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Yevamos Daf 103

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamah of

Tzvi Gershon Ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for his neshamah and may his soul find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Artificial Leg

The Gemora asks: Who is the author of the braisa who stated chalitzah performed with an artificial leg is valid? It must be Rabbi Meir, as the Rabbi Meir in the Mishna in Shabbos (65b) states that a person who is missing a leg can walk outside on Shabbos with his artificial leg, and not worry about transgressing the prohibition against carrying on Shabbos. Rabbi Yosi there argues that he may not go outside with this leg on Shabbos. *[Rebbi Meir must permit this because he holds that the artificial leg is like a shoe that everyone holds does not present a problem of carrying on Shabbos, as it is like an article of clothing. It therefore follows that he would also state it is considered a shoe for chalitzah.]*

The Gemora therefore concludes that when the end of the braisa states that cloth wrapping cannot be used for chalitzah, it must be the opinion of the Rabbis who argue on Rabbi Meir. *[If Rabbi Meir allows an artificial leg, there does not seem to be a reason he would disallow a cloth wrapping either, see Rashi.]* However, this seems strange, as this would mean the braisa would have two different authors.

Abaye therefore suggests that the entire braisa reflects the opinion of the Rabbis. The case of the artificial leg is regarding an artificial leg that is covered in leather, making it a valid chalitzah shoe according to the Rabbis (see 102b).

Rava said to Abaye: This would mean that if the foot was not totally covered in leather, it would be unfit to be used for chalitzah. If so, instead of the braisa making up a new case regarding the invalidity of a fabric sock, it could have taught us the same lesson by qualifying the case of the artificial leg. It could have stated that the artificial leg may only be used if

it is covered with leather, but if it is covered with cloth, it is invalid *(this is also more informative, as it tells us that even something more substantial than a cloth wrapping is invalid because it is not wrapped in leather).*

Rava therefore states that the entire braisa is in fact Rabbi Meir. The reason he states that the cloth wrapping is invalid is because a valid chalitzah shoe must provide protection from the ground. Being that this does not do so, unlike the artificial leg, it is invalid. (103a1 – 103a2)

Digging in Your Foot (Heel)

Ameimar states that one who performs chalitzah must apply pressure with his heel onto the ground.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Doesn't the braisa state that one may perform chalitzah standing, sitting, or bent over?

Ameimar answered him that this is correct, as long he also applies pressure on the ground with his heel. (103a2)

Ameimar also stated that someone who walks by applying pressure on the front part of his foot *(as he cannot apply pressure to his heel, and therefore cannot fulfill the aforementioned Halachah)* cannot perform chalitzah.

Rav Ashi said to Ameimar: Doesn't the braisa validate a chalitzah performed with a foot support (someone who drags himself along by his hands, and puts a shoelike cover of wood or leather on his feet so they shouldn't get hurt)?

No, Ameimar responded. The braisa teaches us that if the cripple gives this support to someone else, and that person performs chalitzah with it, the chalitzah is valid.

Rav Ashi remarked that according to Ameimar, the son of Uva and the son of Kifuf cannot perform chalitzah (*these were people who were crippled, and could not apply pressure with their heels, see Moed Katan 25b*). (103a2 – 103a3)

A Shoe Below the Knee

The Mishna said that a shoe that is below one's knee can be used for chalitzah.

The Gemora asks: The braisa states that people with artificial legs are not required to be *oleh regel* (*to go the Beis Hamikdash on the three festivals*). This is because the verse uses the unusual word "Regalim" for festivals, implying that only people who have "Regalim" – "legs" are required to be *oleh regel*. Why, then, is an artificial leg deemed a leg for chalitzah but not to be *oleh regel*?

The Gemora answers that chalitzah is different, as the Torah merely states that the shoe must be "*mei'al raglo*," something which is usually found "on top of his leg."

If so, the Gemora asks, then why does the Gemora disqualify a shoe that is above one's knee?

The Gemora answers that it cannot be something that is tied above one's knee (*even if he is not a cripple, see Rashba*), as this would be "above that which is on top of one's leg." (103a3)

Rav Pappa said that it is apparent from our Mishna that the ankle connects with the foot to put pressure on the ground. If it would not be so connected as to be useful to the bottom part of the foot, but would be deemed a mere link between the foot and leg, the word "*mei'al*" would be defined as being on the ankle area, whereas anything above that would be considered "above on top of one's leg." Being that the

Mishna does not invalidate any footwear worn above the ankle for chalitzah, it implies that the ankle is actually considered part of the "leg area."

Rav Ashi states that this is not a proof regarding the ankle's function, as it is possible that the ankle is considered part of the leg area merely because it happens to be directly over, and close to, the heel of one's foot. (103a3)

A Shoe Above the Knee

The Mishna stated that a shoe located above one's knee cannot be used for chalitzah.

Rav Kahana asks: Doesn't the verse state "and with the afterbirth that emerges from between her legs?" This implies that the thighs are also called legs!

Abaye answers that the verse means that when a woman gives birth, she will sometimes dig her heels into her thighs to give birth. Hence the afterbirth mentioned in the verse would actually emerge between her legs.

The Gemora also asks from the verse that states "he did not prepare (shave) his (hair between his) legs, nor did he prepare his mustache." This also implies that thighs can be called legs!

The Gemora answers that the verse uses a euphemism (the Torah wanted to use a proper terminology, and therefore stretched the definition of legs beyond its usual usage).

The Gemora similarly asks from the verse that states "and Shaul arrived to cover (went into the cave to urinate) his legs." This also implies thighs are called legs!

The Gemora answers that the verse uses a euphemism.

The Gemora asks a similar question from the verse "he was merely covering his legs in the covered room."

The Gemora answers that the verse uses a euphemism.

The Gemora asks from the verse regarding Yael, that Sisra fell “between her legs.”

The Gemora answers that the verse uses a euphemism. (103a3 – 103a4)

The Benefits of Evil are Detrimental to the Righteous

Rabbi Yochanan said: That evildoer (*Sisra*) had relations with her seven times that time (*day; this was done in order to tire him out*). This is evident from the verse that states: *between her legs he bent, fell, slept, etc.* [The verse uses seven seemingly extra words describing this event, which Rabbi Yochanan understands is implying that they had relations seven times.]

The Gemora asks: Didn’t she enjoy these relations (*why, then, is this deemed such a great deed*)? [Tosfos explains that the Gemora is not asking regarding the permissibility of her actions, for she was involved in the saving of the entire Jewish people from danger. The Gemora is questioning: Why is she regarded so highly for doing this? She is cited as one who is even more deserving of blessing than the Matriarchs!?!]

Rabbi Yochanan answers in the name of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai: All of the benefit that is bestowed by evildoers to the righteous is evil to them (*for he polluted her*). This is apparent from the verse where Hashem warned Lavan “beware lest you speak to Yakov (Avinu) from good or bad.” It makes sense he should not speak of bad to him, but why not beneficial things? It must be because of this concept, that the seemingly beneficial actions of the evil are deemed bad by the righteous.

The Gemora asks: In the case of Lavan, it is reasonable that Hashem warned him not to speak at all, as he might mention the name of his idol. However, what inherent evil is there in

the apparent pleasure that Yael had from her relations with Sisra?

The Gemara answers that Sisra injected her with impurity, similar to the statement of Rabbi Yochanan that when the serpent seduced Eve, he infused impurity into her. When Israel stood at Sinai, that impurity was eliminated, but the impurity of idolaters, who did not stand at Sinai, did not cease. (103a4 – 103b1)

Not his Shoe

The Mishna stated that if he used someone else’s shoe, the chalitzah is valid. The braisa states that the verse says “his shoe.” How do we know, then, that he may also use someone else’s shoe? The verse says “shoe” another time, teaching us that anyone’s shoe will do. Why, then, did the first verse say “his shoe?” This teaches us that it has to be able to fit him, as opposed to it being too big of a shoe that the person cannot walk with, or too small of a shoe that does not cover most of his foot, or broken sandal that has no sole.

Abaye was present before Rav Yosef. A yevamah came to perform chalitzah. Rav Yosef said to Abaye: Give him your sandal so he can perform chalitzah. Abaye gave him his left sandal. Rav Yosef told him, the Rabbis stated that giving a left shoe for a right foot is valid b’dieved (only after the fact), but not l’chatchilah (initially)! Abaye responded: If what you say is so, then when the Mishna states that one may perform chalitzah with someone else’s sandal, it should also mean b’dieved, and not l’chatchilah! Rav Yosef explained to Abaye: When I told you to give him your sandal, I meant that you should give it to him to acquire possession of it (not just to borrow). (103b1 – 103b2)

A Wooden Sandal

The Mishna had stated: A wooden sandal (is valid for chalitzah).

The Gemora asks: Who is the author of this statement that one can perform chalitzah with a wooden sandal?

Shmuel states that this is Rabbi Meir. The Mishna in Shabbos (65b) quotes Rabbi Meir as stating that a person who is missing a leg can walk outside on Shabbos with his artificial leg, and not worry about transgressing the prohibition against carrying on Shabbos. Rabbi Yosi there argues that he may not go outside with this leg on Shabbos. *[If Rabbi Meir allows an artificial leg, there does not seem to be a reason he would disallow a wooden shoe either.]*

Shmuel's father stated that the Mishna is talking about a wooden shoe that is covered with leather, and can therefore be used according to everyone *(even the Rabbis on 102b who say a chalitzah shoe must be made out of leather)*. (103b2)

Shoe with Tzara'as

Rav Pappi stated in the name of Rava that one may not do chalitzah with a shoe that has been confined (*"Musgar"*) because it might have Tzara'as (*biblical leprosy*), but if he did, the chalitzah is valid. A shoe that definitely (*"Muchlat"*) has Tzara'as should not be used, and if it was used, the chalitzah is invalid. *[Rashi explains that it is not deemed to fit the foot of anyone, because it is destined to be burned and is therefore as if it has no mass.]*

Rav Pappa said in the name of the Rava that both should not be used, but if they are used, the chalitzah is valid.

The Gemora asks a question on Rav Pappi from a Mishna in Nega'im. The Mishna states that a house that has been confined on the suspicion that it has Tzara'as renders one who touches the inside of the house impure *(even if he does not fully enter the house)*. A house which has been confirmed to have Tzara'as also renders one who touches the outside of the house impure. Both houses cause someone who enters to become impure. If we state that the reasoning of Rav Pappi that the *"Muchlat"* shoe is invalid is because the shoe is not deemed to exist, why should anyone who enters

the *"Muchlat"* house be rendered impure? The house does not halachically exist, and the verse states that to become impure one must *"come to the house!"*

The Gemora answers that the case of a house with leprosy is different, as the verse states *"and he will dismantle the house,"* teaching us that even when it is being dismantled it still has the status of a house *(unlike a shoe with leprosy, which does not have the halachic status of a shoe)*.

The Gemora asks from a braisa which states that a small piece of cloth that has tzara'as and is the size of three by three fingers, even if it does not have the mass of a k'zayis (olive), it renders all of the contents of a house impure if most of it is brought inside. This must be talking about a cloth that definitely has tzara'as, and it is still considered to have a mass of three by three fingers, even when part of it is outside the house!? This proves that even clothing that definitely has tzara'as is considered to have mass.

The Gemora rejects this proof by saying that the braisa is referring to clothing that only might have tzara'as.

The Gemora asks: However, let us consider the second part of the braisa, which reads that if it was the mass of many olives, even if one olive-size piece enters the house, the contents of the entire house are rendered impure. This is reasonable if the braisa is referring to clothing that is definitely impure, as it is compared to a corpse that can spread impurity even when it is only the size of a k'zayis. However, if it is discussing clothing where we are uncertain if it possesses Tzara'as, where do we see that it is compared to a corpse?

The Gemora answers that the braisa indeed is talking about clothing that definitely has Tzara'as. The Gemora derives from a verse *"and he will burn the clothing"* that the clothing is considered to be clothing (and retains its halachic mass) even when it is being burned.

The Gemora asks: Why don't we derive from here that a shoe that definitely has Tzara'as can also be used, as it should also be said to retain its halachic mass?

The Gemora answers that we do not derive matters of prohibition from matters of impurity.

Rava states that the halachah is that a sandal with either status of tzara'as ("Muchlat" and "Musgar") and a sandal of idolatry should not be used, and if they are used, the chalitzah is valid (after the fact). If it was a sandal of an idolatrous offering, or one that belonged to a condemned city (ir hanidachas), or one that was made in honor of an elder (to be used for his burial), chalitzah should not be performed (using them); and even a chalitzah that has been performed with it (any of those mentioned above), is invalid.

Ravina said to Rav Ashi: In what respect is the sandal that was made in honor of an elder different from an ordinary sandal? Is it because it was not made for walking? That of the Beis Din (designated for chalitzah use) as well was not made for walking!?

Rav Ashi replied: Should the messenger of the Beis Din use it for walking, would the Beis Din object! (103b4 – 104a1)

DAILY MASHAL

Accepting the Torah

The Gemara stated that the Jewish People who stood at Har Sinai had the impurities removed from them, and idolaters who did not stand at Har Sinai did not have impurities removed from them. With regard to converts to Judaism, the Gemara states that even though the converts themselves did not stand at Har Sinai, their *Mazal*, i.e. the heavenly advocate, was there, as it is said: *those who are standing here with us today before Hashem our G-d, and those who are not here etc. with us today.*

In the *Sefer Shalmei Todah* it is brought in the name of the Chofetz Chaim that the *Ger Tzedek*, righteous convert, Avraham ben Avraham, said in the name of the Vilna Gaon, that when Hashem offered the nations of the world to accept the Torah and the gentiles questioned what was written in the Torah, there were actually individual gentiles who accepted the Torah. Although no nation formally accepted the Torah, individuals from some nations did accept the Torah, and it is these gentiles that the Gemara refers to when stating that their *Mazal* was witness to the Revelation at Sinai. In subsequent generations, these souls converted to Judaism. The flipside of this is that Jews who hate Hashem and His Torah are the individual Jewish souls who unfortunately were not prepared to accept the Torah at Sinai.