



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h

Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Comparing all Sacrifices

The *Gemora* continues with Shmuel’s teaching: Just as a *chatas* sanctifies through absorption, so all sacrifices sanctify through absorption.

Just as an *asham* - the fetus and after-birth (*amniotic sac*) inside it are not sanctified (*for an ashm must be a male*), so all sacrifices, the fetus and after-birth inside them are not sanctified (*and the kidneys and the fats of the fetus are not burned on the Altar*). He holds that the offspring of sacrifices become sanctified when they come into existence (*after they are born, and not from the time of conception*), and that we derive what is possible (*a fetus from other sacrifices*) from what is not possible (*such as a fetus of an ashm*).

Just as the inauguration offering - the remainder of it (*the nossar*) was burned, and there were no living animals among its remainder (*for one, by a communal offering, cannot designate another animal in case the first one was lost*), so all sacrifices, their remainder (*nossar*) is burned, but living animals are regarded as remainder (*and are not burned*).

Just as there are parts of the *shelamim* that render *piggul* (*the blood*), and parts that are rendered *piggul* (*the meat*), so too all sacrifices where there are parts that render *piggul* (*the blood*), and parts that are rendered *piggul* (*the law of piggul applies*).

A *braisa* was taught in the name of Rabbi Akiva: Just as a *minchah* sanctifies through absorption, so all sacrifices sanctify through absorption.

The *Gemora* explains why it was necessary to derive this law from *chatas* and from *minchah*.

The *braisa* continues: Just as a *chatas* comes only from *chullin*, and by day, and its service must be performed with the *Kohen’s* right hand; so every sacrifice comes only from *chullin*, and by day, and its service must be performed with the *Kohen’s* right hand. (98a)

Blood and Blood

Rava said: It is obvious to me that if the blood of a *chatas* is below (*since it sprayed on a garment first*) and the blood of an *olah* is above, it requires washing (*since it is the blood of a chatas that absorbed into the garment*). But what would be the *halachah* if the blood of an *olah* was below and the blood of a *chatas* was above? He explains his inquiry: Does a garment need washing because of contact with the *chatas* blood, and here there is contact; or perhaps the reason is on account of absorption, and here it did not absorb? Subsequently he resolved it that it does not require washing.

Rava said: It is obvious to me that blood on one’s garment interposes (*because one usually objects to its being there; therefore, if the garment was tamei, the blood is regarded as an interposition, and it cannot be immersed in a mikvah to become tahor until the blood is removed*), but if its owner is a slaughterer, it does not interpose (*for he does not object to the sight of blood on his garment*). Grease on a garment interposes, but if its owner sells grease, it does not interpose.



Rava inquired: If one is a slaughterer and a seller of grease, and there is blood and grease on his garment, what is the *halachah*? Do we say that he does not object to one, but objects to two; or perhaps he does not object to two either? The question remains unresolved. (98a – 98b)

WE SHALL RETURN TO YOU, DAM CHATAS

Mishna

A *tevul yom* (one who was *tamei*, but has immersed himself in a *mikvah*; he is considered a *tevul yom* until nightfall) and a *mechussar kippurim* (one who was *tamei*, but has immersed himself in a *mikvah*, and has waited until nightfall; he is just lacking atonement until he brings his offerings the next day) do not receive a share in the sacrifices to eat in the evening (even though they will be *tahor* by then). An *onein* (one whose close relative passed away and has not been buried yet) may touch the sacrifices but does not offer them and does not receive a share to eat in the evening. Those who have a blemish, whether a permanent blemish or a temporary one, receive a share and eat, but do not offer.

The *Mishna* states a general rule: Whoever is unfit to perform the service does not receive a share in the meat. And he who has no share in the meat, has no share in the hide. Even one who was *tamei* at the time of sprinkling the blood and was *tahor* at the time of the burning of the fats, does not receive a share in the meat, since it is written: He among the sons of Aaron who offers the blood of the *shelamim* and the fats, shall have the right thigh for a portion. (98b)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Butchers, Writers and Dyers

The *Gemora* assumes that when a person is accustomed to doing something that causes stains, they aren't *makpid* (particular) about those stains and therefore they aren't

considered a *chatzitzah* (interposition). Therefore, blood isn't considered a *chatzitzah* on the clothes of a butcher and wax isn't considered a *chatzitzah* on the clothing of a wax merchant. But, the *Gemora* is clear that wax would be a *chatzitzah* on butcher and blood would be *chatzitzah* on the clothes of a wax merchant, because only the exact item that they are involved in wouldn't be a *chatzitzah*. The *Gemora* then questions when one is a butcher and a wax merchant and has both blood and wax on his clothes, is it considered a *chatzitzah*. Perhaps each one independently isn't a *chatzitzah* but the combination of the two at the same time is significantly degrading and qualifies as a *chatzitzah*, or not? The *Gemora* leaves this unresolved.

The Rama (Y.D. 198:17) writes that one who is a slaughterer or butcher whose hands are always bloody, blood would not be a *chatzitzah* for them since most people of that type aren't *makpid* about blood.

The Beis Hillel (gilyon on Shulchan Aruch) says that if a woman was a writer and dyer, and she has both ink and dye on her when she goes to the *mikvah*, she must go again. The rationale is that the *Gemora* remains with a *teiku* about a combination of two substances even when the person is involved in both occupations, and therefore it is necessary to be stringent. The Sidrei Taharah (Shiyurei Tahara 34) quotes this and agrees with the Beis Hillel because the Rambam (Mikvaos perek 3) concludes that it is a doubt, and so does the Magen Avraham (161:7).

It seems that the Poskim are stringent even though the *chatzitzah* is only on part of her body or even a small amount on part of her hand, since we have a doubt whether she is *makpid*. Reb Avi Lebowitz questions this: Why don't we say that since it is only a minority, which is merely Rabbinic, and we have a doubt about whether she is *makpid*, it would be a doubt concerning a Rabbinical matter, and we can be lenient to say that it doesn't qualify as a *chatzitzah*?