrifice. [Otherwise, the word it should not have been stated at all.]

Ben Azzai explains: What does the word *it* teach us? The verse states: *you should not be late in paying it* (i.e. bringing your sacrifice that you have pledged to bring). One might think that if one is late in bringing his sacrifice that it is no longer accepted (i.e. valid). This is why the verse states, *it*. This teaches us that a sacrifice with an improper intention is invalid, but one who delays fulfilling his vow, his sacrifice is still accepted.

Others say: The verse states, *it should not be considered*. This teaches us that the verse is referring to a sacrifice being invalid due to an improper intention, not because it was eaten from on the third day.

The *Gemora* asks: How does Ben Azzai know that the verse is referring to a sacrifice, and not the one offering the sacrifice?

The *Gemora* answers: It is possible he derives this from the teaching of the others (stated above). [Being that they required a verse to say that the sacrifice does not become invalid if eaten on the third day, it is clear that the verse is discussing the sacrifice, not the one offering the sacrifice.]

Alternatively, the *Gemora* answers: This is apparent from the verse, *it should not be accepted*, which is clearly discussing the sacrifice.

The *Gemora* asks: Does Ben Azzai know that only a sacrifice that was offered with an improper intention is not accepted, but a sacrifice brought late is accepted, from the word *it*?

Doesn't he know this from the teaching of Others? This is as the *braisa* states: Others say, one might think that a firstborn animal that passed its first year should be considered like an invalidated consecrated offering. This is why the verse states: *And you will eat before Hashem your God the ma'aser of your grain etc. (and the firstborn animals of your etc.)*. This teaches us that just as *ma'aser sheini* does not become invalid after its year, so too firstborn animals do not become invalid after their year.

The *Gemora* answers: Ben Azzai still requires the teaching of *it*. Otherwise, one might think that this teaching of Others only applies to a firstborn animal, as it does not offer any appeasement at all. However, sacrifices that do provide appeasement are possibly invalid if brought late. This is why the verse states *it*.

The *Gemora* asks: Don't we know this from the verse (regarding a sacrifice brought late): *And there will be a sin in you*, which indicates that there is no sin (i.e. nothing invalid) in the sacrifice?

The *Gemora* answers: Ben Azzai derives from this verse that *the sin is in you*, and not your wife. One might have thought that being that Rabbi Elozar, and some say Rabbi Yochanan, said: A person's wife only dies if they ask him for money and he does not have any, as the verse says, *if you do not have any money to pay, why should they take your mattress (i.e. wife) from underneath you*, that a person's wife might also be punished if he is late in bringing a sacrifice. This is why the verse states: *And you will have a sin in you*, and not in your wife. [Rashi explains the "money to pay" is money that he stole. See *Tosfos* and *Rabbeinu Chananel* for other explanations.]

(The *Gemora* earlier states) Others say: The verse states, *it should not be considered*. This teaches that the verse is referring to a sacrifice being invalid due to an improper intention, not because it was eaten from on the third day.



The *Gemora* asks: What does Rabbi Eliezer derive from the verse, *it should not be considered*?

The *Gemora* answers: He requires this for the teaching of Rabbi Yannai. Rabbi Yannai states: How do we know that an intention (*such as chutz l'mikomo*) can take away a previous intention (*such as chutz l'zmano*)? This is as the verse states: *It should not be considered* indicating that one should not mix other (*invalid*) intentions with those of the sacrifice (*as all of these thoughts can have an effect on the status of the sacrifice*).

Rav Mari taught that Rabbi Yannai said: How do we know that a person who has an improper intention regarding sacrifices that he receives lashes? This is as the verse states, *it should not be considered* (*which can also be read he should not intend*).

Rav Ashi asked Rav Mari: This is clearly a negative prohibition that does not involve an action, which we know does not make one liable to receive lashes!?

Rav Mari answered: This is according to Rabbi Yehudah, who says that one does receive lashes for such prohibitions. (29b)

### **Mishna**

This is the rule. This is the general rule: Whoever slaughters, receives, brings, or sprinkles intending to eat what is meant to be eaten or to burn on the Altar what is meant to be burned that is the size of an olive – if his intent was to consume it outside the place where he is permitted to do so, he causes the sacrifice to become invalid, but does not cause the one who eats it to incur *kares*. If his intent was to consume it beyond its time, he causes it to be invalid and the one who eats it to receive *kares*. This (*chutz l'zmano*) applies as long as he offers the permitters (*the avodos of the blood*) as required (*there is no other disqualification besides for the piggul*).

What is an example of this requirement? If a person slaughtered a sacrifice in silence, and then accepted the blood, walked with it, and sprinkled it with intent to consume it beyond its time, or if he slaughtered it with intent to consume it beyond its time, and then accepted the blood, walked with it, and sprinkled it in silence, or he did all of these services with intent to consume it beyond its time, this is a case where he offered the permitters as required.

What is a case where the permitters were not offered as required? If he slaughtered a sacrifice with intent to consume it outside of its place, and he then accepted the blood, walked with it, and sprinkled it with intent to consume it beyond its time, or if he slaughtered it with intent to consume it beyond its time, and then accepted the blood, walked with it, and sprinkled it with intent to consume it outside of its place, or he did all of these services with intent to consume it outside of its place, or if he slaughtered a *pesach* offering or *chatas* not for their sake, and he then accepted the blood, walked with it, and sprinkled it with intent to consume it beyond its time, or if he slaughtered it with the intent to consume it beyond its time, and he then accepted the blood, walked with it, and sprinkled it not for their sake, or if he did all of these services (*for the pesach and chatas*) not for their sake, these are cases where the permitters were not offered as required.

If a person (*did one service, such as slaughtering*) had intention to consume a *k'zayis* outside its place and he intended to consume a *k'zayis* beyond its time, or he had intention to consume a *k'zayis* beyond its time and he intended to consume a *k'zayis* outside its place, or he had intention to consume half of a *k'zayis* outside its place and he intended to consume a half of a *k'zayis* beyond its time, or he had intention to consume half of a *k'zayis* beyond its time and he intended to consume half of a *k'zayis* outside its place, the sacrifice is invalid, but one who eats from it does not receive *kares*.



Rabbi Yehudah says: The rule is that if the intention to consume it beyond its time preceded his intention to consume it outside of its place, it is invalid and one who consumes it receives *kares*. If his intention to consume it outside of its place preceded his intention to consume it beyond its time, it is invalid, but one who consumes it does not receive *kares*. The *Chachamim* say: In both cases it is invalid and one who consumes it does not receive *kares*.

If his intent is to eat half a *k'zayis* and burn half a *k'zayis* (either *chutz l'zmano* or *chutz l'mikomo*) the sacrifice is valid, as intentions of eating and burning do not combine to make the sacrifice invalid. (29b)

#### INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

##### ***Why Delaying might Disqualify a Korban***

The *Gemora* cites several sources to teach us that even if one delays on the bringing of a *korban*, the *korban* is still valid.

The commentators all ask as to what would be the logic of invalidating the *korban*? While it is true that the owner committed a transgression by not bringing the *korban* in the proper time, but why would the *korban* become disqualified?

There are many answers on this question and we will cite several of them.

The *Shitah Mekubetzes* answers that this would be compared to a *korban* which is passed its time limitation. The same way that the *korban* is invalid, perhaps if the person passes his time limitation, the *korban* becomes disqualified as well.

*Turei Even* (Rosh Hashanah) answers that there is a principle by *kodashim* that if the Torah repeats a certain law, this indicates that the *kodashim* is unfit to be used. In our *Gemora*, there were several verses cited to prove that one is not allowed to delay the offering of the *korban* and therefore

there is a legitimate reason to believe that the *korban* will become disqualified.

The *Pnei Yehoshua* answers that since the verse states "Do not delay like you vowed," one might think that if you will delay, that will annul the vow.

*Minchas Oni* (son-in-law of the *Noda Beyehuda*) answers that *Rava* states that whenever the Torah commands that something should not be done, if it is done, it is not valid. The Torah warns us that one should not delay in bringing the *korban*, so one might think that if you do procrastinate, the *korban* will be disqualified.

#### DAILY MASHAL

##### ***Intention in Prayer***

The *Tiferes Shlomo* zt"l explained: In his prayer, a person should primarily have in mind Hashem's honor and not contemporary (*zeman*) matters of this world. If he had both intentions in mind, the matter depends on the following (*and this is hinted at from the words of Rabbi Yehudah*): If his thoughts about Hashem (*HaMakom*) preceded his thought about the time (*z'man*), his prayer is fine, for after all, matters of the time (*sustenance, health etc.*) have their need. However, if his thoughts about the time preceded his thought about Hashem's honor, his prayer is *piggul* (*rejected*).