



Nedarim Daf 52



28 Tammuz 5775 July 15, 2015

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Mishna

The *Mishna* states: If a person makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from milk, he is permitted in whey (*the liquid remaining from the milk after it has curdled*). Rabbi Yosi prohibits it. If his *neder* was from whey, he is permitted in milk. Abba Shaul says: If one makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from cheese, he is forbidden to eat all cheese, whether salted or unsalted.

If one makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from meat, he is permitted in the gravy and the bits of meat (*that fall from the meat while it is cooking*). Rabbi Yosi prohibits it.

Rabbi Yehudah said (as support for Rabbi Yosi): It once happened (when one made a neder against eating meat) that Rabbi Tarfon forbade him from eating eggs which had been cooked with it. They said to him: It was indeed so! But when does this prohibition apply? It is only when he says, "This (specific piece of) meat is forbidden to me." For one who prohibits something with a neder and it mixes with something else, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture (if there is not sixty times as much permitted food), it is forbidden.

If one makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, "Konam this wine that I will not taste," and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden. (51b - 52a)

Lentils and Whey

The *Mishna* had stated: If a person makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from milk, he is permitted in whey (*the liquid remaining from the milk after it has curdled*). Rabbi Yosi prohibits it.

The *Gemora* asks a contradiction from the following *braisa*: If a person makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from lentils, he is forbidden in lentil cakes. Rabbi Yosi permits it.

Ra"n Elucidated

[The Yerushalmi states that ashishim are lentils that are kneaded and fried in honey. The two statements from Rabbi Yosi are seemingly contradictory. For if here it is permitted because, since there is honey in it, it is called ashishim (and not lentils); certainly regarding whey, which is something entirely different than milk, it should not have been forbidden?]


The Gemora answers: There is no difficulty, for in truth, the Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yosi do not actually disagree. Each one of them is ruling based upon the language of the people in their locality. (They all agree that a neder will only prohibit the specific foods mentioned in his vow. The Tanna Kamma and Rabbi Yosi are merely discussing the differences of language that is used in their respective localities.) (52b)

Mishna









That which Emerges from the Item

The *Mishna* had stated: If one said, "Konam these olives and grapes that I will not taste," he is forbidden in them and what emerges from them.

Rami bar Chamah inquires: Which expression in the *neder* is the cause that prohibits anything which emerges from the olives and grapes? Is it because he said "these," or is it because he said "that I will not taste"?

Rava said: Let us resolve this inquiry from the following *Mishna*: If one says, "These fruits are a *konam* upon me," or "They should be a *konam* to my mouth," he is forbidden to derive benefit from that which is exchanged for them and what grows from them. It would seem that something which emerges from them would be permitted!

The *Gemora* rejects this proof: In truth, even something which emerges from them is forbidden. The *Mishna* preferred to teach us a greater novelty; namely, that something which is exchanged for the prohibited item is regarded as things which grew from it, and is therefore, forbidden.

The *Gemora* suggests a proof from our *Mishna*: Rabbi Yehudah said (as support for Rabbi Yosi): It once happened (when one made a neder against eating meat) that Rabbi Tarfon forbade him from eating eggs which had been cooked with it. They said to him: It was indeed so! But when does this prohibition apply? It is only when he

says, "This (specific piece of) meat is forbidden to me." For one who prohibits something with a neder and it mixes with something else, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture (if there is not sixty times as much permitted food), it is forbidden. (It is evident from the Tanna Kamma that when someone prohibits a specific item, by saying "these fruits," anything which emerges from it, including taste, will be forbidden.)

The *Gemora* concludes that if one says "these," he certainly is prohibiting anything which emerges from it. Rami's inquiry is if the term "that I will not taste" is sufficient to cause this prohibition.

The Gemora suggests a proof from a Mishna above: If he said, "Fish, fishes that I will not taste," he is forbidden from eating fish, whether large or small, whether salted or unsalted, whether raw or cooked, but he is permitted to eat chopped taris (a large fish; we say that his neder only included whole fish) and brine. (Although he said "that I will not taste," he is still permitted in brine, which emerges from the fish.)

The *Gemora* rejects this proof, for the *Mishna* can be referring to brine that emerged from the fish before he pronounced his *neder*, and that is why it would be permitted. (*The inquiry remains unresolved and in practice we would rule stringently that anything which emerges from the forbidden item is in fact forbidden.) (52b)*

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Something that can become Permitted (Davar she'yeish lo Matirin)

The *Mishna* states: If one makes a *neder* prohibiting himself from wine, he is permitted in cooked food which has in it the taste of wine. However, if he said, "Konam







this wine that I will not taste," and it fell into a cooked dish, if it contains enough to impart flavor to the entire mixture, it is forbidden.

This would imply that if there is not enough to give flavor, it would be permitted. The Ra"n quotes his teachers who ask the following: Something which is forbidden on account of a *neder* is "something that can become permitted" (*davar she'yeish lo matirin*), and we have established that anything that can become permitted is not nullified even in a thousand!?

They answer that when we say that it is not nullified even in a thousand, that refers to something that has been mixed with its own kind. But here, when it says, "and it became mixed," it is referring to something else that is not the same kind, like the case of eggs that were cooked with it. Anything that is mixed with something else that is not its kind is permitted, provided that it does not give flavor, even if it is "something that can become permitted." The Ra"n cites proof to this from a *Mishna* in *Chalah* and a Yerushalmi in our perek.

They, therefore, objected to the statement of the Ri"f in Meseches Chulin concerning bread that was baked in an oven with roasted meat. The *Gemora* states that it is forbidden to eat it with a dairy sauce even though it has been established that we are not halachically concerned with vapors. The reason it is forbidden is because the bread is "something that can be permitted," since one may eat it together with meat. For that reason, it is not nullified, even in a thousand. It is evident from the Ri"f that he maintains that "something that can be permitted" is not nullified even in something that is not its kind.

The Ra"n, however, agrees to the Ri"f. When the *Mishna* here says that "something can become permitted" becomes nullified in something that is not its own kind, that is referring to something that is forbidden now, but will become permitted in the future, like *nedarim*. For the

Ra"n has the following question: Since according to the *Chachamim*, all forbidden things become nullified in their own kind just as in a different kind, why did the *Chachamim* make a distinction in the case of "something that can become permitted," between its own kind and a different kind?

The reason is as follows: The *Chachamim* and Rabbi Yehudah disagree whether or not something can be nullified in its own kind. Rabbi Yehudah maintains that a forbidden item is not nullified in its own kind, because anything that is similar to another thing does not weaken and nullify it; rather, it preserves it and strengthens it.

The *Chachamim* disagree and hold that a forbidden item and something which is permitted are not similar to each other, even if they are the same kind. This is because one is forbidden and one is permitted. For it is not fitting to follow the similarity of their substance, but rather the difference in their being forbidden and permitted.

It is for this reason that the *Chachamim* learned concerning "something that can be permitted" for the sake of being strict towards the opinion of Rabbi Yehudah. For since the forbidden item is not completely different from the permitted one, because the forbidden one will eventually become permitted, we say that it is not nullified in its own kind. It will only become nullified when mixed with a different kind, for the difference that exists between one kind and another will make up for the equality that is added here because it is "something that can be permitted." It is the difference between kinds that is the cause of nullification, and equality interferes with nullification.



