

Mishnah

(One is obligated to bring a shalmei chagigah offering on the first day of every festival.) The Mishnah states: One who did not offer the korban on the first day of the festival may bring it on any day during the festival, including Shmini Atzeres (the last day of Sukkos). If the entire festival passed and the korban was not brought, he is not responsible to bring it any longer. It is written regarding this [Koheles 1:15]: A crooked thing cannot be straightened, and a lack cannot be counted.

Rabbi Shimon ben Menasye interprets this verse differently: A crooked thing cannot be straightened is referring to one who engaged in relations with a woman whom cohabitation is forbidden and produced a mamzer (an illegitimate child born from a union prohibited under penalty of death or kares) through her. He continues: The verse cannot be referring to one who steals because the thief is able to straighten the matter by returning the stolen object. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai states: "Crooked" is only if he was straight initially and then became crooked. Who is this? A torah scholar who abandoned the Torah. (9a1 – 9a2)

Source for Compensation

The Gemora cites the source (for the halachah that the shalmei chagigah can be brought on Shmini Atzeres): Rabbi Yochanan says in the name of Rabbi Yishmael: It is derived through a gezeirah shavah (one of the thirteen principles of Biblical hermeneutics - it links two similar words from dissimilar verses in the Torah) from the seventh day of Pesach, which the Torah refers to as

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Atzeres. Just as that day can be used for compensation (if one did not bring the chagigah offering on the first day of the festival, he can bring it then), so too the eight day (Shmini Atzeres) can be used for compensation.

The Gemora notes that this term (Atzeres) is free (extra), for if it would not be free, the following question can be asked: How can you compare to the seventh day of Pesach, for that day is not distinct from the day before it (and logic would dictate that it can be used for compensation, for it is part of the same festival of Pesach); can you say the same with the eighth day (Shmini Atzeres), which is distinct from the day before it (for Shmini Atzeres is a different festival than Sukkos)?

The Gemora notes that this is indeed accurate – the term Atzeres is free; for let us consider: what does Atzeres mean? It means that one should refrain from performing labor. But the Torah has already wrote: *You shall not perform labor*? Why is it necessary to write 'Atzeres'? Rather, derive from here that it is indeed free (and available for the gezeirah shavah exposition). (9a2)

A Tanna derives this halachah from a different Scriptural verse, as is taught in the following Baraisa: *And you shall celebrate it by bringing the chagigah, as a festival for Hashem, for a seven-day period*. One might have thought that he must continue bringing chagigah offerings all seven days; the Torah, therefore, states: *'it'* (in the singular form): on it are you to bring chagigah offerings, but you are not to offer chagigah offerings on all seven days. If so, why does it say, *'seven'*? It is to intimate that

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one may compensate (by bringing the chagigah offering during the seven days of the festival if he failed to do so on the first day). And from where do we learn that if he did not bring the chagigah offering on the first festival day of Sukkos that he can continue bringing it during the course of the entire festival, even on the last festival day (Shmini Atzeres)? The Torah says: You shall celebrate it in the seventh month, by bringing the chagigah. [This teaches us that compensation applies any day of the festival – even on Shmini Atzeres, for it is in the seventh month.] If the seventh month (teaches us when compensation is applicable), one might think that one can continue bringing the chagigah offering throughout the whole month, therefore the Torah says: 'it.' On 'it' are you celebrate by offering the chagigah, but you are not to celebrate by offering the chagigah outside it. (9a2 – 9a3)

Substitute for which Day?

And what is this compensation? The Gemora presents a dispute regarding this compensation: Rabbi Yochanan says: Every day of the festival is regarded as a substitute for the first day (*the obligation is to bring the shalmei chagigah on the first day; the other days are opportunities to make reparation for the fact that the korban wasn't offered on the designated day*). Rabbi Oshaya disagrees: Every day of the festival can be regarded as a substitute for any of the other days.

The Gemora asks: What is the practical difference between the two opinions?

Rabbi Zeira answers: One who was lame on the first day of the festival (*thus exempting him from the bringing of the korban*) and he became healed on the second day would be a difference between them. Rabbi Yochanan would maintain that he does not have an obligation to bring the korban on the second day since the second day is merely a substitute for the first day: if he wasn't eligible on the first day, he is not eligible on the second day either. Rabbi Oshaya would hold that he is obligated to bring the korban on the second day because each day is independent of the other. (9a3)

The Gemora asks: Did Rabbi Yochanan really say this (that one who was lame on the first day of the festival and he became healed on the second day that he does not bring the chagigah offering)? But Chizkiyah had said: If a nazir (who became tamei, underwent the seven day purification process and was obligated to bring a set of offerings, and then) became tamei during the daytime of the eighth day (before bringing the set of offerings), he must bring offerings (for the second tumah as well, for it was not regarded as one continuous tumah); but (if he became tamei) during the night (preceding the eighth, so that he was never obligated to bring a set of offerings), he is not required to bring an offering (for the first tumah). But Rabbi Yochanan said: Even if he became tamei during the night, he must bring an offering (for the first tumah; this is because the seven days were completed and he was obligated to bring an offering - even though he cannot practically bring it until the Temple is opened on the next day). [Now this statement seems to indicate that Rabbi Yochanan holds that although one is not qualified to bring an offering (e.g., the nazir on the night preceding the eighth day), one may compensate for it later. This same logic should apply to someone who was lame on the first day of the festival as well!?]

Rabbi Yirmiyah answered: The case of tumah is different, because we find compensation as in the case of Pesach Sheini (where one could not bring the Pesach offering on the fourteenth of Nissan due to the fact that he was tamei with corpse tumah, he may make it up by bringing the korban on the fourteenth of Iyar; accordingly, we can apply this logic to all cases of tumah, but not where someone was disqualified due to being lame).

Rav Pappa challenged this: It is reasonable according to the view that the Pesach Sheini is a substitute for the



First), but what is to be said according to the view that the Pesach Sheini is a festival in its own right?

Rather, Rav Pappa said: Rabbi Yochanan must be of the opinion that that the nighttime does not render something premature (and the obligation for the bringing of the offerings has become due – even though, technically, the sacrifice cannot be offered at night).

The Gemora asks: But how could Rabbi Yochanan have said this? For behold Rabbi Yochanan said: [A zav (a man who has an emission similar but not identical to a seminal discharge; if he experiences three emissions, he is classified as an av hatumah and must observe seven clean days and then he immerses himself in spring water, and he brings offerings on the eighth day) would normally be required to bring his offerings on the eighth day; here, he experienced another three emissions on the eighth day, and the question is whether these emissions are a continuation of the first set and he needs to bring only one set of offerings, or perhaps, since he completed the seven clean days, it is a new tumah, and he would be required to bring two sets of offerings.] If a zav experienced one emission in the night (between the seventh and the eighth day) and two in the following day, he must bring (a second offering for the second set of tumah), but if he experienced two emissions in the night and one in the day, he does not bring (a second offering for the second set of tumah). Now, if you would think that Rabbi Yochanan is of the opinion that the nighttime does not render something premature, then even if he experienced two emissions at night and one in the day he should also bring a second offering!?

The Gemora answers: Rabbi Yochanan said this only according to the view that the nighttime does render something premature.

The Gemora asks: But according to this view, it is surely obvious?

The Gemora answers: It is required for the case where there are two emissions in the day and one the preceding night. You might have thought that the halachah would be according to the objection of Rav Shisha the son of Rav Idi (in the instance of 'one by night,' where the emission began at a time when it was not fit for offerings, and therefore it is regarded as one continuous tumah – hadn't Rabbi Yochanan taught us that they combine with one another, and only one set of offerings would be required); it therefore teaches us that it is according to Rav Yosef. (9a3 – 9b2)

Crooked Thing

The Mishnah had stated: If the entire festival passed and the korban was not brought, he is not responsible to bring it any longer. It is written regarding this [Koheles 1:15]: *A crooked thing cannot be straightened, and a lack cannot be counted*.

Bar Hei Hei said to Hillel: If the verse is referring to one who failed to perform a mitzvah, "cannot be counted" is an incorrect expression; it should have written, "cannot be filled?"

He interprets the verse differently: It is referring to a case where one's friends invited him to perform a mitzvah together with them and he refused to be counted with them.

The Gemora cites a Baraisa which supports this interpretation: *A crooked thing cannot be straightened* is referring to one who did not recite krias shema in the morning, or did not recite krias shema in the evening, or one who failed to recite the morning prayers or the evening prayers. *And a lack cannot be counted* is referring to a case where one's friends invited him to perform a mitzvah together with them and he refused to be counted with them. (9b2)



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Bar Hei Hei asked of Hillel: It is written [Malachi 3:18]: You will return and discern between the righteous and the wicked, between one that serves G-d and one that does not serve Him. Is it not true that the one who is righteous is the one who serves G-d; the one who is wicked is the one who does not serve Him?

Hillel answered him: Those who serve Him and those who do not are both completely righteous, nevertheless, there is no comparing one who reviews his learning one hundred times to one who reviews his learning one hundred and one times.

Bar Hei Hei responded to Hillel: Just because he didn't review that one extra time, he is referred to as *one that does not serve Him*?

Hillel answered him: Yes! Go and learn from the market where they hire out donkey drivers. A trip of ten *parsahs* costs one *zuz* and one of eleven *parsahs* costs two *zuzim*. (9b2 - 9b3)

The prophet Eliyahu said to Bar Hei Hei, and others say that he said it to Rabbi Elazar: What is the meaning of the verse: Behold I have refined you but not as silver; I have chosen for you the crucible of poverty? It teaches that the Holy One, Blessed be He, looked at all of the good conditions that might be beneficial to the Jewish people, and concluded that only poverty would be fitting for them.

Shmuel said, and other say Rav Yosef said: That is what people would say: Poverty is so fitting for the Jewish people, like a red strap on a white horse. (9b3)

¹ I.e., to see if they are without blemish and so fit for sacrifice, for they are unfit to start with. Likewise 'made crooked' can only refer to one who was originally worthy and later degenerated. ² It is evident from this Baraisa that Rabbi Shimon ben Menasye considered the illicit union itself as *a crooked thing that cannot be straightened* even if a *mamzer* is not born; why does he say in The Mishnah had stated: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasye said: *A crooked thing cannot be straightened* is referring to one who engaged in relations with a woman whom cohabitation is forbidden and produced a *mamzer* through her.

If he begat a mamzer, then it is (cannot be fixed), but if he did not beget a mamzer, then it is not!? The Gemora asks from a Baraisa: Rabbi Shimon ben Menasye said: If a man steals, he can return the theft and [so] become straight, if a man robs, he can return the theft and [so] become straight; but he that has cohabited with a married woman and makes her prohibited unto her husband is banished from the world and passes away. Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai said: One does not say: Examine the camel, examine the pig,¹ only examine the lamb. And who is this? A disciple of the wise who has forsaken the Torah. Rabbi Yehudah ben Lakish said: Any disciple of the wise who has forsaken the Torah, of him Scripture says: As a bird that wandered from her nest, so is a man that wanders from his place. And it further says: What unrighteousness have your fathers found in me, that they are gone far from me^2 — There is no contradiction: the one case refers to his unmarried sister, the other refers to a married woman.³ Or I might say: Both are cases of married women; but there is no contradiction: The Mishnah is referring to a case where the woman did not consent (and she will not be forbidden to her husband). It is only regarded as a crooked thing that cannot be straightened if a mamzer is born. The Baraisa is referring to a case where she was a willing partner (and she will be forbidden to her husband).

our Mishnah that it is regarded as *a crooked thing that cannot be straightened* only if they produced a *mamzer*?

³ It is considered *a crooked thing that cannot be straightened* by a married woman (*even if a mamzer is not born*) because she becomes forbidden to her husband.



The Gemora offers a third answer: The Baraisa is referring to a case where the woman was the wife of a Kohen and will be forbidden to her husband even if she was violated against her will. (9b3 – 10a1)

INSIGHTS TO THE DAF

ONE HUNDRED AND ONE TIMES

HaRav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg in Nesivos Chaim, The Torah Way of Life explains our Gemora.

Let us analyze the meaning of the prophet Malachi's enigmatic proclamation about the future. For seemingly, Malachi's prophesy (*Malachi* 3:18) is stating the obvious, "Then you will return and will see the difference between the righteous and the wicked, between the one who serves G-d and the one who does not serve Him." In the future when we return from our *golus*, the difference between the righteous and the wicked will become clear, as well as the difference between those who are servants of Hashem and those who are not.

Obviously, a *tzaddik* serves Hashem and a *rosho* does not. Why, then, does the Prophet further qualify the definitions? In fact, this is the question that Bar Hei Hei asked of Hillel, "[Is it not true that] the one who is a *tzaddik* is the one who serves G-d. The one who is a *rosho* is the one who does not serve Him?"

Actually there is a fine distinction between the two. Malachi declares that in the future, the very slight difference between those who are *tzaddikim* and those who serve Hashem will become apparent. Likewise, the difference between those people who are wicked and those people who do not serve Hashem will become obvious. Now, however, in the darkness of *golus*, our perception is clouded and distorted.

Hillel, the great Torah leader of his generation, understood the *Novi's* message. Hillel clarifies the

prophecy and gives this remarkable answer: "Those who serve Him and those who do not are both completely righteous and [but] there is no comparing one who reviews his learning one hundred times to one who reviews his learning one-hundred-and-one times."

Bar Hei Hei responded to Hillel, "And because of one time, he is called, `one who does not serve Him'?"

Hillel answered, "Yes! Go and learn from market where they hire out donkeys. [A trip of] ten *parsas* costs a *zuz* and [a trip of] eleven *parsas* costs two *zuz*."

Remarkably, but fair enough, the final haul of one more *parsa* doubles the cost! The haul of the first ten *parsa* os is not so difficult and therefore costs only one *zuz*. The haul of one single *parsa* is certainly not worth another *zuz* by itself. However, with eleven together, the effort that is needed after the first ten to haul that last eleventh *parsa*, doubles the price -- a whole *zuz* more. The eleventh *parsa* costs the same as the ten previous ones! This combined, final effort adds a whole new dimension to the strain required to complete the journey, and this new dimension is what doubles the price for that one last *parsa*.

Hillel's illustration helps us understand how one may be a called a *tzaddik* and still not be considered a servant of Hashem. Learning one hundred times is not enough. There has to be an element of extra effort.

The one-hundred-and-one times, the resolve and stamina to make that one extra time is, so to speak, as difficult as splitting the Red Sea! At that time, *HaKodosh Boruch Hu* commanded the waters to split. The waters of the *Yam Suf* were obligated to change their nature. Similarly, to go beyond the norm, even an extraordinary norm of one hundred times and even only one more time, requires changing one's nature. The effort of that one extra time produces the transformation, which reflects the true greatness of "those who serve Hashem."



A true servant has only the welfare of the one he serves in mind. Either his personal concerns do not exist at all, or they become secondary. The first hundred times we learn something, we have many logical reasons for doing so. We want deeper understanding and clarity. We wish to engrave what we have learned in our memory and feel satisfaction at the achievement. But what is the justification for the one last time? Only servitude! Bearing the yoke! The yoke only comes when there is difficulty, not when things are easy. A person will not change his nature under sheltered and ideal conditions.

When things are easy for us, we all succeed.

DAILY MASHAL

STORY FROM REB MOSHE

Rabbi Frand, by the Siyum HaShas, told over the following story involving Rav Moshe and HaRav Michel Feinstein. Reb Moshe once called Reb Michel.

Reb Moshe told his nephew, "We need to make a *lechayim*. I'm making a Siyum on *Shas."*

Reb Michel replied, "Uncle, if you make a *lechayim* every time you finish Shas, you'll be a *shikker* (a drunk)."

Reb Moshe protested, "No, this is special. It's the second time."

Reb Michel wondered, "Uncle, you've finished Shas many more than two times. What do you mean the second time?"

Reb Moshe explained, "I mean this is the second time that I'm fulfilling [Rebbe Meir's statement in the Talmud that], `One who learns something one hundred times is not comparable to one who learns it one hundred and one times.' " By that time, Rav Moshe had learned the entire Talmud two-hundred-and-two times! He was said to have learned it dozens of times more by the time he passed away.

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

The Gemora cites a proverb that people would say: Poverty is so fitting for the Jew, like a red strap on a white horse.

The Gaon of Vilna, used to explain this in the following manner. A horse is saddled up when it goes out; in the stable everything is removed. So too, the Jewish people should wear their poverty when they go out in order not to arouse the envy of the gentiles. Within the privacy of one's house, however, wealth is good.