

20 Elul 5778
August 31, 2018



Menachos Daf 21

Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h

Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Salt Requirement

The *Gemora* had cited a *braisa*: But wine, blood, wood and incense do not require salt.

The *Gemora* asks: Who is the *Tanna* of this *braisa*? It cannot be Rebbe, for he holds that wood requires salting. It cannot be the Sages, for they maintain that incense must be salted.

The *Gemora* answers: It is the following *Tanna*, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Rabbi Yishmael the son of Rabbi Yochanan ben Berokah said: Just as the item specified (*the minchah*) is clearly something that can become *tamei*, is consumed by fire and is offered upon the outer altar, so too everything that can become *tamei*, is consumed by fire and is offered upon the outer altar (*requires salting*). Accordingly, wood is excluded since it cannot become *tamei*; blood and the wine are excluded since they are not consumed by fire, and the incense is excluded since it is not offered upon the outer altar.

The *Gemora* notes that a verse was necessary to exclude blood from the requirement of salting; otherwise, I would have thought that blood requires salting. But, the *Gemora* asks, if the blood would be salted, it would lose its status of being blood, for Zeiri said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: Regarding blood which was cooked - one does not violate the prohibition against consuming blood. Rav Yehudah said in the name of Zeiri: Regarding blood which is salted - one does not violate the prohibition against consuming blood. And Rav Yehudah himself said: If one roasted limbs and then offered them up on to the Altar, they do not fulfill the requirements

of producing an aroma. [*Now, one does not violate the prohibition of consuming blood when it is salted, for it cannot be offered as a sacrifice; accordingly, we may ask, how could we have thought that there would be a requirement to salt blood?*]

The *Gemora* answers: We would have thought that a small amount of salt is added in order to fulfill the requirement of salting (*however, it would not be enough to invalidate the sacrifice*). (21a)

Cooked and Salted Blood

The *Gemora* had stated: Zeiri said in the name of Rabbi Chanina: Regarding blood which was cooked - one does not violate the prohibition against consuming blood.

Rava was sitting and he related this teaching. Abaye asked him from the following *braisa*: If a man (*through heat*) hardened the blood and ate it, or if he dissolved forbidden fat and swallowed it, he is still liable.?

Rava answered: This is no difficulty, for in Zeiri's case, he hardened it through fire, and the *braisa* is referring to a case where he hardened it in the sun. Through fire it will not return to its former state (*and therefore it is not fit to be offered*); if it was through the sun it will return (*and therefore one is liable for consumption even in its hardened state*).

The *Gemora* asks: But even when it was hardened through the sun, should we not say that once it has been rejected (*from being used for the sacrifice*), it remains so (*even when*



it returns to its liquid state; and therefore one should not be liable for its consumption)!? For Rabbi Mani inquired of Rabbi Yochanan: What is the *halachah* if one ate congealed blood? He replied: Once it has been rejected, it must remain so.

Rava remained silent.

Abaye said to him: Perhaps the *braisa* is dealing with the blood of outer *chataos* (which became hardened through the sun, but nevertheless, it will remain fit to be thrown on the altar), and Zeiri is referring to the blood of inner *chataos* (which are not sacrificially fit).

Rava said: You have now reminded me of the law, for Rabbah said in the name of Rav Chisda: If one ate the congealed blood of an outer *chataos*, one is liable, for the Torah writes: *And he shall take . . . and he shall place*; and such blood is fit for taking and placing (upon the altar; one would therefore be liable for consumption). If, however, one ate the congealed blood of an inner *chataos*, one is not liable, for the Torah writes: *And he shall dip . . . and he shall sprinkle*; and such blood is not fit for dipping and sprinkling.

And Rava himself said: Even if one ate the congealed blood of an inner *chataos*, one is liable, since with respect of an outer *chataos*, blood in such a condition is sacrificially fit.

Rav Pappa said: If one ate the congealed blood of a donkey, one is liable, since with respect of an outer *chataos*, blood in such a condition is sacrificially fit (even though it itself cannot be thrown on the altar).

Rav Gidal said in the name of Zeiri: Blood on one's body interposes (between the person and the waters of a *mikvah* – ritual bath), whether it is moist or dry.

The *Gemora* objects to this based upon the following *braisa*: Blood, ink, honey, and milk interpose if they are dry; if they are moist, however, they do not interpose.

The *Gemora* answers: It only causes an interposition if it is sticky (and doesn't allow the water to touch the person's body). (21a)

Salt Requirement

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: If the verse would have only stated, 'with salt,' I might have thought that it meant *tevoneihu* (a certain manner, which will be described below, of applying the salt); the verse therefore stated: *You shall salt*. And if the verse would have only stated, 'You shall salt,' I might have thought that it could be salted even with saltwater; the verse therefore stated: *with salt*.

And you shall not discontinue the salt. This teaches us that you shall bring salt which never stopped (it is produced in all seasons); and that is the salt of Sodom (which is thrown from the sea onto its banks). And from where do we know that if one cannot obtain the salt of Sodom one may bring salt of Istrokia (which is coarse and requires mining and processing)? It is because the verse states: *You shall offer. You shall offer* - whatever it is.

The *braisa* continues: *You shall offer* - from any place (even outside of Eretz Yisroel). *You shall offer* - even on Shabbos; *You shall offer* - even in conditions of *tumah* (for communal sacrifices are offered on Shabbos and even in a state of *tumah*).

Rabbah bar Ulla explains what the *braisa* meant when it stated: I might have thought that it meant *tevoneihu*. We might have thought that it should be so heavily salted, similar to straw into clay (to form bricks).

Abaye explains it differently: We might have thought that it should be made like a building (one layer on top of another).



Rav Ashi explains (*based upon Rava*) that we might have thought that a minute amount of salt – enough to impart flavor would be placed on it, like understanding in a person (*where only a small amount gives distinction to a human*).

How is the salting done? He brings a limb and places salt upon it. He then turns it over and places salt on that side. He then offers it up on the altar.

Abaye says: This is the process for cooking in a pot as well (*in order to remove the blood*). (21a)

Benefitting from the Salt

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: The salt which is upon the sacrificial limb is subject to the law of *me'ilah* (*one who has unintentionally benefited from hekdesh or removed it from the ownership of the Beis Hamikdash has committed the transgression of me'ilah, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a korban asham*). The salt, however, which has spilled upon the ramp or upon the top of the altar (*which has no further use*) is not subject to the law of *me'ilah*.

The *Gemora* cites a *Mishna*: The *Kohanim* were permitted (*based upon a stipulation of the Sages*) to derive benefit from the salt and the wood of the Temple.

Shmuel said: This was taught only with respect to their offerings, but not with respect of their eating.

The *Gemora* attempts to explain this as follows: They may use the Temple's salt for their own offerings, but they cannot use it for eating their sacrificial foods.

This, the *Gemora* asks, cannot be the meaning of the teaching, for if they are permitted to use the Temple's salt

for their sacrificial hides, they certainly may use it for their sacrificial foods!

A *braisa* is cited proving that they may use it for their sacrificial hides: There were three places that the salt was placed: 1. In the salt chamber, where they would salt the sacrificial hides; 2. On the ramp, where they would salt the limbs; 3. On top of the altar, where they would salt the *komeitz*, *levonah*, *ketores*, *Kohanim's minchah*, Anointed *Kohen's minchah*, libation *minchah* and a bird *olah*.

The *Gemora* suggests an alternate explanation of the teaching: They may use the Temple's salt for their own offerings – for the eating of their offerings, but they cannot use it for eating, i.e., their non-sacred foods.

The *Gemora* asks: is it not obvious that he cannot use the Temple salt for non-sacred foods? What would such foods be doing there (*it is forbidden to bring non-sacred items into the Temple Courtyard*)?

The *Gemora* answers: Although the master stated that the verse, 'they shall eat' signifies that the *Kohanim* should eat non-sacred food and *terumah* with their sacrificial foods - in order that they should be satiated with the eating of the *minchah*; nevertheless, we do not give them the salt from the Temple.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: This explanation is indeed logical; for should it enter your mind that when Shmuel said 'for their offerings,' he meant that the *Kohanim* were permitted to salt their own offerings, let us consider the following: It seems from the *Mishna* that they are entitled to this only because the Sages stipulated this for them, but had they not done so, they would not be entitled to it! But surely, if we allow a *Yisroel* to use the Temple's salt for their offerings (*without any such stipulation*), shall we not provide this for the *Kohanim* as well?

The Gemora cites a *braisa* (proving that a *Yisroel* may indeed use the Temple's salt for his offering): I might have thought that if a man said, "I accept upon myself to offer a *minchah* offering," he must bring the salt from his house, just as he must bring the *levonah* from his house. And it is logical: It is written by a *minchah* that he should bring a *minchah* and bring salt and it is written that he should bring a *minchah* and bring *levonah*; therefore just as the *levonah* is brought from his house, so too the salt is brought from his house. Or perhaps you can argue this way: It is written by a *minchah* that he should bring a *minchah* and bring salt and it is written that he should bring a *minchah* and bring wood; therefore just as the wood is taken from the communal funds, so too the salt too is brought from the communal funds. Let us then see to which it (*salt*) resembles more. We derive the law concerning a matter that applies to all offerings (*salt*) from another matter which applies to all offerings (*wood*), and *levonah* should not disprove this, since it is not a matter which applies to all offerings. Or perhaps you can argue this way: We derive the law concerning a matter which is offered with the *minchah* in one vessel (*salt*) from another matter which is also offered with the *minchah* in one vessel (*levonah*), and the wood should not disprove this, since it is not a matter which is offered with the *minchah* in one vessel. The Torah therefore states: *it is an everlasting covenant of salt*, and by the *lechem hapanim* it says: *from the children of Israel an everlasting covenant*; just as the *lechem hapanim* was from the communal funds, so too the salt was from the communal funds! [The *braisa* clearly states that a *Yisroel* could use the Temple's salt for his offerings; accordingly, it would be obvious that permission is granted for the *Kohanim* as well (without any special stipulation). The stipulation must therefore be regarding the allowance to use the salt for the eating of their offerings.]

Rav Mordechai said to Rav Ashi: Rav Shisha the son of Rav Iddi said that the stipulation was necessary only according to Ben Buchri (*who maintains that the Kohanim were not included in mitzvah of the donations of the half-shekel*). For we have learned in a *Mishna*: Rabbi Yehudah said: Ben Buchri

testified at Yavneh that a *Kohen* who donated a *shekel* has not committed a sin. [Evidently, he is not obligated to donate the half-shekel. The Gemora in *Shekalim* derives this from a verse, which indicates that only those who were counted by Moshe in the general census have this obligation; this excludes the *Kohanim* who were counted by themselves.] Rabban Yochanan ben Zakkai said to him: Not so, but rather a *Kohen* who did not donate the *shekel* has committed a sin. The *Kohanim*, however, used to expound the following verse to their advantage: *And every minchah offering of a Kohen shall be completely burned; it shall not be eaten*. [Now, if they would donate as well, a communal *minchah* would be partly theirs, and therefore, it would need to be completely burned.] Now, since the *omer* offering and the two loaves and the *lechem hapanim* are ours, how can they be eaten? [They therefore did not donate.]

The Gemora asks that according to Ben Buchri, since they are not obligated to donate the *shekel*, if they do pay it, they surely have committed a sin, for they have brought non-sacred matter into the Temple!?

The Gemora answers: They bring it and give it wholeheartedly to the communal funds.

[The Gemora now explains Rav Shisha's statement:] Now, according to ben Buchri, I might have thought that the Torah allows a *Yisroel* to use the Temple's salt, for they donated money to the *shekalim* chamber; however, a *Kohen*, who does not have a portion in the *shekalim* chamber, perhaps he cannot use the Temple's salt; the *Mishna* therefore informs us otherwise. (21b – 22a)

DAILY MASHAL

Only the Wood Was Put on Yitzchak

If we examine the verses of the *Akeidah*, we discover something of interest: When Avraham and Yitzchak went to the site of the *Akeidah*, Avraham put the wood on Yitzchak



whereas **he** took the fire and the knife (Bereishis 22:6): “And Avraham took the wood of the *’olah* and put it on Yitzchak, his son, and he took in his hand the fire and the knife.” Why? Because one mustn’t put the slaughtering knife, which is not holy, on the sacrifice (see Pesachim 66a and Tosfos, Zevachim 47a, s.v. *Eizehu*). The same applies to the fire whereas the wood was called “wood for the *’olah*” – i.e., it was already sanctified and was allowed to be put on Yitzchak (*Minchas Asher, Vayeira*).

Salt and Understanding

Rav Yitzchak Blazer zt”l would lament: Witness the deterioration of the generations! In Chazal’s era they would say, “it has salt like understanding.” Understanding was important to everyone and salt was compared to it. In our era, values have inverted. If we want to say that someone is lacking maturity, we say that he “lacks salt.” Salt now is understood by all and serves as a parable for the importance of intelligence... (*Telalei Oros, Vayikra 2:12*).