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Sanctifying the Breads

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: The lambs brought on *Shavuos* only sanctify the accompanying breads when they are slaughtered. What is an example of this? If they are slaughtered and the blood is sprinkled with proper intent, the breads become sanctified. If he did both with improper intent, the breads are not sanctified. If he slaughtered with proper intent and sprinkled the blood with improper intent, the breads are “sanctified and not sanctified” (see explanation below). These are the words of Rebbe. Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon states: The breads do not become sanctified until the slaughtering and sprinkling is done with proper intent.

The *Gemora* asks: What is Rebbe’s reasoning?

The *Gemora* answers: This is as the verse states: *And the ram he will make as a shelamim sacrifice to Hashem along with the basket of matzos*. This indicates that the slaughtering sanctifies the breads (*matzos*). Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Shimon argues that *he will make* indicates that when he does everything (*vital*) he is supposed to do with the sacrifice, the bread will become sanctified.

The *Gemora* asks: What does Rebbe do with the word *he will make*?

Rebbe answers: If the verse would state *a sacrifice he should make*, I would agree. However, being that the verse states, *he will make (as) a (shelamim) sacrifice*, it means that the bread is made into a sacrifice by the slaughtering (*of the lambs*).

The *Gemora* asks: What does Rabbi Eliezer do with the significance of the word *sacrifice*?

The *Gemora* answers: He uses it to derive the teaching of Rabbi Yochanan. Rabbi Yochanan states: Everyone agrees that the bread must be extant when the animals are slaughtered (*being extant during the sprinkling alone is not good enough, even according to Rabbi Elozar*).

The *Gemora* asks: What does Rebbe mean when he says that the breads are “sanctified and not sanctified?”

Abaye says: This means they are sanctified, but not completely (see below). Rava says: This means they are sanctified but not permitted to the *Kohanim*.

The *Gemora* asks: What is the difference between their opinions? [*If Abaye says it is not completely sanctified, it is clearly not permitted to the Kohanim!*]

The *Gemora* answers: According to Abaye, money proclaimed to be used to redeem the breads is sanctified, while according to Rava it is not. [*Rashi explains that this is the correct text. Abaye understands that being that the holiness is not complete, the money proclaimed to redeem the breads is able to be somewhat sanctified, as the redemption still has the ability to be valid being that the breads are not completely considered to be part of a sacrifice. According to Rava the breads are completely sanctified, and therefore any attempt to redeem them is meaningless. This means that the money is not sanctified.*]

The *Gemora* asks: This is understandable according to Rava, as this is the difference between Rebbe and Rabbi Eliezer the son

of Rabbi Shimon. [Rabbi Eliezer holds that the redemption is valid, being that the breads are not sanctified. Rebbe holds that the redemption is not sanctified, as explained above according to Rava.] However, according to Abaye, what is the difference between Rebbe and Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Shimon?

The *Gemora* answers: The difference between them is whether or not the breads become unable to be part of such a sacrifice if they leave the Courtyard. [According to Rabbi Eliezer they do not become invalid, as they are not considered yet to have the holiness of part of a sacrifice, while according to Rebbe they do.]

Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak asked a question to Rabbi Chiya bar Abba: If the lambs were slaughtered with proper intent but the blood was sprinkled with improper intent, can the accompanying bread be eaten?

The *Gemora* clarifies: Regarding which opinion did Rav Shmuel ask his question? If it is according to Rabbi Eliezer the son of Rabbi Shimon, we know that he holds that the sprinkling must be done with proper intent for the breads to be sanctified! If it is according to Rebbe, according to both Abaye and Rava the breads are sanctified but not permitted to the *Kohanim*!

The *Gemora* answers: It must be that his question is according to the following *Tanna*. The father of Rabbi Yirmiyah bar Abba taught a *braisa* stating that if the two breads left the Courtyard between the slaughtering of the animal and sprinkling of the blood, and he then sprinkled the blood of the lambs with intent to eat them beyond their allotted time, Rabbi Eliezer says that the bread does not have a status of *piggul*. Rabbi Akiva states: It does have a status of *piggul*. [A *korban* whose service was done with the intention that it would be eaten after its designated time is regarded as *piggul*.]

Rav Sheishes states: These *Tannaim* hold like Rebbe that the slaughtering causes the breads to be sanctified. Rabbi Eliezer merely holds that sprinkling does not take effect for parts of the sacrifice that left the Courtyard, while Rabbi Akiva holds that it does. This is as the *Mishna* states: Limbs of *kodashim kalim* that left the Courtyard before the sprinkling of the blood are not

subject to the laws of *me'ilah* (one who has unintentionally benefited from *hekdes* or removed it from the ownership of the *Beis Hamikdash* has committed the transgression of *me'ilah*, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a *korban asham*) and one is not liable for them for the transgressions of *piggul*, *nossar* (sacrificial meat that has been leftover beyond the time that the Torah designated for its consumption), or impurity. Rabbi Akiva says that it is subject to *me'ilah* and all of these transgressions do apply.

(The *Gemora* continues to ask Rav Shmuel bar Rav Yitzchak's question, now that we know it is according to Rabbi Akiva of this *braisa*.) What is the law? If the sprinkling of the blood causes the breads to be *piggul* despite the fact that they went out of the *azarah*, do we also say that sprinkling with improper intent (which makes the *kivsei atzeres* permitted to be eaten, although new ones must be brought) permits the breads to be eaten by the *Kohanim*? Or perhaps Rabbi Akiva only says that this sprinkling affects the breads in a stringent manner (i.e. to make it *piggul*) but not in a lenient manner (in order to allow it to be eaten)?

Rav Pappa asked (a question to undermine the basis of the question of Rav Shmuel): How do we know that the argument between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Akiva in the *braisa* is regarding the breads being outside of the Courtyard during the sprinkling? Perhaps everyone agrees that if the breads are outside the Courtyard during the sprinkling that the sprinkling does not affect the breads. Their argument is possibly regarding a case where the breads were brought back into the Courtyard before sprinkling. Rabbi Eliezer agrees with Rebbe who says that slaughtering causes it to become sanctified, and it therefore became invalid when it left the Courtyard after slaughtering. Rabbi Akiva holds like Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon who says that slaughtering does not make it sanctified, and it therefore did not become invalid when it left the Courtyard between slaughtering and sprinkling.

The *Gemora* asks a question on Rav Pappa's question. It would be understandable if Rabbi Akiva held like Rebbe, Rabbi Akiva's

logic would be that the slaughtering made the breads sanctified, and the sprinkling caused them to become *piggul*. However, if you say he holds like Rabbi Elozar the son of Rabbi Shimon who says that the slaughtering does not make the breads sanctified, how does the sprinkling cause the breads to become *piggul*? Didn't Rav Gidal say in the name of Rav that sprinkling of *piggul* does not bring nor take out of *me'ilah* (*one who has unintentionally benefited from hekdedesh or removed it from the ownership of the Beis Hamikdosh has committed the transgression of me'ilah, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a korban asham*)? (What does this mean?) It does not bring to a status of *me'ilah* for limbs of *kodashim kalim* (*there is no status of me'ilah for the limbs of kodashim kalim that are supposed to be burned on the altar until after a kosher sprinkling of their blood, being that until then they are considered to belong to the owner*). It does not take away a status of *me'ilah* from meat of *kodshei kodashim* (*a kodshei kodashim has a status of possible me'ilah once it is dedicated, and its meat that is supposed to be eaten by Kohanim only become free of me'ilah after a kosher sprinkling of blood*).

The *Gemora* answers: Rav Gidal's statement in the name of Rav was strongly questioned (*see Me'ilah 3b, and therefore cannot be used to ask a question on Rav Pappa*).

Rabbi Yirmiyah asked Rabbi Zeira: If the two lambs were slaughtered with proper intent and the breads were then lost, can we deliberately sprinkle the blood with improper intent in order to allow the sacrifice to be eaten? (*If it would be sacrificed with proper intent it would be invalid, being that the lack of breads causes the sacrifice to be invalid.*)

Rabbi Zeira answered: Is there anything which is valid when done with improper intent and invalid when done with proper intent?!

The *Gemora* asks: Is this a correct question? We see that a *pesach* sacrifice before midday on *Erev Pesach* is not valid if brought with intent that it is a *pesach* sacrifice, yet it is valid if brought with intent that it is a *shelamim*!

Rabbi Zeira explained: I mean that there is nothing which has become fit to be sacrificed and was then pushed aside from being valid that cannot be sacrificed with proper intent but can be sacrificed with improper intent.

The *Gemora* asks: Is this so? This would apply to the *pesach* sacrifice mentioned above after *Erev Pesach* (*when it had been fit previously to be sacrificed*)!

Rabbi Zeira explained: I mean that there is nothing which has become fit to be sacrificed, was slaughtered, and was then pushed aside from being valid that cannot be sacrificed with proper intent but can be sacrificed with improper intent.

The *Gemora* asks: What about a *todah*? (*We said earlier on 46a that if a todah was slaughtered and then its breads fell apart, its blood should be sprinkled as a shelamim in order that the meat can be eaten, and he must bring another todah. This is very similar to our case!*)

The *Gemora* answers: A *todah* is different, as the Torah itself also calls it a *shelamim* (*it is therefore not considered as changing the intent completely*). (47a – 47b)