

26 Nissan 5780
April 20, 2020



Shabbos Daf 45

Produced by Rabbi Avrohom Adler, Kollel Boker Beachwood

Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

Moshe Raphael ben Yehoshua (Morris Stadtmauer) o”h

Tzvi Gershon ben Yoel (Harvey Felsen) o”h

Mav the studing of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and mav their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Rav’s Ruling on Muktzeh

The *Gemora* says that it is reasonable to say that Rav follows Rabbi Yehudah in his position of *muktzeh* – *things not intended for Shabbos use*. We see this from Rav’s statement that one may place a candle on a tree for *Shabbos*, but not for *Yom Tov*, even though one may not use a tree on *Shabbos*. If Rav follows Rabbi Yehudah, who prohibits one from handling an extinguished candle on *Shabbos*, we understand that Rav therefore allows one to place the candle on the tree for *Shabbos*. Since he is not allowed to handle the candle, he will not use the tree. On *Yom Tov*, when one may handle a candle, even when it’s lit, he may not place it on the tree, since he may thereby use the tree. However, if Rav follows Rabbi Shimon, who permits one to handle the candle once it’s extinguished, there should be no difference between *Shabbos* and *Yom Tov*, as both would have the same concern of someone using the tree.

The *Gemora* challenges this from another ruling of Rav. They asked Rav whether one may move the extinguished Chanukah candles on *Shabbos* to hide them from the gentiles who prohibited lighting them, and he said that one may rely on Rabbi Shimon and move them.

The *Gemora* answers that Rav only ruled this way under these extenuating circumstances.

To prove this, the *Gemora* cites the continuation of the story. Rav Kahana and Rav Ashi asked Rav whether they can conclude from his ruling that we rule like Rabbi Shimon, and Rav responded that we can rely on Rabbi Shimon under

extenuating circumstances, implying that otherwise we wouldn’t rule like him. (45a)

When Does Rabbi Shimon Prohibit Muktzeh?

Rish Lakish asked Rabbi Yochanan whether wheat kernels that one planted in soil or eggs that are under a hen are *muktzeh* according to Rabbi Shimon. Although Rabbi Shimon does not rule that something which is inaccessible is *muktzeh*, perhaps he agrees when one actively removed them from use, as in these cases.

He answered that Rabbi Shimon only applies *muktzeh* to oil in a lit candle, as it is reserved for the *mitzvah* of *Shabbos* lights and due to the prohibition of extinguishing a candle.

The *Gemora* challenges this statement from a *braisa* which says that anything used to decorate a *sukkah* may not be used until after the end of the last day of *Yom Tov*, unless one correctly stipulated his right of use.

The *Gemora* proves that Rabbi Shimon agrees to this from another *braisa* that Rabbi Chiya bar Yosef taught in front of Rabbi Yochanan.

The *braisa* says that one may not take wood from a *sukkah* on *Yom Tov*, but may take wood which is adjacent to it, while Rabbi Shimon permits both. The *braisa* concludes that all agree that the *sukkah* of *Sukkos*, which is used for the *mitzvah*, is prohibited, unless one correctly stipulated the right of use.



The *Gemora* clarifies that Rabbi Yochanan said that Rabbi Shimon agrees to *muktzeh* in any case like oil in the lit candle, i.e., where the item is reserved both for the *mitzvah* and the prohibition of using it. This includes a *sukkah* on *Sukkos*, which is reserved to the *mitzvah* use, and which one is prohibited from dismantling, which is a form of work on *Yom Tov*.

The *Gemora* supports this explanation from Rabbi Chiya bar Abba who quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying this.

Rav Yehudah quotes Shmuel saying that Rabbi Shimon agrees to *muktzeh* only in the case of drying figs and grapes, but not other fruits.

The *Gemora* challenges this from a *braisa* which states that if one was eating figs or grapes, and put the leftovers on the roof to dry up, he may not eat from them on *Shabbos* unless he designated them for use. The *braisa* says that this applies equally to apricots, quince, and any other fruits. The *Gemora* assumes this *braisa* is Rabbi Shimon's opinion, as Rabbi Yehudah would apply *muktzeh* even on things that one didn't actively move away, and yet it includes other fruits along with figs and grapes.

The *Gemora* deflects this, saying that the *braisa* is Rabbi Yehudah. Although he agrees to *muktzeh* even when one didn't move something away, the *braisa* used this case to teach that *muktzeh* applies even though he was originally eating the fruits.

Rabbi Shimon the son of Rebbe asked his father whether Rabbi Shimon agrees that unripened dates are *muktzeh*, and he answered that Rabbi Shimon only applies *muktzeh* to drying figs and grapes, implying that he agrees with Rabbi Shimon.

The *Gemora* challenges this from a *braisa*. The *Mishna* says that on *Yom Tov* one may not water animals that live in the desert (i.e., the wild), but one may water those that live in a house. The *braisa* says that wild animals are those that live in the field during the spring, while those that sleep near the

town are considered house ones. Rebbe says that both of those are considered house ones, but wild ones are those that never come to an inhabited area. This implies that Rebbe agrees with Rabbi Yehudah, who applies *muktzeh* to things one didn't plan to use.

The *Gemora* offers three answers to resolve this:

1. Animals that live in the wild are like drying figs and grapes, which Rabbi Shimon also considers *muktzeh*.
2. When he answered his son, he was defining Rabbi Shimon's position, even though he doesn't rule like him.
3. In the *braisa*, he is debating the Sages' position on Rabbi Yehudah's opinion, saying that even Rabbi Yehudah would agree that any animal that sleeps in an inhabited area is not *muktzeh*, but he himself doesn't rule like Rabbi Yehudah. (45a – 45b)

Ruling like R' Shimon or R' Yehudah

Rabbah bar Chanah quotes Rabbi Yochanan saying that they said that we rule like Rabbi Shimon.

The *Gemora* challenges this statement from another statement. An old person from Siruya (or Kiruya) asked Rabbi Yochanan whether one may move a hen's nest on *Shabbos*, and he answered that it is meant exclusively for the nest, and therefore is *muktzeh*, implying that he agrees with Rabbi Yehudah.

The *Gemora* attempts to explain Rabbi Yochanan's answer to be consistent with Rabbi Shimon. If the nest had a dead chick in it, it is consistent with Rabbi Shimon according to Mar bar Ameimar, who said in the name of Rava that Rabbi Shimon agrees that a healthy animal that died on *Shabbos* is *muktzeh*, since one didn't plan on feeding his animals with it. However, according to Mar the son of Rav Yosef, who said in the name of Rava that Rabbi Shimon allows one to feed his animals from any carcass, even of a healthy animal, this would not be consistent.

The *Gemora* suggests that the nest was *muktzeh* since it had an egg laid that day, but rejects this, since Rav Nachman says



that if one doesn't prohibit *muktzeh* (like Rabbi Shimon), he doesn't prohibit *nolad* – something reserved since it was born today (like an egg) either.

The *Gemora* answers that the nest had a chick still in the egg, which is totally unusable, since even an animal cannot eat it as it is.

When Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rabbi Yosef came, he quoted Rabbi Yochanan ruling like Rabbi Yehudah and Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi ruling like Rabbi Shimon. Rav Yosef said that we now understand why Rabbah bar bar Chanah quoted Rabbi Yochanan saying that *they said* that we rule like Rabbi Shimon, as *they said* so, but Rabbi Yochanan himself disagrees.

Abaye asked Rav Yosef how we could have thought that Rabbi Yochanan doesn't rule like Rabbi Yehudah, since Rabbi Abba and Rabbi Assi went to Rabbi Abba from Chaifa, and when the lamp fell on Rabbi Assi's coat, he didn't handle it, indicating that Rabbi Assi rules like Rabbi Yehudah. This indicates that Rabbi Yochanan, Rabbi Assi's teacher, rules like Rabbi Yehudah.

Rav Yosef answered that a lamp is different than a candle, and one may not move it even if one rules like Rabbi Shimon.

The *Gemora* supports this from a dispute of Rabbi Yochanan and Rish Lakish about a lamp. Rabbi Acha bar Chanina quotes Rabbi Assi saying that Rish Lakish rule in Sidon that one handle a lamp which one can hold in one hand, but not one that one must hold with two hands, while Rabbi Yochanan says that we only have permission to handle a candle according to Rabbi Shimon, but one may not handle a lamp, no matter how large it is.

The *Gemora* asks why one may not handle a lamp.

Rabbah and Rav Yosef say that it is prohibited since one designates a place for it.

Abaye challenged Rav Yosef's reason, as one also designates a place for a groom's bed, yet Shmuel quotes Rabbi Chiya

saying that one may spread and take down such a bed on *Shabbos*.

Abaye therefore says that the lamp they are discussing is one made of segments.

The *Gemora* clarifies that the case is a lamp that has crevices, making it look like it is made of segments.

The *Gemora* explains that if the lamp has actual segments, all agree that one may not move it. They also agree that a big one with crevices is prohibited, as a decree to prevent one from moving one with segments. They differ on whether the decree applies to a small one as well. (45b – 46a)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Rav Follows Rabbi Yehudah

The *Gemora* cites a support for the statement that Rav follows Rabbi Yehudah as far as *muktzeh*.

Tosfos (45a hachi) explains that we have many other indications that Rav agrees with Rabbi Yehudah in his classification of *muktzeh*, and the *Gemora* had no need to support that. However, the *Gemora* was proving that Rav agrees specifically with Rabbi Yehudah's ruling on *migu* – that once something is *muktzeh* at the start of *Shabbos*, it remains so throughout. This applies to the statement of Rav, which referred to coins that were placed somewhere at the start of *Shabbos*, making that item *muktzeh* even if the coins were later removed.

Pushing Away Muktzeh

The *Gemora* says that Rabbi Shimon only agrees to *muktzeh* when one pushed an item away at the start of *Shabbos*, as in the case of figs and grapes that one placed on the roof to dry.

Tosfos (45a haicha) explains that Rabbi Shimon still allows one to use the oil of an extinguished candle, even though he

pushed the oil away when he lit the candle before *Shabbos*, since the pushing away was only for the purpose of it being lit. Once it has gone out, the pushing away has finished. However, when one places fruit on the roof, they are physically still there until he takes them down, so his pushing them away is still in effect.

The *Gemora* later proves that this statement only applies to figs and grapes, but not other fruits.

Tosfos (45a ela) cites the Yerushalmi, which explains that only figs and grapes temporarily spoil in the process of drying, and therefore putting them out to dry is considered pushing them away.

A Live Chick

The *Gemora* tries to explain why Rabbi Yochanan prohibited one from handling a nest on *Shabbos*. The *Gemora* considers the possibilities that the nest had a dead chick, and egg, and, finally, a chick in its egg.

Tosfos (45b hacha) asks why the *Gemora* did not discuss the possibility that it had a live chick, which is presumably *muktzeh*.

Tosfos cites Rabbeinu Yosef who says that a live chick is actually not *muktzeh*, since it is usable to entertain a child who is upset.

Tosfos disputes this, noting that the *Gemora* earlier (43a) which discussed allowing a utensil become *muktzeh* by being a platform for *muktzeh*, implies that live chicks are *muktzeh*.

Furthermore, the *Gemora* discusses the opinion that Rabbi Shimon prohibits one from using the carcass of a healthy animal that died on *Shabbos*, implying that it was *muktzeh* when it was still alive.

Tosfos Yeshanim explains that the *Gemora* did not consider this option, as the nest would not become *muktzeh* due to them, since one could easily shoo them away with his hands.

DAILY MASHAL

Veha amar – Vehaamar Mar

When a questioner presents a question on an *Amora's* statement from another *Amora*, he opens his question with term *Veha amar R...* Sometimes the questioner doesn't mention the other *Amora's* name but says *Vehaamar mar*.

The Shelah, in *Torah shebe'al Peh*, states that he received the tradition that when this term is used, *mar* means Rav, who was the greatest *Amora*. And if the learner wonders: why do we question one *Amora* from another *Amora's* statement – after all, aren't *Amoraim* allowed to disagree? It could only be that the author of the *Gemora* knew that in this case the *halachah* is according to the other *Amora* (*Sefer HaKerisos, Leshon Limudim, sha'ar gimel, 303:9-10, cited in Halichos 'Olam, sha'ar beis, 2:7*).

Also, it is appropriate to question from the statement of an ancient *Amora* such as Rav, Shmuel, Rav Yochanan or Rabbah (*Halichos 'Olam, ibid*).

We emphasize that *amar mar* is not a questioning term but the opening for a discussion concerning a *chacham's* statement whose words were cited nearby (see *Seder Chemed, ma'areches alef, kelal 62*).