



Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

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Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h
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Designated for Idolatry

The *Mishna* had stated: What is meant by “set aside” (for idolatry)? [That which has been set aside for idolatrous use; it (the animal itself) is forbidden (for the altar), but that which is upon it (such as its ornaments) is permitted.]

Rish Lakish said: An animal is forbidden only if it had been designated for seven years (and after the conclusion of seven years of fattening, the animal is to be offered to the idols; it becomes forbidden immediately), since it says: And it came to pass that Hashem said to him (Gideon): Take your father’s young bull and the second, seven-year bull (which he has fattened for seven years; we therefore see that this is the usual period for fattening before it is used for idolatry).

The *Gemora* asks: But there, was it only a case where it was designated? Was it not also a case where it was worshipped? [It was forbidden on account of it being worshipped, so the “seven years” cannot be coming to teach us why it was forbidden!?!]

Rav Acha son of Rabbi Yaakov answers: It was designated for idolatry but they did not actually worship it as an idol.

Rava says: You can maintain that they actually used it as an idol, but there Hashem’s instruction (to offer this as a korban) was a novelty (and nothing can be derived from there), as Rabbi Abba bar Kahana explained, for Rabbi Abba bar Kahana said: Eight things were permitted that night:

1. The slaughtering of an animal outside (for the *Mishkan* was located at *Shiloh*, and private altars were forbidden then)
2. Slaughtering at night
3. Servicing by a non-Kohen (for Gideon was not a Kohen)
4. Performing the service without a ministering vessel
5. Servicing with vessels used in the worship of an *asheirah* tree
6. Using the wood of an *asheirah* tree
7. Offering an animal that was designated for idolatry
8. Offering an animal that had been worshipped (28b – 29a)

Scriptural Source

Rav Tovi ben Masnah said in the name of Rabbi Yoshiyah: Where in the Torah is *muktzeh* (an animal designated; initially the *Gemora* thinks that this means that every offering should be fattened up first) intimated? It is written: Shall you observe to offer to Me in its appointed time, intimating that every consecration requires special observation.

Abaye asked: If this is so, if one brought a starved lamb without having kept it under observation, is it really the law that it is not fit to be offered on the altar?

Rav Tovi replied to Abaye: What I meant is as follows: Shall you observe to offer to Me in its appointed time, implying that it should be designated for Me, but not to another master. What is meant by another master to whom an offering is made? This must be referring to idolatry. (29a)



Designated until when?

Rava the son of Rav Adda said in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak: A designated animal for idolatry remains forbidden only until it has been used for some use (*other than idolatry, for then, it will not be used for idol worship*).

Ulla said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: [*A designated animal for idolatry remains forbidden only*] until the animal is handed over to the idolatrous priests (*to be eaten, for then, it will not be used for idol worship*).

Beiha said in the name of Rabbi Yochanan: [*A designated animal for idolatry remains forbidden only*] until they feed the animal with vetches set aside for idolatry.

Rabbi Abba said to Beiha: Do you and Ulla disagree (*for Ulla said that there is no longer a prohibition as soon as it is handed over to the priests, even before it is fed*)?

He replied to him: No. Ulla himself means that it is fed with vetches set aside for idolatry.

Rabbi Abba said: Beiha knew how to explain this teaching. Had he not, however, gone to *Eretz Yisroel*, he would not have known how to explain it, for it was *Eretz Yisroel* which was the cause (*that made him wise*).

Rav Yitzchak said to him: Beiha belonged to both Bavel and *Eretz Yisroel* (*and his wisdom was due to both countries*).

Rav Chananya of Trita recited the following *braisa* in the presence of Rabbi Yochanan: An animal designated for idolatry remains forbidden only until some act has been done with it. He taught this and also explained it: What is meant by some act? Such as shearing its wool or doing some work with it. [*It is then permitted to be used as an offering, for they will not worship it as an idol any longer, even if the idolatrous priests do not intend to eat it.*] (29a)

Worshipped

The *Mishna* had stated: And what is meant by “worshipped” etc.? [*That which has been used for idolatry; both it (the animal itself) and that which is upon it, are forbidden. In both cases, however, the animal may be eaten.*]

The *Gemora* asks: From where is this law (*that an animal designated for an idol, or one which was actually worshipped, is permitted for private consumption*) derived?

Rav Pappa said: It is written: *From the feast of Israel*, which teaches us that offerings are only valid from that which is permitted to Israel. Now, if you were to assume that they are forbidden for private use, what need is there for a special Scriptural verse to exclude them from the altar?

The *Gemora* asks: But is it the case that wherever something is forbidden for private use there is no need for a Scriptural verse? Is there not the case of *tereifah* (*an animal with a physical defect that will cause its death; it is forbidden to be eaten even if it was slaughtered properly*), which is forbidden for private use and yet a Scriptural verse excludes it from being offered on the altar? For it has been taught in a *braisa*: The verse, ‘*from the cattle*,’ which was not necessary, excludes a *tereifah*.

The *Gemora* answers: The verse *from the cattle* is necessary, for you might have thought that the verse refers to a case where the animal became *tereifah* and then it was consecrated, but where the animal was consecrated and then it became *tereifah*, I might have thought that it is valid for the altar. [*‘From the cattle’ is necessary to teach that even then, it is not eligible to be used for an offering.*]

The *Gemora* asks: But do we not derive this from the following: ‘*Whatever shall pass under the rod*’ excludes a *tereifah*, since it cannot pass underneath it (*in a healthy manner*)!?

The *Gemora* answers: It is also necessary, for from the verse: *From the feast of Israel, I would only have excluded those that emerges as tereifah from their mother's womb (they were never fit for a sacrifice), but where it was once fit, I would say that it is valid as an offering. The Torah therefore states: Whatever shall pass under the rod. (29a)*

Mishna

What is meant by a harlot's wage? If one says to a harlot, "Take this lamb for your wage," even if there are a hundred lambs, they are all forbidden (*for the altar*). Similarly, if one says to his fellow, "Take this lamb and have your slavewoman sleep with my servant," Rebbe says: the lamb is not regarded as a harlot's wage, whereas the Sages say: It is regarded as a harlot's wage. (29a)

Harlot's Wage Forbidden for the Altar

The *Mishna* had stated: even if there are a hundred lambs, they are all forbidden.

The *Gemora* asks: If this meant that she took a hundred animals for her hire, surely it is obvious then that they are all forbidden! What is the difference whether there is one or a hundred?

The *Gemora* answers: It is necessary for a case where she took one lamb as her wage and he gave her a hundred; all are then forbidden, since they all come because of the wage.

The *Gemora* cites a *braisa*: If one gave a harlot an animal but did not cohabit with her, or he cohabited with her but did not give her anything, her wage is permitted (*to be sacrificed*).

The *Gemora* asks: One gave a harlot an animal but did not cohabit with her; is that referred to as a harlot's wage? And furthermore, in the case where he cohabited with her but did not give her anything, so what did he give her (*what is*

the issue)?

The *Gemora* explains the cases: If one gave a harlot an animal and afterwards cohabited with her, or he cohabited with her and afterwards gave her an animal for her wage, her wage is permitted (*to be sacrificed*).

The *Gemora* asks: Why it is not retroactively prohibited as a harlot's wage (*since that's what it was given for, and it was in existence at the time which he cohabited with her*)?

Rabbi Elozar answers that the *braisa* is referring to a case where she already sacrificed it before cohabitation.

The *Gemora* analyzes the case: If the man gave it to her for immediate acquisition, that is obvious that it would be then permitted, for he had not cohabited with her as of yet (*and a harlot's wage will only be if it was given to her at the time of cohabitation or later*), while if he gave it to her to acquire at the time of cohabitation, she cannot sacrifice it (*beforehand*), since one can only consecrate something that they fully possess. Rather, the case of Rabbi Elozar must be where he stipulated that she should acquire it at the time of cohabitation, but if she needs to use it in the interim, it will be hers from now. [*It emerges that retroactively from the time of cohabitation it is hers even beforehand; that is what allows her to consecrate it and to offer it. It is a novelty, for you might think that it should still be forbidden since the man gave it to her with the stipulation that she should not acquire it until cohabitation; perhaps then it is regarded as a harlot's wage. The braisa teaches us that nevertheless it is permitted.*]

Rav Oshaya inquired: What is the rule if she did not sacrifice it, but simply consecrated it. [*Since consecration is tantamount to a formal acquisition, this may be considered equivalent to sacrificing (and it should be permitted for the altar, for it was done prior to cohabitation), or perhaps, since the animal is still in existence at the time of cohabitation, it should be considered as a harlot's wage.*]

The *Gemora* suggests that Rabbi Elozar's explanation that the case is one where she *sacrificed* it, and not a case where she simply consecrated it, indicates that consecration is not equivalent to sacrificing.

The *Gemora* deflects that Rabbi Elozar may also have been unsure about the case of consecration, and explains the inquiry as follows: Do we say that where she offered it, since it is not in existence at the time of cohabitation, the animal is permitted (*for the altar*), but where she consecrated it at the time of cohabitation, the animal is forbidden (*for the altar*), or perhaps, since we have learned: The word of mouth regarding consecration to the Most High is valid like the transferring of an object to a private person, and therefore, if she consecrated it, it is legitimate (*for the altar*), and all the more so is it legitimate (*for the altar*) if she offered it? The *Gemora* leaves this question unresolved.

The second case of the *braisa* mentioned above was explained to mean as follows: If a man cohabited with her and then gave her the animal as payment, it (*the animal*) is permitted (*for the altar*).

The *Gemora* challenges this from another *braisa* which says that if he paid her with an animal, it is prohibited, even if he gave it twelve months later.

Rav Chanan bar Rav Chisda answers that the *braisa* that prohibits it is referring to a case where he said, "Cohabit with me for this lamb" (*he designated the animal beforehand*), while the *braisa* that permits it is referring to a case where he said, "Cohabit with me for a lamb" (*so the animal that is eventually given is viewed as a gift, not as her wage*).

The *Gemora* asks: Why by specifying the animal is it prohibited, since she did not acquire it by *meshichah* – pulling the animal?

The *Gemora* offers two answers:

1. It was a harlot who is an idolater, who acquires without *meshichah* (*but rather through money, and in this case it is through the act of cohabitation*).
2. The animal was in her domain, but he only designated it as an *apotiki* – assets to collect from if he does not pay by a certain date. Since it is only an *apotiki*, it is not hers yet, but if he does not pay, it retroactively is hers, and is a harlot's wage.

Rav said: The law of a harlot's hire applies to a male (*if he cohabited with a male and gave him an animal, it is forbidden to be offered*) and to all forbidden women, except the hire of his wife when she is a *niddah* (*a menstruant woman*). What is the reason? It is written: [*You shall not bring the wage of a harlot, and a niddah is not a harlot. Levi, however, says: Even of his wife when a niddah. What is the reason? It is written: [You shall not bring the wage of a harlot; it is] an abomination, and this is also an abomination.*]

The *Gemora* explains that Levi uses the word *harlot* (*zonah*) to intimate that this law applies by *zonah* (*a female harlot*), but not to a *zoneh* (*a male harlot; if a woman gave a man an animal, it is legitimate for the altar*).

The *Gemora* notes further that Rav would derive this law from the statement of Rebbe, for it has been taught in the following *braisa*: Rebbe said: A harlot's wage is forbidden only when it comes to him through a woman who is an *ervah* (*forbidden to him on pain of kares or death*), but the wage of his wife when she is a *niddah*, or payments (*to the harlot*) for her loss of time (*but not for the act of cohabitation*), or if the woman gave the man a lamb for hire, these are legitimate (*for the altar*). And although there is no Scriptural proof for it, there is an indication of it from the following verse: *When you gave a wage, and no wage was given to you; thus, have you become the opposite. [This verse compares the Jewish people to a harlot in that which they worship idols. Their worship, however, takes the opposite form of the way in which a harlot is hired. A harlot receives something in return*

for her depravity, whereas the Jews gave of their animals as sacrifices and gold and silver as donations to idols and yet receive nothing in return; no blessings or favors from the idols.]

Rav, the Gemora notes, uses the verse, 'an abomination' for the teaching of Abaye, for Abaye said: The hire of an idolatress harlot is forbidden for the altar. What is the reason? Here it is written: *An abomination*, and there (regarding all the women forbidden as arayos) it is written: *For whoever shall commit any of these abominations*. We therefore argue as follows: Just as there the reference is to forbidden relations where *kiddushin* (betrothal) has no effect, similarly here (by a harlot) we are dealing with a case where *kiddushin* has no legal effect (and this would include an idolatress, where *kiddushin* would not take effect).

[A Kohen is forbidden from cohabiting with a zonah. In this context, a zonah refers to a woman who previously cohabited with a man who was forbidden to her.] Abaye continues: And a Kohen who cohabits with her (an idolatress) is not punished with lashes for violating the prohibition of a zonah. This is because the Torah writes: *And he shall not profane his offspring*, implying (that the prohibition applies only to a case where) such offspring as is attributed to him, to the exclusion of an idolatress, whose offspring is not attributed to him (but rather to her; the child of a union between a Jewish man and a non-Jewish woman is not regarded as a Jew).

Abaye continues: The wage of a Jewish harlot (when she is not an ervah) is legitimate (for the altar). This is because she is someone who betrothal has effect with her. And a Kohen who cohabits with her is punished with lashes, for violating the prohibition of a zonah. This is because his offspring is attributed to him.

Rava, however, says: In both cases (an idolatress or a Jewess), her wage is forbidden (for the altar), and a Kohen who cohabits with her is punished with lashes, for violating the

prohibition of a zonah. The reason is because we infer one from the other: Just as in the case of a Jewish harlot there is a negative commandment (that a Kohen cannot cohabit with her), similarly there is a negative commandment in connection with an idolatress harlot. And just as the wage of an idolatress harlot is forbidden (for the altar), similarly the wage of a Jewish harlot is also forbidden (for the altar).

The Gemora asks on Abaye from the following braisa: The wage of either an idolatress harlot or a Jewish harlot is forbidden (for the altar). Does this not refute Abaye?

The Gemora answers: Abaye can say to you that this will represent the view of Rabbi Akiva who holds that *kiddushin* does not take effect in relationships involving the infringement of (even) a negative commandment. And the novelty of the braisa is that in any case of a harlot with whom betrothal takes no effect, similar to the case of a widow with a Kohen Gadol, the wage is forbidden. [The braisa is teaching Abaye's point precisely.]

The Gemora asks: How does Rava (who maintains that the wage of any harlot is forbidden – even if the woman is permitted to the man) understand the comparison to the case of a widow with a Kohen Gadol?

The Gemora answers: The braisa is teaching the following: Just as in a case of a widow with a Kohen Gadol, he is not punished with lashes until he is warned, similarly with a harlot, there is no prohibition (for the altar) until he declares, "Here is your wage," thus excluding the opinion of Rabbi Elozar, for Rabbi Elozar said: If an unmarried man cohabits with an unmarried woman without intending for marriage, he has rendered her a zonah (and accordingly, a payment to her would be forbidden for the altar as a harlot's wage; Rava, however, disagrees and holds that she is not rendered a zonah through this act of cohabitation, and the money is regarded as a gift). Where, however, she is already a zonah (she has accepted money for cohabitation), whatever he

gives her is forbidden for the altar (*even according to Rava, and even if he did not specify his intentions*).

The *Gemora* cites another version (*of answering the challenge against Abaye from the braisa*): The *braisa* above refers to *arayos* (*forbidden relations*), where *kiddushin* take no effect (*and therefore, even by a Jewish woman, the wage is forbidden*).

The *Gemora* asks: But doesn't the latter clause of the *braisa* say: As e.g., a widow with a *Kohen Gadol*, a divorcee or a *chalutzah* (*one who submitted to chalitza*) for an ordinary *Kohen*, her wage is forbidden? Now, in these cases *kiddushin* takes effect (*and yet the wage is forbidden; this is contrary to Abaye's opinion*)!?

The *Gemora* answers: The *Tanna* of this *braisa* is Rabbi Elozar, who holds that an unmarried man, who cohabits with an unmarried woman without intending for marriage, has rendered her a *zonah* (*and Abaye stated his ruling according to the Rabbis who disagree with R' Elozar*).

The *Gemora* asks: If the *braisa* represents the opinion of Rabbi Elozar, why mention the case of a widow with a *Kohen Gadol*? Why not mention the case of an unmarried woman?

The *Gemora* answers: It was necessary to mention the case of a widow with a *Kohen Gadol*, for otherwise, you might have thought that a harlot's wage is only forbidden for the altar when the man and the woman are permitted to cohabit with each other, but where they are forbidden, the wage is not forbidden; the *braisa* therefore teaches us that this is not so. (29a – 30a)

DAILY MASHAL

Air of Eretz Yisroel

Rashi writes that the very atmosphere of *Eretz Yisroel* imparts wisdom. The *Sefer Habris*, zt"l, explains the

greatness of living in *Eretz Yisroel*. *Daf Digest* (Bava Basra 158) translates it: Any person who is pure of heart and who has any option to immigrate will surely wish to move to *Eretz Yisroel*. I have never understood the wealthy among us who have the means but don't bother to ascend to the land on which 'the eyes of Hashem are at all times.' How can they be so foolish? Surely if anyone who moved to *Eretz Yisroel* was granted a large sum of money they would have moved long ago. It is surely fitting for any person who is able to run to the land, just like a young child races to his mother's lap with great longing and joy. The Jewish nation is only called an *am echad* when we are on our land. This is clear from the verse, 'I have made them one nation in the land, in the hills of *Yisroel*.' "But what should one do if he truly cannot immigrate to *Eretz Yisroel*? He must visit, of course. Since even treading four cubits in the land with the intention of accepting its unique holiness affords one a portion to the world to come, surely one visit impart wisdom as well."

Once, when the *Imrei Emes*, zt"l, visited *Eretz Yisroel*, he met *Rav Kook*, zt"l. When *Rav Kook* asked him if he could feel the wisdom imparted by the holy land entering into him, the *Rebbe* responded with characteristic sharpness. "Don't our sages teach: "the fence for wisdom is silence"?"