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Oil and/or Levonah

The *Mishna* lists *minchah* offerings that have different combinations of required oil or *levonah* spice (*frankincense*).

Minchah	Oil	Levonah
Fine flour	Y	Y
Fried (machavas)		
Deep fried (marcheshes)		
Loaves (chalos)		
Crackers (rekikin)		
Kohen’s		
Kohen Gadol’s chavitin		
Non-Jew’s		
Women’s		
Omer (on second of Pesach)		
Brought with sacrifice	Y	N
Show bread	N	Y
Two breads (of Shavuos)	N	N
Sinner’s <i>minchah</i>		
Sotah’s		

Rav Pappa says that whenever the *Mishna* lists the first group of *minchah* offerings, it means ten units of one type. This is opposed to Rabbi Shimon, who says that one may bring a *minchah* that mixes different types (e.g., 5 loaves and 5 crackers).

The verse about the omer *minchah* states that: *V’nasata aleha shemen - you shall give on it oil*
V’samta aleha levonah - and you shall put on it levonah
Minchah hee – it is a minchah

The *braisa* says that the first phrase specifies “it” to exclude the show breads, as we may have thought that it is logical to require oil for them. If the *minchah* offered with a sacrifice, which does not require *levonah*, requires oil, certainly the show breads, which require *levonah*, should require oil. The verse therefore must exclude the show breads from requiring oil.

The *braisa* continues to say that the second phrase specifies “it” to exclude the *minchah* offered with a sacrifice, as we may have thought that it is logical to require *levonah* for them. If the show breads, which do not require oil, require *levonah*, certainly the *minchah* with a sacrifice, which requires oil, should require *levonah*. The verse therefore must exclude the *minchah* with a sacrifice from requiring *levonah*.

Finally, the *braisa* says that the last phrase’s use of the word *minchah* includes a requirement of *levonah* for the *minchah* brought on the eighth day of the inauguration of the *Kohanim*, while the word “it” excludes the two breads of *Shavuos* from requiring oil or *levonah*.

The *Gemora* questions why the *braisa* used the first phrase to exclude show breads, rather than to exclude the *minchah* of a *Kohen*.

The *Gemora* suggests that a *Kohen’s minchah* should require oil like the omer *minchah*, since they have these in common, as opposed to the show breads:

1. They are an *issaron* measure, while the show breads are two *issarons* per loaf.
2. They must be kneaded in a sanctified vessel, while the show breads only require a sanctified oven.
3. Their service is out of the sanctuary, while the show breads are placed inside it.
4. They are invalid if left overnight, while the show breads were left inside for a week.
5. They must be brought next to the altar, while the show breads are not.
6. Some part of them is offered on the altar, while no part of the show breads is.

The *Gemora* challenges this, with the list of things that the show breads have in common with the *omer*, as opposed to a *Kohen's minchah*:

1. They are communal sacrifices.
2. They are obligatory, while the *minchah* of a *Kohen* is voluntary.
3. If the community is impure, they can still be brought.
4. Some part of them is eaten.
5. They can become *piggul* – unfit due to improper intentions.
6. They may be offered on *Shabbos*.

The *Gemora* answers that the verse introducing the flour *minchah*, which requires oil, refers to *nefesh* – a soul who offers it, indicating that all *minchah* offerings brought by individuals, even a *Kohen*, requires oil. We therefore exclude the show breads from the first phrase.

The *Gemora* questions why the *braisa* used the second phrase to exclude the *minchah* of a sacrifice, rather than to exclude the *minchah* of a *Kohen*.

The *Gemora* suggests that a *Kohen's minchah* should require *levonah* like the *omer minchah*, since they have these in common, as opposed to the *minchah* of a sacrifice:

1. They are an *issaron* measure.
2. They must be mixed with a *log* measure of oil, while the *minchah* of a sacrifice requires three *log* per *isaron*.
3. They must be brought next to the altar.

4. They are brought on their own, and not tied to any other sacrifice.

The *Gemora* challenges this, with the list of things that the *minchah* of a sacrifice has in common with the *omer*, as opposed to a *Kohen's minchah*:

1. They are communal sacrifices.
2. They are obligatory, while the *minchah* of a *Kohen* is voluntary.
3. If the community is impure, they can still be brought.
4. They may be offered on *Shabbos*.

The *Gemora* again answers that the verse introducing the flour *minchah*, which requires *levonah*, refers to *nefesh* – a soul who offers it, indicating that all *minchah* offerings brought by individuals, even a *Kohen*, requires *levonah*. We therefore exclude the *minchah* of a sacrifice from the second phrase.

The *Gemora* asks why we do not assume that the concluding phrase excludes the *minchah* of the inauguration, and answers that we would have no reason to assume it did require oil and *levonah*, since it was a one-time sacrifice, which cannot be learned from the general rule of *minchah* offerings. Therefore, the verse must be including this *minchah* in the requirement of oil and *levonah*.

The *Gemora* asks why the final exclusion was used to exclude the two breads of *Shavuot*, rather than to exclude the *minchah* of a *Kohen*.

The *Gemora* suggests that a *Kohen's minchah* should require oil and *levonah* like the *omer minchah*, since they have these in common, as opposed to the two breads:

1. They are an *issaron* measure, while the two breads are two *issarons*.
2. They must be kneaded in a sanctified vessel, while the two breads only require a sanctified oven.
3. They are *matzah* - unleavened, while the two breads are *chametz* – leavened.
4. They are brought on their own, while the two breads are brought along with other sacrifices.

5. They must be brought next to the altar.
6. Some part of them is offered on the altar.

The *Gemora* challenges this, with the longer list of things that the two breads have in common with the *omer*, as opposed to a *Kohen's minchah*:

1. They are communal sacrifices.
2. They are obligatory, while the *minchah* of a *Kohen* is voluntary.
3. If the community is impure, they can still be brought.
4. Some part of them is eaten.
5. They can become *piggul* – unfit due to improper intentions.
6. They may be offered on *Shabbos*.
7. They permit something (*the new grain: for general consumption by the omer, and for use in sacrifices by the two breads*).
8. They are waved.
9. They are brought from produce of *Eretz Yisroel*.
10. They have a mandated time to be offered.
11. They are offered from the new grain.

The *Gemora* again answers that the verse introducing the flour *minchah*, which requires oil and *levonah*, refers to *nefesh* – a soul who offers it, indicating that all *minchah* offerings brought by individuals, even a *Kohen*, requires *levonah*. We therefore exclude the two breads from the final phrase. (59a – 59b)

Sinner's Minchah

The *minchah* of a sinner may not include oil or *levonah*, as the verse says:

Lo yasim aleha shemen – he shall not place on it oil
V'lo yiten aleha levonah – and he shall not give on it levonah.

The *Mishna* says that the verse is prohibiting either act, and one is therefore liable for each one individually. If one placed oil on it, it is invalid, while if one placed *levonah* on it, he may remove it, and make it valid again. One is not liable for placing oil on the remainder (*after taking the fistful*). If one placed a vessel of oil on top of the *minchah*, it is still valid.

The *braisa* says that if one placed oil on the sinner's *minchah*, it is invalid, while if he placed *levonah* on it, it is valid if one removed it. The *braisa* learns this from the concluding phrase in the verse, which states *chatas hee* – it is a sin offering. The word *chatas* includes a *minchah* which had *levonah* on it, while the word *hee* – it excludes a *minchah* with oil in it. The *braisa* says that we apply the exclusion to the case of oil, as it is impossible to remove the oil, while we apply the inclusion to the case of *levonah*, since one can remove it. (59b)

Removable or not Absorbed?

Rabbah bar Rav Huna asked Rabbi Yochanan whether a sinner's *minchah* is valid if one placed ground *levonah* on it, which cannot be removed, but is not absorbed in the *minchah*. Is a sinner's *minchah* with *levonah* on it valid, simply because one can remove all the *levonah*, or is it valid because the *levonah* does not get absorbed like the liquid oil?

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from the *Mishna*, which says that one should remove *levonah* placed on the sinner's *minchah*, implying that this is necessary to make it valid again.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying that although the *minchah* is valid in any case of *levonah*, since it didn't absorb it, the *Mishna* was saying that when the *levonah* was whole, there is an additional reason that it is valid.

The *Gemora* similarly attempts to resolve this from the *braisa* above, which said that we apply the inclusion to the case of *levonah*, which can be removed, and the *Gemora* deflects this the same way as it did the proof from the *Mishna*.

The *Gemora* resolves this from a *braisa* cited by Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak. The *braisa* says that if one put *levonah* in a sinner's *minchah*, he must remove it, and then it is valid. If, while it still had *levonah* on it, he planned to eat it improperly (*in the wrong place or at the wrong time*), it is invalid, but it is not *piggul*, since it is not valid in this state. Once he removed the *levonah*, if he then planned to eat it at the wrong time, it is *piggul*, and one is punished with *kares* for eating it. This *braisa* proves that while the *levonah* is on the *minchah*, it is invalid.

Therefore, if ground *levonah* was placed on it, it is invalid and cannot be corrected. (59b)

Disqualified, Forever?

The *Gemora* discusses this *braisa* in further detail, challenging the first case of improper intention. While the *levonah* is on it, we should consider it disqualified, and therefore the improper plans should have no effect.

The *Gemora* offers the following answers:

1. Even though the *levonah* must be removed, the verse still refers to it as a *chatas*, even with the *levonah* on it, indicating that it is not disqualified. (Abaye)
2. This *braisa* follows Chanan Hamitzri, who says that sacrifices are not disqualified, even when they are currently invalid. The *Gemora* cites the *braisa*, in which he says that if one of the goats of *Yom Kippur* dies, even if the other one's blood is already in a vessel, we don't consider the slaughtered goat disqualified, but we simply replace the missing one, and continue. (Rava)
3. Anything which can be corrected by a person is not disqualified. Therefore, since one can remove the *levonah*, it is not disqualified. (Rav Ashi)

Rav Ada supports Rav Ashi's answer, from the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. In the case of the goats of *Yom Kippur*, Rabbi Yehudah says that if one of the goats is unusable, the other is disqualified and must be discarded, indicating that he says that something disqualified is unusable. Yet, Rabbi Yehudah says that after all the *Pesach* sacrifices were offered, one cup was filled with the blood on the floor, and spilled on the altar, in case some of the sacrifices' blood spilled directly on the floor and was not yet applied to the altar. If blood spilled directly on the floor, it was disqualified, but Rabbi Yehudah says that it still is valid for the altar. The distinction must be that in the case of *Pesach*, we have the ability to collect that blood and apply it, and therefore it is not considered disqualified. (59b)

How Much?

Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef quotes Rabbi Yochanan discussing the parameters of the prohibitions of applying oil or *levonah* to a

sinner's *minchah*. He said that to invalidate it with oil, one must place any amount of oil on a *k'zayis* – *olive size* of a sinner's *minchah*. The verse says *lo yasim aleha shemen* – *he will not place oil on it*, and "placing" applies to any amount, while on "it" refers to a substantial portion of the *minchah* (i.e., a *k'zayis*). He also said that to invalidate it with *levonah*, one must place a *k'zayis* of *levonah* on any portion of the *minchah*. The verse says *lo yiten aleha levonah* – *he will not give levonah on it*, and "giving" implies a substantial amount (i.e., a *k'zayis*). Although on "it" refers to a substantial amount, the unnecessary repetition of this word in the second phrase reverses the meaning, teaching that one is liable even for placing it on less than a *k'zayis*.

Some say that Rav Yitzchak bar Yosef quoted Rabbi Yochanan raising the question of whether it is invalid if one placed less than a *k'zayis* of oil on a *k'zayis* of the *minchah*. Do we assume that the "placing" used to refer to the oil is similar to the "giving" used to refer to the oil, and therefore implies a *k'zayis*, or are they unrelated? The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved. (59b – 60a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

A Vessel

The *Gemora*, when comparing various *minchah* offerings, states that the *omer minchah* and a *Kohen's minchah* both require a vessel, while the show breads do not.

Rashi explains that the *Gemora* means that they must be kneaded in a sanctified vessel, but the show breads are only sanctified when baked in the oven.

Tosfos (59a keli) challenges this explanation. If we assume that the vessels to measure dry flour were sanctified, all three require a sanctified vessel. If we assume that these vessels were not sanctified, none of them necessarily need a sanctified vessel. The *Gemora* cannot mean that the *minchah* offerings that need (liquid) oil need a sanctified vessel, since the *Gemora* is trying to determine whether the show breads or the *Kohen's*

minchah need oil, but still states that the *Kohen's minchah* needs a vessel.

Tosfos concludes that the *Kohen's minchah* and the *omer* both use the same *type* of vessel for sanctification, as opposed to the show breads, which are sanctified with the table for the bread and the spoons for the *levonah*. Tosfos notes that this reading does not fit with the later stage of the *Gemora*, where these *minchah's* are contrasted with the two breads of *Shavuos*.

Shabbos

The *Gemora* says that the *omer* and the show breads are similar in that their service is performed even on *Shabbos*.

Rashi explains that the *omer* is offered even on *Shabbos*, while the show breads are placed on the table on *Shabbos*.

The Rashash notes that placing the show breads does not involve any generally prohibited form of work, and therefore does not indicate a similarity with the *omer*. He suggests that perhaps the *Gemora* is referring to burning the *levonah* on the altar, which is a generally prohibited form of work.

Inauguration Minchah

The *braisa* says that the final clause, *minchah hee – it is a minchah*, is comprised of two components: *minchah*, which includes the *minchah* of the inauguration of the *Mishkan*, and *hee*, which excludes the two breads of *Shavuos*. The *Gemora* asks why we include the *minchah* of inauguration, rather than excluding it.

The Rashash explains that although *minchah* is an inclusive phrase, the *Gemora* means to ask why we do not apply the phrases in the reverse way, applying excluding phrase of *hee* to the *minchah* of inauguration, and applying the inclusive phrase of *minchah* to the *minchah* of two breads.

Disqualified

After citing the *braisa* which says that if one had an improper plan for a sinner's *minchah* while it had *levonah* on it, it is

invalid, but not *piggul*, the *Gemora* asks why the *minchah*, while it has *levonah*, is not considered disqualified.

Rashi explains that the *Gemora's* is asking why the improper thought makes it invalid. While it has *levonah* on it, it is invalid, and should be disqualified, making the improper plan irrelevant, and it should therefore have no lasting effect on the *minchah*.

Tosfos (59b v'tihavi) challenges this reading, as the *braisa* simply says that it is invalid. Even if the improper plan had no effect, at this point it is invalid, since it has *levonah* on it.

Tosfos says that the *Gemora's* question was not on the case of the *braisa* per se, but on any case of *levonah* placed on the sinner's *minchah*. Since it is invalid with the *levonah* on it, how does it ever become valid again? Once it became invalid at one point, it should be permanently disqualified, as is generally the case with sacrifices.

DAILY MASHAL

The Golden Path

Leavening, said the *Shoel Umeishiv*, symbolizes the sourest and honey symbolizes the sweetest: two opposites. One should choose the golden path, not to go too much to the right or to the left (Rambam, *Hilchos Dei'os*, 2:2). One mustn't offer leavening or honey for Hashem's service. But when one starts to serve Hashem, "a **first sacrifice** you shall offer them." He must follow the extreme opposite side to conquer his attributes and only afterwards return to the middle path, as Rambam wrote (*Telalei Oros*, *Vayikra*).