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Nazir Daf 27

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Daf Notes is currently being dedicated to the neshamot of

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May the studying of the Daf Notes be a zechus for their neshamot and may their souls find peace in Gan Eden and be bound up in the Bond of life

[The Gemora had stated: Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: What is the reasoning of the Rabbis (that money and items that can easily be converted to money are regarded as unspecified funds)? It is because they say: “Money” (was stated in the Halachah), but not animal and not bars of metal; “money” and not building beams. But if so, shouldn’t it follow that we can say: “Money” and not birds!? And if you will say that this is indeed accurate, but let us consider that which Rav Chisda said: **[There are certain times when one is obligated to bring two bird offerings, one *chatas* and one *olah*. One example of such a person is a woman who has given birth and can’t afford a lamb. The Torah says she should purchase them and the Kohen will make one a *chatas* and one an *olah*. From here the Gemora derives that one can only designate which is which at the time of purchase or the time the sacrifice is offered.]** Bird offerings are designated (*as a chatas or an olah*) only at the time of purchase by the owner or at the time of offering by the Kohen. Now, why should that be the case (that the Kohen may designate the birds)? It is “money” alone that we have learned (from the Halachah that is regarded as unspecified; so the birds should be regarded as specified from beforehand, and the Kohen cannot alter their designation)!?]

Rav Pappa said to him: And according to your reasoning (that both animals and birds are regarded as unspecified), how would you explain that which we learned in the following Mishnah: Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: If he brought three animals, but he did not specify (which animal should be brought for which *korban*), the one fit for the *chatas* (*a ewe-lamb*) should be brought as the

chatas, the one fit for the *olah* (*a he-lamb*) should be brought as the *olah* and the one fit for the *shelamim* (*ram*) should be brought as the *shelamim*. Now, why should this be the case? You have stated that (unspecified) animals (at the time of their designation) are not regarded as specified (so how can they be sacrificed)?

Rav Shimi bar Ashi said to Rav Pappa: There (regarding the birds), the Merciful One said: *he shall take*, and *he* (the Kohen) *shall make*. This teaches us that the designation of birds is determined either at the time of purchase by the owner or at the time of offering by the Kohen. [If the Kohen is permitted to designate the birds, they (the birds) are obviously regarded as unspecified beforehand.] But here (regarding the nazir’s sacrifices) as well, can you say that the one for the *chatas* can be offered as an *olah*? [The animal which is fit for the *chatas* is unfit to be used as any other of the nazir’s sacrifices, and therefore, the designation of the animal to be used for the nazir’s sacrifices is automatically regarded as a specification of a *chatas*.] For this is a female, and that is a male! (26b2 – 27b1)

Shaving on the Father’s Korbanos

The Gemora above (26b) had stated that an animal with a blemish is regarded as unspecified money (*since it may be redeemed quickly*), and therefore it may be used to purchase voluntary communal offerings.

Rav Hamnuna asks from the following Baraisa: What is the case of someone who does shave on the *nezirus* of his

father (he may complete his nezirus, i.e. bring the korbanos, using the money that his father set aside for his own korbanos)? A person's father was a nazir who separated money for his korbanos without specifying which parts of the money should be used for each korban. The father then died. If his son states, "I am a nazir on the condition that I will shave using the money of my father," he may use the money to shave (bring korbanos) from his father's nezirus. If, however, someone who was a nazir at the same time as his father, and his father proceeded to separate unspecified money for his korbanos and then died, and the son states, "I am a nazir on the condition that I will shave using the money of my father," his father's money should be used for voluntary offerings (and he does not use the money of his father for the korbanos of nezirus). If the father had specified animals, the animal that was designated for a chatas must be left to die. The animal that was designated for an olah may be brought as an olah. The animal that was designated for a shelamim may be brought as a shelamim. Rav Hamnuna concludes: Isn't the Baraisa teaching us that unspecified animals are regarded as specified monies (and they cannot be used to purchase voluntary offerings)?

The Gemora answers: No! The Baraisa is only referring to animals that do not have a blemish.

The Gemora asks: If a blemished animal is regarded as unspecified money, why did the Baraisa choose to discuss a case of money (when offering an example of a case of unspecified money)? It should have said: If the animal has a blemish, the money may be used to purchase voluntary offerings!

The Gemora answers: The Baraisa could have mentioned that case. However, since an animal with a blemish is sanctified for its value, mentioning money is just like mentioning an animal with a blemish! (27b1 – 27b2)

Korbano

Rava asks on Rav Nachman from the following Baraisa: It is written (regarding a korban chatas): His offering (b'korbano). This teaches us that a person may discharge his obligation with his own chatas, but he may not discharge his obligation with his father's chatas.

The Baraisa continues: I might have thought that this would be so only if the father had designated a korban chatas to atone for a light transgression (such as eating forbidden fats or blood, where one would receive kares) and the son was using the chatas for a severe transgression (such as desecrating Shabbos or worshipping an idol, where one would receive death by the hands of a human court), or if the father had designated a korban chatas to atone for a severe transgression and the son was using the chatas for a light transgression. However, perhaps he may discharge his obligation in a case where the father had designated a korban chatas to atone for a light transgression and the son was also using the chatas for a light transgression, or if the father had designated a korban chatas to atone for a severe transgression and the son was also using the chatas for a severe transgression. The Torah therefore writes: His offering (b'korbano), his offering (twice) to teach us that the son may not discharge his obligation with his father's chatas (even in these cases).

The Baraisa continues: I might have thought that this would be so only if the father had designated an animal for his korban chatas to atone for a light transgression and the son was also using the chatas for a light transgression, or if the father had designated an animal to be used for his korban chatas to atone for a severe transgression and the son was also using the chatas for a severe transgression. The reason why the above is true is because we find that a son may not shave on the nezirus of his father (upon completing his nezirus, he cannot bring the korbanos that his father had designated for his own

nezirus; this proves that the korban chatas may not transfer from father to son). However, perhaps he may discharge his obligation in a case where the father had designated money to be used to purchase his *korban chatas*, and even in a case where the father had designated the money to be used to purchase a *korban chatas* to atone for a light transgression and the son was using the money to be used to purchase a *chatas* for a severe transgression, or if the father had designated the money to be used to purchase a *korban chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and the son was using the money to be used to purchase a *chatas* for a light transgression. This would be so because we find that a son may shave on the *nezirus* of his father's money when the money is unspecified, but not when they are specified (*proving that the money of a korban chatas may transfer from father to son*). The Torah therefore writes: *His offering (b'korban) (a third time)* to teach us that the son may not discharge his obligation with his father's money (*even in these cases*).

The *Baraisa* continues: I might have thought that this would be so only if the father had designated money to be used to purchase his *korban chatas*, and even in a case where the father had designated the money to be used to purchase a *korban chatas* to atone for a light transgression and the son was also using the money to be used to purchase a *chatas* for a light transgression, or if the father had designated the money to be used to purchase a *korban chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and the son was also using the money to be used to purchase a *chatas* for a light transgression. However, perhaps he may discharge his obligation in a case where he himself had designated a *korban chatas*, and even in a case where he originally designated the *chatas* to atone for a light transgression and now he wishes to use it for a severe transgression, or if he originally designated the *chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and now he wishes to use it for a light transgression. The Torah therefore writes: *His offering for*

his sin to teach us that he may not discharge his obligation unless the *chatas* was designated for that particular sin.

The *Baraisa* continues: I might have thought that this would be so only if he originally designated the *chatas* to atone for a light transgression and now he also wishes to use it for a light transgression, or if he originally designated the *chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and now he also wishes to use it for a severe transgression, or if he originally designated the *chatas* to atone for a light transgression and now he wishes to use it for a severe transgression, or if he originally designated the *chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and now he wishes to use it for a light transgression. The reason why the above is true is because we find that if one designated an animal to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating forbidden fats, but by mistake it was brought as a *korban* to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating blood, or if he designated an animal to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating blood, but by mistake it was brought as a *korban* to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating forbidden fats, he has not committed *me'ilah* (*one who has unintentionally benefited from hekdesch or removed it from the ownership of the Beis Hamikdash has committed the transgression of me'ilah, which normally would result in the object become chullin*) and therefore he does not receive atonement. (*Since he was not trying to use the animal for an unsacred use, there is no me'ilah and the animal remains with its original sanctity; it therefore cannot be used for a different transgression.*) However, perhaps he may discharge his obligation in a case where he designated money to be used to purchase the *chatas* to atone for a light transgression and now he also wishes to use it for a light transgression, or if he originally designated money to be used to purchase the *chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and now he also wishes to use it for a severe transgression, or if he originally designated the money to be used to purchase a *chatas* to atone for a severe transgression and now he wishes to use it for a light

transgression, or if he originally designated the money to be used to purchase a *chatas* to atone for a light transgression and now he wishes to use it for a severe transgression. This would be so because we find that if one designated money to be used to purchase an animal to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating forbidden fats, but by mistake it was used to purchase a *korban* to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating blood, or if he designated money to be used to purchase an animal to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating blood, but by mistake it was used to purchase a *korban* to serve as atonement for unintentionally eating forbidden fats, he has committed *me'ilah* and therefore he receives atonement (*for the money became chullin and the animal that he purchased can be sanctified for the sake of a different transgression*). The Torah therefore writes: *His offering for his sin* to teach us that he may not discharge his obligation unless the money set aside to purchase the *chatas* was designated for that particular sin.

Rava concludes: Isn't the *Baraisa* teaching us that even an animal with a blemish is regarded as specified monies (*and they cannot be used to purchase voluntary offerings*)?

The *Gemora* answers: No! The *Baraisa* is only referring to animals that do not have a blemish.

The *Gemora* asks: If a blemished animal is regarded as unspecified money, why did the *Baraisa* choose to discuss a case of money that the father had set aside for his *korbanos*? It should have said: If the animal has a blemish, the money may be used to purchase voluntary offerings!

The *Gemora* answers: The *Baraisa* could have mentioned that case. However, since an animal with a blemish is sanctified for its value, mentioning money is just like mentioning an animal with a blemish! (27b2 – 28a2)

DAILY MASHAL

Animal won't Budge

The Medrash (Vayikra Rabbah 3:5) cites the following incident: There was an animal that was being brought to the Beis Hamikdosh to be brought up on the Altar as a *korban*. As they got near the final destination, the animal refused to budge. A pauper came by and fed the animal a bundle of *truksima* (*a certain type of grass that is known to cause animals to sneeze*). As the animal sneezed, a needle discharged from inside its throat. The animal then allowed itself to be pulled towards the Altar and be brought as a *korban* (*if the needle would have stayed inside, it would have punctured one of the animal's vital organs rendering it a treifa, which would invalidate it from being used as a korban*). The poor person appeared to the animal's owner in a dream and said, "The offering of a pauper (*my bundle of vegetables*) is regarded as being more significant than your bull.

The Drush Shmuel explains the following verse accordingly [Vayikra 1:3]: *An unblemished male you shall offer it according to his will*. Only if the animal is going willingly should it be brought as a *korban*; otherwise (*if it refuses to budge*), do not offer it as a sacrifice, for it might be because it has a blemish (*that the owner is not aware of*).