

28 Elul 5775  
Sept. 12, 2015



Nazir Daf 21

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

### **Who Is The Last One Linking To?**

The *Gemora* inquires: When a third person says, “And I,” is he linking to his predecessor (*who also said, “And I”*), or is he linking to the original person (*who declared, “I am hereby a nazir”*)?

The *Gemora* asks: What is the practical halachic difference between them?

The *Gemora* answers: The difference would be if more people would be allowed to become a *nazir* in this manner. If you would say that he is linking to his predecessor, many people can do the same (*provided that they do it within the period of an utterance after the one before them*). However, if you say that he is linking to the original person, then only those who will say, “And I” within the period of an utterance from the original vower will be able to become a *nazir*.

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve this from our *Mishna*: If one declared, “I am hereby a *nazir*,” and his friend heard him and said, “And I,” and a third person heard and said, “And I,” they are all *nezirim*. It is evident from the fact that the *Mishna* only mentioned two people that they are all linking to the first person. For if they would each be linking to their

predecessor, the *Mishna* could have mentioned many people!

The *Gemora* rejects this proof by asking: Is the *Tanna* like a peddler (*advertising his merchandise*) that he should list all the possibilities?

The *Gemora* counters: If so, the *Mishna* should have only mentioned one case! Why list two cases?

The *Gemora* answers: Since the *Mishna* said, “If the first one is released from his vow, they are all released (*since their vow was dependent upon his*); if the last one is released from his vow, he is permitted, but their *nezirus* remains intact,” this would imply that there is a middle person (*besides the first one and the last one*), therefore the *Mishna* said two cases.

The *Gemora* attempts again to resolve this inquiry from our *Mishna*: If the first one is released from his vow, they are all released. We can infer from here that it is only if the first person is released that they are all released, but if the middle person is released, the last one will still remain a *nazir*. This would prove that they are all linking to the original person!

The *Gemora* rejects this proof: In truth, each of them is linking to the one preceding him. The *Mishna* said

the case where the first one is released from his *nezirus* since it wanted to say a case where they are all released. For if the *Mishna* would have said the case where the middle one is released from his *nezirus*, the last person would be released, but the first person would not.

The *Gemora* attempts again to resolve this inquiry from our *Mishna*: If the last one is released from his vow, he is permitted, but their *nezirus* remains intact. We can infer from here that this is the only case where the others are unaffected, but if the middle person is released from his *nezirus*, the last one will be released as well. This proves that they are each linking to their predecessor!

The *Gemora* rejects this proof: In truth, they are all linking to the first person. When the *Mishna* mentioned “the last one,” it actually was referring to “the middle one.” Since the *Mishna* mentioned “the first one” (*in the previous halacha*), it also stated “the last one.”

The *Gemora* resolves the inquiry from the following *braisa*: If the first one is released from his vow, they are all released. If the last one is released from his vow, he is permitted, but their *nezirus* remains intact. If the middle one is released, all those after him are released as well, but those before him are not released. This proves that each person is linking to the one preceding him. (21a)

### ***Mouth and Hair***

The *Mishna* had stated: If one declared, “I am hereby a *nazir*,” and his friend heard him and said, “My

mouth is like his mouth,” or “My hair is like his hair,” he is also a *nazir*.

The *Gemora* asks: Just because he said, “My mouth is like his mouth,” or “My hair is like his hair,” he becomes a *nazir*?! This would seemingly contradict the following *braisa*: If one said, “My hand is a *nazir*,” or “My leg is a *nazir*,” he has said nothing. If, however, he said, “My head is a *nazir*,” or “My liver is a *nazir*,” he is a *nazir*. This is the rule: If his life depends on the organ mentioned, he is a *nazir*. (*And accordingly, why should he be a nazir when he mentioned his mouth or his hair?*)

Rav Yehudah answers: Our *Mishna* is discussing the following case: He said, “My mouth should be like his mouth with respect to (*abstaining from*) wine,” or “My hair should be like his hair with respect to (*refraining from cutting*) my hair.” (21a – 21b)

### ***Retroactive or From that Point On?***

The *Mishna* had stated: If a woman said, “Behold, I am a *nezirah*,” and upon hearing this, her husband said, “And I,” he cannot revoke her *nezirus*.

The *Gemora* inquires: When the husband revokes his wife’s *neder*, does his revocation take away the vow retroactively as if it never happened or is the revocation only for the future?

The *Gemora* suggests a practical difference between the two: If a woman vowed to be a *nezirah* and her friend heard about it and she said, “And I,” and the husband of the first woman heard her *neder* and revoked it. If the husband’s revocation works

retroactively, the second woman will also be released from her vow. However, if the revocation only affects the future, she will be released, but her friend's vow will remain intact.

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve the inquiry from our *Mishna*: If a woman said, "Behold, I am a *nezirah*," and upon hearing this, her husband said, "And I," he cannot revoke her *nezirus*. This would prove that the husband's revocation works retroactively, for if it would only affect the future, let him revoke his wife's vow and he will remain a *nazir*!

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: In truth, his revocation affects only the future. The reason that he cannot revoke her *neder* in this instance is because his statement of "and I" is in effect, a confirmation of her *neder*, for if she is not a *nazir*, he can't be either. If he has his confirmation annulled, he may revoke her *neder*; otherwise, he cannot.

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve the inquiry from the following *Mishna*: If a woman made a *neder* to become a *nazir*, and she designated the animals for her *korbanos* (that were to be brought upon conclusion of her *nezirus*), and then the husband revoked her *neder*, the *halacha* is as follows: If the animals belonged to the husband, they may go out and graze in the flock (they are not consecrated any longer for the following reason: He is obligated to supply her with animals for her required *korbanos*; here, she is not required to bring any *korbanos*, for he has revoked her *nezirus*; it emerges that she did not have the power to designate these *korbanos* and they revert to their *chullin* state). If the animals were hers (that the husband had no control over), the *chatas* is

left to die. Now if you would conclude that the husband retroactively revokes her vows, the *chatas* should revert to a *chullin* state (for the animals were designated erroneously, since she was never a *nazir*). This proves that the husband revokes her *neder* only affecting the future.

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: In truth, the husband revokes her *neder* retroactively. The reason that her *chatas* must be left to die is because she does not require any atonement, and therefore it is regarded as a *chatas* whose owner has died (she was correct when she designated the animal for a *chatas*; although her *neder* is revoked retroactively, the consecration is nevertheless valid), and the *halacha* is that such a *chatas* must be left to die.

The *Gemora* attempts to resolve the inquiry from the following *Mishna*: If a woman made a *neder* to become a *nazir*, and she drank wine or became *tamei* from the dead, she incurs the forty lashes. What is the case? If the husband did not revoke her *neder*, what is the novel *halacha* that the *Mishna* is teaching us (it is obvious that she should receive lashes)? Rather, it is evident that the husband did revoke the vow. Now, if you will conclude that the husband retroactively revokes her vow, why does she receive lashes? It is therefore a proof that his revocation only affects the future, and not the past.

The *Gemora* rejects the proof: In truth, the husband's revocation works retroactively. The only reason the *Mishna* teaches the first *halacha* is because of the next *halacha*. The *Mishna* states: If her husband had revoked the *neder* for her, but she was not aware of this, she would not incur the forty

lashes. (Since it is necessary to teach this ruling, the Mishna teaches the first halacha as well.) (21b – 22a)

## DAILY MASHAL

### *Permanence of the Nazir's Status*

"And this is the law of the Nazir on the day when he completes his Nezirus ... then he shall bring his Korban to Hashem, a lamb ... " (6:13/14).

Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler writes: This Korban (which includes an Olah and a Chatas) is unique, says R. Bachye, inasmuch as all other such Korbanos one brings as the result of a sin; whereas here, the Nazir has just performed a Mitzvah, which rendered him holy and detached from all worldly desires. On what basis does the Torah now obligate him to bring a Chatas and an Olah, he wonders?

This is what Chazal mean when they refer to it as a Chidush (an innovative ruling).

The author cites a Ramban however, which ascribes the Korban to the Nazir's 'sin' of terminating his Nezirus. Having attained such a high spiritual level as to understand the futility of worldly pleasures and made the effort to become holy in his ways, he ought to have declared himself a permanent Nazir, rather than allowing himself to return to earth, as it were. Due to the fact that he is willing to return to his former mundane level, necessitates a Kaparah in the form of a Korban.

That explains why the Pasuk in Amos compares a Nazir to a Navi, says the Ramban. Just as prophecy is a permanent appointment so too, ought Nezirus to be permanent. (Indeed, the Torah calls a Nazir 'Kodosh', and Kedushah per se has connotations of permanence.)

HaRav Moshe Feinstein explains that this is why the Torah states upon the nazir's completion of his term: *And afterwards, the Nazir may drink wine.* "Nazir"? He has completed his nezirus!?! The answer is that once a person committed to become a nazir, he will always retain some level of holiness from this ordeal.