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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

Mishna

If a woman made a *neder* to become a *nazir*, and she designated the animals for her *korbanos* (that were to be brought upon conclusion of her *nezirus*), and then the husband revoked her *neder*, the *halachah* is as follows: If the animals belonged to the husband, they may go out and graze in the flock (they are not consecrated any longer for the following reason: He is obligated to supply her with animals for her required *korbanos*; here, she is not required to bring any *korbanos*, for he has revoked her *nezirus*). If the animals were hers (that the husband had no control over), the *chatas* is left to die. The animals which were designated for the *olah* and the *shelamim* may be brought as a voluntary *olah* and *shelamim*. The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day (like the regular *shelamim* of a *nazir*, and not like a voluntary *shelamim*, which may be eaten for two days and a night), but it does not require the breads (which usually accompany the *nazir's shelamim*).

If she had an unspecified amount of money designated for these *korbanos* (she did not designate a certain amount of money for each *korban*), they are to be used for voluntary communal offerings. If the money was specified, the *halachah* is as follows: The money set aside for the *chatas* must be cast into the Dead Sea. It is prohibited to benefit from it, but one does not commit *me'ilah* (one who has unintentionally benefited from *hekdesh* or removed it from the ownership of the

Beis Hamikdash has committed the transgression of *me'ilah*, and as a penalty, he would be required to pay the value of the object plus an additional fifth of the value; he also brings a *korban asham*) by using it (since it is not destined to be brought on the Altar). The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*, and one does commit *me'ilah* if he uses it. The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*. The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day, but it does not require the breads. (24a1 – 24a2)

Paying for his Wife's Korbanos

The *Gemora* asks: Who is the *Tanna* who holds that the husband is not obligated to supply his wife with her *korbanos* (and that is why the *Mishna* rules that if the animals belonged to the husband, they may go out and graze in the flock)?

Rav Chisda said: It is the opinion of the Rabbis, for if the *Mishna* would be in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, he is obligated to supply her with animals for her *korbanos*, so why would the *Mishna* rule that the animals may return to the flock (they should be considered her animals and consequently should remain consecrated)?

For we learned in the following *braisa*: Rabbi Yehudah said: A rich person is obligated to bring a rich person's *korban* for his wife, and likewise, he is obligated to provide her with the animals for any of her *korbanos*

that she must bring, for the following is what he wrote for her in the *kesuvah*: My properties are pledged for every claim you may have against me from before up to now.

Rava says: Our *Mishna* may be following Rabbi Yehudah's opinion as well. For even according to Rabbi Yehudah, the husband is only obligated to supply her with the *korbanos* that she needs, but he is not obligated to provide her with anything that she does not need (*here, she is not required to bring any korbanos, for he has revoked her nezirus*).

The *Gemora* cites an alternate version of the above discussion: The *Gemora* asks: Who is the *Tanna* of our *Mishna*?

Rav Chisda said: It is in accordance with Rabbi Yehudah, for the husband is only obligated to supply her with the *korbanos* that she needs, but he is not obligated to provide her with anything that she does not need. For if the *Mishna* would be following the opinion of the Rabbis, he is not obligated to her at all (*so how would she be able to consecrate his animals to be used for her korbanos*)? The only time he would be obligated is if he explicitly gave her this right, and if he gave her the right, the animals would be hers (*even if she took them from his flock, so why would the Mishna distinguish between his animals and hers*)!

Rava says: Our *Mishna* may be following the Rabbi's opinion as well. For even according to the Rabbis, the husband is only obligated to supply her with the *korbanos* that she needs, but he is not obligated to provide her with anything that she does not need (*here, she is not required to bring any korbanos, for he has revoked her nezirus*). (24a2 – 24b1)

Her Own Animals

The *Mishna* had stated: If the animals were hers (*that the husband had no control over*), the *chatas* is left to die. The animals which were designated for the *olah* and the *shelamim* may be brought as a voluntary *olah* and *shelamim*.

The *Gemora* asks: How can she own the animals? Didn't we learn that whatever the wife acquires belongs to her husband?

Rav Pappa answers: The *Mishna* is referring to a case where she saved it out of her food-allowance money (*she ate less than she normally would*).

Alternatively, you can answer that someone gave her a gift on the condition that her husband does not have any rights to it. (24b1)

Shelamim Without Breads

The *Mishna* had stated: The animals which were designated for the *olah* and the *shelamim* may be brought as a voluntary *olah* and *shelamim*. The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day (*like the regular shelamim of a nazir, and not like a voluntary shelamim, which may be eaten for two days and a night*), but it does not required the breads (*which usually accompany the nazir's shelamim*).

Shmuel said to Avuha bar Ihi: Do not sit on your knees until you explain me this matter (*when does someone bring a nazir's ram without bread*)?

Avuha replied: These are the four cases that one brings the *nazir's* ram without bringing the bread with it: His, hers, after his death and after he received atonement.

The *Gemora* explains the cases: “Hers” is what we have learned in our *Mishna*.

“His” is what we have learned in the following *Mishna*: A father can impose upon his son a *nezirus* vow, but a mother cannot impose a *nezirus* vow on her son. If he (the son) shaves his head (as an act of protest), or his relatives shave his head, or he protests, or his relatives protest on his account (*immediately upon hearing of the father’s declaration, which stops his nezirus*); if the father had designated an unspecified amount of money for his son’s *korbanos*, they are to be used for voluntary communal offerings. If the money was specified, the *halachah* is as follows: The money set aside for the *chatas* must be cast into the Dead Sea. It is prohibited to benefit from it, but one does not commit *me’ilah* by using it (*since it is not destined to be brought on the Altar*). The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*, and one does commit *me’ilah* if he uses it. The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*. The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day, but it does not require the breads.

“After his death” is what we have learned in the following *Mishna*: If one designated an unspecified amount of money for his *korbanos*, it is prohibited to benefit from it, but one does not commit *me’ilah* by using it since all the money can be used to purchase a *shelamim* (*which is classified as kodshim kalim, and is therefore not subject to me’ilah*). If he died and he had designated an unspecified amount of money for his *korbanos*, they are to be used for voluntary communal offerings. If the money was specified, the *halachah* is as follows: The money set aside for the *chatas* must be cast into the Dead Sea. It is prohibited to benefit from it, but one does not commit *me’ilah* by using it (*since it is not destined to be brought on the Altar*). The money

set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*, and one does commit *me’ilah* if he uses it. The money set aside for the *olah* should be used for a voluntary *olah*. The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day, but it does not require the breads.

“After he receives atonement” is learned through the following logic: Why is the *shelamim* that is brought after his death brought without bread? It is because it is not fit for atonement. So too, in a case where he has already received atonement, this *shelamim* is not fit for atonement.


The *Gemora* asks: Are there no more cases? Isn’t there the following case, which we learned in a *braisa*: If the *nazir’s shelamim* was slaughtered without the proper intention (*i.e. he had in mind that it should be brought as an olah*), it is a valid *korban*; however, it does not discharge the *nazir* of his obligation (*he is required to bring another one*). The *shelamim* can only be eaten for one day, but it does not require the breads. (*Why isn’t this case included in the listing?*)

The *Gemora* answers: *Avuha* only listed cases that were done correctly. This case, where it was slaughtered incorrectly, he does not include. (24b1 – 24b3)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

Halfway Nezirus

It is evident from our *Mishna* that if a woman made a *neder* to become a *nazir*, and she did not designate the animals for her *korbanos* (*that were to be brought upon conclusion of her nezirus*), and then the husband revoked her *neder*, she is not obligated to bring those *korbanos*.



The Reshash notes: The *Gemora* in *Nedarim* 83a discusses the concept of a halfway *nezirus* and that there are no *korbanos* for a partial *nezirus* (since the *Torah* only required *korbanos* upon completing a *nezirus*). The *Rosh* and *Ran* explain the case as follows: If a woman became a *nazir* and counted fifteen days, and then her husband revoked it, she has not completed her *nezirus* and therefore is not obligated to bring *korbanos*.

It can be inferred that it is only in a case where she observed *nezirus* for fifteen days that she would be exempt from bringing the *korbanos*, since that is not regarded as a complete *nezirus*, however, if she would have declared to become a *nazir* for sixty days, and her husband revoked it after thirty days, perhaps she would be obligated to bring the *korbanos*, for she has completed a full, standard term of *nezirus*.

The Reshash concludes that this is not the *halachah*. Anytime that the woman does not complete her *nezirus*, she is not obligated to bring the *nazir's* *korbanos*.

DAILY MASHAL

Divine Inspiration

One of the restrictions upon a *nazir* is the prohibition against contact with the dead. The *Ba'al HaTurim* explains that this is because the *nazir* may merit *Ruach HaKodesh* (Divine Inspiration), and people may attribute his newfound ability to impure and forbidden sources such as the dead.

R' Ozer Alpert asks: Why should a person who refrains from these three activities suddenly merit Divine Inspiration?

Rav Segal suggests that the answer lies in the words of the *Ibn Ezra*, who posits that the word connoting the *nazir's* separation from these activities ("yaflee") is rooted in the word "pela" – wonder – because the *nazir's* actions are considered peculiar in the eyes of others. Most people are accustomed to innately following their earthly desires without a second thought about keeping them in check. The idea of a person voluntarily relinquishing physical pleasure runs counter to societal norms and is indeed a wonder. Through the *nazir's* willingness to defy societal pressures and take action to curb his desires, he becomes a king over them and earns a spiritual crown, to the point that he may even merit Divine Inspiration!

Still, the *Darkei Mussar* questions why the *nazir* should earn these tremendous and lofty rewards for such an objectively minor action. He explains that while human nature is to evaluate actions quantitatively and to assume that larger deeds are superior, in Heaven actions are judged by their qualitative purity. Although the *nazir* remains in the physical world and accepts only three "minor" prohibitions on himself, if he does so purely for the sake of Heaven, he may receive Divine Inspiration.

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