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Menachos Daf 57

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Partially Cooked

The *Gemora* discusses a previous statement. Rabbah bar bar Chanah stated in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: If one placed meat on coals on *Shabbos* and turned it over, he is liable for transgressing *Shabbos*. If he did not, he is exempt.

The *Gemora* asks: What is the case? If the case is that if he would not have turned it over it would not become cooked, obviously he is only liable in this situation (*and it does not have to be said*)! Rather, the case must be where it would have cooked anyway. Why, then, is he not liable unless he turns it over?

The *Gemora* answers: If he would not have turned it over, it would only have been cooked on one side like Ben D’rosai’s food (*a robber, who would always eat on the run; his food was cooked to only one-third of an ordinary cooking*). If he turned it over, it would be cooked in this fashion on both sides. Rabbi Yochanan is teaching that if one partially cooks food (*like the food of robbers*) on *Shabbos* on only one side of the food, he is not liable for cooking on *Shabbos*.

Rava states: If in one spot of the meat, a dried fig’s volume of meat is totally roasted, he is liable even if it is only on one side.

Ravina asked Rav Ashi: Does this mean that the roasted part (*the size of a dried fig*) must be together in one place, and not spread out over two or three different places of the meat? But it was taught in a *Mishna*: If one drills on *Shabbos* - even a small hole, he is liable. What is the case? If it is in one place, what can one do with a tiny hole in one place? Rather, it must be referring to two or three different holes, which together combine to be useful (*and therefore make one liable for boring holes on Shabbos*). [*Here, too, it must be that even a combination of totally roasted areas on the meat that equal the size of a dried fig should make one liable for transgressing Shabbos!*]

Rav Ashi answered: The *Mishna* means that one is liable for drilling one hole. It can be used for the opening for a key (*which is sharply pointed at its tip*).

Others state: Rava said that even if the meat is roasted in two or three places (*that combine to the size of a dried fig*), he is liable.

Ravina told Rav Ashi: We indeed learned this in a *Mishna*! The *Mishna* states: If one drills even a small hole he is liable. What is the case? If it is in one place, what can one do with a tiny hole in one place? Rather, it must be referring to two or three different holes, which together combine to be useful (*and therefore make one liable for drilling holes on Shabbos; just as here one can be liable with the combination of two or three areas of the meat*).

Rav Ashi replied: It is not a proof, as it is possible that one is liable for drilling one hole. It can be used for the opening for a key. (57a)

Leavening

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: If it would have written in the verse: *that you offer to Hashem shall not be prepared leavened (and the verse would not begin with the words ‘any minchah’)*, I would have said that the prohibition is only regarding the leavening of the *komeitz*. How would I know that the prohibition is against leavening any part of the *minchah* (*even before the komeitz is removed*)? This is why the verse states: *Minchah*. How do I know this applies to all other *minchah* offerings as well (*as this verse is only specifically regarding a minchas marcheshes*)? The verse states: *Any minchah*, indicating that this applies to all *minchah* offerings. *That you bring to Hashem* indicates that the prohibition applies only to a valid *minchah* offering, not to an invalid one. From here they said that if someone causes a valid *minchah* to become



leavened, he is liable. If he does this to an invalid *minchah*, he is not liable.

Rav Pappa inquired: If one leavened a *minchah*, and it then left the Courtyard, and then he leavened it again (*by baking it*), what is the law? Do we say that once it left the Courtyard it is invalid because it left the Courtyard, and therefore one is not liable for leavening it again? Or do we say that being that it was leavened originally, the disqualification that it left the Courtyard does not register, and therefore one who leavens it again is liable for leavening after leavening? The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved.

Rav Mari inquired: What is the law if he leavened it at the top of the altar? The verse states, *that you will bring*, seemingly indicating that one is only liable before it is brought to the altar (*not once it is brought*). Or perhaps we say that the prohibition exists until it is burned, for as long as it is lacking burning, it is still missing a service action? The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved.

The *Gemora* asks: Now that we derive the prohibition against all *minchah* offerings becoming *chametz* from ‘any *minchah*,’ why does the verse state ‘*that you will offer*’ (*which seems to indicate that one is only liable on the komeitz - the portion that is offered*)?

The *Gemora* answers: We require this for that which was taught in the following *braisa*: *That you will offer* includes *minchas nesachim* (*a minchah brought with libations*) in the prohibition against leavening a *minchah*; these are the words of Rabbi Yosi ha’Gelili. Rabbi Akiva says: This includes the *lechem ha’panim* (*showbreads*) in this prohibition.

The *Gemora* asks on Rabbi Yosi ha’Gelili: *Minchas nesachim* cannot be included, as it is mixed with fruit juice (*olive oil*) which means it cannot become leavened!?! [*Tosfos explains that other minchah offerings are mixed with a lot of water, as they do not contain a lot of oil. However, a minchas nesachim contains a lot of oil and is therefore not mixed with any water, rendering it unable to become leavened.*]

Rish Lakish answers: Rabbi Yosi ha’Gelili used to say that one could knead a *minchas nesachim* with water, and it is still valid (*this is why he needed to include it in the prohibition against becoming chametz*).

The *Gemora* asks on Rabbi Akiva: This is difficult, as the *lechem ha’panim* were made with a measuring cup designated for solids, and we know that Rabbi Akiva understands that this type of measure was not sanctified (*and therefore did not make its contents holy*). [*Accordingly, Rabbi Akiva would not say that one can make the lechem ha’panim into leaven, as when they are in the measure, they do not yet have the status of the lechem hapanim! Why, then, does he say that the verse includes them in the prohibition?*]

Ravin sent a message in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: The *braisa* means as follows, being that the opinions are reversed. *That you will offer* includes *minchas nesachim* (*a minchah brought with libations*) in the prohibition against leavening a *minchah*; these are the words of Rabbi Akiva. Rabbi Yosi ha’Gelili says: This includes the *lechem ha’panim* (*showbreads*) in this prohibition.

The *Gemora* notes: Rabbi Yochanan’s understanding of the *braisa* is according to his reasoning. Rabbi Yochanan states: Rabbi Yosi ha’Gelili and one of Rabbi Yishmael’s students say the same thing (*that they did sanctify a Temple measure which was designated for solids*). This student was Rabbi Yoshiyah. This is as the *braisa* states: *And he anointed them and sanctified them*. Rabbi Yoshiyah explains: The vessels used for liquids were anointed on the inside and the outside (*and therefore they would sanctify that which was inside of them, and even that which came into contact with the outside of the vessel*). The vessels used for dry goods were anointed only on the inside, but not on the outside. Rabbi Yonasan says: The vessels used for liquids were anointed on the inside, but not on the outside. The vessels used for dry goods were not anointed at all. This is clearly true, as the verse states: *From your dwelling places you shall bring the bread for waving, two comprised of two issarons, of fine flour they shall be; they shall be baked leavened, first offerings to Hashem*. This indicates that when are they (*the shte ha’lechem*) considered sanctified to Hashem? This is only after they were baked (*not when the flour is placed in the vessels*).

The *Gemora* asks: What is the crux of their argument?

The *Gemora* answers: It is regarding the word *osam* (*them*). Rabbi Yoshiyah understands that this word excludes a measure designated for solids – they were not anointed on the outside. Rabbi Yonasan understands that the vessels designated for solids were not holy at all, and they therefore do not need a verse to

exclude them. The verse is only needed to exclude the vessels designated for liquids - they were not anointed on the outside.

The *Gemora* asks: Why didn't Rabbi Yochanan say that Rabbi Akiva and one of Rabbi Yishmael's students, namely Rabbi Yonasan, said the same thing?

The *Gemora* answers: This is because they do not agree regarding liquid measurements. (*Rabbi Yonasan says they were only sanctified on the inside, while Rabbi Akiva says that the outside was also sanctified.*)

Rav Pappa asked Abaye: Isn't the bias (*the vessel used for mixing the oil and flour*) considered a vessel used for liquids (*and therefore it should be considered holy right away; if this was used for the kneading of the lechem ha'panim, it should be sanctified before the baking*)?

Abaye answered: The case could be where the *lechem ha'panim* was kneaded on top of a leather skin.

The *Gemora* asks: If so, when Rabbi Yonasan gave proof that it (*a vessel designated for solids*) was not sanctified (*by the fact that the shte ha'lechem was not sanctified until it was baked*), Rabbi Yoshiyah can refute his proof by saying that the Torah was referring to a case where the flour was measured in a non-sacred vessel (*but dry holy vessels would normally cause their contents to become holy*)!

The *Gemora* answers: Being that the Torah did not say explicitly one should make a kneading vessel for the *lechem ha'panim*, it is understandable that the case could be where it was kneaded on leather. However, being that the Torah stated to make an isaron (*dry vessel*) and use it to measure the flour, why should we assume that one did not use this vessel and instead used a non-sacred vessel? [*It is therefore not a good response to Rabbi Yonasan to say that the verse could be talking about a case where we ignored the Torah's instruction to use a holy dry vessel.*]

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: How do we know that if someone offers on the altar the meat of a *chatas*, *asham*, other *kodshei kodashim*, *kodashim kalim*, the remainder of the *omer*, the remainder of the *shte ha'lechem*, *lechem ha'panim*, or the remainder of other *minchah* offerings (*all of which are supposed to be eaten and not*

burned on the altar) that he has transgressed a negative prohibition? The verse states: *For all leavening or honey you should not burn from it as a fire offering to Hashem*. This indicates that any sacrifice that already had portions thrown to the fires of the altar is subject to the prohibition of '*you should not burn.*'

The *Gemora* asks: Is there any part of the *shte ha'lechem* or *lechem ha'panim* that are thrown to the fires of the altar (*that they should be included in this prohibition*)? Doesn't the *braisa* state: The *shte ha'lechem* and *lechem ha'panim* are excluded (*from the service of bringing them close to the altar*) because no part of them is cast to the fires of the altar?

Rav Sheishes answers: There is no part of these breads that go to the altar (*and that is why they are excluded from the service of bringing them close to the altar, however, with respect to the prohibition against burning them on the altar, they are included, for their accompanying sacrifices - the frankincense and the two lambs permit them for consumption, and therefore they are regarded as a remainder of a minchah*).

It was taught: If one of these items (*mentioned above*) was offered on the ramp of the altar, Rabbi Yochanan states that he has transgressed this prohibition. Rabbi Elozar states that he is exempt.

Rabbi Yochanan states that he is liable, as the *braisa* states: *The altar*. We only know this prohibition is regarding the altar. How do we know it even applies regarding the ramp of the altar? The verse states: *And to the altar they may not go up for a satisfying aroma*. Rabbi Elozar says he is exempt, as the verse states: *For all leavening or honey, you should not offer them as a first offering to Hashem*. (*this is a mixture of verses; see Rashi*). [*Rashi explains that the verse is referring to the shte ha'lechem, which was leavened, and they are called first offerings, for they are brought from the new wheat crop of the year. The torah is saying that it is regarding these items that the ramp is subject to the same prohibition as the altar; regarding all other things, such as the meat of the sacrifices, however, there is no prohibition against bringing them up on the ramp.*] One is only prohibited from bringing them (*shte halechem and bikkurim*) to the ramp, not any other items listed above in the *braisa* (*which are only prohibited to be brought to the altar itself*). (57a – 57b)



INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Making kiddush on sweetened wine: the opinions and the halachah

We again face a very interesting *halachic* issue which combines the *halachos* of the Temple with *halachos* pertaining to daily life. This concerns the wine fit for *kiddush*. The *Gemora* in Bava Basra explains (97a) that “one makes *kiddush* only on wine fit for libation on the altar”. The Rambam (*Hilchos Shabbos*, 29:14) rules: “We make *kiddush* only on wine fit for libation on the altar. Therefore, if honey or leavening were mixed in, even the amount of a drop of mustard in a big barrel, we do not make *kiddush* on it and thus we rule in the entire West.” This ruling is based on the Torah’s instruction, discussed in our *sugya*, that all leavening and all sweet things, you shall not offer from it a fire-offering for Hashem” (*Vayikra* 2:11). In other words, as one mustn’t offer a sacrifice or *minchah* containing a sweet substance, we must also not make *kiddush* on wine containing honey. But we must sharpen the definition of the prohibition to offer a sacrifice with a sweet substance to understand Rambam’s opinion. HaGaon Rav Yitzchak Zeev of Brisk zt”l will help us, as follows.

Food mixed with honey becomes disqualified or is the honey in it disqualified? If we want to examine the prohibition to offer a sacrifice or *minchah* containing honey, we find that we can define the prohibition in two ways. It is possible that the Torah forbade offering the sacrifice as, by its being offered, honey will be offered on the altar and the Torah wanted to prevent offering honey on the altar (*Minchas Chinuch*, mitzvah 107, os 4). It could also be that a sacrifice or *minchah* containing honey is disqualified in itself! In other words, the prohibition to offer them on the altar is not only to prevent offering honey but because the whole offering has become a sort unfit for the altar.

We return to Rambam’s ruling, that one mustn’t make *kiddush* on wine containing honey, and we easily notice that it can be understood only by means of the second explanation. After all, if the sacrifice containing honey is not forbidden because of itself, it is very difficult to understand why a barrel of wine, into which a drop of honey fell, is unfit for *kiddush*: the wine itself is fit for libation on the altar and only a peripheral impediment, that one

mustn’t offer honey on the altar, prevents it from being offered. However, if wine containing honey assumes a prohibition in itself not to be offered on the altar and becomes a type of disqualified wine, we can well understand why it mustn’t be used for *kiddush* (see another variation in *Kisvei HaGriz*).

What is “honey”? We have understood the underlying definition on which Rambam’s ruling is based and now we must clarify if wine is disqualified only by honey or also by sugar. For that reason we must understand what “honey” means. Indeed, Rashi is the first to relate to the topic when he writes “any sweetness of a fruit is called honey” (*Vayikra* 2:11). The Radbaz (on Rambam, *Hilchos Isurei HaMizbeich*, 5:1) explains that it must be that any sweetness of a fruit is called honey as we eat bees’ honey, though it derives from an impure creature, as it is gathered from fruit. In other words, honey was only permitted because the bees gather the nectar from fruit and exude it without adding anything from their bodies and as this substance is called honey, it is obvious that the sweetness of fruit is honey (see *ibid* in *Mishneh Lamelech*).

Therefore, according to Rambam, one mustn’t make *kiddush* on wine sweetened with sugar as sugar grows in the ground. Now let’s read the following halachah in *Shulchan Aruch* and realize how many opinions are hidden in the short sentences (*O.C.* 272:8): “One may make *kiddush* on... wine containing honey and some say that one mustn’t make *kiddush* on it.” The Remo rules: “...and the custom is to make *kiddush* on it, even if he has other wine but which is not as good as that containing honey (*Agur*).” In other words, if he has two wines, one sweetened and one not, he should prefer the tasty wine.

DAILY MASHAL

Sweeter Than Honey

The Torah commanded: “All leavening and all honey you shall not offer from it a fire-offering for Hashem” (*Vayikra* 2:11). The Gerer Rebbe zt”l, author of *Imrei Emes*, said that though honey is the sweetest substance, there is nothing sweeter than observing the *mitzvos* of the Torah.