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**Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h**

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Rabbi Zeira asked the following question: What is the law if a man said: ‘Behold, I undertake to offer for an olah-offering either a ram or a lamb’, and he brought a palgas?<sup>1</sup> Of course according to Rabbi Yochanan the question does not arise, since he holds that it is a distinct species. For we have learnt: If a man [under an obligation to bring a lamb or a ram as a sacrifice] offered a palgas, he must bring for it libations as for a ram, but he does not thereby discharge the obligation of his sacrifice. And Rabbi Yochanan said that the verse, Or a ram, included a palgas. The question, however, does arise according to the view of Bar Padda, who holds that he must bring [for it libations as for a ram] and account for the possibilities. The question therefore is: must he account only for the possibility of it being either a ram or a lamb but not of it being a distinct species, or must he also account for the possibility of it being a distinct species and declare that if it is a distinct species all the libations shall be regarded as a freewill-offering? The question remains unresolved.

Rabbi Zeira asked the following question: What is the law if a man said: ‘Behold, I undertake to bring [ten] loaves of a todah offering either leavened or unleavened’, and he brought siur? According to whose definition of siur does the question arise? If [he brought] that siur as defined by Rabbi Meir (paled dough, but cracks did not develop yet), and [the question is asked] according to Rabbi Yehudah's ruling about it, then it is undoubtedly unleavened! And if [he brought that siur] as defined by Rabbi Yehudah (cracks developed in the

dough) and [the question is asked] according to Rabbi Meir's ruling about it, then it is clearly leavened! Again if [he brought that siur] as defined by Rabbi Meir and [the question is asked] according to Rabbi Meir's ruling about it, then it is evidently leavened, since one is liable to lashes [for eating it on the Passover]! Indeed, the question arises on Rabbi Yehudah's definition [of siur] and according to Rabbi Yehudah's ruling about it; thus, is it a condition of doubt, then in our case he at all events fulfills his obligation; or is it a distinct state, then he does not fulfill his obligation?

The Gemora asks: But hasn't Rav Huna said that if a man said: ‘Behold, I undertake to offer the loaves of a todah-offering’, he must bring a todah-offering as well as the loaves? Now in our case, since there is imposed upon this person the duty of bringing a todah-offering as well as the loaves, he does not know whether he must regard these [loaves of siur] as leavened and so bring for the rest unleavened loaves, or as unleavened and so bring leavened loaves [among the others]!

The Gemora answers: The question could only arise where a man said: ‘Behold, I undertake to bring [ten] loaves, [either leavened or unleavened] in order to release So-and-so from this obligation in his todah-offering’.

The Gemora asks: Even so, that other person does not know whether to regard these [loaves of siur] as leavened and

<sup>1</sup> A sheep in its first twelve months is called a ‘lamb’, after thirteen months it is termed a ‘ram’, in its thirteenth month it is known as a palgas.



bring the unleavened himself, or to regard these as unleavened and bring the leavened himself!

The Gemora answers: The question only arises in the case where he did not say, 'In order to release', and the point is this: Has this person fulfilled his obligation or not? — The question remains unresolved.

MISHNAH: [The method of killing] which renders the parah adumah valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the red cow invalid.

GEMARA: Our Rabbis taught: The parah adumah is rendered valid by slaughtering and invalid by breaking its neck; the heifer is rendered valid by breaking its neck and invalid by slaughtering. It follows, therefore, that [the method of killing] which renders the parah adumah valid renders the heifer invalid, and the method which renders the heifer valid renders the parah adumah invalid.

The Gemora asks: But shouldn't the parah adumah be rendered valid by breaking its neck by the following kal vachomer argument? Thus, if the heifer which is not rendered valid by slaughtering is nevertheless rendered valid by breaking its neck, the parah adumah which is rendered valid by slaughtering should surely be rendered valid by breaking its neck!

The Gemora responds: The verse, therefore, says: And he shall slaughter it, and in addition [the law is stated to be] a statute, in order to indicate that it is rendered valid only by slaughtering and not by breaking its neck.

The Gemora asks: But is it established that whenever 'statute' is written [in connection with a law] one may not apply to it a kal vachomer argument? But what of Yom Kippur in connection concerning which 'statute' is written, nevertheless, it was taught: [Upon which the lot fell for the Lord,] and it shall determine it for the chatas, implies that only the lot can determine it for the chatas, but designation

cannot determine it for the chatas. For [without this Biblical direction] I would have argued by a kal vachomer argument thus: If offerings which are not consecrated by lot are nevertheless consecrated by designation, an offering which is consecrated by lot should surely be consecrated by designation! It is therefore written: 'And it shall determine it for the chatas', to indicate that the lot only can determine it for a chatas, but designation will not determine it for a chatas. Now this is so, only because it is written in the Divine Law, 'And it shall determine it for the chatas', but without this verse one would have applied the kal vachomer argument!

The Gemora provides a different source: The Divine Law excluded all others when it stated in connection with the heifer, 'Whose neck was broken', indicating that only this shall have its neck broken, but no other.

And should not the heifer be rendered valid by slaughtering by the following kal vachomer argument? Thus, if the parah adumah which is not rendered valid by breaking its neck is nevertheless rendered valid by slaughtering, the heifer which is rendered valid by breaking its neck should surely be rendered valid by slaughtering! The verse states: And they shall break the neck, and also, 'Whose neck was broken', thus emphasizing that the heifer is rendered valid only by breaking its neck and not by slaughtering.