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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Thoughts of Delay

The *Gemora* asks: What is Rabbi Yehudah’s reasoning?

Rabbi Elozar answers: There are two verses stated regarding *nossar* (leftover meat from the sacrifice). One verse states: *And you should not leave over from it until morning*. The other states: *He should not set aside until morning*. Being that this second verse is not needed to teach us about the prohibition against leaving over, it must be teaching that one cannot have in mind to leave over meat from the sacrifice (or the sacrifice becomes invalid).

The *Gemora* asks: Does Rabbi Yehudah indeed derive this from this verse? Doesn’t he require it for the teaching of the following *braisa*? The *braisa* states: *And the meat of the sacrifice of the todah of his shelamim*. We already learned that a *todah* sacrifice is eaten for one day and one night. How do we know that this applies to *chalifin* of a *todah* (if a *todah* was lost and another animal was dedicated in its place, and then the first animal was found, the second animal is *chalifin*), the offspring of a *todah*, and the *temurah* of a *todah*? This is derived from the extra word, *And the meat*. How do we know that a *chatas* and *asham* are also only eaten for one day and one night? This is derived from the extra word *sacrifice*. How do we know that this is also the law regarding the *shalmei nazir* and *shalmei pesach*? This is derived from the extra word *his shelamim*. How do we know this applies to the bread of the *todah* and the *chalos* and wafers of a *nazir*? The verse states *his sacrifice*. Regarding all of these sacrifices, the verse states: *he should not set aside*.

The *Gemora* answers: Rabbi Yehudah will tell you that if the only teaching from this verse would be that of the *braisa*, the verse should say, *And you should not leave over*. Why did it say *and he should not set aside*? It must be teaching that being that this second verse is not needed to teach us about the prohibition against leaving over, it must be teaching that one cannot have in mind to leave over meat from the sacrifice.

The *Gemora* answers: This verse is a good source to teach that one cannot have in mind to leave over blood or limbs. How do we know that the sacrifice would be invalid if he has in mind to take some of it outside the designated area? Additionally, isn’t Rabbi Yehudah’s law based on his reasoning (and not a derivation from a verse)? This is as the *braisa* states: Rabbi Yehudah said to them, don’t you agree that if he leaves the blood over to the next day (without sprinkling it) that the sacrifice is invalid? We should similarly say that if he had in mind to leave it over it should be invalid!

Rather, the *Gemora* answers: It must be that Rabbi Yehudah’s reasoning is indeed based on logic (and not a derivation).

The *Gemora* asks: If so, let him argue on all of the laws in the *Mishna*!

The *Gemora* clarifies: Which laws should he argue on? You cannot say he should argue regarding a thought to break bones of the *korban pesach* or eat from it when it is not cooked, as the *korban* itself does not become invalid if these things happen (meaning that his reasoning would not apply)!

Similarly, you cannot say that he should argue regarding a thought that impure people will eat from it or bring it, as this also would not make the sacrifice invalid! Similarly, you cannot say that he should argue regarding a thought that a person without a circumcision should eat from it or bring it, as this does not make the *korban* itself invalid!

Another version of this train of thought is that nobody will listen to such thoughts. (*In other words, the kohanim who are impure will not acquiesce to offer the korban when they are impure. Accordingly, his thoughts are irrelevant, as he needs the cooperation of others that is presumably not forthcoming.*)

The *Gemora* continues: It cannot be that he should argue about a thought to mix its blood with the blood of invalid sacrifices, as Rabbi Yehudah himself holds that blood is not nullifies by other blood (*and accordingly the sprinkling would be valid*). Similarly, one cannot say he should argue regarding a thought to sprinkle blood that should be put over the *chut hasikra* under the *chut hasikra* or in the reverse case, as Rabbi Yehudah himself holds that blood that is not sprinkled on the right place on the Altar is still valid. Similarly, we cannot say that Rabbi Yehudah should argue regarding a thought to sprinkle blood that is supposed to be sprinkled inside the *Heichal* outside in the Courtyard or in the reverse case (*see Rashi that the question is not from the first case, but rather from the case of thinking to sprinkle blood from a sacrifice brought in the Azarah in the Heichal*), as Rabbi Yehudah requires that the thought be about a place that is relative to blood, meat, and limbs (*as opposed to the Heichal where only blood is sprinkled, see 33b at length*).

The *Gemora* asks: Does Rabbi Yehudah indeed hold of this logic? The *braisa* states: Rabbi Yehudah says that the verse *an evil thing* teaches us that a *chatas* slaughtered in the southern area of the *Azarah* and a *chatas* slaughtered with intent to bring the blood into the *Heichal* is invalid.

The *Gemora* replies: Are you telling me he does not hold of this logic? The *Mishna* states: Rabbi Yehudah says that if he brought the blood into the *Heichal* accidentally, it is valid. If he did it on purpose, it is invalid. The *Gemora* establishes that this is only if he sprinkled the blood on the *mizbe'ach* in the *Heichal*. Accordingly, it seems logical that if Rabbi Yehudah only holds it is invalid if he purposely brings and sprinkles blood in the *Heichal*, certainly the sacrifice will not be invalid if he merely thinks to bring the blood into the *Heichal*!

The *Gemora* answers: These are two different *Tannaim* who argue regarding the true opinion of Rabbi Yehudah.

The *Gemora* asks: Does Rabbi Yehudah really hold that a person who slaughters a *chatas* in the south of the *Azarah* should receive lashes? Doesn't the *braisa* say: Rabbi Yehudah says that one might think that a *chatas* slaughtered in the south will make one liable to receive lashes. The verse states: *Do not slaughter for Hashem your God and ox or sheep etc. anything bad*. This teaches that one is only liable to receive lashes for a bad thing (*offering an animal with a blemish*), and not for slaughtering a *chatas* in the southern part of the *Azarah*.

The *Gemora* answers: These are two different *Tannaim* who argue regarding the true opinion of Rabbi Yehudah.

Rabbi Abba says: Rabbi Yehudah agrees that this thought of leaving the blood over after the allotted time does not mean that if a beyond its time intention was had regarding a different part of the service that the sacrifice does not become passed its time.

Rava states: It is clear that this is correct, as before the sprinkling of the blood a sacrifice cannot be considered *piggul*. It is the sprinkling (*on the day that it is supposed to be done*) that makes the *piggul* status take effect. (*The Shitah Mekubetzes explains (in his primary explanation) Rava's proof. Being that the thought to leave the blood over for the next day is not indicated as a bad thought by the verse, and*

is derived using logic, it should not be strong enough to override a thought of *chutz lzmano* when the sprinkling of the blood, which determines the status of the sacrifice, is done. See *Shitah Mekubetzes* at length.)

The *Gemora* rejects this proof. While this is true regarding a case where there is only one thought, this is not necessarily the case when there are two different thoughts, where one makes it invalid and one also causes it to be *piggul* (even if one of these thoughts is not mentioned or indicated by the verse).

Rav Huna asked Rabbi Abba a question on his statement from a *braisa*. The *braisa* states: If one thought (see 26b) to sprinkle the blood of sacrifices that are supposed to be sprinkled atop the *chut hasikra* underneath the *chut hasikra*, or in the reverse case, if he thought to do so on the correct day for the sprinkling the sacrifice is still valid. If he then thought to eat the sacrifice outside of the allotted area, he causes the sacrifice to be invalid, though one is not punished by *kares* if he eats it. If he thought to eat it after the allotted time, he causes it to be invalid, and that one who eats it should be liable to receive *kares*. If he thought to do the sprinkling in the wrong place (above instead of below or the reverse) on the next day, it is invalid. If he then thought a thought of eating outside the allotted area or the allotted time, it is invalid, but one is not liable to receive *kares* if they eat it. The *Gemora* concludes that this is a strong question on Rabbi Abba (who said that Rabbi Yehudah agrees that a second thought of *chutz lzmano* can cause the sacrifice to be *piggul*, making one who eats it receive *kares*).

Rav Chisda says in the name of Ravina bar Sila: If he thought that impure people should eat it tomorrow, one who eats it is liable to receive *kares*. (We do not say that the fact that he wanted impure people to eat it *chutz lzmano* is a thought that makes the sacrifice merely invalid, but not *piggul*.)

Rava states: It is clear that this is correct, as meat before sprinkling cannot be eaten, and yet when he thinks these thoughts it makes the meat have a status of *piggul*!

The *Gemora* answers: This is incorrect. In a regular case where a sacrifice is brought with a beyond its time intention, it would be able to be eaten normally without this intent. However, in this case it could not be eaten at all by impure people (accordingly there is no conclusive proof that we should say that it is *piggul* and not invalid).

Rav Chisda states: There was a pearl (of a statement) in the mouth of Rav Dimi bar Chinina. Meat from the *pesach* offering that was not roasted and *todah* breads that did not have the four breads (out of forty) taken off to be given to the *Kohen* still make one liable if he eats them while he is impure.

Rava says: It is clear that this is correct, as the verse states that is to *Hashem* which includes limbs of *kodashim kalim* that are eaten by someone who is impure. This implies that even though they are not supposed to be eaten, one is still liable if he eats them while impure. Here, too, even though the meat from the *pesach* offering and *todah* breads cannot yet be eaten, one should be liable if he eats them while impure.

The *Gemora* rejects this proof. Limbs of *kodashim kalim* are currently fit to go on the Altar, as opposed to meat of a *pesach* offering that is not roasted and *todah* breads that did not have their four breads taken for the *Kohen*, as they are not fit to go on the Altar or to be eaten. (36a – 36b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU,
KOL HAPESULIN

Mishna

Beis Shamai states: Any *korban* that is supposed to have its blood sprinkled on the outer Altar, and only one sprinkle is



actually sprinkled on this Altar, is valid (*b'dieved*). A *chatas* must have a minimum of two sprinkles. Beis Hillel states: Even a *chatas* is valid if at least one sprinkle was sprinkled on the Altar. Therefore, if the first sprinkle was valid and the second was done with intent to eat the sacrifice beyond its time, the sacrifice is still valid. However, if the first was sprinkled beyond its time and the second was a regular sprinkling, the sacrifice is invalid, and one who eats from it is liable to receive *kares*. If a sacrifice is supposed to have its blood sprinkled on the inner Altar, if one of its sprinklings is not done it is as if he has not atoned. Therefore, if he sprinkled all of the sprinklings in a valid manner and did one in an invalid manner, the sacrifice is invalid but does not make one who eats it liable to receive *kares*. (36b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The six names of the two altars

Moshe was commanded to erect two altars in the Sanctuary. The first – “and you will make the altar of acacia wood...and cover it with **copper**” (Shemos 27:1-8) – and the second – “and you will make an altar for incense...and cover it with **pure gold**” (Shemos 30:1-10). In the Temple the copper altar was replaced by one of stone but the golden altar remained.

Essential differences between the altars: Aside from being built of different materials, there are essential differences between the altars. The copper altar stood outside the *Heichal* while the golden altar stood inside it. The *’olas hatamid* was sacrificed on the copper altar each day, morning and afternoon, all the sacrifices were offered on it and their blood was applied on its “horns” (*keranos*, the cubic protrusions atop its four corners) and sides. On the other hand, the incense (*ketores*) was burnt on the golden altar every morning and afternoon but no sacrifice was offered on it and no blood sprinkled thereon, except for once a year, as we are told: “...and Aharon will atone on its horns once a year from the blood of the *chatas* of Yom Kippur” (Shemos 30:10). In rare instances when a *chatas* was sacrificed for a

communal sin or that of a *Kohen mashiach*, its blood was sprinkled on the golden altar. The sanctity of the two altars was also not the same. Rabbi Avraham Ibn Ezra (Shemos 30:10) writes that the golden altar was second in importance only to the *aron hakodesh*.

Each altar had three names: Each altar had three names, as mentioned in the *Beraisa (Melech HaMishkan, Ch. 11)*: two from the Torah and another added by the Tanaim. The gold-covered altar is called by the Torah “the **golden altar**” for its covering (Shemos 39:38) and “the **incense altar**” (Shemos 30:27) for its main purpose. Additionally, in our *sugya* and other sources (Yoma ch.2 m.3, etc.), the Tanaim called it the “**inner altar**” due to its location in the *Heichal*. The copper-covered altar is called by the Torah the “**copper altar**” (Shemos 38:30) and the “altar of the **’olah**” (Shemos 30:28) for the *’olah* which was entirely sacrificed on it (as distinguished from other sacrifices, part of whose meat was eaten by *kohanim* or by the owner). In addition, our *sugya* and other Tanaic sources (Yoma ch.5 m.5) called it the “**outer altar**” as it stood outside the *Heichal*.

Each name has a function: In his *Masas HaMelech* (on the Torah, *parashas Terumah*), HaGaon Rav Shimon Diskin zt”l offers a very seemly explanation for Chazal’s use of the various names. Their major names are owed to their function: the incense altar and the altar of the *’olah*. But when they are mentioned in connection with certain halachos, *Chazal* called them by the name connected with that particular subject. For example, a *Mishnah* in Chagigah (3:8) rules that “all the objects that were in the Temple need immersion except for the **golden altar** and the **copper altar**, for they are like the ground”. As this *Mishnah* treats the spread of impurity, it was necessary to mention their being made of **metal**, which generally receives impurity, to tell us that nonetheless the altars do not become impure as they are like the ground. On the other hand, our *Mishnah* and other sources treat the sprinkling of the blood on the altar. The altars are then named for their location – the outer altar and the inner altar – as blood to be sprinkled on the outer



altar that has entered inside becomes disqualified. Therefore, when discussing the sprinkling of the blood, the location of the altar is mentioned as it affects the qualification of the blood (and see *ibid* further as to his remarks on the phrasing of the *Mishnah* in Menachos 49a).

The outer altar causes peace: We conclude with Recanti's remark (*parashas Tetzaveh, ibid*), that the purpose of the outer altar is to make peace between the Jews and Hashem. Therefore, it is not fitting that it should be covered with gold or even silver as they cause disunion. But the incense altar was made of gold as it reminds us of the Shechinah, of which we are told "...her clothing is of gold" (Tehilim 45:14).

DAILY MASHAL

A reason for the Mitzvah

Seeing as man is made of (physical) matter, he is automatically drawn after his worldly desires - for thus is the nature of the physical human-being to go for whatever it finds pleasant and enjoyable - like a horse and a mule - devoid of understanding, were it not for the Soul with which G-d graced him, which holds him back from sinning, as much as it is able. Unfortunately however, due to the fact that it is located on man's territory (earth), far removed from its own home-ground (Heaven), it cannot truly overpower him; the opposite, he generally succeeds in overcoming it! As a result, the soul requires many guards to protect it from its evil neighbour, lest he arises and kills it - seeing as it is in his vicinity and under his jurisdiction. Consequently, in his wish to merit us, the Holy people, He commanded us to place powerful guards around the Soul, consisting of - not interrupting from Torah-study day and night, placing four Tzitziyos on the corners of our garments, a Mezuzah on our door-posts and Tefilin on our arms and on our heads. All of these are there to remind us to desist from 'the thievery of our hands' and from going astray after the sight of our eyes and the evil thoughts of our hearts. This explains why the

Chachamim said in Zevachim (36b) that during the Avodah, Kohanim and Levi'im are exempt from Tefilin. And since what we just explained is an intrinsic part of Tefilin, the Gemara in Menachos (36b) teaches us not to take our minds off the Tefilin as long as we are wearing them. And now my son (says the author) just take note how our bodies are that much stronger than our souls, inasmuch as even with all these guards, a breach sometimes occurs in our defenses, may Hashem in His mercy, assist us and protect us, Amein!