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Wood for the Altar

The *Gemora* asks: Why is it obvious to the *Tanna* that the wood for the sacrifices comes from the communal funds (*and not every individual who brings a sacrifice*)?

The *Gemora* answers: The *braisa* states that one might think that a person who says, “It is upon me to bring an *olah*,” should be required to bring wood as well, just as he needs to bring the libations brought with an *olah*. The verse therefore states: *On the wood that is on the fire that is on the altar*. This teaches us to compare the wood and fire to the altar. Just as the altar comes from the communal funds, so too, the wood and fire come from the communal funds; these are the words of Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon. Rabbi Elozar ben Shamua says: Just as the (*material of the*) altar was not used by a commoner for his private use (*before it was designated to be used for the altar*), so too the wood and fire could not have been used by a commoner for his private use.

The *Gemora* asks: What is the difference between these two opinions?

The *Gemora* answers: The difference between them is new food (*for according to Rabbi Elozar ben Shamua, new wood is required*).

The *Gemora* asks: Is it true that old wood could not be used? Doesn’t the verse state: *And Aravnah said to David: Let my master the king take it and offer up what seems best in his eyes; see, the oxen for the olah offerings, and the morigim and the gear of the oxen for the wood*. [*Evidently, new wood was not required for the altar!?*]

The *Gemora* answers: The wood had not been used.

The *Gemora* asks: What are *morigim*? Ulla said: It is a bed of *turbeil*, which Rav Yehudah explains to mean a tool shaped like a goat with hooks that the threshers thresh.

Rav Yehudah explains: It is a wooden beam with many pegs that was used in a thresher (*a bull would pull it over grain*).

Rav Yosef asked: Where do we see this word in the verse?

He answered: The verse states: *Behold I have made of you like a new sharp morag that has many sharp blades and can thresh mountains*. (22a)

Mishna

If the *komeitz* of a *minchah* became mixed up with another *komeitz*, or with a *minchah* of a *Kohen*, or with a *minchah* of the Anointed *Kohen*, or with a *minchah* of libations, it is valid (*for they are all items that need to be burned on the altar*). Rabbi Yehudah says: If it was mixed up with a *minchah* of the Anointed *Kohen* or with the *minchah* of libations, it is invalid, as one is a thick mixture and one is a thin mixture (*minchah of libations, as it has more oil*), and they absorb from each other. [*Rashi explains that the minchah nesachim is considered to have less oil, as some of it is absorbed by the thick komeitz, and the thick komeitz is considered to have too much oil, as it absorbs some oil from the minchah nesachim.*] (22a)

Nullification



The *Mishna* stated elsewhere: If the blood (which was in the service vessel – prior to its sprinkling on the altar) was mixed with water (which fell in), if it retains the appearance of blood, it is valid. If it was mixed with wine, we regard it as though it were water (and we determine if the blood would have been recognizable in that amount of water – then it would be valid). If it was mixed with the blood of a domesticated animal (an unconsecrated one) or a wild beast, we regard it as though it were water. Rabbi Yehudah says: Blood does not nullify blood. [Accordingly, if a small amount of blood from a sacrifice fell into regular blood from an animal, it can still be sprinkled on the altar.]

Rabbi Yochanan says: Both the *Tanna Kamma* and Rabbi Yehudah derive their law from the same verse. And he will take from the blood of the bull and from the blood of the goat. [This is referring to the *Yom Kippur* service; the blood from these animals are mixed together and applied on the inner altar.] Everyone knows that there is more blood from the bull than the goat. [Why isn't the blood of the goat considered nullified when it is mixed with that of the bull?] The Rabbis hold that this is a source that two sacrifices do not nullify each other. Rabbi Yehudah says: This is a source that when one kind becomes mixed with its own kind that it does not become nullified.

The *Gemora* asks: Why don't the Rabbis hold like Rabbi Yehudah?

The *Gemora* answers: The Rabbis would have said Rabbi Yehudah's reasoning if it were only referring to a case where one kind becomes mixed with its own kind, and not where there were two offerings on the altar. Being that these are two sacrifices, we say that this is the reason why they do not become nullified.

The *Gemora* asks: Perhaps the Rabbis maintain that both the fact that they are offerings on the altar and the fact that they are two of the same kind contribute to the fact that the blood is not nullified? The *Gemora* concludes that this is a difficulty.

The *Gemora* asks: Why doesn't Rabbi Yehudah hold like the Rabbis?

The *Gemora* answers: If the Torah would have given an example of offerings on the altar which are two different kinds becoming mixed together, he would agree. However, being that these are of the same kind, it must be teaching that there is no nullification because they are two of the same kind.

The *Gemora* asks: Perhaps Rabbi Yehudah maintains that both the fact that they are offerings on the altar and the fact that they are two of the same kind contribute to the fact that the blood is not nullified? The *Gemora* concludes that this is a difficulty.

Rabbi Yehudah said in our *Mishna*: If it was mixed up with a *minchah* of the Anointed *Kohen* or with the *minchah* of libations, it is invalid, as one is a thick mixture and one is a thin mixture (*minchah* of libations, as it has more oil), and they absorb from each other.

The *Gemora* asks: According to Rabbi Yehudah, why should the fact that they absorb from each other be a concern? Doesn't he say that there is no nullification when the mixture consists of two like kinds?

Rava answers: Whenever there is a mixture of one kind with its own kind, and it also contains something which is of a different kind, we remove its own kind as if it were not here, and the "other" kind – being that it is the majority, nullifies the (remaining) kind. [The *komeitz*, which is made up of oil and flour, was mixed with a *minchas nesachim*, which also contained oil. Now the oil in the *komeitz* is disregarded, so that the flour of the *komeitz* will nullify the oil of the other *minchah* which it has absorbed; this results in the fact that the *komeitz* has too much oil and the *minchas nesachim* has too little, and therefore, they are both ruled to be invalid.] (22b – 23a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

The difference between the firewood for the altar and the keilim of the Temple

By: Meoros HaDaf HaYomi

Rambam rules according to the Tosefta (*Hilchos Beis HaBechirah*, 1:20): “All the *keilim* (holy utensils) are made from their beginning only for the holy purpose and if they were made from their beginning for a mundane purpose, they are not to be used for the Temple.” In other words, *keilim* that, when they were made, were meant for a mundane purpose are disqualified for the Temple even if they haven’t yet served a mundane purpose. The author of *Mishneh Lamelech* writes in his *Parashas Derachim* (*derush* 12) that “I always wondered about Rambam’s statement” as our *sugya* cites a few interpretations from the verse “on the wood that is on the fire that is on the altar” (Vayikra 1:12), including the interpretation of Rabbi Elazar ben Shamma: “Just as the altar had not served a mundane purpose, the same applies to the wood.” This is a *hekesh* – comparison: Just as in the Temple one must not use an altar that served a mundane purpose, the same applies to the firewood for the altar. The *Gemora* asks a question from Shmuel II (24:22) about Aravnah the Yevusi who donated wooden utensils for igniting the fire on the altar. It appears, then, that it is allowed to use objects that served a mundane purpose to ignite the fire on the altar. The *Gemora* answers that those were new utensils that had never been used. The *Gemora* indicates that nothing prevents us from using objects that were made for a mundane purpose in the Temple as long as they have not been used. Why, then, did Rambam follow the Tosefta and why did he not rule as indicated in our *Gemora*, that only mundane **use** forbids an object for the Temple? That is the Mishneh Lamelech’s question (we could distinguish between the halachah of firewood and that of the utensils but as everything is learnt from a *hekesh*, comparing

firewood to the altar, we have the rule that there is no partial *hekesh*).

Two separate halachos: HaGaon Rabbi Elchanan Wasserman zt”l solves this question in the following manner (*Kovetz Shi’urim*, II, 25). This question, he says, is based on the assumption that the two prohibitions, to use in the Temple a utensil that was **made** for a mundane purpose and to use in the Temple a utensil that **served** a mundane purpose, stem from the same rule: that *keilim* should not be mundane. However, the truth is that they are two different halachos. The halachah that “all the utensils are made from their beginning only for the holy purpose” is learnt from the verse “and they will **make for Me** a Temple” (Shemos 25:8), as Rashi comments: “for Me – **for My name**” (there is no positive *psul* disqualifying the object but the absence of **making** it *lishmah*). On the other hand, our *Gemora* compares firewood to the altar regarding the *psul* of an object that was **used** for a mundane purpose. A brief examination reveals that we can apply to the firewood only the second halachah, that it served a mundane use but not the halachah of making it *lishmah* as, after all, firewood is not made or manufactured but is put in the fire as it is... The *hekesh* cannot teach a halachah that doesn’t apply. Therefore, our *sugya*, which addresses the firewood, determines that it suffices that it didn’t **serve** a mundane purpose whereas the Tosefta, which is the source for Rambam’s ruling, addresses a different halachah that pertains only to the utensils of the Temple – that they should be **made** for the Temple.

Napoleon’s Cloak for a Paroches

The event occurred in 5572, about 190 years ago, during the war between France and Russia. Napoleon Bonaparte and his close aides camped in a small village near Moscow, hiding from the relentless enemy. It is told that a rich Jew from Mohilov by the name of R.Yosef Luria encountered Napoleon, who asked for his help. Yosef greeted him royally and after giving him food and drink, guided him and his company along the forest paths that he knew so well. Before

they parted, Napoleon removed his luxurious cape and gave it to Yosef in recognition of his devotion and because he suspected that he would be detected because of his regal clothing.

The cloak that became a *paroches*: The story of the royal mantle of richly embroidered green velvet is related in *Mishpachas Luria*, which recounts the family's genealogy. Yosef kept the garment in great trepidation for fear of the authorities, lest they discover that he had aided their bitter enemy. The family finally made a fine *paroches* from it and sent it to Yerushalayim where it adorned the *aron kodesh* of the Menachem Tziyon Synagogue in the Old City, led by HaGaon Rabbi Yeshayah Bradki zt"l.

A good story, but how does the halachah regard it? In our *sugya* we learn that wood that served a mundane purpose should not be used in the Temple. What about a "small Temple" – a synagogue? May one use objects there that served a mundane purpose, such as for Napoleon?

Indeed, the Maharil (Responsa, 112) rules in the name of *Sefer HaAgudah*: "One should not purchase coats which served a mundane purpose for a holy purpose" just as wood that served a mundane purpose should not be used for the altar, and the halachah was so ruled (Remo, *O.C.* 147:1; *Mechaber*, 153:21). But *Magen Avraham* (147, *S.K.* 5) writes that if one changes the form of the garment, one may use it for a synagogue. As proof, he mentions the *kiyor* in the Temple which was made from women's mirrors (see *Eliyah Rabah*, *ibid*, *S.K.* 4; Responsa *Chavos Yair*, 161; and see the remarks of Chasam Sofer to *Shulchan Aruch*, *ibid*, about this proof). *Mishnah Berurah* sums up, "Though some are strict also in this matter, people have the custom to be lenient" (*S.K.* 13).

In addition, the *Taz* (*Y.D.* 282) wrote that the halachah not to use an object that served a mundane purpose for a holy purpose is valid only for an object that directly serves a *sefer Torah*, *tefillin* and the like. However, there is no prohibition

to use such an object to "serve a server": a *paroches* does not serve a *sefer Torah* but serves an *aron kodesh* which serves a *sefer Torah* (see *Magen Avraham*, *ibid*; *Eliyah Rabah*; *Mishnah Berurah* and *Sha'ar HaTziyun*).

A matzah bag as a bag for *tefillin*: Still, *Pri Megadim* (*ibid*, 1:1, *S.K.* 5, cited in *Mishnah Berurah*, *ibid*) wrote that at any rate one should not use a garment or object which served a purpose that is not honorable. The Gaon of Boczacz zt"l (*Eishel Avraham* on *Shulchan 'Aruch*, *ibid*) recounts that he wrapped his *tefillin* in paper which served for wrapping matzos for *lechem mishneh* on Pesach and as it served a mitzvah, it cannot be defined as a dishonorable use (see *ibid* as to the nature of a dishonorable use).

DAILY MASHAL

Mitzvos not Nullifying Each Other

In the *sefer Aryeh Sha'ag* it is written that the reason *mitzvos* do not nullify each other is because the angels who are created from each *mitzvah* are angels of peace, and on the contrary, each angel is connected to his fellow, for the six hundred and thirteen *mitzvos* collectively make up the entire person, and each limb connects to its fellow; however, regarding prohibitions, one can nullify the other. This is because every angel that is created from a transgression is separate from his fellow, and one has no connection to the other at all.