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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Inside Out

Rava says: Now, according to the opinion that the vessel does not set the amount, if a person set aside six *log* for a bull and proceeded to take four of these *lugin* and offer them outside the Temple, he should be liable. This is because four *lugin* is the amount used for the libations of a ram sacrifice. If a person set aside four *log* for a ram and proceeded to take three *lugin* and offer them outside the Temple, he should be liable. This is because three *lugin* is the amount used for the libations of a sheep sacrifice. If there is less than three *lugin* offered, one is exempt (*as there is no sacrifice with less than three log*).

Rav Ashi says: The Sages do not derive the laws of libations being offered outside the Temple from the laws of offering sacrifices outside the Temple, even though they are both offered outside the Temple. However, they do derive offering from offering, even though one is in the Sanctuary and one is in the Holy of Holies. (110a)

Reduced Amount

The *Mishna* states that if the proper amount was lacking, one is exempt.

They inquired: If the sacrifice was taken outside the Temple in its entirety, but it was reduced before it was sacrificed, what is the law? Do we say that the fact that it was lessened outside means it was indeed not a proper amount, or do we

say that it is as if the entire sacrifice is extant as long as it left the Temple with the proper amount? Do we say that because it left the Temple, it should not make a difference how much it is when it is offered (*as it is already invalid once it leaves the Temple*)? Or do we say that one is only liable if he sacrifices something that is still entirely extant?

Abaye says: We can answer this from Rabbi Eliezer’s statement that one is exempt until he offers the entire sacrifice.

Rabbah bar Rav Chanan asked Abaye: Are you answering this question based on the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer? (*Our question is according to the Rabbis who are more stringent than Rabbi Eliezer!*)

Abaye answered: I explicitly heard from Rav that the Rabbis only argue on Rabbi Eliezer when the item is intact. However, if part of it is no longer extant, the Rabbis agree that one is not liable. This is therefore a proof, as the case must be where the item became lessened outside the Temple (*and yet the Rabbis will agree he is exempt!*)

The *Gemora* rejects this proof, and says that it is possible the case is where it was reduced inside the Temple. (*This is therefore not proof to a case where it was only reduced outside the Temple.*)

The *Gemora* attempts to answer this question from the *Mishna*. The *Mishna* states: If any of them were lessened and offered outside the Temple, he is exempt. This indicates that they were lessened outside, and he is still exempt!

The *Gemora* rejects this proof, and says that it is possible the case is where it was reduced inside the Temple.

The *Mishna* says that one who offers meat and sacrificial parts outside the Temple is liable.

The *Gemora* asks: Why? Isn't the meat (*which is not supposed to be burned*) considered an interposition between the limbs? (*The Gemora currently assumes the Mishna is like Rabbi Yosi's opinion, that the offering has to be like that of the Temple to be liable.*)

Shmuel answers: The case is where he turned over the fats and limbs so they should be underneath.

Rabbi Yochanan says: The case could even be where they were not turned over, and according to the opinion of Rabbi Shimon who says that even if one offered this on a stone, he would be liable. (*In other words, Rabbi Shimon does not require that the offering be like that of the Temple in order for one to be liable.*)

Rav says: Being that the fats and meat are of a similar nature, the meat is not considered an interposition. (110a)

Mishna

If one did not do *kemitzah* to a *minchah* offering and then offered it outside the Temple, he is exempt. If he did *kemitzah*, and then put the *kemitzah* back into the *minchah* and offered it outside the Temple, he is liable. (110a)

Komeitz

The *Gemora* asks: Why should he be liable? Why don't we say that the leftover part of the *minchah* offering should nullify the *komeitz*?

Rabbi Zeira says: The Torah says "*haktarah*" – "burning" regarding the *komeitz*, and it also says it regarding the leftovers (*do not burn etc.*). Just like the burning of a *komeitz* is not nullified by a different *komeitz*, so too the burning of a *komeitz* cannot be nullified by leftovers of a *minchah*. (110a)

Mishna

If a person offered either the *komeitz* or *levonah* outside the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer states: He is exempt unless he offers the second part as well. If a person first offers one part inside the Temple, and then offers the second part outside the Temple, he is liable. If he offers one (*out of the two*) of the containers of *levonah* (*two permitted the lechem ha'panim to be eaten*) outside the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer states: He is exempt unless he offers the other one as well. If a person first offers one inside the Temple, and then offers the second outside the Temple, he is liable. (110a)

Half a Permitter

Rabbi Yitzchak Nafcha inquired: If a person offered the *komeitz* with intent to permit a specific half of the *minchah* (*and the second half will only be permitted when the levonah is burned*), can he eat that half? Do we say that each part literally permits half, or do we say that it just weakens the prohibition against eating the entire *minchah*, which is still prohibited?

The *Gemora* clarifies: Who is this question according to? It cannot be according to Rabbi Meir who says that one can render a sacrifice *piggul* by thinking a *piggul* thought regarding half of the sacrifice (*i.e. doing kemitzah with intent to eat a size of an olive of the leftover minchah beyond its time*), as in our case the half is definitely permitted! According to the Rabbis who say that one cannot render the sacrifice *piggul* by thinking a *piggul* thought regarding half of the sacrifice, it is possible that it is not permitted and the

prohibition is not even weakened! Rather, the question is according to Rabbi Eliezer.

The *Gemora* asks: Rabbi Eliezer holds like the Rabbis that one cannot render it *piggul* in this fashion! (*How can the question be according to him and not like the Rabbis?*)

Rather, the *Gemora* answers: It must be according to the Rabbis of our *Mishna* (*who say that one is liable for offering either the komeitz or levonah outside the Temple*). Do they say it permits half, or do they say it weakens the prohibition? The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved. (110a)

Mishna

If someone sprinkles part of the blood outside the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer says: Even if one does libations on *Sukkos* outside the Temple to water that was collected to do the water libations on *Sukkos*, he is liable. Rabbi Nechemiah states: If one sprinkles leftover blood of a sacrifice outside the Temple, he is liable. (110a – 110b)

Libations

Rava says: Rabbi Eliezer admits that if part of the blood was sprinkled outside the Temple, one is liable. This is as the *Mishna* states: Rabbi Elozar and Rabbi Shimon state that from the place where he stops, he starts. (*The Mishna is referring to a sacrifice where the blood started to be sprinkled, and then the rest of the blood he was holding spilled. Rabbi Elozar and Rabbi Shimon hold that one can pick up where one left off (as opposed to the Tanna Kamma who says to the start the sprinklings over), after obtaining new blood. This shows that they understand even partial sprinkling is significant.*)

The *Mishna* states: Rabbi Eliezer says that even if one does libations on *Sukkos* outside the Temple to water that was collected to do the water libations on *Sukkos*, he is liable.

Rabbi Yochanan says in the name of Rabbi Menachem Yudfa'ah: Rabbi Elozar said this based on the opinion of his teacher, Rabbi Akiva, who holds that water libations are a Torah obligation. This is as the braisa states: *And its libations* imply two types of libations, a libation of water and a libation of wine.

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan: If so, we should derive that just as the wine libations require three *lugin*, so too the water libations should require three *lugin*! However, Rabbi Eliezer said that one is liable for any water collected for *Sukkos* (*indicating even if it is less than three lugin*)!

The *Gemora* counters: If we should derive water from wine, we should also say that just as one can be liable for pouring wine the whole year, they can also be liable for pouring water the whole year. Yet, Rabbi Eliezer only said that one can be liable for water on *Sukkos*!

The *Gemora* answers: Rabbi Menachem Yudfa'ah forgot Rabbi Assi's statement. Rabbi Assi states in the name of Rabbi Yochanan in the name of Rabbi Nechunyah, who was a man from the valley of Beis Churtan: The ten trees (*the amount of trees one must have in a certain size area in order not to have to keep the additional time added on to shemitah, see Rashi in Sukkah 34a at length*), taking an *aravah* (*in the Temple on Hoshana Rabbah*), and water libations are laws given to Moshe at Mount Sinai.

The braisa states: If someone does libations on *Sukkos* outside the Temple to three *lugin* of water that was collected to do the water libations on *Sukkos*, he is liable. Rabbi Eliezer states: He must have collected the water with intent for *Sukkos*.

The *Gemora* asks: What is the difference between these opinions?

Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak answers: The argument is whether or not a specific amount must be filled up. (*Rashi*

explains that the Tanna Kamma holds a minimum of three lugin must be filled, but one is liable for more as well. Rabbi Eliezer holds one is only liable for a vessel filled to contain three lugin, not more.)

Rav Pappa said: They are arguing whether libations were offered in the Wilderness or not.

Ravina said: They are arguing whether we derive libations of water from libations of wine or not. (110b – 111a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

A father clasped his son's hands that were holding the four species. Did he observe the mitzvah?

Many fathers will respond to their children's pleas and give them the *lulav* for a moment, clasping their small hands so that it won't fall. Though the father doesn't touch the *lulav*, can he observe the *mitzvah* in such a way? The author of *Ben Ish Chai* zt"l raised this question (Responso *Torah Lishmah*, 181), which actually encompasses a whole realm of topics that address the halachic rule of "a kind does not interfere with its own kind".

A kind does not interfere with its own kind: A *shelamim* sacrifice is not entirely burnt, but its fats and part of its innards are offered on the altar. There is a halachah concerning offerings that nothing may interfere between a sacrifice and the altar. The *Gemora* wonders why the *Mishna* treats a *shelamim* whose meat was burned together with its fats (outside the Temple and he who offered it transgressed the prohibition of offering a sacrifice outside the Temple) as offered correctly. After all, the meat of the *shelamim*, which shouldn't be offered on the altar, interferes between the fats and the altar. The *Gemora* offers a number of answers and finally decides on Rav's, which was accepted as halachah (Rambam, *Hilchos Pesulei HaMukdashin*, 1:21): *min bemino eino chotzeitz* - "a kind does not interfere with its own kind".

In other words, as the parts to be burned and the interfering meat are of one kind, it is not considered a *chatzitzah*.

"A kind with its own kind": only for one body or also for two? A tremendous difference of opinions between the *poskim* about the validity of this rule influences many cases. Their difference of opinions concerns the question whether a kind does not interfere with its own kind in every case or perhaps only pertaining to one body. According to many commentators (see *Birkei Yosef*, O.C. 74, S.K. 5, and thus it seems from the Rishonim), a kind does not interfere with its own kind even if the interfering object does not belong to the same body as the interfered object. *Birkei Yosef* (ibid) disagrees, maintaining that "a kind does not interfere with its own kind" applies only to cases like that of our *sugya*, where the meat of the animal is not considered an interference between its fats and the *bamah* (external altar) as the animal is all one body. However, if the meat of the animal and the innards would be from two bodies, the meat would interfere between the *bamah* and the innards.

We now return to the father who took up the four species held by his son. According to *Birkei Yosef*, he didn't observe the *mitzvah* as his hand and his son's are two bodies. Hence his son's hand interferes between his hand and the *lulav* (and so wrote *Ben Ish Chai*, ibid). According to the other Acharonim, **apparently** the son's hand does not interfere between the *lulav* and his father's hand, as the rule of "a kind does not interfere with its own kind" is also valid for two bodies.

"A kind with its own kind" does not help in an unusual form of holding: We said "apparently" because in this case, according to all opinions, the father did not observe the *mitzvah*: Tosfos (Sukkah 37a, s.v. *Ki*) assert a basic halachah concerning the rule of "a kind does not interfere with its own kind" and that is that the rule cannot include an unusual type of touching. Since a person does not usually take up a *lulav* in this manner, the rule of "a kind does not interfere with its own kind" does not help him to observe the *mitzvah*.



DAILY MASHAL

The Sefas Emes writes that the three mitzvos of Nessachim [wine libations on the altar, accompanying certain sacrifices], the mitzvah of Challah [separating a portion from our kneaded dough for the Kohen], and the mitzvah of Tzitzis [fringes worn on the corners of our four-cornered garments] appear in the Parshah of the Meraglim – the spies. This is because they stand in contrast to the philosophy of the Meraglim. The Meraglim held that the two worlds cannot be molded. "Olam haZeh" and "Olam haBah" -- never the twain shall meet. There is an eternal dichotomy and an unbridgeable chasm between spirituality (Ruchniyus) and physicality (gashmiyus). The Meraglim felt that you cannot have both, the Torah counters that you can have both and you MUST have both!

HaShem wants us to plant a vineyard, sit out in the hot sun, and sweat and worry about the grapes. "Will it be too hot or too cold; will there be bugs or birds that will consume my crop?" After we toil and sweat and break our back, HaShem wants you to take those grapes into which we invested our physical 'kishkas' and make them into wine and offer them on the holy Mizbayach. HaShem wants to show us that there are not two worlds. The end result of all those physical efforts is an act of sanctification of the produce of this world."

The same is true regarding the efforts needed to sow the seeds, grow the wheat, make the grain into flour, and then bake it into bread. All these physical efforts culminate in the mitzvah of the separation of Challah. We must transform the physicality of this world into spirituality and holiness.

The same is true regarding the raising of sheep, shearing of wool, spinning of yarn, and making of clothing. What can be further from spirituality than spending time with smelly sheep all day? Yet all those physical efforts culminate in placing fringes on the corners of our garments, such that we

may look at what we have accomplished through our efforts "and remember thereby all the commandments of Hashem."

Rabbi Yissocher Frand concludes: This is the name of the game. This is what Judaism is all about. We are not like other religions who believe that we cannot bridge the worlds of spirituality and physicality.