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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishnah: If the knife fell and he paused [in the slaughtering in order] to lift it up, if his coat fell down and he paused to lift it up, if he sharpened the knife and grew tired and another came and slaughtered — [in each case] if the pause was for the length of time required for slaughtering, the slaughtering is invalid. Rabbi Shimon said: [it is invalid] if the pause was for the length of time required for examining [the knife].

Gemara: What is meant by the length of time required for slaughtering? — It means, said Rav, the time required for slaughtering another animal. Rav Kahana and Rav Assi asked Rav: is the test in the case of an animal to be the length of time required for slaughtering another animal, and in the case of a bird the length of time required for slaughtering another bird; or is the test always the length of time required for slaughtering an animal even in the case of a bird? — Rav answered: I was not on such intimate terms with my uncle [R' Chiya] as to ask him this.

It was stated: Rav said: in the case of an animal the test is the length of time required for slaughtering an animal, and in the case of a bird the length of time required for slaughtering a bird. Shmuel said: the test even in the case of a bird is the length of time required for slaughtering an animal. So, too, when Rabbi Avin came [from Israel] he

reported Rabbi Yochanan's opinion that the test even in the case of a bird is the length of time required for slaughtering an animal.

Rabbi Chanina said, [the Mishnah means] the length of time required for fetching another animal and slaughtering it. Fetching! Why he might fetch an animal from anywhere! Then you have made the test to vary [with the circumstances of each case]! — Rav Pappa explained: The difference between them is as regards an animal that is ready for casting.¹

In the West it was reported in the name of Rabbi Yosi son of Rabbi Chanina: [the Mishnah means] the length of time required to lift up, lay on the ground and slaughter, in the case of small animals, a small animal, and in the case of large animals, a large animal.

Rava said: If one spent the whole day slaughtering [one animal] with a blunt knife, the slaughtering is valid.

Rava raised the question: Are several [short] pauses to be combined? But surely this can be solved from his preceding statement!² — No, for there he did not pause at all.

¹ According to R' Yochanan the pause which renders invalid is the length of time required for slaughtering, but according to R' Chanina it is the length of time required for casting the animal on the ground plus the time required for slaughtering it.

² For it is presumed that in the course of a day's slaughtering there must have been many short pauses.

Rav Huna the son of Rav Nassan raised this question: What if he paused while cutting the lesser portion of the pipes? — This remains unresolved.

Rabbi Shimon said, [it is invalid] if the pause was for the length of time required for examining [the knife]. What is the meaning of the length of time required for examining? — Rabbi Yochanan said: It means the length of time required for a Sage to examine [the knife]. But this test would vary with the circumstances of each case! — It means the length of time required for the slaughterer, himself a sage, to examine [the knife].

Mishnah: If a man first cut the esophagus and then tore away the trachea [with a nicked blade], or first tore away the trachea and then cut the esophagus; or if he cut one of these pipes and paused until the animal died; or if he burrowed the knife underneath the second pipe and cut it — [in all these cases] Rabbi Yesheivav said: the animal is neveilah (since the shechitah was invalid, it is as if it died naturally); Rabbi Akiva says: It is a tereifah.³ Rabbi Yesheivav laid down this rule in the name of Rabbi Yehoshua: Whenever an animal is rendered invalid by a fault in the slaughtering, it is neveilah; whenever an animal has been duly slaughtered but is rendered invalid by some other defect it is tereifah. Rabbi Akiva [ultimately] agreed with him.

Gemara: If a man first cut the esophagus etc. And Rabbi Akiva agreed with him.

A contradiction was pointed out. We have learned: The following defects render cattle tereifah: If the esophagus

was pierced, or the trachea severed!⁴ — Rava answered: There is no contradiction. In the one case he first cut [the esophagus] and then tore away [the trachea]; in the other case he first tore away [the trachea] and then cut the esophagus. Where he first cut [the esophagus] and then tore away [the trachea] we regard it as a fault in the slaughtering, but where he first tore away [the trachea] and then cut [the esophagus] we regard it as invalidated by some other defect.⁵

Rav Acha bar Huna raised the following objection against Rava: [It was taught:] If he first cut the esophagus and then tore away the trachea, or first tore away the trachea and then cut the esophagus, the animal is neveilah! — Render [the second clause] thus: [or if he tore away the trachea] having already cut the esophagus. He retorted: There are two arguments against this. First, it is now identical with the first clause; and secondly, it expressly says. 'and he then cut'. — Rather, said Rava: it must be interpreted thus: the following defects render the animal prohibited, some as neveilah and some as tereifah.

The Gemora asks: Then why does it not include also the case of Chizkiyah? For Chizkiyah taught: If one cut an animal into two it is neveilah. And also the case of Rabbi Elozar? For Rabbi Elozar taught: if the thigh of an animal was removed and the cavity was noticeable it is neveilah.

The Gemora answers: It includes such neveilah only as does not convey tumah while alive, but not such neveilah as conveys tumah while alive.⁶

³ It may not be eaten, but it does not render tumah.

⁴ It is there stated that if the trachea was severed the animal is merely tereifah, whereas in our Mishnah, if the slaughterer tore away (i.e., severed) the trachea, the animal is stated to be neveilah by Rabbi Yesheivav, and Rabbi Akiva ultimately also concurred.

⁵ Since it was rendered invalid actually before the commencement of the slaughtering.

⁶ In the cases of Chizkiyah and R' Elozar the animal is at once regarded as neveilah for all purposes even though the animal still shows signs of life by the convulsive movements of its limbs.

Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish suggested: In the one case he cut [the trachea] in the place where it was already lacerated; in the other case he did not cut [the trachea] in the place where it was already lacerated. Where he cut it in the place where it was already lacerated we regard the animal as invalidated by a defect in the slaughtering; but where he did not cut it in the place where it was already lacerated we regard the animal as invalidated by some other defect.

The Gemora asks: But did Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish really say this? Surely Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish has said that if the lung was pierced after he had cut the trachea [but before he had cut the esophagus], the slaughtering was valid.⁷ This proves, does it not, that [once the trachea has been cut] the lung is regarded as though placed in a basket? Here also we should say, should we not, that [once the trachea has been lacerated] it is regarded as though placed in a basket?⁸

The Gemora answers: Rather, said Rabbi Chiya bar Abba in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: There is no contradiction. There [the Mishnah represents the view of Rabbi Akiva] before he retracted, here after he retracted; that Mishnah, however, was allowed to stand.

The text above stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Lakish said: If the lung was pierced after he had cut the trachea [but before he had cut the esophagus], the slaughtering is valid. Rava said: This decision of Rish Lakish applies only to the lung because the vitality of the lung is entirely dependent upon the trachea, but it does not apply to the intestines.

Rabbi Zeira asked: Saying since you declare [the animal] permissible wherever a defect occurred [after cutting one pipe], what difference does it make whether the defect was in the lung or in the intestines?

Rabbi Zeira, however, must have withdrawn his objection, for Rabbi Zeira had put the following question: What is the law if the intestines were perforated after the first pipe but before the second pipe [was cut]? Is the first pipe to be reckoned together with the second in order to render the animal tahor, and not neveilah, or not?⁹ And we replied: Wasn't this question similar to that put by Ilfa, viz., what is the law if a fetus put forth its foreleg [out of the womb of its mother] after the first pipe but before the second pipe [was cut]¹⁰? Is the first pipe to be reckoned together with the second in order to render [the foreleg]

⁷ For as soon as the trachea has been cut the slaughtering has been completed regarding it; hence any defect which occurs subsequently in any pipe which is directly connected with or attached to the trachea is of no consequence.

⁸ With the result that the animal has virtually only one pipe fit to be slaughtered and it must therefore be neveilah.

⁹ The effect of slaughtering, it must be remembered, is twofold: (a) the animal is permitted to be eaten, and (b) it is not neveilah; and, it is suggested, in order that the slaughtering be valid each pipe must serve this twofold purpose. In our case, however, whereas the cutting of the first pipe tends to produce this twofold effect the cutting of the second pipe does not, for the defect that has occurred in the intestines before the cutting of the second pipe has already precluded (a); the slaughtering therefore should be invalid absolutely. On the other hand, it might be argued that the

slaughtering should be effective at least with regard to (b), since this purpose is common to both pipes.

¹⁰ It is established law that the embryo within the womb of its mother is rendered fit for food by the valid slaughtering of the mother; if, however, part of the embryo protruded out of the womb before the slaughtering, such part will not be rendered fit for food by the valid slaughtering of the mother, although it will be rendered clean by such slaughtering. The question here raised is whether or not the slaughtering of the mother will render tahor that part which protruded out of the womb after the first pipe had been cut. The argument is similar to that in the preceding note. For the slaughtering of the first pipe serves a twofold purpose, namely, to render the limb which protruded later tahor and also fit for food, whereas the slaughtering of the second pipe serves only the single purpose of rendering the limb tahor. The question therefore is. Can the first pipe be reckoned together with the second in order to

tahor, and not neveilah, or not? Now the question put [by R' Zeira] was only as to whether or not the animal was to be regarded as tahor, and not neveilah, but [admittedly] it is forbidden to be eaten.

Rav Acha bar Rav said to Ravina: It may very well be that Rabbi Zeira did not withdraw his objection at all, but he merely formulated his question from the point of view of Rava, though he himself did not agree with it.

DAILY MASHAL

Pausing (during the shechitah) for only a small amount of time is a big deal!

Rashi explains that upon the death of Miriam, there was no longer any water for the people to drink as the well which had sustained them with water had only existed in the merit of Miriam. How can this be reconciled with the Gemora in Bava Metzia (86b) which states that the well was provided in the merit of Abraham's kindness in welcoming guests and providing them with water to drink?

The Maharsha (Taanis 9a) answers that the well initially appeared in the merit of Abraham's actions. However, if only for Abraham's kind deeds, the well would have remained for a short period of time and then departed. In the merit of Miriam, the well which had come due to Abraham remained with the Jews throughout their journeys in the wilderness until her death. The Torah Temimah challenges this explanation, questioning how the merit of Miriam, who sustained the well for 40 years, could be greater than that of Abraham, who was only able to make it last a short while. Some suggest that the first

effect the purpose common to both, namely, to render the limb tahor?

opinion maintains that initially bringing about a miracle takes infinitely more merits than sustaining it once it has already begun, and in this sense Abraham's merits were indeed greater than those of Miriam's.