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Libations

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: If one pours three *lugin* of wine as a libation outside the Temple, he is liable. Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon said: This is only if it was sanctified in a sacred vessel beforehand.

The *Gemora* notes the practical difference between them: Rav Adda the son of Rav Yitzchak – The overflow of the vessel (for according to the *Tanna Kamma*, one would be liable for offering the overflow outside, for a vessel sanctifies the liquid overflow, whereas according to Rabbi Elozar, he would not be liable for it).

Rava the son of Rabbah – Libations offered on a *bamah* (private altar) – (if they were obligated to offer libations on a *bamah*, this would be a proof that libations do not require a service vessel; if, however, they were not obligated, libations would require a service vessel; this is why Rabbi Elozar holds that libations require sanctification in a service vessel in order to be liable for offering it outside). And their disagreement is connected to the dispute of the following *Tannaim*, for it was taught in a *braisa*: Sacrifices offered on a private *bamah* do not require libations; these are the words of Rebbe. The Sages maintain: Libations are necessary.

The *Gemora* notes further: And the disagreement of these *Tannaim* is dependent upon the following different dispute, for it was taught in a *braisa*: It is written (in the passage regarding the requirement of libations): When you will enter (the Land) – this teaches us that they were obligated to bring libations on a major *bamah* (one that had similar characteristics to the altar in the Tabernacle; communal

sacrifices can be offered only on such an altar, not a private one; evidently, this Tanna maintains that libations were not offered in the Wilderness, and that is why the requirement is dependent upon entering Eretz Yisroel). Perhaps, asks the *braisa*, the requirement of libations should even apply to a minor *bamah* (for libations were offered on a major *bamah* in the Wilderness, and the Torah is mentioning Eretz Yisroel in connection with libations to teach us that even a minor *bamah* requires libations)!? The *braisa* answers: Since the Torah writes, “to the land of your dwellings... which I will give you” (in a plural form), this indicates that the Torah is referring to a *bamah* which is applicable to you all (a communal one); these are the words of Rabbi Yishmael.

Rabbi Akiva says: When you will enter (the Land) – this teaches us that they were obligated to bring libations on a minor *bamah* (for libations were offered on a major *bamah* in the Wilderness, and the Torah is mentioning Eretz Yisroel in connection with libations to teach us that even a minor *bamah* requires libations). Perhaps, asks the *braisa*, the requirement of libations should even apply to a major *bamah* (and the Torah is informing us that libations were not offered in the Wilderness, and that is why the requirement is dependent upon entering Eretz Yisroel)!? The *braisa* answers: Since the Torah writes, “to the land of your dwellings,” this indicates that the Torah is referring to a *bamah* which is used in all of your dwellings (a private one, and not the major one, which is only located in the Mishkan).

The *Gemora* explains the dispute: Rabbi Yishmael holds that individuals did not bring libations while they were in the Wilderness (and therefore the new obligation teaches us that

in Eretz Yisroel, they are commanded to bring libations on a major bamah). Rabbi Akiva holds that they did bring libations while they were in the Wilderness (and therefore he cannot explain the verse to mean that when they enter Eretz Yisroel, they are obligated to bring libations, for they were already obligated to do this; rather, it means that the obligation is applicable even on a private bamah). (111a)

Blood Remnants Outside

Rabbi Nechemiah had stated: If the remnants of the blood were offered outside, one is liable.

Rabbi Yochanan said that this is in accordance with the opinion that holds that the spilling of the remnants of the blood (*on the base of the altar*) is essential (*for the validity of the sacrifice; and that is why one would be liable for offering it outside*).

The Gemora asks from a braisa: Rabbi Nechemiah said: If the remnants of the blood were offered outside, one is liable. Rabbi Akiva said to him: But the spilling of the remnants of the blood is merely the remnants of a mitzvah (*and is not essential for atonement; if so, how could one be liable for throwing it outside*)!? Rabbi Nechemiah responded: The limbs and the fats of a sacrifice can be used to refute your logic, for they are only the remnants of a mitzvah, and yet, one is liable for offering them outside! Rabbi Akiva replied: No! The fats and limbs are different, for they are the start of a service; the remnants of the blood, however, are at the conclusion of the service (*and therefore, one should not be liable for spilling it outside*)!? The Gemora concludes its question: And if it is true (*that Rabbi Nechemiah holds that the spilling of the remnants of the blood on the base of the altar is essential for the validity of the sacrifice*), he should have replied that this (*the remnants of the blood*) is also essential!? This, the Gemora states, is indeed a refutation.

The Gemora notes: And now that Rav Adda bar Ahavah said that the dispute (*of whether the spilling of the remnants is*

essential or not) is only with respect to the remnants of an inner chatas, but with regards to an outer chatas, everyone agrees that it is not essential, it can be answered that Rabbi Nechemiah is discussing the remnants of an inner chatas, and the braisa (*where he seemed to agree that the spilling of the remnants are non-essential*) is referring to the remnants of an outer chatas.

The Gemora concludes that Rabbi Nechemiah maintains that the spilling of the remnants is essential by an outer chatas as well, and Rabbi Nechemiah was only responding to Rabbi Akiva according to the words of Rabbi Akiva. (111a)

Mishna

If one performed melikah on a bird inside and offered it outside, he is liable. If he performed melikah outside and offered it outside, he is not liable (*for a melikah outside renders it a neveilah, and he is not liable for offering up a neveilah; and there is only liability for shechitah outside, not melikah*). If he slaughtered a bird inside and offered it outside, he is not liable (*for once he slaughters it, it is invalidated and it is not accepted on the altar*). If he slaughters it outside and offers it outside, he is liable (*for both*). It emerges that the way it is valid inside (*through melikah*) exempts him outside, and the way it is valid outside (*through slaughtering*) exempts him inside. Rabbi Shimon said: In any case that one is liable (*for an initial service*) outside, he will be liable if the initial service was inside and then he offered it outside, except for one who slaughters a bird inside and then offers it outside. (111a – 111b)

Rabbi Shimon's Disagreement

The Gemora notes that the Mishna should not say “valid” (*outside; for it is not valid when it is slaughtered there*), but rather, it should be emended to say “liability.”

The Gemora wishes to determine the case where Rabbi Shimon disagrees: If he refers to the first case, where the

Mishna ruled that one who performed *melikah* on a bird inside and offered it outside is liable, and one who performed *melikah* outside and offered it outside is not liable, and Rabbi Shimon came to say that just as one is liable when it (*the melikah*) was performed inside, so too he is liable when it is performed outside; then, should he have stated, “in any case where one is liable for an initial service outside,” he should have said, “in any case where one is liable for offering outside when its initial service was performed **inside**”!?

And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon meant that just as one is exempt (*for offering up a bird outside*) when the *melikah* was performed outside, so too he shall be exempt (*for offering up a bird outside*) when the *melikah* was performed inside; he should have stated, “in any case where one is **not** liable for offering it up when its initial service was performed outside”!?

Rather, he must be referring to the latter case, where the *Mishna* ruled that one who slaughtered a bird inside and offered it outside, he is not liable (*for once he slaughters it, it is invalidated and it is not accepted on the altar*), and if he slaughters it outside and offers it outside, he is liable (*for both*); and Rabbi Shimon came to say that just as one is exempt (*for offering up a bird outside*) when the slaughtering was performed inside, so too he is not liable when the slaughtering was performed outside; he should have stated, “in any case where one is **not** liable for offering it up”!?

And if you will say that Rabbi Shimon meant that just as one is liable (*for offering up a bird outside*) when the slaughtering was performed outside, so too he shall be liable (*for offering up a bird outside*) when the slaughtering was performed inside; this can certainly not be, for Rabbi Shimon states clearly in the *Mishna*: except for one who slaughters a bird inside and then offers it outside!?

Zeiri said: The dispute in the *Mishna* pertains to a case where an animal was slaughtered at night, and this is what the *Mishna* was saying: And similarly, if one slaughters an animal

at night, and then offers it up outside, he is not liable, but if he slaughtered it at night outside, and then offered it up outside, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: In any case that one is liable (*for an initial service*) outside, he will be liable if the initial service was inside and then he offered it outside, except for one who slaughters a bird inside and then offers it outside.

Rava said: The dispute in the *Mishna* pertains to a case where one received the blood of the sacrifice in an unsanctified vessel, and this is what the *Mishna* was saying: And similarly, if one received the blood of the sacrifice in an unsanctified vessel and then offers it up outside, he is not liable, but if he received the blood of the sacrifice in an unsanctified vessel outside, and then offered it up outside, he is liable. Rabbi Shimon said: In any case that one is liable (*for an initial service*) outside, he will be liable if the initial service was inside and then he offered it outside, except for one who slaughters a bird inside and then offers it outside.

The *Gemora* offers a third interpretation: Now that the father of Shmuel the son of Rav Yitzchak said: If one performs *melikah* on a bird inside and offers it up outside, he is liable, but if he performs *melikah* on a bird outside and offers it up outside, he is not liable; but Rabbi Shimon rules that even in that case, he is liable, you can then say that Rabbi Shimon refers to that case, but emend the *Mishna* to say as follows: In any case that one is liable for an initial service performed inside and then he offered it up outside, he will be liable if the initial service was outside and then he offered it outside.

If one received the blood of a *chatas* in one bowl and applied it outside and then applied it inside, or, if he applied it inside and then applied it outside, he is liable, since all of it is fir to be applied inside (*on the altar*). (111b)

Mishna

If he received its blood in two bowls, and applied both inside, he is exempt; if he applied both outside, he is liable; one

inside and one outside, he is exempt; one outside and one inside, he is liable for the outside application, and the inside application effects atonement. To what can this be compared? To one who designated his *chatas* and it was lost, and he designated another one in its place; then the first one was found, and both are in front of us. If he slaughtered both inside, he is exempt; if he slaughtered both outside, he is liable; one inside and one outside, he is exempt; one outside and one inside, he is liable on account of the one outside, but the one inside effects atonement. Just as the blood (of the first *chatas*) exempts its flesh (from the laws of *me'ilah*), so does it exempt the meat of its companion. (111b)

purchased the wine from the non-Jewish peddlers, and that was enough to provide them for the libations which accompanied the communal offerings.

DAILY MASHAL

Libations in the Wilderness

Rabbi Yishmael holds that individuals did not bring libations while they were in the Wilderness (for there were only libations for communal offerings brought in the Wilderness; individuals were only obligated to bring libations once they entered Eretz Yisroel). Rabbi Akiva holds that they did bring libations while they were in the Wilderness (even for private offerings).

It is stated in a Medrash in Shir HaShirim: From where did the Jewish people get the wine for libations in the Wilderness? Rabbi Levi said: It was from the cluster of grapes from Eretz Yisroel, brought back by the spies. Rabbi Abba notes that these grapes were extremely large. The Rabbis said that there were non-Jewish peddlers that sold their wares to the Jews in the Desert. Rabbi Yishmael commented: The wine of a non-Jew was not yet forbidden to a Jew at that time.

Accordingly, R' Shammai Ginzburg, points out that according to Rabbi Levi and Rabbi Abba, the cluster of grapes that the spies brought back with them was sufficient to provide for all the Jewish people's libations for their entire stay in the Wilderness – even for individual offerings – according to Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yishmael, however, maintains that they